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This thesis presents a study of women’s empowerment in Nepal, a low-income 
country in South Asia with significant gender inequities across multiple 
dimensions. The thesis took place in the context of a cluster randomized 
controlled trial called the Low Birth Weight, South Asia Trial (LBW-SAT), which 
compared the impact of participatory women’s groups either alone or in 
combination with food or cash transfers on low birth weight. The thesis sought 
to understand the impacts of participatory women’s groups on women’s 
empowerment, as well as the role of agency in enabling or obstructing women’s 
use of cash transfers. First, a scale for measuring women’s agency freedom Deci 
and Ryan’s Self-Determination Theory [1] was validated and adapted for use in 
the local context. Second, the adapted tool was applied to evaluate the impact 
of LBW-SAT on women’s agency freedom. The results showed little evidence for 
an impact on women’s empowerment across a range of measures, except an 
improvement in women’s agency in group participation (p<0.01). Third, a 
grounded theory study was conducted on women’s financial agency in the 
household. The results showed that daughters-in-law had severely restricted 
access to cash, while their mothers-in-law were recipients of household income 
and managers of savings, loans and expenditures. Fourth, results from the same 
grounded theory study showed that LBW-SAT trial staff put considerable 
pressure on beneficiary families to avoid non-recommended uses of their cash 
transfers. Thus, while daughters-in-law were often allowed to spend the cash 
transfer on food by their family members, daughters-in-law may have feared 
angering LBW-SAT staff if they spent the cash transfer on non-food items. Future 
researchers and policy-makers need to better integrate economic and gender 
considerations into health programming to achieve empowerment objectives.  
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1.1 Why study women’s empowerment? 
Women’s empowerment has been characterised as “essential to both the 
reduction of world poverty and the upholding of human rights” [2]. Although 
occasionally described as an “emerging” concern [3-5], women’s empowerment 
has implicitly been part of the agenda of the international community for more 
than half a century. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
guaranteed the rights to employment, education, health and security as well as 
freedoms of thought, expression and movement without distinction of sex. 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s, developments ranged from the adoption of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by 
the United Nations General Assembly, to the complex debates over Women in 
Development vs. Gender and Development [6,7]. In the 1990s and 2000s, the 
women’s empowerment became increasingly prominent in global policy 
statements including the Cairo Declaration on Population and Development in 
1994, the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 and the Millennium Development 
Goals in 2000. Finally, the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 included a 
comprehensive set of targets and indicators for 2015-2030 in achieving women’s 
empowerment [8]. 
 
Despite the many international commitments, women continue to suffer 
pervasive institutionalised disadvantages world-wide. This includes, but is by no 
means limited to, lack of property and inheritance rights [9-12], fewer 
opportunities for education, employment and political power [13], lack of 
decision-making power in the household [14], restricted mobility outside the 
household [15-18], discriminatory access to food and health care [19] and 
exposure to intimate partner violence [14,20]. In Nepal alone, the 2011 
Demographic and Health Survey revealed that 40% of married, working-age 
women had received no education (compared to 14% of men), 61% performed 
unremunerated labour (compared to 12% for men) and 22% had experienced 
physical violence and 12% sexual violence [21]. Moreover, anthropological 
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associated with patrilineal descent, dowry and female purity, honour, modesty 
and female self-sacrifice [22-24].  
 
Gender inequalities on a global scale are not only a tragedy for millions of 
women world-wide, they are also a waste of human potential. In the words of 
Gill, Pande and Malhotra [25], “women deliver for development”. There are 
three ways in which this is true. First, women constitute a disproportionately 
larger share of the world’s poor and underdeveloped. Gill, Pande and Malhotra 
in part attribute the near-total lack of measurable progress in maternal mortality 
in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East from 1983 to 2005 to women’s 
continued disempowerment in these regions [25]. Researchers concerned with 
the feminization of poverty find women are increasingly suffering from income 
and time poverty and engaging in precarious, informal work [26,27]. Second, 
women’s empowerment has been linked to a wide range of developmental 
outcomes including macro-economic growth [28,29], agricultural productivity 
and household income [30], HIV/AIDS prevention [31,32] and fertility behaviour 
[33]. As women are often found to spend more on their families and their 
children, investing in women is also investing in the future [34]. Indeed, studies 
have linked women’s empowerment in a number of contexts to both child 
health [35,36] and child education [37,38]. Third, empowerment, autonomy and 
the expansion of freedoms and capabilities is arguably an intrinsic goal of 
development itself [39]. 
 
1.2 Combating low birth weight with women’s groups 
Low birth weight, is a serious public health concern affecting 20 million 
newborns world-wide annually, of which more than half are born in South Asia 
[40]. Low birth weight is usually defined as being born of weight less than 2500 
g [40]. Low birth weight is associated with impaired immune function, poor 
cognitive development, child stunting, increased adult susceptibility to chronic 
disease and in females, inter-generational risks of giving birth to low birth weight 
babies [41]. Due to its multiple consequences, it is estimated that 80% of 
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In rural Nepal, unfavourable social norms pose particularly challenging barriers 
to reducing low birth weight. Some pregnant women restrict food intake in the 
belief that eating too much could make their unborn child “too fat” and cause a 
difficult birth [43]. Women also avoid certain types of micronutrient-rich foods 
because of a belief that certain fruits and vegetables, e.g. mango, are “hot” 
foods and should not be consumed during pregnancy due to risk of harm to the 
mother and child [43,44]. Finally, intra-household inequalities in the allocation 
of food can translate into insufficient amounts of food for pregnant women [44]. 
 
Existing behaviour change strategies for reducing low birth weight have largely 
focused on individual behaviour change through nutrition education or 
counselling approaches [45,46]. Evaluations of such interventions have shown 
mixed results [47-49]. Participatory women’s groups are a promising approach 
to reduce low birth weight through behaviour change. Inspired by the 
philosophy of Paulo Freire [50], women’s groups aim to mobilize action at both 
individual and community levels. By involving the entire community, the 
intervention could achieve wider sociocultural effects that would be difficult for 
individuals to achieve on their own [51]. Further, since the problems and 
strategies to address these have been formulated by local stakeholders, they 
may stand a greater chance of being locally acceptable, relevant and sustainable 
compared to strategies imposed from an outside organization [52]. 
 
This thesis studies women’s empowerment within the context of a cluster-
randomized, controlled trial: The Low Birth Weight South Asia Trial (LBW-SAT). 
The trial compares the effect of participatory women’s groups either alone or 
combined with unconditional cash or food transfers on the incidence of low 
birth weight in pregnant women in Dhanusha and Mahottari districts of Nepal. 
The women’s groups follow a participatory learning and action cycle [53-57], 
where women met monthly to first identify and prioritise local barriers 
preventing healthy maternal nutrition and control of risk factors of low birth 
weight, second design and implement strategies of their making and finally 
evaluate their progress. At the end of the process, women identify and prioritise 
new problems in their community and the cycle starts afresh. The entire cycle 
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women’s groups and cash transfer arm receive monthly unconditional transfers 
of NPR 750 or USD 7.3 equivalent1. In the women’s groups and food transfer 
arm, they receive monthly unconditional transfers of 10 kg of Super Cereal 
produced by the World Food Program.  
 
1.3 Aim of thesis 
In this thesis, we define empowerment as an “expansion of agency” [59] and 
agency as the “the extent to which a person’s enacted behaviour takes place in 
accordance with their enduring interests, values and desires in the face of 
internal and external barriers to achieving such behaviour”2.  
 
The thesis addresses four fundamental research questions:  
1) To what extent can we design valid tools for measuring agency in the 
context of LBW-SAT?  
2) What is the impact of participatory women’s groups on women’s agency?  
3) What forms of agency do young, married women have over cash in their 
households in general?  
4) What forms of agency do pregnant women have over the cash transfers 
provided in LBW-SAT? 
 
Questions 1) and 2) are important to answer, because community-based 
interventions, including LBW-SAT, are frequently promoted on the basis that 
they empower women [60]. This requires an understanding of the appropriate 
tools to apply to measure empowerment in practice. Questions 3) and 4) are 
important to answer because researchers and policy-makers need to 
understand the intra-household contexts in which unconditional cash transfer 
programmes such as those implemented in LBW-SAT unfold. Understanding this 
context allows us to understand how family dynamics may inhibit or enable the 
policy goals of cash transfer interventions. 
                                                          
1 Note, all conversions between NPR and USD will be conducted using an exchange rate from the 18th of June 
2015, as the majority of the quantitative and qualitative data for this thesis was collected in the summer of 2015. 
An exchange rate from Bloomberg Markets [58] was quoted as 102.3518 USD in exchange for 1 NPR. 
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1.4 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis will be organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces Nepal and the LBW-
SAT intervention to frame the geographical and public health context for the 
rest of the thesis. Chapter 3 presents a theoretical discussion on how to 
conceptualise and measure women’s empowerment followed by a review of 
current problems in the empirical measurement of women’s empowerment. 
This motivates the introduction of the Relative Autonomy Index which has been 
proposed by the Oxford Poverty and Human development Initiative [59] as an 
alternative measure of women’s empowerment. Only one published validation 
study from Chad [61] has explored its validity in a low-income setting, which 
leaves open the question of context-sensitive, appropriate tools for measuring 
empowerment in LBW-SAT. Chapter 4 fills this evidence gap by presenting a 
study on the validation and development of a scale for measuring women’s 
agency freedom using the Relative Autonomy Index. In turn, this answers 
question 1).  
 
Chapter 5 reviews the evidence linking participatory women’s groups to 
women’s empowerment, which shows that we have inconclusive evidence on 
the impact of participatory women’s groups on women’s empowerment. The 
rest of Chapter 5 aims to fill this evidence gap through analysis of data from 
pregnant women enrolled in the LBW-SAT trial during its last year of operation. 
This answers question 2). 
 
Chapters 6-9 present qualitative research on the contextual and processual 
aspects of the LBW-SAT intervention with a particular focus on what enabled 
and hindered the cash transfers distributed in LBW-SAT in achieving reductions 
in low birth weight. These Chapters also fill important gaps in knowledge on the 
financial freedom of women participating in cash transfer programmes by 
allowing women’s own views and perspectives on what they consider to be 
central financial problems in their lives to come to light. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the qualitative grounded theory methodology for our study, 
its data collection methods and analysis procedures. Chapter 7 sets out the 
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grounded theory model of the financial freedom of young, married women in 
the household. This answers question 3). Chapter 9 applies the theory to 
understand and explain the ability of pregnant women receiving cash transfers 
provided by the LBW-SAT trial in retaining control over their cash transfers. This 
answers question 4).  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of the results and their 
implications for further areas of research and provides policy recommendations 
for gender and health policy. 
 
1.5 Own contribution 
Since this research project took place within the larger LBW-SAT trial, it is 
important to clarify the contributions of different researchers including myself. 
Appendix A lists all researchers who made contributions to the research in this 
thesis and discusses their role in full. Briefly, the idea for studying women’s 
empowerment in the LBW-SAT had already been proposed by my thesis advisors 
Jolene Skordis-Worrall and Joanna Morrison when I applied to do the PhD. In 
particular, they were both interested in measuring and evaluating the impact of 
LBW-SAT on women’s empowerment using the tool proposed by the Oxford 
Poverty and Human development Initiative, which we explore in this thesis. 
However, I designed the study which validated and adapted this tool in Chapter 
4 and I also designed the study that evaluated the impact of LBW-SAT on 
women’s empowerment in Chapter 5. I also conceived of the research questions 
for the second part of this thesis, namely Chapters 6-9 and designed the studies 
to answer these research questions. In terms of the implementation of the 
research itself, all the qualitative data collection and translation of data into 
English was conducted by qualitative researchers (see Appendix A). All the 
quantitative data collection was also conducted by field workers employed by 
the LBW-SAT project. I played the primary role in supervising and coordinating 
the quantitative and qualitative teams. I also conducted all the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses in this thesis, interpreted the results of these analyses and 
wrote all the text within this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Nepal and the LBW-SAT intervention 
 
2.1 Geographical context: Overview of Nepal 
Nepal is a land-locked country situated between the Northern Indian plains and 
the southern Himalayan ranges of Tibet with a population of 26.5 million 
according to the latest census in 2011 (see Table 1). Nepal is among the poorest 
countries in the world with 25.2% of the population living below the national 
poverty line and life expectancy birth at at 68 years. 29% of its GDP comes from 
remittances and 70% of the population is employed in agriculture [62]. Nepal 
has traditionally been a conservative, religious society with 81% of the 
population self-identifying as Hindus, 9% as Buddhists and 4% as Muslims. Local 
interpretations of Hinduism prescribe strict caste- and gender-based social 
hierarchies based on notions of purity and pollution [22], although 
discrimination based on caste was outlawed in Parliament in 2011. Although the 
ratio of girls to boys in secondary is roughly equal, it ranks 102 out of 147 
countries on the Gender Development Index, an international index of gender 
equality in human development. After a violent civil war from 1997-2007, the 
Government of Nepal completed a protracted process of drafting a new 
constitution for Nepal in 2015. 
 
Table 1. Nepal socioeconomic, health and gender equity indicators 
Indicators  Nepal 
Population according to 2011 census [63] 
26.5 
million 
Gender Development Index (out of 147 countries, higher scores are worse) [64] 102 
Population living below national poverty line (%) [62] 25.2 
Life expectancy at birth  (years) [65] 68 
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education [66] 1:1 
Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (%) [66] 44.8 
Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament [67] 29.5 
Total fertility rate (births per woman) [68,68] 1.8 
Maternal Mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) [66] 170 
Infant Mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) [66] 46 
Low Birth Weight rate in 2011 (%) [21] 12.4 
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Figure 1.Trial site for the Low Birth Weight South Asia Trial (LBW-SAT). 
 
Grey areas on the minimap represent Kathmandu Valley, while the red and purple areas represent 
Dhanusha and Mahottari districts respectively. The main map shows Dhanusha and Mahottari districts 
at a larger scale and marks out major roads (red) and study area clusters (blue). The blue colouring 
represents the number of women of reproductive age who consented to take part in trial surveillance 
to detect new pregnancies when the trial started in 2013-2014. 
 
This study takes place in Dhanusha and Mahottari districts of Nepal (Figure 1). 
These districts form part of Janakpur zone and border Bihar state in India to the 
South. The districts are situated in the Plains (Terai) of Nepal. Districts in Nepal 
are sub-divided into Village Development Committees (VDCs), which are each 
further subdivided into nine wards. The local language and culture is Maithili. 
Dhanusha and Mahottari are the top two districts in Nepal for out-migration of 
domestic labour to foreign countries [69]. Apart from India, with whom Nepal 
shares open borders, top destinations for economic migrants are Qatar, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates and Malaysia [69]. 94% of migrant workers are men [69].  
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21% of households in the region are classified as “severely food insecure” [21]. 
Levels of under-nutrition in women and girls are high [21] and the incidence of 
low birth weight prior to initiation of the trial intervention was 37% [70]. By 
comparison, the national incidence of Nepal was at 18% in 2011 and the national 
incidences in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan were at 28%, 22% and 32% 
respectively between 2006 and 2007 [71]. 
 
The government of Nepal runs multiple cash transfer schemes in the region 
including the national Senior Citizens’ Allowance and the national Maternity 
Incentive Scheme [72]. All citizens aged 60 or above are eligible to receive a 
Senior Citizens’ Allowance worth minimum NPR 500 [USD 4.9] per month with 
special provisions for widows and people with disabilities [72]. The scheme aims 
to provide social protection for vulnerable subgroups of Nepal who may not 
always be able to access secure livelihoods for themselves [72]. The Maternity 
Incentive Scheme aims to increase the rate of institutional births by providing 
NPR 500 [USD 4.9] to women giving birth in a facility [72]. Higher rates are paid 
to women giving birth in a facility in the Hill and Mountain regions of Nepal [72]. 
 
2.2 The LBW-SAT intervention in Nepal 
From 2013 to 2016, University College London (UCL) collaborated with civil 
society organization Mother Infant Research Activites (MIRA) in conducting the 
Low Birth Weight, South Asia Trial (LBW-SAT), a cluster-randomized trial in the 
Dhanusha and Mahottari districts of Nepal. Each VDC was treated as one cluster. 
In order to reduce heterogeneity between clusters, large towns and 
municipalities, hilly, forested or non-Maithili speaking VDCs, VDCs along major 
highways and VDCs with an estimated population <4000 or >9200 were 
excluded. A previous trial had been conducted by UCL and MIRA in Dhanusha 
and Mahottari [73] with results pending publication. The trial aimed to reduce 
newborn mortality through a combination of participatory women’s groups and 
health worker training in management of neonatal sepsis. VDCs which 
participated in this previous trial were excluded from LBW-SAT. After all 
exclusion criteria had been applied, 80 VDCs remained. 
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For LBW-SAT, 80 VDCs in Dhanusha and Mahottari were selected excluding areas 
which had participated in previous women’s group trials as well as large towns 
and municipalities. The VDCs were randomized into one of four arms in the trial 
1) Control, no intervention 2) Participatory women’s groups only 3) Women’s 
groups and cash transfers 4) Women’s groups and food transfers. Both the food 
and cash transfers were conditional only on pregnant women turning up at 
distribution points and registering for an ID card. The protocol for LBW-SAT has 
been described in detail elsewhere [74]. 
 
2.2.1 Women’s groups in LBW-SAT 
Female Community Health Volunteers (FCHVs) ran existing community women’s 
groups through a national government programme, the FCHV programme. They 
conducted monthly women’s groups meetings within each ward, a sub-unit of 
VDCs. In Mahottari and Dhanusha, the study team found that most of these met 
irregularly and without a specific agenda. These were the platform for the 
behaviour change strategy and the transfers in the intervention areas. FCHVs 
were trained and supervised by the trial intervention team to conduct meetings 
using the Participatory Learning and Action approach. Due to the high levels of 
illiteracy among FCHVs (60%), nutrition mobilisers (NMs) with a minimum of 5 
years of education were recruited to support the FCHV in running the groups. 
Both FCHVs and NMs were paid incentives for running the meetings. 
 
Both FCHVs and NMs were trained on using a pictorial manual of activities to 
conduct group meetings. The topics covered by the manual were: maternal 
nutrition, low birth weight, perinatal danger signs and care-seeking, infection 
control and hygiene, the importance of rest and family support, and newborn 
care. No meeting was explicitly devoted to discussing women’s empowerment 
in the family as a topic in its own right, but facilitators were trained to be open 
to discussing agency and power in the family, were it to be raised by women’s 
group members themselves. FCHVs and NMs were supervised by facilitation 
coordinators (FCs) who coordinated women’s group activities and supervised 
the distribution of cash and food transfers in the women’s group and transfer 
arms. Each FC supervised a number of VDCs and all the women’s group 
facilitators working a single VDC were supervised by one FC. 
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Each group in the intervention areas followed a participatiory action-learning 
cycle of problem identification, strategy formulation and prioritisation, strategy 
implementation and evaluation, after which problem identification and strategy 
formulation would begin anew. The strategy had been shown to be successful 
in reducing maternal and newborn mortality in a number of settings [54,75-77], 
although its effect on low birth weight had not been studied before. The FCHV 
and the NM were encouraged to pose questions in order to enable members to 
use existing knowledge and resources and debate current practices and the 
potential for change. Groups were also encouraged to reflect on how to involve 
key stakeholders such as village leaders, mothers-in-law and husbands and how 
to reach potentially excluded women. As they prioritised and implemented 
strategies through discussion, games and sharing stories, most groups decided 
to raise awareness of pregnant women’s nutritional needs through separate 
meetings with community members or through home visits to pregnant women 
unable to attend the groups. 
 
2.2.2 Food transfers 
The food transfers comprised 10 kg sacks of Super Cereal which were delivered 
to all pregnant women in the food arm of the trial. They were delivered every 
month, from eight weeks of gestation until birth. FCHVs and NMs were trained 
in keeping records of the distribution of food transfers. Transfers were 
distributed at the end of women’s groups meetings, but women were not 
required to attend women’s groups meetings to receive the transfers, only to 
visit the meeting place at the time of the meeting to collect the cereal. Women 
who were physically unable to go to the meeting place could receive their 
transfers at home delivered by the NM. A detailed system of QR barcodes and 
photographic identification ensures each woman receives a maximum of seven 
transfers for each pregnancy. Super Cereal is a blend of maize, whole soya beans, 
sugar, vegetable oil and micronutrients developed by UNICEF and World Food 
Program [78]. A recommended 150 g intake per day meets requirements for all 
nutrients except iron and folic acid [79], which should come from iron-folate 
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supplements provided by FCHVs from the Government of Nepal and iodine, 
which should come from iodised salt consumption.  
 
2.2.3 Cash transfers 
The cash transfers were NPR 750 [USD 7.3] per month. Envelopes with cash were 
delivered to resident pregnant women in the same manner as food transfers. 
Thus, FCHVs and NMs were trained in keeping records of the distribution of cash 
transfers. Transfers were distributed at the end of women’s groups meetings 
and women who were physically unable to attend meetings could receive their 
transfers at home delivered by the NM. NPR 750 was estimated to comprise 32% 
of the total monthly cost of a nutritionally adequate food basket for a pregnant 
woman estimated using 2015 prices, but women were able to spend the transfer 
on anything. The cash transfer was meant to cover micronutrient-rich items such 
as dairy products, meat, fish and eggs and fruits which a pregnant woman 
needed to eat to meet her minimum nutrient requirements. 
 
2.3 Cultural context: Gender roles in Dhanusha/Mahottari 
The cultural context was crucial to interpreting findings from research on 
women’s empowerment, particularly within the context of a complex 
intervention [80]. Maithili cultural and gender norms also share many 
similarities with Hindu and Muslim culture in much of Pakistan, North India, 
Nepal and Bangladesh, while its essential structural features generalise to an 
even broader geographical area ranging from North Africa over the Middle East 
to South and East Asia3.  
                                                          
3 Kandiyoti [81] labelled the entire geographical area ranging from North Africa over the Middle East to South 
and East Asia, the “patriarchal belt”, where notions of honour and sexual purity play a key role in structuring the 
position of women and women trade economic security for subservience to their husband as well as their 
mother-in-law. Mandelbaum’s [82] extensive review of anthropological evidence on gender roles in Northern 
South Asia identified North India, Bangladesh and Pakistan as “purdah regions” where “purdah practices are 
taken to be central elements of social life”. “Purdah” was in turn defined as “the beliefs and values about the 
behaviour of women, the restrictions on their movements outside the household and the requirements for their 
respectful and deferential demeanor within the home”. Closely similar behavioural patterns to those discussed 
by Mandelbaum have been reported in Minturn’s [83] ethnography of Chettri Hindus in a Northern Indian village 
and Jeffrey’s [84] study of Muslim women in Delhi. Agarwal’s [9] review of ethnographic literature also reported 
high levels of purdah practice across the belt from Pakistan to North India to Bangladesh. Using statistical data, 
Agarwal [9] found that low female labour force participation mapped almost exactly onto the regions with high 
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Maithili women are expected to live through a varied and complex life cycle of 
relative freedom as young daughters, obedient help in the husband’s home as 
newly married women, powerful mothers-in-law in middle age and widows in 
old age. However, at all stages of life women are usually afforded limited 
autonomy over their own bodies in terms of physical movement, dress, 
manners, speech and social interaction due to the need to preserve family 
honour4. 
 
2.3.1 Honour and women’s bodies 
The Arabic/Persian word izzat, or ijjat in Maithili/Nepali, is usually translated as 
“honour” in English. Honour reflects the value of individuals and households in 
society’s eyes and marks their public position. Households that retain their 
honour in the community are invited to participate in informal networks of 
essential financial and social support [88], while lost honour causes intense 
shame, damaged marriage prospects for one’s children [89] and possibly 
excommunication from the wider family and community [83]5.  
 
Honour accrues to men primarily through maintaining financial and social 
investments in relationships in the community at large [88]. However, women 
carry special burdens of maintaining family honour through physical and social 
seclusion from public life [88]. Although the norm of female seclusion is not 
uniform across Maithili society (Section 2.3.3), this often excludes contact with 
men outside the family. The strict regulation of women’s bodies take place even 
before marriage when parents anxiously police the physical movements of 
daughters for fear of damaging marriage prospects should they be seen in male-
dominated spaces [85]. During periods of menstruation, women’s access to 
                                                          
purdah practices in South Asia. In the Nepal context, the findings of Minturn, Mandelbaum and Agarwal closely 
match Bennett’s [22] ethnography of Brahmin Hindus in a Hill village in Nepal, Davis’ [85] qualitative study of 
gender roles in Janakpur and Acharya and Bennett’s [86] study of women’s participation in household decision-
making in Maithili families. Indeed, Agarwal [9] cited Acharya and Bennet’s [86] results to claim that Maithili 
Hindus practice purdah in a manner similar to the Northern Indian regions. A local (patriarchal) Maithili saying 
also describes the relationship between North India and the Plains of Nepal as a roti-peti relationship, literally a 
“bread-daughter” relationship where bread and wives are exchanged with similar ease. Indeed, currently 30 
million Maithili speakers currently live in India, while 3 million live in Nepal [87]. 
4 Although much of the literature in this review does not come from Dhanusha and Mahottari directly, qualitative 
data generated from this thesis was largely consistent with the results reported in this section (see Chapter 7). 
5 In one Turkish study, honour was described as “more important than money” [90]. 
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ritually important spaces such as religious shrines or the house kitchen is further 
curtailed [22]. In certain cases, women are even required to sleep outdoors 
during periods of menstruation [24]. 
 
After marriage, women are expected to show respect and modesty by veiling 
themselves in public and assuming a diffident, shy and self-effacing demeanour 
devoid of casual talk and loud laughter, a “bridal shell” [82]. Movement outside 
of the household is firmly controlled by senior family members with even minor 
transgressions such as wearing the veil an inch too high resulting in lengthy 
excoriations as these may cost the family in terms of honour. Stigma attaches to 
women loitering on their own or casually socializing without purpose with strong 
connotations of sexual availability [22] and even prostitution [91]. Women who 
do have extramarital sexual encounters, whether by force or consent, may 
suffer hard sanctions including being cast out of her husband’s family and 
separated from her children [82]. The shame falls not only on her, but also 
blights her entire family. 
 
Although newly married women’s movements are intensively supervised in 
Maithili culture, there are occasions for escape. Women whom the community 
knows have a good reason for being in public are not at risk of reputational 
damage, e.g. when engaging in religious worship [82]. Legitimacy is achieved by 
avoiding perceived male-dominated spaces such as the market place and using 
a senior family member as a chaperone or staying together in large groups [82]. 
 
The burden of “honour” decreases as women gradually cease to be considered 
newly married and begin to be considered as women who have proven their 
loyalty and dedication to their husband’s family [22]. Mothers-in-law and elder 
sisters-in-law and have greater freedom of movement and it is generally seen as 
the duty of the most senior female family member to assist with practicalities 
outside the household [82]. This is accentuated by the context of prevalent long-
term out-migration of male family members leaving many families managed 
almost entirely by women (Section 2.3.3). 
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2.3.2 Duties of care: Life as a newly married daughter-in-law 
During the wedding ceremony, the bride and her family may cry sorrowful tears 
both at the transfer and “loss” of the daughter to the husband’s family and at 
the anticipated harsh treatment and loss of privileges in the husband’s family 
[22,83]. Although marriage “saves” women from the demeaning eventuality of 
spinsterdom [92], at the time of the wedding, it is often considered a traumatic 
imposition on the hitherto carefree lives of daughters [22,83]. After the 
wedding, recently married daughters may send distressed letters home to natal 
parents complaining of being “locked in a cage like a parrot” [83]. In his study of 
Indian folk tales, Ramanjuan [93] observed how marriage indicated the end of 
suffering, when the protagonist was male, while suffering began for women with 
marriage. 
 
The social standing of a newly married bride, or kanya in Maithili, in her new 
home is decidedly lower than before marriage. Where daughters are considered 
honoured “guests” in their parents’ home, kanyas are often viewed with 
suspicion as newly arrived strangers and subjected to intense scrutiny in the 
husband’s home [22,83]. As described by Davis [85]  
 
“As the structurally least enfranchised household members, daughters-in-law 
often bear the brunt of stresses and strains among members of their [husband’s] 
households. They are sometimes overworked, under-nourished, or subject to 
physical attack” (p.252) 
 
Daughters-in-law tend to have especially fraught relationships with their 
mothers-in-law [22,81-83]. As junior women in the family, daughters-in-law are 
expected to carry out most of the household tasks. While punctilious deference 
to all family elders is considered essential to a functioning family [82], the 
mother-in-law may dictate exactly when and how meals are cooked, which 
ingredients to use, when daughters-in-law may rest, which parts of the house 
need to be cleaned and so forth. Like most human relationships, the relationship 
between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law is greatly influenced by the 
individuals who enter them. Where the daughter-in-in-law and the mother-in-
law are mutually supportive, the mother-in-law can become like a “second 
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mother” for the daughter-in-law [22]. Indeed, as the mother-in-law has a 
responsibility for maintaining unity and honour in the household, she 
traditionally assumes caretaking responsibilities over daughters-in-law. 
 
In general, emergent emotional closeness between husband and wife often 
remains strategically hidden from both household and non-household members 
in a pattern called “respect-avoidance” [22,82,83]. In this behavioural pattern, 
husbands and wives practice a “studied mutual ignoring” in public [22] and wives 
are required to perform displays of deference in public to their husbands, even 
if their relationship is not one of submission in private. In a telling example from 
Uttar Pradesh in India, a wife was observed to be castigated abusively in public 
by her husband. However, when the ethnographer looked more closely at the 
wife, she was beaming with smiles underneath her veil. They had successfully 
performed a public display of her ability to be a “proper wife” and his ability to 
be a “proper husband” to the wider community [82]. However, in modern Nepal, 
extensive, prolonged male labour migration has affected this pattern for families 
with migrant husbands (see Section 2.3.3). 
 
Eventually, daughters-in-law living in joint families become mothers-in-law 
themselves. They give birth to and raise sons who get married and bring new 
daughters-in-law into the fold. Their own mother-in-law may have passed away 
or lost power over the family in their old age, particularly if the father-in-law is 
too infirm to work. The newly fashioned mothers-in-law frequently consider it 
part of the “patriarchal bargain” [81] that they are now able to inflict the same 
exacting regimen of backbreaking household chores and obligations to show 
respect and deference to how they suffered in their own time as the new kanya 
in the family. 
 
2.3.3 Variation by caste, religion, ethnicity, sociodemographic status 
and region 
Substantial variations in the roles and duties of newly married daughters-in-law 
exist by caste, religion, ethnicity, region and sociodemographic status, although 
detailed evidence on such variation does not always paint a consistent narrative. 
Researchers have also noted how gender norms vary both between and within 
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countries. Mobility restrictions on women seem to be somewhat stronger 
among the Maithili population of Nepal compared to the Hills population 
elsewhere [86]. In India, a common observation regarding India is the more 
gender equitable norms in the South of India compared to the North [9] and the 
more restrictive norms among high caste Hindus in India as opposed to among 
scheduled tribes [94].  
 
In terms of caste, religion and ethnicity, it should be noted that religious and 
ethnic affiliation in Nepal have close links with caste status and can thus be 
difficult to distinguish from caste in terms of its effects on gender norms in the 
family. The Mulki Ain from 1854 which formed the Civil Code for Nepal classed 
all ethnic, caste, and religious identities into one overarching caste system 
including Muslims and Buddhists [95]. The Nepal Government Census also class 
“Muslim” and the various Buddhist ethnicities as a “caste/ethnicity” [63]6.  
 
Buddhist Hill ethnicities have less restrictive mobility norms on women than the 
Hindu Plains ethnicities [86]. However, this is difficult to separate from a regional 
effect as the Hindu Hill ethnicities also have less restrictive mobility norms than 
Hindu Plains ethnicities [86]. In terms of Hindu castes, researchers have noted 
how low-caste Dalit women often have more freedom and autonomy and fewer 
social and behavioural restrictions than women of high caste [96]. Researchers 
have also commented on the greater risk of physical and sexual violence 
suffered by Dalit women in public due to their low status in the community [97].  
 
In terms of Muslim and Hindu religion, differences are unlikely to be large. 
Mandelbaum’s [82] study of sex roles in North India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan 
devoted a chapter to comparing Muslim and Hindu sex roles and concluded that: 
 
“Both versions agree that women should be much more restrained in their 
movements and constrained in their conduct than are men. In both versions 
women are banned from participation in public affairs of the traditional kind. 
                                                          
6 In qualitative interviews with women (Chapter 6), almost all Hindu women interviewees provided their caste 
affiliation when asked to state their religion and needed several rounds of clarification before they classified 
themselves as “Hindu”. 
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Both assume that a woman must be protected from and must vigilantly shield 
herself against strangers outside the home. Both are sensitive to potential 
dangers to the coherence of a joint family from the junior wives. Similar 
variations according to age, region, class, and education occur in each. Under 
each regime there is a reciprocal relation between purdah and izzat, [that is] 
between women’s seclusion and men’s honor.” (p. 96) 
 
Mandelbaum continued to conclude that perhaps Muslims put more emphasis 
on dangers to women from strangers outside the household, whereas Hindus 
were more sensitive to dangers to household honour from junior wives within 
the household. Muslims favour close-in marriages, such as between children of 
brothers in the same village, whereas Hindus forbid cousin marriages and the 
Hindu bride comes into her husband’s family as a stranger. However, in both 
Hindu and Muslim families, the same fractious relations between daughters-in-
law and mothers-in-law were observed. Acharya and Bennett’s study of gender 
roles across Nepal [86] allowed for a major role in the divide between Hindu and 
Buddhist religions in shaping gender norms, but did not discuss differences 
between Hindu and Muslim gender roles at all. 
 
As regards socioeconomic status, the close connection between caste and 
poverty in South Asia has entailed that the anthropological literature has rarely 
sought to distinguish the effects of caste and socio-economic status on gender 
(a notable exception is [98]). Authors have frequently noted how poorer women 
are driven to seek employment out of necessity rather than due to privilege 
[94,99,100]. Specifically, as families become wealthier and less dependent on 
manual labour for survival, women may increasingly substitute income-
generating work for what Hannah Papanek has termed “status production” work 
inside the confines of the home [101], which seeks to generate social and 
symbolic capital [102,103] rather than produce direct material benefit. Such 
work includes teaching children status-appropriate behaviour, maintaining 
relationships through gossip and gift exchange and performing public displays 
of religious observance. Poorer, lower-caste women may not have the luxury of 
engaging in status production to the same extent as middle- and upper-caste 
women, while land-owning elites withdraw women from public visibility to 
differentiate themselves from poorer, lower-caste members of society [98,99]. 
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On the other hand, lower-caste households may deliberately try to emulate 
behaviours in upper-caste households to enhance their social status in the 
community (also known as “Sanskritization” [104]). 
 
Education also plays a role in shaping gender norms in the family. Although 
education is commonly employed as a predictor variable in quantitative analyses 
of women’s empowerment [14,105], qualitative studies of education and 
women’s empowerment, particularly in the context of rural Nepal, are rare. As 
a marker of privilege [106,107], educated daughters-in-law have been known to 
overrule their mothers-in-law despite traditional norms to the contrary and 
have greater influence over their husband’s decisions [105]. In addition, the 
exposure to learning and the ability to regularly socialize with people outside 
the household may also have increased the self-confidence of women [105]. 
 
Household composition may also influence gender roles. Where husbands have 
left their wives to govern a household on their own, women are household 
heads by default [108]. In Nepal, male foreign labour migration is common 
(Section 2.1). Husbands migrate abroad, stay for years on end and leave the 
remaining family members to fill in for them on family plots or enterprises [109]. 
In households where mothers-in-law have passed away, daughters-in-law have 
often found themselves neding to take up work on the family farm [110] or in 
other types of employment [109]. In addition, couples living in nuclear families 
either due to a family separation [111] or because the couple lost support of 
their natal families after having a love marriage [107], do not live with an 
extended family and make day-to-day decisions themselves. 
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Chapter 3 
Women’s empowerment: Theory and 
measurement 
3.1 History of the empowerment term 
3.1.1 Origins of the empowerment concept in development 
The roots of the empowerment concept can be traced back to early social 
movements such as second-wave feminism, the Black Power movement, 
Gandhian philosophy, and particularly Paolo Freire’s liberation theology [112]. 
In 1968, Freire published the “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, in which he 
introduced the notion of “conscientization” / conscientização. These terms refer 
to a process through which formerly oppressed people, whose behaviour and 
mindset used to serve the status quo, acquired a new mindset which enabled 
them to understand the social causes of their oppression and act on this 
understanding to change their role in society. Drawing on Marxist ideas of 
popular uprising, Freire referred to this new mindset as “critical consciousness” 
and the tool with which to enable oppressed peoples to gain this mindset, 
“popular education”. The process of revolting against collective oppression 
crucially involved breaking a “Culture of Silence” which permitted oppressive 
societal norms, forces and structures to go unchallenged, because people were 
too afraid to speak out against them. 
 
Popular education was premised on the idea that teachers should act as 
facilitators of student learning and action by drawing out knowledge and skills 
that students already have, asking questions to allow students to reflect on their 
own goals and values and encouraging students to take collective action to 
change their circumstances. Freire contrasted this form of education with 
traditional “banking education” which saw teachers as authoritative experts 
who only needed to deposit their knowledge into the blank spaces of students’ 
heads. Thus, Freire’s approach is often labelled a “participatory” approach [113], 
because it relies on students’ active participation in the learning process. 
However, Paulo Freire almost never used the term “empowerment” (or its 
Portuguese equivalent empoderamento) in this period, preferring instead to 
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work with his vocabulary of “popular education”, “critical consciousness”, and 
“conscientisation”. 
 
In the 1970s, Freire’s concept of popular education spurred a growing number 
of researchers and activists in global development to call for alternatives to “top-
down” development based on centralised planning, information flow and 
decision-making to “bottom-up” approaches to development, where 
beneficiaries were considered active, not passive participants in development 
[112]. For example, a 1980 UN report called for a new development model 
anchored in the “primary community, whether geographical or organizational” 
(p.10) and aimed at “improved forms of political decision-making – facilitating 
people’s access to power and resources both locally and nationally” (p.20) [114]. 
Within global health, the Alma Ata Declaration in 1978 declared that “the people 
have the right and duty to participate individually and collectively in the planning 
and implementation of their health care”, while exhorting primary health care 
providers to ensure “appropriate education on the ablity of communities to 
participate” [115]. However, none of the formal documents for these new 
approaches to global development made use of the term “empowerment”. 
 
In 1987, Freire published “A Pedagogy for Liberation” [116], which presented 
transcripts from informal conversations between him and fellow educationalist 
Ira Shor. In the book, Freire remarked on how the word “empowerment” was a 
curiously American obsession which seemed to denote an individualistic 
concern with self-improvement and self-help. Freire lamented how the word 
had lost its original radical roots from the 1960s, where it denoted a radical 
transformation of class society through sustained political action. Instead, he 
recommended the term “social class empowerment” as an anti-dote to 
American individualism. In the same year, Freire published a joint publication 
with Donaldo Macado [117], where Canadian cultural critic Henry Giroux 
introduced the book with a chapter titled “Literacy and the Pedagogy of Political 
Empowerment”, in which Giroux stated that Freire’s pedagogy sought to 
engender a “critical literacy” in students that allowed them to understand 
societal power structures and enable both “self- and social empowerment”. 
Giroux did not define the empowerment term, but broadly used it to denote an 
increase in critical awareness leading to socio-political action among oppressed 
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individuals. After 1987, Freire never mentioned the term again as more than a 
passing reference. Nonetheless, Freire’s philosophy became indelibly associated 
with the empowerment term in public health, education, social work and 
development since then. 
 
3.1.2 Mainstreaming women’s empowerment in development 
In 1989, empowerment first entered international development discourse, 
when feminist researchers, activists and politicians advocated for a new 
approach to women in development, called the “empowerment approach” 
[118]. Moser [118] argued that development agencies had hitherto only been 
interested in promoting women’s “practical needs”, which concerned their 
needs for overall well-being such as food, shelter, clothing, and leisure time, to 
the exclusion of women’s “strategic needs”, which concerned their position in 
society and the power structures that shaped women’s ability to participate in 
society. Fulfilment of women's strategic needs should take place through 
“empowerment”, which signified a radical transformation of the economic, 
political, legal and social societal structures that perpetuated oppression along 
the lines of gender, race, and class. This process of empowerment was to come 
about through legislative changes, “political mobilization, conscientization and 
education for the people” (p. 1) [119]. Frequent referral was made to Paulo 
Freire’s participatory approach and the need for bottom-up mobilisation using 
grassroots women’s organisations as “catalysts of women’s visions and 
perspectives”  (p. 114) [119]. 
 
In the 1990s, a proliferation of feminist writing on the empowerment concept 
followed [112], including seminal articles by Srilatha Batliwala [120], Jo 
Rowlands [16] and Naila Kabeer [10]. Batliwala defined power as “control over 
material assets, intellectual resources and ideology” (p.129), and defined 
empowerment as “the process of challenging existing power relations, and of 
gaining greater control over the sources of power” (p. 130) [120]. Kabeer [10] 
conceptualised empowerment as divided into three inextricably related 
components: the pre-conditions for empowerment (resources), the processes 
of empowerment (agency), and the results of empowerment (achievements). 
Kabeer [10] then defined empowerment as “the process by which those who 
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have been denied the ability to make strategic choices acquire such an ability” 
(p.1). 
 
Rowlands [16] was particularly influenced by new conceptualisations of power 
and freedom arising out of feminist work on political philosophy in the 1980s 
and early 90s. This body of work emphasised the need for alternatives to existing 
conceptions of power perceived to be hierarchical, masculinist conceptions of 
“power-over” other people [121]. Feminist philosophers saw such notions of 
power as about simply altering the identity of people who held power in society 
while leaving the underlying structures of hierarchy and inequality intact [122]. 
The task of feminist philosophy was to re-conceptualise the notion of power as 
a capacity to nurture and transform oneself and others (“power-to”) [121,123], 
an ability to exhibit solidary and act in concert with others (“power-with”) [124], 
and an inner, mental power (“power-from-within”) [125]. In political philosophy, 
this new feminist conceptualisation of power became known as the 
“empowerment” approach to power [126]. Rowlands brought these ideas into 
mainstream development discouse in her highly-cited book “Questioning 
Empowerment” [16] where she outlined the concepts of “power-over”, “power-
to”, “power-with”, and “power-from-within” for a development audience.   
 
During this period, the term “women’s empowerment” also became increasingly 
prominent in global policy statements. The Cairo Declaration on Population and 
Development in 1994 identified women’s empowerment and gender and sexual 
rights as central to population issues [127], while the Beijing Platform for Action 
in 1995 stated that “women’s empowerment and their full participation on the 
basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-
making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of 
equality, development and peace” [128]. In lieu of wider formal recognition by 
development agencies of the importance of women’s empowerment came an 
increased use of quantitative indicators to track progress on empowerment7. 
 
                                                          
7 Measures on women’s “decision-making power” or “women’s status” in the Global South had been in use since 
the early 1980s [86,129], and measurement of women’s decision-making power had been carried out since the 
1960s by in the Global North [130]. However, the explicit measurement of “empowerment” was new. 
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In 1995, the United Nations Human Development Reports expanded to a new 
Gender Empowerment Measure, which measured and ranked countries on their 
level of progress in reducing gender inequalities and promoting women’s 
empowerment [131]. In 1999, the Demographic and Health Surveys began 
regularly collecting data on women’s participation in household decision-
making across all country offices [14]. In 2000, the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) formally set targets to eliminate gender disparities in educational 
enrolment to “promote gender equality and empower women” [13]. In 2002, 
the World Bank commissioned a review on “Measuring Women’s Empowerment 
as a Variable in International Development” [132]. At the same time, academic 
researchers in global health and development economics began to routinely 
evaluate the impact of social interventions on measures of women’s 
empowerment (e.g. [37]). Finally in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals 
unveiled a detailed set of targets for the global community to “Achieve gender 
equality and empower all women and girls” by 2030 [133]. 
 
3.1.3 The voice of the Human Capabilities Approach  
In parallel with the above developments from the 1990s to the 2010s, 
development economists Amartya Sen and Sabina Alkire began acquiring an 
increasingly prominent voice on women’s empowerment through their 
Capabilities Approach to development. Originally conceived as an alternative to 
welfare economics, the Human Capabilities Approach argued that individual 
flourishing could not be assessed on the basis of access to material resources, 
individual happiness, or desire-fulfilment, but instead, individual capabilities 
should form the proper basis for assessments of flourishing [134]. 
 
“Capability” had a technical meaning in this approach, signifying opportunities 
for persons to “lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value” (p 
18) [39]. Amartya Sen distinguished “functionings” which were valued states of 
doing and being from “capabilities” which denoted opportunities to realise 
specific functionings. For example, receiving quality education is a functioning, 
while the opportunity to receive quality education is a capability. Sen saw 
individual capabilities as a form of personal “freedom”, which it was the role of 
the state and public policy to promote [39]. Sen distinguished between “well-
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being freedoms”, which pertained to realising basic human needs such as life, 
health and security, and “agency freedoms”, which were fundamental 
capabilities to pursue individuals’ personal, social or political agenda [134]. Both 
agency and well-being freedoms were essential human capabilities, which it was 
the responsibility of public policy to promote. 
 
In 1990, Amartya Sen and development economist Mahbub ul Haq launched the 
United Nations Human Development Reports to track country-level progress in 
realising capability-related outcomes [135]. The Human Development Index, 
which measured a combination of life expectancy, adult literacy, educational 
enrolment, and GDP, ranked and compared countries internationally on their 
level of development [135]. The Gender Empowerment Measure was added to 
these reports in 1995 [136]. This measure combined indicators for women’s 
representation in decision-making positions in politics and business with the 
female share of earned income [136]. However, the report never defined the 
term “gender empowerment”. Amartya Sen himself almost never made 
references to women’s empowerment in his own writing [137], preferring to 
work with “capabilities”, “well-being freedoms” and “agency freedoms”.  
 
In 2005, Sabina Alkire made an explicit link between Amartya Sen’s notion of 
agency freedom and the wider discourse on women’s empowerment. Alkire 
stated that “empowerment” referred to a subset of the dimensions of agency 
that focused on the instrumental value of agency, such as the ability to cause 
positive changes in one’s well-being or realise one’s values [137]. Alkire [137] 
reviewed a wide variety of survey tools that could potentially be used to 
measure Sen’s notion of agency freedom including Schwartz’ self-direction scale 
[138], items from the World Values Survey on participation and autonomy [139] 
and Bandura’s self-efficacy scale [140]. However, Alkire concluded that the 
conceptualisation and measurement of “autonomy” in Deci and Ryan’s Self-
Determination Theory [1], which used the Relative Autonomy Index (RAI), came 
closest to Sen’s notion of agency. In 2007, Alkire and Ibrahim launched a 
proposal for a set of internationally comparable indicators to measure individual 
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agency and empowerment where the authors proposed the use of the RAI to 
measure women’s agency “with considerable energy” [59]. 
 
This desire for widespread use came partly true in 2014, when Alkire launched 
the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index [141,142] in conjunction with 
USAID and the International Food Policy Research Institute. The index measured 
empowerment in the domains of agricultural production, access to resources, 
leadership and time use, and contained the RAI as a sub-domain of the wider 
index [141,142]. The index was piloted and rolled out across multiple countries 
from Guatemala to Bangladesh [143-145] and was extensively used in research 
and policy evaluation of the nutritional impacts of agricultural initiatives [144]. 
However, Alkire and colleagues continued to argue for the use of the RAI on its 
own in order to explore the possibly unique properties of the RAI that were not 
captured by other measures of agency [61]. 
 
3.1.4 Growing criticisms of the empowerment concept 
Although the empowerment concept became an increasingly regular feature of 
both global and local development agenda in the 2000s and 2010s, this process 
was not without its detractors. In an ironic rehash of Freire’s own reservations 
with the term in the 1980s (Section 3.1.1), a group of critical academics and 
activists now argued that the concept had become a “buzzword” [146], robbed 
of its original radical, political meaning, and co-opted by development agencies 
to serve a neoliberal, technocratic purpose [112,146,147]. The range of 
meanings of empowerment was seen to have extended far beyond its original 
scope of denoting a radical transformation of economic, political and social 
structures through collective power [148]. Instead, critics argued, the concept 
now referred to distinctively neoliberal ideas such as the maximisation of 
individual self-interest, participation in self-help, privatisation of public services, 
and devolution of state responsibility for human rights onto local communities 
[112,146,147].  
 
Critics argued that “empowerment” was used as a politically expedient device 
to legitimise development blueprints that had already been decided by top-
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down planners without the involvement of local women themselves [146,149]. 
The vague, but resolutely optimistic connotations of the empowerment concept 
made it difficult for policy-makers, implementers, or voters to argue against a 
goal of empowerment [146,147]. At the same time, the seeming ability of the 
term to cover both ends of the political spectrum simultaneously instilled a false 
sense of consensus in listeners whose flaws and contradictions would only be 
revealed when programme managers tried to implement the goal of 
empowerment in the field [112]. 
 
Feminist activists were particularly vocal in their critique of the Third MDG for 
women’s empowerment, which they saw as needlessly reductive, by measuring 
women’s empowerment using a single target of gender disparity in educational 
enrolment and two auxiliary progress indicators on female employment and 
parliamentary representation [150,151]. Critics lamented the complete lack of 
emphasis on the mobilisation of poor women in both “letter and spirit” [151] in 
the MDGs, the exclusion of rights-based approaches to empowerment including 
the assertion of reproductive and sexual rights, political rights, property rights 
or freedom from violence [152], and the lack of challenge to macro-level factors 
such as neoliberal macroeconomic policies [152]. Academics from the Human 
Capabilities Approach also played a role in this critique by arguing that access to 
resources such as education, employment or political office were poor proxies 
for women’s empowerment, as women often lacked the agency to act on their 
resources [59,153]. The lack of nuance in the MDG targets was eventually 
rectified in part in the Sustainable Development Goals which included many 
policy-based, rights-based and agency-based indicators [133]. 
 
Still, some theorists and practitioners continue to have reservations about the 
attendant risks of ignoring more radical, and potentially transformational, forms 
of empowerment in favour of further institutionalisation of gender issues in 
development [154]. However, researchers and activists have also acknowledged 
that the current central placement of gender on the global development agenda 
should be recognised as a hard-won achievement resulting from the efforts of 
many activists, researchers and policy-makers who have repeatedly engaged in 
contentious political processes [155,156]. Most theorists who have been critical 
of the use of the empowerment concept in mainstream development have 
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expressed a desire to rehabilitate the empowerment concept and restore its 
former radical meaning rather than discard it from their practice [112,146,147].  
 
3.1.5 Looking forward 
Our brief history of the empowerment concept illustrates a process of repeated 
discussion, definition and re-definition over decades of debate. Today, the 
concept has currency across diverse fields including feminist and multiracial 
politics [10,157], health promotion [158], critical, liberation and community 
psychology [159], multicultural counselling and social work [159], robotics [160], 
leadership and organisational management studies [161,162], and, of course, 
global development [163]. None of these fields have come close to a consensus 
on the meaning of the empowerment term [159,163-165]. Drydyk [148] noted 
how “It is nearly customary by now to begin a conceptual article on 
empowerment by lamenting how confused the concept has become” (p. 249). 
In Section 3.3.1, we will discuss some of the reasons why consensus is so difficult 
to achieve. First, we will describe a systematic way of organising the many 
conflicting interpretations of empowerment in the existing literature. 
 
3.2 Organising conceptualisations of empowerment 
In this section, we will draw on feminist writing on empowerment within global 
development and the work of early analytic political philosophers of freedom 
and power in the 20th century to provide an overall framework for conceptual 
understandings of empowerment. Drawing on the work of analytic political 
philosophy is important, because there is much overlap between definitions and 
debates over the meaning of agency and empowerment and definitions and 
debates over power and freedom. For example, writers on empowerment 
frequently define it in terms of both “expanding freedoms” and “gaining 
powers” [10,59,166]. Global health and development researchers also measure 
women’s empowerment using both indicators of “decision-making powers” and 
“freedom of movement” [14,132].  
 
Feminists ideas of power and agency in the 1990s were also prefigured by the 
work of early analytic political philosophers. Naila Kabeer’s [10] much-cited 
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conceptualisation of empowerment as divided into resources, agency and 
achievements mirrored the distinction between bases of power, instruments of 
power, and the scope of power already provided by Robert Dahl in 1957 [167]. 
Feminist ideas of relational forms of power such as “power-with” [126] or 
“relational agency” [123] were predated by Gerald Cohen’s [168] arguments in 
1967 for “essentially interpersonal” notions of individual freedom such as “X is 
free to do A with Y”, which he termed “freedom-to-act-with” or “relational 
freedom”. 
 
Analytic philosopher Gerald MacCallum’s seminal “tripartite” [169] concept of 
freedom will form an important basis of our organising framework. MacCallum 
noted that many arguments over the “truest” or “most worthwhile” notion of 
freedom were not arguments over rival concepts of freedom, only arguments 
over specific sub-instantiations of an overall concept. This overall concept could 
be encapsulated by the formula “agent x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, 
become, not become) z”. MacCallum strongly disagreed with philosophers who 
distinguished between “freedom to” and “freedom from” as distinct concepts 
of freedom. MacCallum argued that such statements simply left parts of the 
tripartite formula implicit rather than explicit. For example, in the concept of 
“freedom from detention without trial”, x referred to individuals, y referred to 
detention without trial, but z was left implicit. In the concept of “freedom to a 
fair trial”, x referred to individuals, z referred to a fair trial, but y was left implicit.  
 
In the following sections, we will explore the implications of instantiating x, y, 
and z with different values for our concept of empowerment, as well as some 
dividing lines that fall outside of MacCallum’s framework. 
 
3.2.1 Type of agent: Individual or collective 
Gerald Cohen [168] first asked the question whether collective notions of 
freedom behaved differently from individual notions of freedom. A collective 
notion of freedom involves the capacity of a collective agent x in overcoming 
certain barriers y to achieve an outcome z, where individual notions let x refer 
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to individual people. Cohen noted that collective freedom was fundamentally 
distinct from individual freedom and that individual freedoms did not aggregate 
into collective freedoms in a direct manner. For example, a policy that reserved 
1% of all civil servant jobs in local government for women might empower 
women individually, since all women now have greater individual opportunities 
for being part of the select 1%. Nonetheless, we might argue that the collective 
ability of women to enter government service has not altered noticeably. 
 
There are other reasons why individual empowerment differs fundamentally 
from collective empowerment. The ability of groups to achieve outcomes often 
depend on more on the quality of interpersonal interactions between group 
members than the capability of individuals [170]. Large groups of individuals, 
such as communities or countries, face high transaction costs when coordinating 
action across large geographical areas. It is thus a truism in political science that 
collective interests do not necessarily translate into collective action and that 
large, poorly organised constituencies are regularly outmanoeuvred by smaller, 
better organised groups [171]. For example, a 1983 Gallup poll showed that 40% 
of people in the US believed it was likely that there would be nuclear war by 
1998 and 70% believed they would not survive a nuclear war, yet only a very 
small minority of US citizens engaged in collective action to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear missiles in the 1980s [172]. 
 
Indeed, individual power is often directly opposed to collective capacity, when 
the capacity of groups to take action requires constraints on individuals’ ability 
to deviate from a group norm [173]. The proper balance between individualist 
and collectivist values is an enduring theme in sociology, since high degrees of 
individual mobility and independence might contribute to alienating loneliness, 
while high degrees of social control might contribute to suffocating conformity 
[174]. Conversely, individual freedom are compatible with collective power, 
when the powers of the collective are used for legitimate purposes [175,176]. 
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For these reasons, we will distinguish empowerment as an individual concept 
from empowerment as a collective concept. 
 
3.2.2 Type of agent: “Higher” and “lower” selves? 
Many political philosophers have also argued for interpretations of freedom, 
power or empowerment, where x refers to a sub-self, usually a “higher” self (to 
be distinguished from a “lower” self), or an “authentic” or “true” self (to be 
distinguished from an “inauthentic” or “false” self). In 1958, Isaiah Berlin [177] 
argued that the history of political philosophy contained two incompatible 
notions of freedom that had both been referred to by the term “freedom”. The 
“positive” notion of freedom referred to a form of self-realisation or “self-
mastery”, derived “from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own 
master” [177]. In this concept, self-realisation came about when people acted 
according to their principled, “real”, or “higher” self and avoided the 
temptations of their irrational, impulsive, or “lower” self. Berlin’s “negative” 
notion of freedom referred to the condition of being free from interference, 
coercion or restraint. These restraints needed to be imposed by other people, 
rather than caused by natural events or incapacity, in order to qualify as a form 
of unfreedom. Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom 
remains foundational and is taught in most political science courses today8. 
 
Berlin argued that only negative freedom ought to be protected and promoted 
by the state, because the concept of positive freedom could be satisfied without 
any change in individiuals’ external circumstances. A prisoner living in an 
isolation cell could still be considered free by the definitions of positive freedom, 
so long as their actions accorded with their own guiding values. Berlin argued 
such a concept could easily be appropriated by totalitarian states to restrain 
citizens’ political liberties by claiming they were “liberating” them by protecting 
them from their “lower selves”. A heated debate in the philosophical literature 
followed over whether positive or negative freedom consisted of the “truest” or 
most “worthwhile” form of freedom [169]. The philosopher Charles Taylor [179] 
                                                          
8 For example, UK A-level Politics [178]. 
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sharply criticised negative freedom for ignoring internal, mental obstacles to 
realising individual freedoms, since the very idea of state protection of individual 
freedoms depended on a political community that valued such freedoms. Taylor 
argued that individual action was often guided by “fear, inauthentically 
internalised standards, or false consciousness” (p.215) [179] rather than their 
own authentic values and goals and that such types of action should properly be 
considered cases of unfreedom. Gerald Dworkin argued that individuals had 
both “first-order desires”, which were desires for substantive achievements 
such as wealth and happiness, and “second-order desires”, which were desires 
about desires, such as the desire to stop wanting to smoke [180]. 
 
However, the choice of which desire should be considered the “higher”, “truer”, 
or more “authentic” desire remained a controversial and non-obvious issue. 
Studies by psychologists showed that individual judgments of the authenticity 
of such choices were not consistently made in favour of either first- or second-
order desires. In one behavioural experiment, researchers found that American 
undergraduate students presented with vignettes representing conflicts 
between two selves tended to locate the “true” self in whichever self was the 
most consistent with their current set of moral and political values. When 
presented with a case study of a man who felt physical attraction to other men, 
but was opposed to homosexuality on religious grounds, liberal students tended 
to locate the “true” self in the self that felt attracted to other men, while socially 
conservative students located the “true” self in the self that followed their 
religious beliefs [181].  
 
Other psychologists even disputed the very possibility of multiple agentic selves 
with competing priorities. Bandura [182] argued that the concept of multiple 
selves was inconsistent, because the presence of two simultaneous selves in an 
individual required a third self to oversee and manage these selves, which 
potentially required a fourth self to manage the others and so on. Baumester 
[183] argued that that psychologists operating with concepts of multiple selves 
mistook different sub-processes of the same executive process for distinct 
selves. 
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Thus, in this thesis, we will refrain from distinguishing between “higher” and 
“lower” selves. Instead, we will see struggles over self-control or psychological 
morbidity as instances where a single self trying to reconcile conflicting second- 
and first-order desires. This allows us to recognise a role for definitions of 
empowerment based on internal, mental barriers to action, while avoiding the 
conceptual complexity of a full theory of multiple selves.  
 
3.2.3 Type of barrier: Internal, external interpersonal or impersonal 
The next part of MacCallum’s tripartite conception concerns the type of barrier 
to action y that is considered. MacCallum himself [169] noted that Berlin’s 
distinction between positive and negative freedom could be framed as a choice 
of y. Conceptions of positive freedom operated with a notion of internal, mental 
barriers, where freedom consisted in the ability to control one’s impulses and 
follow one’s principles. Conceptions of negative freedom operated with 
external, interpersonal barriers, since freedom consisted in a condition of non-
interference from other people. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, an enduring 
debate in philosophy was the extent to which positive freedom or negative 
freedom should be considered the “truest” form of freedom. 
 
Feminist philosophers contributed to this debate by arguing over the merits of 
“power-from-within” [125] in relation to traditional notions of power (Section 
3.1.2). Instead of basing their conceptualisation of power on notions of 
interpersonal dominance, and “power-over” other people, they argued for a 
power signalling an inner mental or spiritual strength, “power-from-within”. 
“Power-from-within” was defined as a capacity to overcome self-hatred, 
inferiority complexes, and internalised homophobia and sexism [16,112,184]. In 
political philosophy, Gerald Dworkin [180] defined autonomy in terms of an 
individual’s capacity for rational thought, self-control and freedom from self-
delusion, and argued for its central role in the legal and medical spheres of work. 
Similarly, Paulo Freire and many other philosophers argued that individuals 
often undergo socialisation processes from early childhood through which they 
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come to accept existing oppressive social norms and values as natural and 
inevitable to the extent that alternative social realities become practically 
inconceivable [50,185-187]. Insufficient critical awareness becomes a key 
barrier to engage in action to change such circumstances [50,185,188,189]9. 
 
The practice of using internal notions of empowerment was enthusiastically 
adopted in the field of psychology. Kitzinger’s [184] study of power in feminist 
psychology closely documented how a small self-help industry blossomed in the 
1980s which claimed that women’s own “psychological dependency” on men 
and their lack of respect for their own capacities was “the chief force holding 
down women”. Albert Bandura, founder of self-efficacy theory [182], even 
produced a detailed theory of human agency, where agency was defined in 
terms of four core internal features: intentionality (having intentions behind 
one’s behaviours), forethought (planning behaviours in advance), self-
reactiveness (motivating and regulating one’s actions, thoughts and feelings), 
and self-reflectiveness (reflecting on one’s actions, thoughts and feelings) [193]. 
Koestner and colleagues distinguished between “reactive autonomy” referring 
to a propensity to be resistant to external influences and “reflective autonomy” 
referring to a propensity to only make decisions that result from careful 
reflection over one’s options and interests rather than automatic behaviour, and 
argued that reflective autonomy was superior at promoting psychosocial 
functioning over reactive autonomy [194,195]. 
 
However, many feminist psychologists were in fact dissatisfied with the existing 
emphasis on internal notions of freedom and power. Riger [196] castigated the 
psychological profession for its focus on notions of empowerment which did not 
promote “actual power but rather the sense of empowerment” (p.281) and 
where “the political is made personal and, ironically, the status quo may be 
                                                          
9 Quantitative evidence from political psychology has showed a deterrent effect of “meritocratic” beliefs in a 
just social order on individual propensity to take political action [190,191]. This effect is often a particularly 
pronounced problem in the very populations that are the most disadvantaged by the prevailing social order 
[190,191]. National and international surveys also report higher rates of accepting attitudes towards wife 
beating among women who have experienced intimate partner violence compared to women who have not 
[20,192]. 
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supported” (p.281). Kitzinger [184] argued that such notions of power blamed 
victims of rape and other forms of abuse for their victimhood and reinforced the 
structural drivers of gender inequality. Declaring the “free, autonomous, self-
fulfilled and authentic woman” an “individualist myth” (p.124) [184], Kitzinger 
proceeded to argue for an explicitly political notion of power. Freire [116] was 
emphatic that critical awareness on its own was insufficient for empowerment 
and castigated US notions of empowerment for seeing it in purely internal 
terms. Within the development sphere, Alkire [137] argued that Ryan and Deci’s 
RAI was a better measure of empowerment than Bandura’s self-efficacy 
measure because of its neglect of “external barriers to empowerment”.  
 
However, MacCallum [169] noted that many concepts of freedom also seemed 
to involve barriers that were neither internal nor external and interpersonal, but 
impersonal or due to wider societal forces. For example, the phrase “freedom 
from hunger” signalled a concept where the barriers to being free could stem 
from an extended drought, a failed harvest, a lack of social protection policies, 
or a global recession. In development, studies using exclusively resource-based 
measures of empowerment such as education, household assets, health or 
employment [197] often risk falling into this group, since women are considered 
empowered if any of these improve regardless of whether their interpersonal 
relations or intra-personal conditions change. 
 
Studies using extremely broad definitions of empowerment also implicitly 
include impersonal barriers in their conceptualisation. Wallerstein’s [198] 
definition of “powerlessness” as a “lack of control over destiny” or a 
“generalized lack of control” allowed her to include poverty and unemployment 
as indicators of disempowerment in and of themselves. Certain feminist 
conceptions of the “power-to” concept [126] which sought to avoid the negative 
connotations “power-over” ended up defining “power-to” as a general ability to 
overcome any barrier and achieve, experience or resist any change in any 
dimension. Johnstone [199] first equated empowerment with an expansion of 
human capabilities in Sen’s capabilities framework [39] (effectively equating 
empowerment with the entirety of the development enterprise) and then 
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declared that providing HIV/AIDS patients in South Africa with internet access is 
a form of empowerment in itself. 
 
Thus, in this thesis, we will distinguish concepts of empowerment that are 
internal, external interpersonal, or impersonal. 
 
3.2.4 Type of outcome: Subjective or objective interests 
The last variable in Gerald MacCallum’s formula is z, which denotes the outcome 
than an agent is able to achieve. Theoretically, it is clear that the choice of z 
matters, since not all achievements are equally relevant. For example, repairing 
potholes in the road can hardly be said to disempower local women, even if it 
restricts their “freedom” to fall into a hole on the road [188]. An important 
debate concerning the choice of z is whether the promotion of individuals’ 
“subjective interests” or their “objective interests” should be considered a form 
of empowerment [200]. Theorists are divided over whether every individual 
should determine the relevant outcome z according to their own unique 
standards (“subjective interests”) or whether it is possible to discern at least 
some universally acceptable domains of life (e.g. health) through careful 
reasoning by a group of experts (“objective interests”) [200]. 
  
Expert-driven agenda-setting comes with risks of paternalism due to ignoring 
the voices of individual women and committing to goals deemed irrelevant by 
women themselves [189]. Differences in individual preferences and social 
contexts also mean that some domains may be judged highly relevant for some 
women, but not for others [98,129]. We might also plausibly argue that 
individuals cannot be considered empowered if they do not feel empowered 
themselves [201]. On the other hand, it is widely recognised that individuals 
often have to make important choices under severe information constraints and 
are prone to various cognitive, emotional or behavioural biases even with 
perfect information (see Section 3.2.3). For example, health researchers have 
repeatedly called for improved ‘health literacy’ to provide individuals with the 
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capacity to obtain, understand and act on basic health information in their 
decision-making processes [202,203]. 
 
Amartya Sen argued for a notion of “positional objectivity” [204] where multiple 
objectively valid positions on contentious issues were possible. If we viewed 
certain statements as hidden relative statements whose meaning was relative 
to the speaker’s position in the world. For example, the statement “from here, 
the sun and the moon look similar in size” could be both objectively valid and 
objectively invalid depending on where the speaker was located. If we extended 
the notion of position to an agent’s age, education, access to sources of 
information and social context, then we could start considering “I am a fairly 
empowered woman” to be a positionally objective statement. 
 
However, Sen also admitted that positional objectivity of a statement did not 
entail its truth. For example, a man with limited exposure to astronomical 
evidence might objectively claim that the “the sun and the moon are of the same 
size”, but it could still be an untrue statement in terms of accepted astronomical 
knowledge. Indeed, Amartya Sen argued that people in chronic deprivation 
develop mental adaptations, such as adjusting their desires and expectations for 
life, to cope with otherwise oppressive conditions [39]. These adaptations, 
which Sen called “adaptive preferences” [39], are widely interpreted as denoting 
a form of misperception of one’s own empowerment [189].  
 
Thus, in our classification of concepts we will maintain a distinction between 
subjective and objective interests. 
 
3.2.5 Type of process: Direct or indirect freedom 
One axis of variation in concepts of empowerment that does not match Gerald 
MacCallum’s framework is the type of process that leads to empowerment. A 
recurring debate in the theory of empowerment is whether empowerment 
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should be defined in terms of “direct” or “indirect” freedom10 [153,205,206]. 
Direct freedom refers to direct involvement in realising one’s own goals, while 
indirect freedom allows for third-party intermediaries to help realise one’s goals 
and values, possibly without one’s full awareness. Iversen [205] argued that 
indirect freedom was a disempowering and paternalistic notion, because it 
deprived agents of the opportunity to cultivate self-reliance and decision-
making skills. Without such opportunities, Iversen argued, agents became 
dependent on others to realise their own goals and values and needed to 
continually ingratiate themselves with others to extract desired favours. Indeed, 
Iversen argued, such notions of empowerment would merely serve to legitimise 
the status quo where a male patriarchal household head “supported” female 
household members by ruling over them. 
 
Conversely, supporters of indirect freedom recast dependency as social support 
and saw direct freedom as disempowering, because it burdened agents with the 
entire responsibility of realising their own goals and values without the 
assistance of others. Feminist theorists heavily criticised concepts of 
empowerment based on individualism and “a preference for traditionally 
masculine concepts of mastery, power, and control over traditionally feminine 
concerns of communion and cooperation” (p.279) [196] and called for 
alternatives to an obsession with autonomy and independence to the point of 
“autonomy fetishism” [207] which did not exclude the idea of empowering 
relationships. Riger [196] even argued that the traditional notions of power had 
marginalised behaviour belonging to the communal, expressive, “feeling” realm 
and had led feminists to punish women for making relationships and 
connections central to their lives. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan [208] argued 
that autonomy should be distinguished from independence, because individuals 
could autonomously choose to be dependent on others, if they were perceived 
as supportive and responsive. From a societal perspective, Sen argued that “it is 
often not possible to organise society in such a way that people can directly 
                                                          
10 This distinction has also been referred to as the difference between “effective power” and “choice-mediated 
ontrol” [205], or the difference between “effective power” and “procedural control” [134] or the difference 
between “personal control” and “proxy control” [140]. 
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exercise the levers that control all the important aspects of their personal lives” 
(p.210) [134]. 
 
One illustration of this conceptual divide in development work comes from 
Kabeer [209]’s observation that many academic disputes in the 1990s over the 
impact of micro-credit programmes on women’s empowerment were confused 
by a lack of distinction between “policy-level control” and “management”. 
“Policy-level control” referred to an ability to set an overall direction on loan 
use, while “management” referred to personal involvement in the 
implementation of loan use. Kabeer [209] argued that researchers interpreted 
findings of increased market-oriented work as empowerment, when they 
operated with a management concept of power, where increased independence 
equated to increased power [210], while the same findings indicated 
disempowerment, when researchers used a policy interpretation of power to 
criticise women’s increased physical workloads [211]. Conversely, women’s 
poor knowledge of how their loans were used and their lack of labour input into 
the activities funded by the loan indicated disempowerment under a 
management interpretation [212], but not under a policy interpretation [213]. 
 
Thus, in this thesis, we will distinguish between concepts of empowerment 
based on a notion of direct freedom from concepts based on a notion of indirect 
freedom. 
 
3.2.6 Type of relationship: Neutral, co-operative, or antagonistic 
A closely related axis of variation that lies somewhat outside of MacCallum’s 
framework is the assumed nature of interpersonal relationships. Kabeer [209] 
noted that researchers’ background assumptions on the nature of gender 
relations impacted their interpretation of data on the impact of micro-credit on 
women’s empowerment. Negative evaluations of micro-credit tended to stress 
gender antagonism in the household and discount the possibility of cooperation, 
while positive evaluations tended to assume co-operative relations. For 
example, De Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott and Roy [214] explicitly stated that they 
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only counted women’s as empowered if they were “sole” decision-makers, 
because reports of “joint” decision-making was likely just disguised male 
dominance. On the other hand, Singh [215] only scored women as empowered 
if they were “joint” decision-makers and scored them as disempowered if they 
were “sole” decision-makers, because “joint” decision-making was taken as an 
indication of well-functioning couple communication, while “sole” decision-
making indicated break-down of couple communication and risk of domestic 
violence. 
 
As discussed in Sections 3.2.5, feminist political philosophers strongly argued for 
conceptions of power focusing on individual interconnectedness and nurturing 
relationships due to the perceived masculinist bias of existing notions of power. 
However, Kitzinger argued that critiques of “power-over” as a masculinist 
concept reinforced women’s oppression by perpetuating the myth that the two 
sexes held separate spheres of competence, which had been invoked by 
philosophers “from Aristotle through Rousseau to Freud” to argue for “women’s 
different and (implicitly and explicitly) inferior understandings of political issues 
like justice, ethics and power” (p.115) [184]. Kitzinger also argued that this 
position mischaracterised the work of many male political philosophers such as 
Stephen Lukes or Bertrand Russell who operated with more nuanced notions of 
power than simply the power to dominate. Other feminists caution that 
intransigent conflicts of interests across societal divides are not easily be solved 
through a naïve emphasis on harmony [216]. In particular, they caution that 
invocations of “community”, “family harmony” and the pressures of male 
“breadwinners” carry their own risk of silencing marginalized voices and hiding 
the considerable power differentials that exist within households [146,147,216-
219]. Indeed, Eller [220] opened her article series on concepts of power by citing 
African-American abolitionist Frederick Douglass for his contention that “Power 
concedes nothing without a demand; it never has and it never will”.  
 
Thus, in this thesis, we will distinguish between concepts of empowerment that 
carry implicit assumptions of co-operative or antagonistic relationships or that 
are neutral in their stance on interpersonal relationships. 
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3.2.7 Type of viewpoint: Forward- or backward-looking freedom 
A final axis of variation in notions of empowerment that is poorly captured by 
Gerald MacCallum’s framework is, what we call the “viewpoint” of the concept 
of empowerment. Taylor [179] argued in 1979 that Berlin’s notion of positive 
freedom was an “exercise concept” where the deciding factor for whether an 
individual was considered free was whether their actions were motivated by 
their values and goals. In contrast, negative freedom was an “opportunity 
concept” where freedom consisted of having options available, regardless of 
whether one actually exercised any of these options. Theorists of power also 
distinguished between “episodic” power, which defined power in terms of the 
types of action that were actually undertaken by actors, and “dispositional” 
power, which referred to the potential range of actions that actors could take 
[221]11. 
 
While opportunity notions of freedom saw individuals as free even if they never 
used their opportunities, a symmetrical situation arose with exercise notions of 
freedom. Bavetta [223] noted how conceptions of freedom based exclusively on 
alignment between individual preferences and actions entailed individuals could 
be free even if they never had more than one option to choose from. As long as 
this option was the most preferred option, it did not matter how many extra 
options were added. Similarly, exercise notions of freedom entailed individuals 
could be free, even if they only had a single option to choose from, as long as 
this option was consistent with their own values and goals. 
 
Sen [224] helped bring these ideas into mainstream development discourse 
when he stated that “the process through which things happen may also be of 
importance in assessing freedom” (p.585). Sen [225] distinguished between 
“process freedoms” and “opportunity freedoms”. While opportunity freedoms 
referred to the “opportunity to achieve our objectives” (p.522), process 
freedoms referred to the ability to have “the levers of control in one’s own 
                                                          
11 Another term for this difference was “enacted” versus “potential” power [222]. 
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hands (no matter whether this enhances the actual opportunities of achieving 
our objectives)” (p.522) [225]. Process freedom did not concern which outcome 
was achieved in the end, but whether the process through which this outcome 
was achieved respected individual rights and allowed participants to make their 
decisions without undue pressure or interference from others.  
 
Sen [224] further distinguished between “personal process freedoms” which 
referred to the extent to which individual behaviours in their own personal life 
were self-determined and “systematic process freedoms” which concerned the 
ability of society as a whole to protect individual rights and ensure justice. Alkire 
[226] argued that that Ryan and Deci’s RAI came closest to measuring personal 
process freedoms among existing survey tools and additionally stated that Sen’s 
notion of “personal process freedoms” was actually equivalent to his notion of 
“agency freedom”. Drydyk [148] similarly stated that the core idea of Sen’s 
notion of agency was the extent to which one’s activities were “owned” by 
oneself and that the opposite of agency should be named “alienation”.  Deci and 
Ryan’s paper on SDT indeed dedicated a whole section to reviewing empirical 
evidence on the importance of process titled “The Process of (or Why) Goal 
Pursuits Makes a Difference” [1]. All these interpretations of the notion of 
agency saw agency as essentially concerned with the motivations or reasons 
behind actions and outcomes. 
 
In this thesis, we call notions of empowerment that base their assessment of 
empowerment entirely on the motivation or reason behind an outcome or 
action, “backward-looking”. By contrast, opportunity freedoms are “forward-
looking”, since they defined by looking ahead to see what opportunities might 
lie in the future at any given time point. Of course, backward- and forward-
looking notions of empowerment are not causally separate from one another, 
since it is usually hard to feel intrinsically motivated to perform a task when one 
has no choice, but to do it. On the other hand, we have no empirical grounds for 
assuming they are identical either. Thus, we will distinguish concepts of 
empowerment that operate with a backward-looking viewpoint from those with 
a forward-looking viewpoint. 
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3.3 Conceptualising women’s empowerment in LBW-SAT 
3.3.1 Philosophical approach to empowerment 
The political philosopher Steven Lukes described “power” as an “essentially 
contested concept” [185,227]12. For such concepts, widespread agreement 
exists concerning their practical importance in the real world, while 
disagreement abounds concerning their proper interpretation, let alone 
operationalisation and measurement. These disagreements stem from entirely 
reasonable fundamental differences in philosophical standpoints rather than 
simply differences in linguistic convention, lack of logical clarity, or lack of 
empirical evidence. Thus, definitional disagreements should not be seen as a 
threat to the validity of essentially contested concepts, but rather as an intrinsic 
function of such concepts, since such tensions often create productive and 
creative conversations about fundamental human values. 
 
Like the concept of power, “empowerment” also falls into this class of essentially 
contested concepts. The dispute over whether empowerment should be defined 
in terms of “direct freedom” or “indirect freedom” (Section 3.2.5) is not simply 
reducible to a matter of empirical evidence, because the same set of behaviours 
can be classed in opposite ways depending on whether we decide to call certain 
types of behaviour “encouraging dependency” or “providing social support”. 
Differences in interpretation also cannot be attributed to a lack of logical clarity 
since any reasonable definition of “dependency” or “social support” would 
create contradictory stances on empowerment in practice. Nor can we attribute 
differences in opinion to mere differences in linguistic convention, since 
different interpretations have real consequences for policy and practice. For 
example, the Sustainable Development Goals set an explicit target to “achieve 
gender equality and empower all women and girls” by 2030 [8]. How policy-
makers and programme implementers on the ground interpret the meaning of 
empowerment will influence how this goal is implemented. Thus, the definition 
                                                          
12 Sen also stated that freeom was an “irreducibly plural concept” [226]. 
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of empowerment is not a mere technocratic detail, but an inherently political 
speech act. 
 
However, any attempt at waiting for universal agreement on the meaning of an 
essentially contested concept would almost certainly lead to paralysis in policy 
and research on this subject. A large body of thinking on tackling complexity in 
development policy and research [228] draws a distinction between “puzzles” 
or “problems” on the one hand, and “messes” or “wicked problems” on the 
other. The first class of issues has well-defined, agreed statements, known 
dimensions and variables, and solutions which can be argued for depending on 
the constraints faced. The second class of issues do not have a well-defined 
form, the parameters for solution are incomplete, changing and often 
contradictory, little consensus exists on their most crucial aspects, and no 
obvious test exists of whether a solution has been found, or whether it is indeed 
“right” or “wrong”. In the second class of issues, the scope of the issue itself is 
cannot be understood until a solution has been attempted, but the very effort 
at attempting a solution alters the understanding of the issue and may reveal or 
create other issues. 
 
Studies of women’s empowerment likely belong to this class of issue. For 
example, Jo Rowlands’ [16] seminal book “Questioning Empowerment” as well 
as her doctoral thesis [229] consisted of two detailed case studies of the 
gendered dynamics of power in women’s groups conducted over several years 
of fieldwork in Honduras. In the process of researching the causes, mechanisms 
and outcomes of women’s empowerment, Rowlands had to constantly revise 
the meaning of empowerment that she originally arrived with. In the 
penultimate chapter of both her book and her thesis, she presented a new 
conceptualisation of empowerment that differed dramatically from the original 
conceptualisation in her second chapter. 
 
In this thesis, my approach to studying empowerment will be grounded in 
philosophical Pragmatism [230] which provides an epistemological framework 
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for tackling “wicked problems” [228]. In philosophical Pragmatism, objective 
enquiry is not an enquiry that follows a fixed universal methodological standard 
that will be valid in all situations and for all posterity. Rather, it is a form of 
enquiry that is only settled through open debate with fellow inquirers within a 
community of people holding shared assumptions about theory and 
methodology. Philosophical Pragmatism admits that “ultimate reality” can 
never be apprehended, because all observations are theory-laden, fallible and 
interpreted through an intersubjective process. Rather than attempt to satisfy 
some set of transcendental universal standards, researchers should aspire to 
make warranted assertions that withstand the test of time through unpressured 
peer scrutiny [230]. This enables us to recognise that any conceptualisation of 
empowerment is by intrinsic necessity provisional, while still permitting us to 
provide one to make progress on the subject. As argued by Anita Raj in the 
Lancet, the conceptualisation and measurement of empowerment is always “a 
choice of progress or perfection” [231]. 
 
Critical realism [232] also provides a useful philosophical framework for 
understanding empowerment. Critical realism posits that an external physical 
reality does exist whose fundamental physical constitution exists independently 
of observers, but whose social and symbolic aspects are entirely constructed 
through the social interaction of individuals. Empowerment is one of these 
socially constructed, symbolic aspects of physical reality that is amenable to 
change through collective action. However, critical realism also recognises that 
many social meanings are heavily resistant to change, whether in toto 
“revolutionary” change or in part “institutional change” [232]. While global 
agenda-setting agencies such as the United Nations might be able to affect the 
nature of empowerment itself through defining it in official documents, single 
individuals, or small clusters of individuals, have limited agency to redefine 
widely shared social constructions. Our ability to change the nature of women’s 
empowerment in Nepal by defining its meaning in this thesis is likely quite 
limited. While we acknowledge that the act of defining empowerment can have 
ramifications for the nature of empowerment, we will treat our act of defining 
empowerment in this thesis as an ontologically neutral event. 
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Finally, our axiological position in this thesis sees empowerment as both a 
normatively valued outcome and a behavioural regularity following predictable 
cause-effect relations. Pragmatist philosopher Putnam has repeatedly argued 
against a sharp dichotomy between values and facts [233-235]. Putnam [234] 
calls concepts such as “bravery”, “destitution” or “well-being” “thick ethical 
concepts” (p.34), because statements using such concepts inescapably involve 
judgements of both value and fact. Putnam rejects the idea that such concepts 
can be factored into a purely descriptive component and an attitudinal, value-
laden component, because previous attempts at defining such separate 
components have invariably ended up describing concepts that have little to do 
with the original term itself. For example, defining “brave” to mean “not afraid 
to risk life and limb” would make it impossible to distinguish “brave” from 
“foolhardy”. Rather than see all concepts as potentially classifiable into “value-
laden” or “factual” concepts, a continuum of concepts from the “purely value-
laden” to the “purely factual” might be a more productive classification. Thus, 
we see empowerment as lying in the middle of this continuum by containing 
both normative and positive aspects at the same time. 
 
3.3.2 Conceptualising autonomy in Self-Determination Theory 
In this thesis, we will follow Ibrahim and Alkire’s [59] proposal for using Ryan 
and Deci’s RAI to measure women’s agency, and base our definitions of agency 
and empowerment on Ryan and Deci’s notions of “autonomy” and “self-
determination”13. It is thus important to describe exactly how Ryan and Deci 
define their autonomy concept, since this term is ambiguous. For example, 
debates have occured over whether autonomy should be defined in terms of 
internal or external barriers (Section 3.2.3) or whether it should be based on 
notions of direct or indirect freedom (Section 3.2.5). In Deci and Ryan’s Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) [1], individuals are seen to have intrinsic, 
“organismic” needs for competence, affiliation and autonomy. A canonical 
definition [208] of autonomy that is repeatedly emphasised by Alkire 
[59,137,226] reads as follows: 
                                                          
13 Deci and Ryan use the terms “autonomy” and “self-determination” interchangeably in their writing. 
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 “A person is autonomous when his or her behavior is experienced as willingly 
enacted and when he or she fully endorses the actions in which he or she is 
engaged and/or the values expressed by them. People are therefore most 
autonomous when they act in accord with their authentic interests or integrated 
values and desires” (p.98) 
 
Given the emphasis on the values and desires expressed by individual action, 
the type of motivation underlying action becomes critical to the SDT notion of 
autonomy. Internal motivation are reasons for individual action or inaction that 
are internal to an individual, such as that individual’s own goals, values and 
desires. External motivation are reasons for individual action or inaction that are 
external to an individual, such fear of sanction or a desire to impress others. 
Within SDT, all motivations are seen to be falling on a continuum from the fully 
autonomous to the fully non-autonomous, or “heteronomous” [208]: 
 
• Non-regulation – People do not act at all or simply “go through the 
motions” [1] without reflection; behaviour lacks any semblance of 
intention behind it; 
• External regulation – Behaviour is controlled by external contingencies, 
such as tangible rewards or punishments, imposed by other people 
• Introjected regulation – Control of behaviour comes from contingent 
consequences administered by individuals to themselves, for example in 
case of pride, guilt or shame 
• Identified regulation – The underlying value of a behaviour is recognized 
and accepted as a means to an end rather than a source of intrinsic 
enjoyment and satisfaction, for example when exercising solely for the 
purpose of improving one’s health 
• Integrated regulation – Behaviours have been fully accepted and brought 
into harmony with other aspects of a person’s values and identity 
 
External and introjected regulation are classified as external motivation, while 
identified and integrated regulation are internal forms of motivation. Non-
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regulation is classified as a form of ‘amotivation’ that reflects an absence of any 
form of motivation, whether external or internal. 
 
Parsing this conceptualisation of autonomy in terms of our distinctions in 
Section 3.2, we first note that the agent in question is a single, whole person 
since the canonical definition of autonomy explicitly starts “a person is 
autonomous when…”. This rules out collective interpretations of autonomy, 
such as the autonomy of a community or a group of women. Second, we note 
that the barriers to autonomy are primarily internal. In the canonical definition, 
autonomy is defined in terms of a person’s experienced or stated motivations 
behind their actions. Thus, even if a person’s actions are implicitly in line with 
their own values and goals, these do not enhance their own autonomy, unless 
they are consciously experienced as such. Third, as discussed, the SDT 
conception of autonomy falls on the side of indirect freedom. Fourth, the SDT 
conceptualisation of autonomy takes a backwards-looking viewpoint, as it is 
defined entirely through the motivations that underlie extant behaviour rather 
than the range of possible options for future behaviour. Fifth, SDT arguably takes 
a rather neutral stance on interpersonal relations, seeing them as neither 
inherently antagonistic or cooperative. 
 
However, with regard to the divide between subjective and objective interests, 
SDT theorists take an inconsistent approach. On the one hand, the canonical 
definition of autonomy defines it in terms of the experience of having willingly 
enacted one’s behaviour. Indeed, Ryan and Deci [1] views internalisation of 
social norms in unusually positive terms when they write: 
 
“SDT, with its organismic-dialectical metatheory, proposes that, like intrinsic 
motivation, internalization is an active, natural process in which individuals 
attempt to transform socially sanctioned mores or requests into personally 
endorsed values and self-regulations” (p.235-236) 
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Rather than seeing internalisation as a societal means of co-opting individuals 
to agree with social norms that maintain unequal power strucures, it is instead 
seen in organic terms as a natural, almost physiological process. Incomplete 
internalisation is an internal barrier to autonomy rather than a defense against 
indoctrination and propaganda in this conceptualisation. 
 
On the other hand, the canonical definition of autonomy insists that people are 
most autonomous when they act in accordance with their “authentic” interests. 
Ryan and Deci [1] maintain that some goals and values are so contrary to the 
human needs for competence, affiliation and autonomy that they cannot be 
internalised as truly authentic interests. Ryan and Deci [1] states that they 
“suspect that a cultural value for genital mutilation, and a cultural more that 
boys should not cry, are practices that … cannot be integrated within the self” 
(p.247). The authors proceed to introduce the idea of “acquired motives” which 
include motives for “wealth, image and fame” or “abasement, acquisitiveness, 
achievement, and dominance” (p.249). These are supposed to result from 
unconscious psychological processes that create substitute needs when 
individiduals’ basic needs are not met [1]. In their recommendations for 
therapeutic practice, Ryan and Deci [236] propose a vital role for therapists in 
fostering awareness and mindfulness in individuals over their own blocked or 
suppressed emotions and helping them contact their true basic needs. Thus, 
Ryan and Deci are not shy of positing that individuals can be mistaken about 
their own motives and values.  
 
However, Ryan and Deci’s contention that we can distinguish authentic interests 
from acquired motives by checking whether these motives satisfy basic needs 
for competence, affiliation and autonomy is circular. Autonomy is defined in 
terms of an individuals’ authentic interests, so it does not make sense to then 
define authentic interests in terms of individual autonomy. Thus, Ryan and Deci 
do not provide any substantive basis for distinguishing between the “natural” 
norm-internalisation process that converts societal norms into authentic values 
and the “unnatural” motive acquisition process that uses societal pressures to 
create spurious needs. We might read SDT as advocating for a heavy emphasis 
on subjective interests with a small dose of scepticism towards apparent 
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endorsements of individual goals and values, but Ryan, Deci and their colleagues 
have not provided a clear description of how this balancing act would work out 
in practice. 
 
3.3.3 Comparing Sen’s “agency” with the notion of “autonomy” in SDT 
In his foundational paper on agency, “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The 
Dewey Lectures 1984”, Sen [134] defined agency freedom, or just “agency”, as 
“A person’s “agency freedom” refers to what the person is free to do and 
achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important” 
(p.203). Alkire [137,226] repeatedly stated that SDT theorists’ notion of 
autonomy was close to Sen’s notion of agency freedom. Indeed, both schools of 
thought define their concept in terms of an alignment between one’s actions 
and one’s values and goals. Both schools of thought work with the individual as 
their agent of choice rather than the collective. Both have rather neutral 
assumptions about interpersonal relations and emphasise the importance of 
indirect freedom over direct freedom. 
 
Both schools also maintain rather similar positions on the divide between 
subjective and objective interests. Drydyk [148] interpreted Sen’s notion of 
agency as endorsing purely subjective interests and saw Sen as conceiving 
agency purely in terms of what people happened to value rather than what they 
had reason to value. On the other hand, Alkire [153] maintained that Sen’s 
notion of agency concerned “a person’s ability to act on behalf of things they 
value and have reason to value” (p.2, emphasis mine) and argued that Sen’s 
notion of agency contains both subjective (“things they value”) and objective 
(“[things they] have reason to value”) components.  
 
The original writings of Sen himself are ambiguous. In “Well-Being, Agency and 
Freedom”, Sen [134] seemingly endorses the position of subjective interests, 
when he writes: 
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“A person’s agency aspect cannot be understood without taking note of his or 
her aims, objectives, allegiances, obligations, and – in a broad sense – the 
person’s conception of the good … Agency freedom is freedom to achieve 
whatever the person, as a responsible agent, decides he or she should achieve. 
That open conditionality makes the nature of agency freedom quite different 
from that of well-being freedom, which concentrates on a particular type of 
objective and judges opportunities correspondingly” (p.203-204) 
 
However, in the next line, Sen argues that one must apply “discipline” to one’s 
assessment of the conception of good rather than take “anything that appeals” 
at face value: 
 
“This open conditionality does not imply that the person’s view of his agency 
has no need for discipline, and that anything that appeals to him must, for that 
reason, come into the accounting of his agency freedom. The need for careful 
assessment of aims, objectives, allegiances, etc., and of the conception of the 
good, may be important and exacting. But despite this need for discipline, the 
use of one’s agency is, in an important sense, a matter for oneself to judge.” 
(p.204) 
 
Thus, in a rather similar way to SDT theorists, Sen lays heavy emphasis on the 
subjective interests of each individual, while allowing for some margin of error 
in the determination of their own interests. Like SDT theorists, Sen also does not 
provide guidance for how subjective and objective interests are to be balanced 
in practice. Indeed, in “Rationality and Freedom”, Sen explicitly acknowledges 
that this issue is “enormously complicated” and that he does not have a “great 
solution to offer” (p.570) [224]. 
 
Furthermore, Sen’s notion of agency differs importantly from SDT theorists’ 
notion of autonomy in one important respect, namely its treatment of barriers 
to action. Sen puts much greater emphasis on external barriers to action, as he 
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does not define agency in terms of the motivations that people consciously 
experience or endorse, but rather in terms of any alignment between their 
actions and their goals and values, whether implicit or explicit. Sen [134] makes 
this clear by providing an example of a person who chooses a course of 
treatment for their friend who was injured in a car accident and unconscious. 
Sen argued that by making the choice that their friend would have chosen 
themselves if they had been conscious, the friend’s agency freedom would be 
effectively enhanced. Sen proceeded to cite a scenario of the state clearing the 
streets of muggers as a case where “our freedom is being well-served, even 
though we have not been given control over the choice of whether to be mugged 
or not” (p.210) [134]. These examples show that Sen considers changes in 
individuals’ external circumstances agency-enhancing, even if no changes in 
agents’ internal, mental state have occurred. The examples also show that Sen 
had a relatively broad conception of the types of external barriers that might 
arise, including impersonal barriers in the case of clearing the street of muggers.  
 
Finally, both Drydyk and Alkire argued that Sen’s notion of agency takes an 
essentially backward-looking viewpoint (Section 3.2.7). However, Sen’s own 
writings seem compatible with either backward or forward-looking viewpoints. 
For instance, Sen provided an example of a person eating their sandwich at the 
beach and being confronted with a man who is about to drown right in front of 
them. Sen saw this as an example of an agency-enhancing situation due to the 
presence of an opportunity to save a man from drowning. This is clearly forward-
looking conception of agency, because it concerns an increase in the availability 
of opportunities. 
 
Conversely, Sen provided examples of agency that had a distinctly backward-
looking feel, such as Sen’s aforementioned example of having a friend choose 
one’s treatment on one’s own behalf, which evaluates agency on the basis of an 
action that has already been enacted. Sen’s main definition of agency in “Well-
Being, Agency and Freedom” [134] as “what the person is free to do and achieve 
in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important”  (p.203) 
seems to allow for either. 
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3.3.4 Defining agency and empowerment 
In this thesis, we distinguish between “societal empowerment”, “community 
empowerment” and “individual empowerment”. “Societal empowerment” 
denotes the complete elimination of social exclusion, oppression, exploitation, 
marginalisation and violence along the lines of gender, race, ethnicity, caste and 
class through a process of grassroots mobilisation through popular education. 
This was arguably the concern of radical feminists from the 1970s and also 
comes closest to Freire’s recommendation for more widespread usage of the 
term “social class empowerment” [116]. 
 
“Community empowerment” denotes the capacity of a local community to 
coordinate, mobilise and enact plans to provide public goods for its residents, 
resolve conflict and disputes in an equitable and peaceful manner, and solve 
existing problems in partnership with formal institutions. This concept has long 
been the concern of community psychologists, even before Freire and his 
colleagues wrote about empowerment [237]. However, over time, it has been 
made to fit Freire’s philosophy through the interpretations of Nina Wallerstein 
[52,198,238,239]. This concept is arguably one of the main outcomes of 
programmes to promote community-driven development and participatory 
governance by the World Bank [240]. It is also central to the drive for 
involvement and participation of communities in formal health systems within 
the UN Global Strategy for Women and Children [241] and the WHO Framework 
for Integrated People-Centred Health Services [242].  
 
In this thesis, we will exclusively concern ourselves with empowerment at the 
individual level. This is because the focus of our impact evaluation is not on 
explaining how participatory women’s groups achieve their health outcomes, 
but rather on their value in promoting agency as an outcome in itself14. We 
define “individual empowerment” in the same way as Ibrahim and Alkire, 
namely as “the expansion of agency” [59] and treat the terms agency and 
empowerment as roughly coterminous15, unless we explicitly state otherwise.  
                                                          
14 Appendix A also contains further discussion of our choice of empowerment concept. Chapter 10 contains a 
discussion of how we might measure Freirean notions of empowerment in future work. 
15 Note that Alkire has not maintained a consistent position on the relationship between agency and 
empowerment. In 2005, Alkire stated that “empowerment” referred to a subset of the dimensions of agency 
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We define “agency” thus: 
 
Main definition: A person’s “agency freedom”, or just “agency”, refers to the 
extent to which this person’s enacted behaviour takes place in accordance with 
their enduring interests, values and desires in the face of internal and external 
barriers to achieving such behaviour. The process of removing such barriers 
increases agency whether it involves antagonism or co-operation with others. 
Individuals also do not need to be personally involved in removing such barriers, 
but can rely on third parties to help them do so.  
 
Regarding interests, values and desires: These must be enduring and resistant 
to change in case the person is engaged in a period of unpressured self-
reflection and dialogue with others offering possibly contrary views. 
 
Regarding the barriers: Internal barriers include undesirable feelings of guilt, 
shame or low self-confidence, but exclude a lack of knowledge or awareness of 
impersonal facts. A shift in understanding of what constitutes a good life may 
constitute removal of an internal barrier, but only if this results in enduring 
change in the person’s interests, values and desires. External barriers include all 
forms of interpersonal pressure such as coercion, physical force, manipulation, 
or deception as well as any unwillingness or inability to lend support to the 
person in question by her immediate social network contacts. 
 
                                                          
that focused particularly on the instrumental value of agency, such as the ability to cause positive changes in 
one’s well-being or realise one’s values [137]. However, in 2007 Ibrahim and Alkire offered two new 
contradictory accounts of the relationship between empowerment and agency. In one, empowerment was seen 
as the “expansion of agency” [59] and thus somewhat coterminous with agency. In another account, citing the 
work of Alsop et al. [243], empowerment contained two components, agency and opportunity structure. While 
agency focused on the ablity of individuals to act, opportunity structure referred to their institutional 
environment. In this account, empowerment was a superset of agency [59]. None of these accounts were 
compatible with the 2005 position where empowerment was a subset of agency [137]. Drydyk also noted how 
“Alkire, for instance, sometimes switches from [agency] to [empowerment] in mid-sentence, on one occasion 
noting that they are ‘related but often differently defined’” [148]. 
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This definition of agency leans heavily on both Sen’s conception of agency and 
SDT theorists’ autonomy concept. As with SDT theory, this definition naturally 
invokes notions of internal and external motivation, because it defines agency 
in terms of the extent to which the reasons for one’s behaviour lie with one’s 
enduring interests, values and desires rather than fear of sanction from other 
people. The main difference between our own, Sen and SDT theorists’ notions 
lies in the conception of barriers to agency. 
 
First, we include only the internal barriers to agency from the definition of 
“introjected regulation” in SDT (see Section 3.3.2), i.e. feelings of guilt, shame or 
low self-confidence that create a fear of self-punishment unless individuals act 
to alleviate their own guilt or bolster their self-esteem. We thus exclude poor 
self-control as an internal barrier. We also exclude external impersonal barriers 
to agency, such as a lack of transport links to the health facility, in our definition. 
Unlike Sen, we do not view any change in an individual’s external circumstances 
that fits with their own goals and values as agency-enhancing regardless of 
whether they have any personal connection to this change. For instance, Sen’s 
example of reducing mugging in the community arguably fits better with the 
community empowerment conept than individual empowerment. 
 
Within the context of LBW-SAT, we need to clearly distinguish women’s 
empowerment from general improvements in their well-being. Since most 
women likely value their children’s survival, growth and development as an end 
in itself, a notion of agency freedom that includes impersonal barriers to agency 
would conflate agency with the main trial outcome, namely reducing low birth 
weight. For the same reason, we do not include a lack of knowledge or 
awareness of impersonal facts such as basic health literacy [202] as an internal 
barrier to agency. This would make most pregnant women attending women’s 
groups empowered by definition, since the vast majority of such women are 
likely to acquire at least some new information on healthy self-care behaviours 
during pregnancy that they did not know before. 
 
Chapter 3 
Women’s empowerment: Theory and measurement 
 
75 | P a g e  
 
Instead, we only include external interpersonal barriers in our definition. These 
can include overt forms of pressure such as coercion or physical force, but also 
more subtle forms of pressure such as manipulation and deception. We also 
include a lack of social support as a barrier that is overcome, for example when 
a pregnant daughter-in-law successfully convinces her mother-in-law to spend 
money on her maternity care. This is in keeping with our basic assumption that 
agency can come about either through antagonism or co-operation. We restrict 
the type of people under consideration to the immediate social network to 
exclude people with influence over one’s life who have no personal relation with 
oneself. For example, the Prime Minister of Nepal is not a relevant external 
barrier to women’s agency freedom, because we are only trying to remove 
barriers to healthy behaviour at the local level within the LBW-SAT trial. 
 
Second, with respect to people’s values, interests and desires, we define agency 
only in terms of people’s “enduring” interests and desires rather than their 
“authentic” or “integrated” interests as in SDT. This avoids the difficult question 
of establishing the authenticity of a person’s interests. SDT theorists do not 
address this question themselves, since they invariably use the RAI to measure 
autonomy [208] without gauging whether respondents’ expressed intrinsic 
motivations are truly authentic or not.  
 
We also avoid taking individual perceptions of their own interests at face value, 
by stipulating that such interests must be “enduring”, i.e. they must be in some 
way deeply held, so that periods of individual reflection or dialogue with others 
offering possibly contrary views does not suddently change their perceptions of 
these values. This definition follows the spirit of Pragmatist philosophy in 
defining interests and values using real-world social interactions rather than 
abstract, universal principles. It is also the approach suggested by Serene Khader 
[189] in her “deliberative perfectionist” account, where she advocated 
deliberating with deprived people to understand why they had the preferences 
they had and whether they were attached to them. Only if their preferences 
seemed inappropriate after such deliberation, did Khader suggest helping 
people imagine a different future for themselves. 
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Thus, we do not subscribe to the view of SDT that internalisation of social norms 
is an organic, natural and largely unproblematic process that always results in 
greater individual agency (see Section 3.3.2), since individuals might teach 
themselves to tolerate deprivation as a mental coping strategy16. However, we 
also do not consider a poor “understanding” of the good life as a barrier to 
women’s agency, because such a concept implies that there can be a “correct” 
understanding of the good life according to some transcendental, universal 
standards [244], which is incompatible with our Pragmatist approach to studying 
empowerment. 
 
Instead, we highlight the importance of distinguishing apparent interests from 
“enduring” interests that are truly resistant to change in the face of unpressured 
self-reflection and critical dialogue. Women’s internalisation of gender norms 
often starts from a young age when they are heavily dependent on others to 
survive, are subject to strong pressures to conform, and are deprived of access 
to information on alternative values and views. Such conditions hardly fit to the 
Pragmatist ideal of unpressured reflection and critical dialogue. If such values 
and goals would change as a result of unpressured reflection and dialogue, we 
would not consider women’s internalised norms as their enduring values. If, on 
the other hand, they do persist, we respect women’s decision and assess their 
agency freedom on the basis of these values and goals. 
  
                                                          
16 This is what Berlin [177] has called the “doctrine of sour grapes”, Sen [39] called “adaptive preferences”, and 
feminists have named “internalised oppression” [16]. 
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Table 2. Structure of the original LBW-SAT tool for measuring agency freedom using the 
Relative Autonomy Index before undergoing adaptation described in Chapter 4 
Domain Questions 
Work outside the home 
Do you work inside, outside the house or both? 
[If she performs work outside] What type of work do you do? 
[If she performs work outside] Please indicate whether you fully 
agree/partially agree/partially disagree or fully disagree: 
a) I do this work because I have to 
b) I do this work because I will get into trouble if I don’t 
… 
[If she does not perform work outside] Please indicate whether you fully 
agree/partially agree/partially disagree or fully disagree: 
a) I do not work outside the home because I can’t 
b) I do not work outside the home because I will get into trouble if I 
do 
… 
Household chores  
Who performs household chores in your house? 
Please indicate whether you fully agree/partially agree/partially disagree 
or fully disagree: 
a) I do these activities because I have to 
b) I do these activities because I will get into trouble if I don’t 
… 
Health-seeking 
Where do you seek help in case of severe health problems? 
[If she seeks help for health problems] Please indicate whether you fully 
agree/partially agree/partially disagree or fully disagree: 
a) I seek health-care the way I do because I have to 
b) I seek health-care the way I do because I will get into trouble if I 
don’t 
… 
[If she does not seek help for health problems] Please indicate whether you 
fully agree/partially agree/partially disagree or fully disagree: 
a) I don’t do anything because I can’t 
b) I don’t do anything home because I will get into trouble if I do 
… 
Group participation 
Do you participate in any groups? 
[If she participates in groups] Which groups do you participate in? 
[If she participates in groups] Please indicate whether you fully 
agree/partially agree/partially disagree or fully disagree: 
a) I participate in groups because I have to 
b) I participate in groups because I will get into trouble if I don’t 
… 
[If she does not participate in groups] Please indicate whether you fully 
agree/partially agree/partially disagree or fully disagree: 
a) I do not participate in groups because I can’t 
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3.4 Measuring women’s empowerment in LBW-SAT 
3.4.1 Measuring agency using the Relative Autonomy Index 
The tool used in LBW-SAT to measure agency was based on a survey tool used 
by the Oxford Poverty and Human development Initiative in Chad, which itself 
was based on Deci and Ryan’s RAI17. An abbreviated overview of this tool is 
provided in Table 2. The tool contains four similarly structured sections 
concerning women’s agency in the domains of ‘work outside the home’, 
‘household chores’, ‘health-seeking’ and ‘group participation’. 
 
Each section attempts to capture a women’s agency in a specific domain, hence 
each section opens with a framing question requiring the respondent to provide 
specifics on her behaviour in the domain under examination. As an example, in 
the section on ‘work outside the home’, the respondent would first be asked if 
she performs work inside the house, outside the house or both inside and 
outside. If the respondent replies that she performs work outside the house, she 
is asked to provide specifics on what type of work she performs. The framing 
question serves to prime the respondent to think of their agency only in the 
particular domain that is being assessed.  
 
This is followed by a series of statements about the influences that motivate her 
to behave the way she does. Each statement refers back to the specific answer 
provided in the framing question in order to anchor the participants’ thought 
processes in the domain under assessment. For example, if the respondent sells 
milk from her own cattle, then in the following series of statements, she will be 
asked the extent to which she sells milk from her own cattle because she wants 
to, it is personally important, she likes it, because she is forced to, she will get 
into trouble otherwise or she is afraid of others’ ill-judgment. 
 
The woman is then asked to agree or disagree with each statement on a 4-point 
Likert scale. In case respondents report that they do not perform an action, they 
are instead asked about their motivations for refraining to perform the action in 
                                                          
17 Survey modules can be found at: http://www.ophi.org.uk/research/missing-dimensions/survey-modules/  
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question. For example, if a woman does not work outside the home, she is 
subsequently asked why she does not work outside the home. Is it because she 
does not want to, because it is not important to her, because she does not like 
it or because she is forced to refrain from working outside the home? 
 
The recommended scoring for this tool by the Oxford Poverty and Human 
development Initiative is a weighted sum of Likert scale scores. Statements are 
categorized according to the categories of external, introjected, identified and 
integrated regulation from SDT (Section 3.3.2), following the same approach as 
Vaz, Pratley and Alkire [61]. The categorisation of statements into regulation 
types are listed in Table 3. Statements reflecting external regulation were score 
-4 points per level of agreement, whereas statements indicating introjected 
regulation score -2 per level of agreement. Statements reflecting identified or 
integrated regulation score +3 points per level of agreement, as respondents 
have been observed in the past to lack a clear distinction between the forms of 
motivation in low-income contexts [245]. Finally, amotivation items scored 0 
points indicating inability to make choices due to a lack of motivation. 
 
Table 3. Classification of statements into motivation types in the original pilot tool 
Regulation type Statement 
Amotivation I do X because I have to. 
External regulation I do X because I will get in trouble if I don’t 
Introjected regulation I do X so that others don't think badly of me 
External regulation I do X because I might get punished if I don’t 
External regulation I do X because I get a benefit if I do it. 
Identified regulation I do X because I think it is valuable 
External regulation I do X because that is what other people tell me to do.  
Integrated regulation 
I do X because I personally think it is the right thing to do, 
whether or not others agree. 
Integrated regulation I do X because I enjoy it. 
External regulation I do X so that others won’t get angry with me. 
Introjected regulation I do X because I want people to like me. 
Integrated regulation I do X because it is personally important for me. 
Introjected regulation I do X to please other people 
 
In many respects, this survey tool matches our notion of agency freedom quite 
well. First, the tool measures the agency of an individual person in a variety of 
domains of life. Second, the tool measures agency from a backward-looking 
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viewpoint, as it asks respondents about the motivations behind their actions 
rather than potential future actions they might be able to take. Third, it is neutral 
concerning whether agency involves overcoming antagonism or receiving social 
support. Reduced antagonism may result in higher scores, if individual action 
ceases to be motivated by fear of punishment or anger. Increased social support 
may also result in higher scores, if individuals previously undertaking a task for 
reasons purely related to force of necessity, become supported to stop doing 
the task. In that case, the tool fully allows for respondents to answer that they 
do not work outside the home, because it is not important, valuable or desirable 
to them, not because anyone has forced them to stay at home. From this 
example, we also see that the tool does not favour independence and direct 
freedom over indirect freedom, since women who have chosen to stay at home 
score just as highly on our tool as women who have chosen to work outside the 
home. 
 
Fourth, by measuring the full range of motivations in Ryan and Deci’s conception 
from external to integrated, the tool takes both internal and external barriers 
into account in its assessment of individual agency. Items such as “I do this work 
so that others won’t get angry with me” are supposed to measure external 
barriers to agency, because the presence or absence of an external threat of 
punishment decides women’s level of agency. Items such as “I do this work 
because I want people to like me” are supposed to reflect an internal barrier to 
agency, because it primarily reflects a fear of self-punishment through feelings 
of rejection and low self-esteem that the respondent is pressured to ignore their 
personal values and goals18. The external items focus in turn on interpersonal 
relations with people in the respondents’ immediate social network, namely the 
people who might potentially get angry with the respondent or punish them for 
non-sanctioned behaviour. At the same time, the tool excludes impersonal 
barriers to agency by scoring the amotivation item “because I have to/can’t” 0. 
By excluding items such as “I don’t work outside the home, because I do not 
                                                          
18 It is certainly conceptually possible that a fear of others’ anger is entirely internal, if no actual external threat 
of punishment existed, but the fear was entirely psychological. Similarly, in contexts where respondents’ well-
being and survival depend crucially on being liked by others, a motivation to be liked may contain external 
components as well as internal components. In Chapter 4, we question the ability to distinguish introjected from 
external forms of regulation using this tool in our context based on our validation data. 
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know of suitable vacancies for me”, the tool also excludes a lack of knowledge 
or awareness about impersonal facts from our measurement of agency. 
 
One important point of difference between what this tool measures and what 
our ideal notion of agency denotes is the role of subjective versus objective 
interests. In our definition, we state that only enduring interests, values and 
desires should be taken into account when assessing an individual’s agency. 
However, our tool takes respondents’ changes in expressed interests at face 
value and scores them accordingly. Ideally, we would elicit such interests, values 
and desires through the Pragmatist ideal of unpressured reflction and dialogue 
with others, similar to Khader’s [189] deliberative perfectionist account of 
agency. Such an approach is taken in the qualitative methodology known as 
Participatory Action Research [246], where local women conduct the academic 
evaluation of specific interventions in partnership and dialogue with each other 
and with the external research team. 
 
However, existing participatory approaches do not necessarily approximate the 
Pragmatist ideal very well. Participatory action projects can be abused by 
development organizations to rubber stamp interventions rather than create 
true dialogue [113]. Patron-client relations may develop between local 
participants and local implementing organisations [247]. Dialogue between local 
participants and implementation organisations may only involve powerful local 
elites rather than poorer, deprived stakeholders [248]. Group dynamics 
frequently reported in social psychology such as the tendency to take greater 
risks in groups or the tendency to impose conformity through group pressures 
can lead to sub-optimal group decisions [249]. Khader [189] acknowledged that 
her deliberative perfectionist ideal was not a practical prescription for any 
specific intervention. 
 
Furthermore, the use of such a research methodology would practically amount 
to a participatory women’s group intervention on its own, since it involves 
extensive periods of reflection, engagement and dialogue with other women in 
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the community. In order to avoid contaminating the design of the larger trial by 
potentially altering women’s agency freedom through our research methods, 
we did not use participatory action research in this thesis.  
 
3.4.2 Possible alternative measures of agency freedom 
Reviews of measures of women’s empowerment [33,132,250] have repeatedly 
noted the presence of a set of commonly used measures of empowerment. 
These include resource-based measures of empowerment, such access to 
material resources, education and participation in politics, household decision-
making and physical mobility, and bargaining power in the spousal relationship. 
 
3.4.2.1 Resource-based measures 
Resource-based measures of empowerment usually measure access to material 
resources, education or participation in politics. Interpretation of such measures 
as measuring agency freedom requires a presumed link between access to 
resources and power in interpersonal relationships. However, empirical 
analyses have also revealed a largely inconclusive evidence base for the 
existence of a causal relationship between access to material resources, 
education or political participation and more direct measures of women’s 
empowerment, such as decision-making power in the family (see Appendix B). 
Observational studies also show inconsistently varying correlations between 
direct measures of empowerment and resource-based indicators [61]. 
Furthermore, the use of resource-based proxies for empowerment in empirical 
research intrinsically prevents researchers from separating the causes or effects 
of empowerment from empowerment itself [251]. For example, we would not 
be able to tell, using the proxy measure of education, whether women’s 
education causes or is caused by greater empowerment among women. 
 
Thus, we have both theoretical and empirical reasons to suspect that purely 
resource-based measures are ill-suited to studying women’s empowerment in 
this thesis.  
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3.4.2.2 Spousal bargaining power 
Spousal bargaining power is conceptualised as a difference in fall-back positions 
in case of non-cooperation or divorce within the spousal relationship. The 
spouse who is the most resilient to a relationship breakdown is thought to have 
the greatest bargaining power, while the spouse who would suffer inordinately 
(e.g. by being unable to fend for their own survival economically) is considered 
to have the least bargaining power. Studies using bargaining models thus 
operate with a notion of empowerment that works with external barriers to 
individual freedom, as fall-back positions are determined by markets and prices 
rather than individuals’ psychological coping mechanisms. At the same time, the 
concept of bargaining power allows for indirect freedom, since a spouse is 
considered empowered, when household expenditures follow their own 
preferences, even if this happened without conscious effort (e.g. if their spouse 
anticipated and accommodated their desires in advance of them stating them). 
Furthermore, bargaining power is often thought of in forward-looking terms as 
a factor that opens up opportunities for people to influence how the household 
budget is spent. Further, bargaining studies operate with a notion of 
empowerment based on women’s objective interests, since women themselves 
are not consulted over whether greater power over the household budget 
relative to their husband is indeed desirable. Finally, the concept of bargaining 
power contains strong assumptions of gender antagonism, since wives who 
depend economically on their spouses are inherently thought of as having low 
bargaining power. 
 
Many rearchers have criticised the concept of spousal bargaining power, arguing 
that it ignores female-female relationships such as with the mother-in-law [252] 
which may constitute stronger and more salient sources of oppression.  For 
example, in the Nepal context, the husband may in fact be perceived to be a 
potential ally of the daughter-in-law vis-à-vis the mother-in-law [22]. 
Researchers have also argued that a focus on female bargaining power in the 
spousal relationship ignores the social pressures of masculinity on men and 
marginalises husbands who desire involvement in “women’s issues” [253-255]. 
Demasculinising pressures of poverty and inequality may create the feelings of 
insecurity that induce aggressive male behaviour in the first place [256]. 
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Researchers argue that the intersectional issues of poverty, inter-caste and 
inter-class discrimination may loom larger in women’s lives than their bargaining 
power over their husband [96,149,209,252]. Poor women may be unlikely to 
narrowly focus on equality with men when it is “blatantly clear to them that men 
are not equal amongst themselves” (p.468) [149]. Sociologists Vogler and Pahl 
[257] also noted how the wives’ role as managers of household money in low-
income households in the UK was not experienced as empowering, because the 
household budget was so constrained that few choices were available in the first 
place. Indeed, the division of labour allowed husbands to blame their wives for 
mismanagement of funds when their own incomes were insufficient [257]. Thus, 
increased bargaining power does not equate to increased agency, since women 
may not prioritise or even desire increased bargaining power in their spousal 
relationship. 
 
From a methodological point of view, bargaining studies are problematic as they 
overwhelmingly infer changes in bargaining power from observed changes in the 
allocation of household expenditure. For example, studies have found that that 
greater female shares of household income are associated with greater 
expenditure on food [4,258-260]. This creates certain methodological problems, 
since in order for such shifts to indicate greater bargaining, an a priori 
assumption is needed that the observed changes in household expenditure (e.g. 
more food) are aligned with the preferences of women themselves [4]. Since 
evidence for this assumption is rarely presented, ambiguous interpretations 
often result.  
 
For example, Kabeer’s [209] study of competing interpretations of the impact of 
micro-credit on women’s empowerment noted how conflicting interpretations 
emerged over observed shifts in household expenditure towards consumption 
rather than investment following receipt of loans. Some authors interpreted 
such shifts as evidence for greater weight given to women’s preferences, while 
others saw them as evidence that women’s ability to make decisions on loan use 
had been compromised by social pressures to cover the consumption needs of 
their family members. Ngo and Wahhaj even presented a mathematical model 
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where shifts in budget allocations reflected decreased bargaining power, 
because female income was co-opted by household members who wished to 
invest it in their own productive assets [261]. 
 
In this thesis, we will refrain from using measures of bargaining power to proxy 
for agency freedom. However, the notion of “bargaining power” will be used in 
Chapter 5 as a useful theoretical concept within a wider theory of change to 
explain why we do or do not see an impact on agency freedom from the LBW-
SAT trial19. 
 
3.4.2.3 Decision-making power and physical mobility 
In decision-making questions, women are typically asked if decisions in a 
particular domain, e.g. household purchases, are made exclusively by them, 
exclusively by their spouse, exclusively by another family member, jointly with 
their spouse, jointly with another family, or in any other way. In questions on 
mobility, women are usually asked if they go out of the house to visit various 
locations (e.g. the marketplace), either alone or accompanied by someone else, 
or if they need permission to go out of the house to visit these same locations, 
either alone or accompanied by someone. 
 
These questions operate with a notion of external, interpersonal barriers in the 
family environment to individual empowerment. For example, a woman living 
in a crime-ridden area who feels more self-confident about going out alone at 
night does not register as more empowered by typical questions on mobility, if 
her family already allows her to leave the house whenever she wants to. In 
addition, such questions do not incorporate impersonal barriers in their notion 
                                                          
19 The backward-looking nature of the agency concept makes it difficult to express ideas about power in a 
forward-looking manner. For example, we would like to be able to express a notion of women having greater 
opportunities in general because they have gained access to employment or become a mother-in-law in their 
family. Saying that women’s overall agency freedom has increased would not be congruent with this, because 
increases in backward-looking notions of freedom are potentially compatible with a lack of change in forward-
looking freedoms (Section 3.2.7). Thus, “bargaining power” is a useful auxiliary concept to enable us to talk about 
multidimensional changes to a person’s overall household position due to better fallback positions. 
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of empowerment. If the head of household only has one effective choice about 
what type of rice to buy, because it is the only rice available on the market, then 
they are still the main decision-maker on household purchases, unless other 
household members make this decision for them. If a woman is unable to visit 
the local clinic, because an earthquake has destroyed local transport links, she 
is still empowered according to mobility questions, if her family members do not 
stop her from going out of the house. 
 
Decision-making questions favour indirect freedom, since it does not matter if 
women are personally involved in implementing their own decisions as long as 
they are the ones making the decision. Mobility questions, on the other hand, 
favour direct freedom, since they place a clear emphasis on women’s physical 
independence. Women are not considered empowered according to mobility 
questions, if household purchases are carried out for them by other household 
members. Rather the ability to go and make their own purchases is considered 
empowering. In decision-making questions, the degree to which household 
relations are assumed to be co-operative or antagonistic depends on the scoring 
scheme (see Section 3.2.6). Mobility questions tend to assume only antagonistic 
relations; if women report needing permission before going to visit the 
marketplace, this is not interpreted as family members caring about their well-
being, but rather family members seeking to control their physical movements. 
 
As noted by Alkire [153], both questions on household decision-making and 
physical mobility measure empowerment according to women’s objective 
interests rather than their subjective interests, because it is a priori assumed 
that women have an interest in being able to make decisions in the domains that 
are queried or to visit the locations that are surveyed. At the same time, both 
questions operate with either a forward- or a backward-looking viewpoint 
depending on how they are phrased. Decision-making questions that ask women 
“who usually makes decisions about X” use a backward-looking viewpoint, since 
it is not about who has the opportunity to make decisions about X, but about 
who actually makes decisions about X in practice (under an assumption that if 
they do not make decisions about X, it is because they can’t rather than because 
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they do not want to). On the other hand, decision-making questions that ask 
women “who has the final say about X” use a forward-looking viewpoint, since 
it is about who is able to potentially influence decisions about X in the future 
rather than who is usually involved in influencing such decisions. Similarly with 
mobility, questions such as “do you usually go and do errands outside the house 
on their own?” take a backward-looking viewpoint since they measure whether 
women’s enacted behaviour is freely chosen or not (with a background 
assumption that women actually want to do errands). On the other hand, 
questions such as “do you need permission to go visit the marketplace?” take a 
forward-looking viewpoint, because they concern women’s future opportunities 
rather than their current enacted behaviour. 
 
Since the types of decisions that are queries are selected in advance by survey 
researchers, this leaves decision-making and mobility measures vulnerable to 
criticism that they ignore the values, desires and interests of local women 
themselves. For example, researchers have criticised the use of independent 
mobility as a measure of empowerment, as this may be undesirable for women 
where male accompaniment is a sensible means of physical protection and 
practical support. Societal seclusion norms may confer prestige, family support 
and self-esteem on women who conform to norms. In such contexts, 
researchers argue, unaccompanied mobility may be a sign of poverty and lack 
of social support rather than a signal of independence or authority 
[10,149,209,262]. Similarly, sole decision-making in a domain may reflect a lack 
of willingness by other household members to take responsibility for household 
matters and provide social support [10,209,252,262,263]. Specific domains of 
decision-making may be important in one setting, but entirely irrelevant in 
another [129]. Since few studies using these two types of questions have used 
follow-up questions on the desirability of mobility and decision-making in the 
locations and domains queried, the evidence base on women’s attitudes 
towards mobility and decision-making remains quite sparse.  
 
From a methodological standpoint, South Asian studies find strong social 
desirability pressures on respondents to present the husband as the main 
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decision-maker, regardless who actually makes decisions [10,209,252,262,263]. 
Spouses also differ dramatically in perceptions of decision-making authority 
when asked to provide simultaneous responses in comparative surveys [264-
267]. In Nepal, one study found that 29-53% of couples disagreed on how 
decisions were made depending on the domain of decision-making [267]. One 
reason for this discrepancy may be due to the complexity of the decision-making 
process itself, which includes multifaceted social acts such as agenda-setting, 
information-manipulation, bargaining, claiming one’s rights, subversion and 
resistance [268-270]. Such complexity is not easily captured with a single 
reductive question on “who makes decisions”. 
 
Although the methodological weaknesses of mobility and decision-making 
questions are not easily rectified, these measures can be made to accord better 
with an emphasis on subjective interests as opposed to objective interests. For 
example, Peterman et al. [271] aimed to measure “ideal” decision-making 
power by asking respondents if the people who actually made decisions in the 
household. Ibrahim and Alkire’s [59] suggested following questions on decision-
making with a question on whether the respondents were able to participate in 
these decisions, if they really wanted to. Similar modifications could in theory 
be made to questions on mobility. 
 
Thus, in this thesis, we included questions on decision-making on food and 
major expenditures. However, we followed Ibrahim and Alkire’s suggestion by 
following up with asking respondents who reported not participating in 
decision-making whether they could participate if they wanted to. Such 
modifications increased the match the concept targeted by these measures and 
our own notion of agency, which has a heavy emphasis on women’s own 
subjective interests. 
 
3.4.3 The multidimensionality of empowerment 
Empowerment is often described as a multidimensional phenomenon, whose 
different domains do not move in lockstep [132]. Empirical evidence for this 
usually comes from quantitative studies showing a poor correlation between 
Chapter 3 
Women’s empowerment: Theory and measurement 
 
89 | P a g e  
 
measures of empowerment in different domains and qualitative studies 
showing examples of women who seem empowered in one domain, but 
disempowered in others. For example, one multi-country study of women’s 
decision-making power across multiple domains of application found only 
moderate correlation (<0.35) between domains [250]. Liddle and Joshi’s [98] 
study of professional women in India reported numerous examples of civil 
servants, doctors and university lecturers who made powerful public decisions 
in their professional life on a daily basis, but nevertheless deliberately assumed 
a submissive persona in front of their husbands. Sammon and Santos [250] also 
reported multiple qualitative studies where women were simultaneously 
powerful mothers, but excluded from the labour market by social convention, 
or economically powerful and independent in the market, but sexually and 
socially submissive in the domestic arena. 
 
On the other hand, different domains of empowerment are unlikely to be 
completely causally disconnected. In the field of psychology, debates over 
generalized versus specific constructs have been characterized as a debate 
between “lumpers” – who seek to aggregate narrow concepts into broad 
concepts – and “splitters” – who seek to make fine distinctions by splitting broad 
constructs into their constituent elements [272]. For example, Bandura [273] 
has repeatedly claimed that “generalised self-efficacy” does not exist, because 
self-efficacy is a “multi-dimensional” [140] domain-specific construct. Bandura 
maintains that the self-efficacy construct only attains adequate predictive 
validity as a scientific construct when one examines “microrelations at the level 
of particular activities” [140] such as a sports player’s perceived self-efficacy in 
winning a particular game against a particular opponent in a particular setting. 
Yet, Judge, Erez, Bono and Thoresen [272] conducted a series of studies where 
they concluded not only that generalised self-efficacy was a valid construct, but 
that it was empirically difficult to distinguish from an array of other constructs 
in psychology such as self-esteem, neuroticism and locus of control. As a result, 
the authors questioned the usefulness of maintaining a conceptual distinction 
between all these constructs [272]. Indeed, highly specific questions about big 
concepts may produce more reliable, but less valid measurement, as the 
questions become over-specific for the concept in question [274]. 
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Within the development literature, we may note that theoretical conceptions of 
bargaining power usually ignore domain-specificity, as it is represented as a 
unitary parameter that weights the degree to which budget expenditures and 
labour allocations take one party’s preferences into account over the other 
[5,260,275]. This parameter is determined by different parties’ fall-back 
positions and in turn determines a wide range of multidimensional outcomes. 
For example, Doss’ [4] review describes a diverse list of outcomes to greater 
bargaining power that have been shown by empirical studies including: 
investment in children’s health and education, suicide rates among women, 
survival rates of girls and boys, time allocation between leisure and labour, and 
prenatal care-seeking. At face value, it seems unlikely that increases in 
bargaining power would impact all the above outcomes simultaneously in a 
single individual, but it also seems plausible that these domains are not all 
disconnected from one another. Similarly, within the anthropological literature, 
family power is often described in broad, multidimensional terms, even if such 
power may not be completely general. For example, the mother-in-law in the 
Maithili family is often seen to have broad, multidimensional powers over her 
daughter-in-law (Section 3.2.2) that range from dictates on how the daughter-
in-law carries out her cooking duties to how, where and when she sleeps. 
 
Thus, the degree to which empowerment is truly multidimensional remains an 
unsettled empirical question. Some factors may induce broader changes in 
women’s circumstances than others. Some domains may be sufficiently closely 
related that they behave in essentially similar ways, while others may be so 
unlike one another that there is no common behavioural regularity between 
them. In this thesis, we will be careful to specify the domain in question to which 
our concept of agency applies. When we are applying the agency concept more 
broadly to signify an overall congruence between an individual’s actions and 
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Chapter 4 
Development and validation of a scale 
for measuring women’s agency in Nepal 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the RAI was proposed for use as a standardised and internationally 
comparable survey for the measurement of women’s empowerment [59], little 
published work exists to examine the hypothesis that it is indeed valid for use 
across sites in low-income contexts. To our knowledge, only one published study 
from Chad [61] and one unpublished study from Bangladesh [276] have reported 
on the measurement properties of the RAI in low-income contexts. It remains 
an important empirical question whether a contextually sensitive construct such 
as agency can or should be measured using a standardised measure based on 
the RAI. Indeed, persistent concerns regarding the context-sensitivity of 
empowerment-related measures have undermined the scope for comparative 
research in the past [251]. 
 
In this section, we present the analysis of baseline data collected to inform the 
development and adaptation of our pilot survey tool (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1) 
to measure our notion of agency freedom for women in the rural plains of Nepal. 
It should be noted that the work from this Chapter has now been published by 
the author of this dissertation [277]. 
 
4.2 Methods 
The study used mixed methods to check for: 1) content validity to ensure 
consistency between researcher and respondent understanding of 
questionnaire items [278] 2) reliability to ensure the instrument is free of gross 
random error [279], and 3) construct validity to verify that the instrument 
enables the researcher to make sound inferences [280]. We explored content 
validity through think-aloud interviews and discussions with field staff. We 
assessed reliability using spot checks of previously filled questionnaires and 
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calculations of inter-rater variability in empowerment scores. We assessed 
construct validity using factor analysis and comparison of empowerment scores 
across a priori predictive categories of empowerment. 
 
The data were collected and analysed in three phases (Figure 2). First, a pilot 
questionnaire was administered and construct validity of the survey data was 
assessed using exploratory factor analysis and convergent validity analysis 
between October and December 2013. Reliability of the survey data were 
assessed using measures of inter-rater variability and test-rest reliability. 
Secondly, between January and February 2014, qualitative think-aloud 
interviews were conducted with local women, and a focus group discussion 
(FGD) was held with interviewers from the first stage of surveying. We analysed 
the results of this qualitative round to explore content validity and modified the 
pilot questionnaire to create the adapted version of the questionnaire. Finally, 
we conducted further think-aloud interviews and collected quantitative data in 
May 2014 using the newly adapted tool. Confirmatory Factor Analysis verified 
construct validity and qualitative analysis verified content validity.   
 
This approach allowed the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies to explore content and construct validity, which cannot be 
adequately assessed with one method alone [281]. While statistical methods 
may be able to tell us if the tool behaves numerically as expected, they cannot 
tell us if the items in the tool are perceived as reflecting intrinsic or extrinsic 
motivation in the minds of the respondents. Nor can they tell us why 
respondents may have difficulty providing answers to certain questionnaire 
items or how the questionnaire should be modified. Conversely, qualitative 
methods are limited in their sampling and cannot inform us about the 
population distribution of responses or whether respondent answers are 
correlated in expected or unexpected ways. Referring to the three phases in 
Figure 2, Phase II and Phase III contained qualitative components, while Phase I 
and Phase III contained quantitative components. Section 4.2.1 will describe the 
qualitative components of this study, while Section 4.2.2 will describe its 
quantitative components.  
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Phase I: Quantitative methods 
 
Data collection using pilot questionnaire 
1 Calibration sample (n=511) 
 
Analysis 
1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
2 Analysis of Convergent Validity 
3 Inter-rater reliability 
4 Test-retest reliability 
 
Phase II: Qualitative methods 
Data collection using pilot questionnaire 
1. Think-aloud with local women (n=7) 
2. Focus group discussion with interviewers from Phase I 
 
Analysis 
1. Content Validity 
 
Action 
1. Creation of adapted questionnaire 
Phase III: Mixed methods 
Data collection using adapted questionnaire 
a) Think-aloud interviews (n=2) 
b) Validation sample (n=509) 
 
Analysis 
• Content Validity 
• Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Figure 2. Flow of data collection for the validation and adaptation of the scale to measure 
women’s empowerment 
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4.2.1 Qualitative data collection and analysis 
4.2.1.1 Think-aloud interviews 
The main approach to assessing the content validity of the tool was through 
think-aloud interviews, an interviewing methodology derived from social and 
cognitive psychology [282]. In traditional ‘rehearsal’ piloting methods, 
interviewers run through questionnaires with a participant while an observer 
notes down length, flow, salience and ease of administration. In think-aloud 
interviews, the interviewer asks the respondent how they went about answering 
the survey question. Think-aloud interviews allow researchers to explore 
whether respondents understand the concept behind a question or are simply 
providing answers out of politeness. They complement statistical techniques by 
exploring not only whether the survey tool captures the underlying concept or 
not, but why it would not capture that concept and what changes would 
improve its cognitive-conceptual fit. 
 
4.2.1.2 Sample 
In January 2014, I conducted unstructured interviews with four local field 
employees in Nepali and English about women’s role in the household and 
society in order to gather information about context. Trained qualitative 
researchers and employees of MIRA Neha Sharma (NSh) and Kabita Sah (KS) 
conducted seven think-aloud interviews with female respondents in the field. I 
observed all seven think-aloud interviews. I had purposefully selected them 
from the trial surveillance system to reflect both high and low socioeconomic 
status, high and low levels of education and Hindu and Muslim faiths (Table 4). 
NS and KS digitally recorded four interviews and translated these directly into 
English. Three participants refused to be recorded so NS made notes 
summarising each statement, and translated these into English. NS and KS 
conducted interviews in Maithili and Nepali, their native language. I conducted 
one FGD with the fieldwork team who had collected data using the original pilot 
questionnaire in English and Nepali to identify problematic questions and 
triangulate our preliminary findings from the think-aloud interviews. I took 
notes during the FGD. In March 2014, I shortened and modified the pilot 
questionnaire and NS recorded and conducted two additional think-aloud 
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interviews using the revised questionnaire. NS translated recorded interview 
into English from Maithili. 
Table 4. Summary of participants in think-aloud interviews 
 
4.2.1.2 Analysis 
For analysing the think-aloud interviews collected in our first round of 
qualitative data collection (Phase II in Figure 2), I applied framework analysis 
[283] using each motivation type from our survey tool as a pre-defined code. I 
used the content of transcripts to fill a two-dimensional framework matrix, 
labelling rows by respondent and domain of application and columns by 
motivation types. I generated a summary of every respondents’ general 
understanding of each motivation and exctracted illustrative quotes. I used my 
observation field notes to inform the analysis process by marking out points of 
tension, lack of comprehension or disturbance by other family members during 
interviews. I used data from the unstructured interviews to inform the analysis 
process by providing context for the interpretation of the think-aloud data. I 
used data from the FGD to check the consistency of my findings with their 
experiences of the local field team, noting points of contrast and points of 
agreement. Finally, I compared the responses to the think-aloud interviews in 
our last round of qualitative data collection (Phase III in Figure 2) to the think-
aloud interviews in the first round of data collection (Phase II in Figure 2) to 
assess changes in cognitive fit between target concepts and respondents’ 











1 20 Low Illiterate Hindu Yes Original 
2 20-30 High Unknown Hindu No Original 
3 40 Low Illiterate Hindu No Original 
4 25-30 Medium Illiterate Hindu Yes Original 
5 20 Low 
Quranic School up to 5th 
level Muslim 
Yes Original 
6 20 Low Could read with difficulty Muslim Yes Original 
7 45 High 
Studied up to 10th 
standard Hindu 
No Original 
8 20 Low 
School Leaving 
Certificate (SLC)  Hindu 
Yes Revised 
9 25 Medium 
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4.2.2 Quantitative data collection and analysis 
4.2.2.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
I used Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to study the fit between the empirical 
behaviour of indicators and the structure of agency proposed by SDT. The 
mathematical details of the EFA are presented in Appendix D.  EFA is a statistical 
method for uncovering the underlying structure of a set of indicators. By 
choosing the statistical model that best models correlations between the 
indicators, it allows the analyst to summarize the interrelationships between a 
large set of variables in terms of a smaller set of dimensions called “factors” 
[284]. A number of approaches exist to assess the fit of a particular factor 
structure including the number of factors: Use of a scree plot [285], the Kaiser 
criterion [286] and use of fit statistics such as Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 
and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR) [287]. 
 
In the “scree plot” method, the approximate additional variance explained by 
adding another factor against the total number of factors is plotted. This 
approximate amount of variance accounted for is called the “eigenvalue” of the 
factor and the ideal number of factors is selected based on where a `kink’ is 
perceived to exist in the scree plot [285]. The Kaiser Criterion limits the choice 
of factors by ruling out factors with eigenvalue greater than 1 [286]. 
 
For the RMSEA and the SRMSR, a good fit is indicated by a value less than 0.06, 
an adequate fit by a value less than 0.08 and a poor fit by a value greater than 
0.08. For the CFI and TLI a good fit is indicated by a value greater than 0.95, an 
adequate fit by a greater than 0.90 and a poor fit by a value less than 0.90 [287]. 
It is generally recommended to avoid exclusively relying on statistical indicators 
of model fit and to consider whether the emergent factor structures are 
substantively plausible in deciding on the final number of factors [288].  
 
4.2.2.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory Factor Analysis seeks to reveal the underlying structure in an 
exploratory, inductive fashion. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) seeks to 
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confirm or refute a pre-specified model of factor structure [284] using the fit 
statistics RMSEA, SRMSR, CFI and TLI with the same cut-off values for adequacy 
of model fit as in Exploratory Factor Analysis. The mathematical details of the 
CFA are presented in Appendix D. Since Confirmatory Factor Analysis is used to 
verify pre-existing theory rather than generate new theory, we can use 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis to verify the factor structure hypothesized during 
Exploratory Factor Analysis, using an independent sample from the same 
population. The sample on which we performed Exploratory Factor Analysis is 
called the calibration sample and the sample on which we performed 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis the validation sample.   
 
4.2.2.3 Sample 
Trained local field workers collected a calibration sample of interviews from 511 
women between the 1st of October and the 1st of December 2013, using the pilot 
questionnaire. Respondents constituted randomly selected women who were 
enrolled in the trial surveillance. To be eligible for the trial surveillance study, 
women needed to be aged between 10 and 49, married and neither widowed, 
divorced nor separated. Women who had family planning surgery or whose 
husbands had a vasectomy were also excluded. From 25th of April to 25th of 
August 2014, field workers also interviewed 509 randomly sampled women 
satisfying the same eligibility criteria, using the revised questionnaire. This 
constituted the validation sample. All the data collected from participants were 
collected in anonymous form. I have stored it in a confidential file location that 
only I can access. Table 5 displays participant characteristics from the calibration 
and validation samples. 
 
Although the father-in-law was usually the head of the household (41-42%), the 
respondent herself was household head in 11-17% of the population. 80% of 
women were between the ages of 19 and 34 and 63-67% of the sample could 
not read. The rate of participation in any groups was very low (7-10%). 
Additionally, 15-25% experienced months without enough food for family 
needs, 46-51% of husbands were working outside of Nepal, 14-16% of women 
were Muslim, the rest Hindu, and 65-70% had already had two or more 
pregnancies (data not shown in table).  
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Table 5. Baseline characteristics of participants in calibration and validation samples 
 Sample  Sample 
Address Calibration Validation 
Where would you go if you had 
simple health problems? Calibration Validation 
Husband’s family home 488 (96%) 493 (97%) Public sector health institution 77 (15%) 92 (18%) 
Respondent’s natal home 21 (4%) 16 (3%) 
Private medical centre, clinic, nursing 
home or hospital 89 (17%) 71 (14%) 
Other 2 (0.4%) 0 (0%) Pharmacy/Medical Shop 294 (58%) 308 (61%) 
    Other specify 19 (4%) 13 (3%) 
Head of household in husband’s home   Don't do anything 29 (6%) 19 (4%) 
Husband 129 (25%) 162 (32%) Don't know 3 (1%) 6 (1%) 
Father-in-law 213 (42%) 210 (41%)     
Mother-in-law 67 (13%) 57 (11%) 
Do you voluntarily participate in any 
group?    
Other man from husband's household 9 (2%) 4 (1%) Yes 34 (7%) 53 (10%) 
Other woman from husband's household 6 (1%) 4 (1%) No 477 (93%) 456 (90%) 
Woman herself 87 (17%) 56 (11%)     
Unknown 0 (0%) 16 (3%) Literacy    
  
 
 Cannot Read 320 (63%) 343 (67%) 
Husband working outside Nepal  Reads with difficulty 114 (22%) 71 (14%) 
No 252 (49%) 273 (54%) Reads easily 77 (15%) 95 (19%) 
Yes 259 (51%) 236 (46%)     
Age Of Woman (years)   
Which type of work are you involved 
in?    
<=18 51 (10%) 33 (6%) Indoor Work 314 (62%) 283 (56%) 
19-24 182 (36%) 196 (39%) Outdoor Work 6 (1%) 14 (3%) 
25-34 223 (44%) 209 (41%) Both 191 (37%) 212 (42%) 
35+ 55 (11%) 71 (14%)       
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I tested and compared two scoring methods for compiling survey responses into 
a single index. First, I scored the results using the fixed scoring scheme described 
in Section 3.4.1. Second, I performed an Exploratory Factor Analysis on our 
calibration sample and created scores using Empirical Bayes estimation (see 
Appendix D). I also created a Confirmatory Factor Analysis model based on the 
results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis by retaining factor components with 
loadings of magnitude greater than 0.05 and predicted maximum a posteriori 
factor scores for the underlying latent factors. I predicted factor scores for each 
domain of agency separately and summed the scores across domains and 
normalized them to standard deviation 1 and mean 0. For the purposes of 
comparability, I normalised scores from the fixed scoring scheme to standard 
deviation 1 and mean 0. 
 
4.2.2.3 Construct validity 
I tested the Construct validity of the tool by inspecting the results of factor 
analysis and comparing them to the predictions of SDT. I also performed an 
analysis of convergent validity (Seppälä et al. 2009) by comparing the final score 
across characteristics expected to vary with their agency freedom (age, parity, 
socioeconomic status, education, caste, decision-making power). I assessed the 
strength of evidence was assessed using linear regression adjusted for clustering 
using Huber robust variance estimators. I checked the internal consistency using 
Cronbach’s alpha and by performing Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the 
validation sample using the factor structure hypothesized from Exploratory 
Factor Analysis on the calibration sample. 
 
4.2.2.4 Reliability 
I checked the inter-rater reliability by estimating the intra-cluster correlation for 
differences in agency scores across field workers using a linear random intercept 
model. I checked the test-retest reliability of the tool by getting field workers to 
re-interview six purposively selected women from the calibration sample. Four 
re-interviews checked the household chores and health seeking domains 
amongst women with average scores from the fixed scoring scheme and the 
remaining two checked work outside the home and group participation amongst 
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I carried out all analyses involving exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis in 
Mplus 7.11. I carried out all analyses involving calculation of fixed scores or 
regression analysis in Stata/MP 13. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Factor analysis 
Figure 3 shows a scree plot of eigenvalues associated with factors for each 
domain separately. Group participation results should be used with caution due 
to its small sample size (n=34). Across all domains there was a `kink’ at two or 
three factors. According to the Kaiser Criterion [289] two factors was the 
maximum, as the third eigenvalue was less than one. With respect to fit indices, 
two factors achieved a good fit or borderline good fit for work outside the home 
(RMSEA 0.048, TLI 0.98, SRMSR 0.052), household chores (RMSEA 0.050, TLI 
0.97, SRMSR 0.037), health seeking (RMSEA 0.077, TLI 0.96, SRMSR 0.043) and 
group participation (RMSEA 0.091, TLI 0.986, SRMSR 0.067) whereas lack of 
work outside the home (RMSEA 0.106, TLI 0.89, SRMSR 0.057), and non-group 
participation (RMSEA 0.126, TLI 0.93, SRMSR 0.42) displayed a poorer fit and 
only achieved a good fit with three factors (RMSEA and SRMSR<0.05, TLI>0.95). 
 
Figure 4 displays the factor loadings for a two-factor solution across domains as 
well as the scores from the fixed scoring system. Factor 1 loaded predominantly 
on items related to getting into trouble, being told to do things, avoiding others’ 
anger, wanting others to like oneself and pleasing others. Factor 2 loaded 
predominantly on items related to getting a benefit, doing things that are 
valuable/necessary, the right thing to do or things that were personally 
important. Items relating to the statement “because I have to/I can’t” loaded on 
both Factor 1 and Factor 2. Factors consistently loaded on the same items across 
all domains except non-group participation except for the statement “because I 
have to/I can’t”.  
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Work Outside the Home (n=197) Lack of Work Outside the Home (n=314) Household chores (n=505)
Health seeking (n=508) Group Participation (n=34) Lack of Group Participation (n=477)
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Based on the manner in which the two factors favoured some items over others, 
related directly to the classification in Self-Determination Theory (Section 3.3.2): 
Factor 1 related to external pressure for behaviour, while Factor 2 related to 
internal motivation for behaviour, while the amotivation item “because I have 
to/I can’t” loaded on both Factor 1 and Factor 2. By comparison, the three-factor 
solution was considerably less consistent across domains (see Figure 5) and did 
not display substantially improved fit statistics (RMSEA 0.00-0.87, TLI 0.952-
1.00, SRMSR 0.024-0.045). On balance, we opted for the two-factor solution. We 
added factor scores for Factors 1 and 2 respectively from each domain and 
normalized the total to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. These total scores we 
henceforth refer to as Factor E and Factor I. The scores were well approximated 
by a normal distribution, although ceiling effects were observed. 
 
Recall that participants worked outside the home or participated in groups 
would be asked statements relating to their motivations for engaging in these 
behaviours, while participants who did not work outside the home or did not 
participate in groups would be asked about their motivations for refraining from 
the same behaviours. Thus, some participants would be asked positively worded 
questions (reasons for engaging in behaviour), while others would be asked 
negatively worded questions (reasons for refraining from behaviour). One 
concern associated with this change of wording is the fact that the positive or 
negative wording might in itself incline participants to respond differently to the 
survey item. In psychology, ‘acquiescent response bias’ [290] refers to a 
tendency to answer items affirmatively irrespective of their content. 
 
Figure 6 displays the proportion of participants who fully or partially agreed with 
each statement in the domains that had both a negatively and positively worded 
version. While positively worded items relating to internal motivation have 
higher agreement rates than negatively worded items, this was not consistently 
the case with external motivation. Using linear regression with Huber robust 
adjustment for clustering, we found considerably greater differences in the 
number of items agreed to among statements relating to internal motivation 
(mean difference (MD) 2.0, p<0.001 for work outside the home; MD 1.7, p<0.001 
for group participation) than for external motivation (MD 0.63, p=0.004 for work 
outside the home; MD 0.09, p=0.826 for group participation). 
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4.3.2 Reliability 
In terms of test-retest reliability, the proportion of matching questionnaire 
items were: 89% for household chores, 79% for health seeking, 54% for work 
outside the home, and 33% for group participation. Caution in interpreting these 
results is required as the sample size is small and an interval of two months 
elapsed between survey administration and spot-checks.  
 
In terms of inter-observer reliability, the intra-cluster coefficient (ICC) for Factor 
I was 0.48 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.66), 0.39 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.57) for Factor E and 0.20 
(95% CI 0.09 to 0.36) for the scores from the fixed scoring system. This suggests 
substantial inter-observer variability for Factors I and E, as more than 39% of the 
variation was attributable to differences between observers, and somewhat 
lower variability for the scores from the fixed scoring system. The proportion of 
women interviewed by each field worker reported to agree to all or all but one 
of the statements varied from 0-20% in work outside the home, 0-70% in 
household chores, 0-82% in health-seeking and 0-47% in group participation. 
The high inter-rater variability is a cause of concern and is expanded upon in 
Section 4.4. 
 
4.3.3 Construct validity 
Figure 7 shows the results of a convergent validity analysis. The figure shows 
how scores on Factor E, Factor I and the fixed scoring scheme predicted from 
Self-Determination Theory vary according to socioeconomic and health-related 
covariates. Factor E and the scores from the fixed scoring scheme varied in 
expected directions. For example, older women, women with greater parity and 
women staying in their parental home also had higher scores from the fixed 
scoring system and lower levels of Factor E. We also observed that highly 
educated, wealthy, high-caste women who make decisions in the household 
received lower scores on Factor E and higher scores on the fixed scoring scheme. 
However, only moderately wealthy or educated women displayed similar or 
greater scores on Factor E to the extremely poor or uneducated. This suggested 
an inverted J or inverted U-shaped relationship between socioeconomic status 
and external pressure. The interpretation of this will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
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Factor I was often in the opposite direction to that predicted by theory. 
According to Self-Determination Theory, external and internal motivation are 
opposites on a continuum [1]. Higher scores from our fixed scoring system, 
lower Factor E scores and higher Factor I scores were thus theoretically 
predicted to co-occur. But Factor I moved in the same direction as Factor E 
across all predictors except the number of pregnancies. The Pearson correlation 
between Factor E and Factor I was 0.64. Factor correlations in our Exploratory 
Factor Analysis were also positive and ranged from 0.33 to 0.66. Indeed, the 
same group of educated, wealthy and high-caste women displayed lower levels 
of Factor I rather than higher levels as would be expected, while there was no 
evidence for a difference in levels of Factor I (p>0.22) in terms of age, parity or 
place of residence. The positive correlation between Factor E and Factor I will 
be further discussed in Section 4.4. 
 
In terms of discriminant validity, having a female as opposed to a male 
interviewer was associated with lower scores from the fixed scoring system (-
0.38, p=0.038) and higher scores on Factor E (0.23, p=0.17). Factor I scores did 
not change materially according to the gender of the interviewer (0.07, p=0.70). 
The presence of other household members at the interview was also correlated 
with lower scores from the fixed scoring system (-0.33, p=0.004) and greater 
Factor E scores (0.37, p=0.002), while being unrelated to Factor I scores (0.03, 
p=0.79). Thus, women who were interviewed in the presence of neighbours or 
other family members were likely to report greater external pressure than 
women who were interviewed alone. 
 
The positive correlation between Factor E and Factor I was robust to adjustment 
for presence of external observers and the identity of the interviewer with one 
unit increase in Factor E being associated with 0.59 units increase in Factor I 
(p<0.01, 95% CI 0.46 to 0.72). The repercussions of this correlation between 
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4.3.4 Content Validity 
Table 6 presents the analysis of the think-aloud data. After an initial reading of 
the think-aloud data, it became apparent that women’s understanding of 
questionnaire items did not differ substantially across different domains, as long 
as the type of motivation reflected by the item remained the same (e.g. 
“because I have to” versus “because it is personally important to me”). Hence, 
results in Table 6 are grouped by type of motivation rather than by domain. 
While there was some divergence in local and intended understandings of some 
questions, respondents did not struggle with understanding or articulating the 
motivations behind their actions. However, a number of issues requiring 
resolution did emerge during an analysis of the think-aloud data. 
 
4.3.4.1 Redundancy from high semantic overlap between items 
The statements related to fear of others getting angry with them, punishing 
them, “getting into trouble”, losing their reputation and the need to be 
ingratiating were difficult to distinguish from each other. Responses for these 
reflected a generalised fear of scolding and hope of praise if the respondent 
conformed to social norms. On the other hand, the items on personal 
importance and doing the personally right thing seemed to be interpreteted 
from a general moral and personal perspective rather than as distinct items.  
 
This was supported by quantitative data from the calibration sample, which 
showed high Spearman correlations between motivations. In particular, 
“because I will get into trouble” correlated highly with “because I might get 
punished” (0.57-0.68 depending on domain), “so that others don’t get angry 
with me” correlated with “so that others don’t think badly of me” (0.36-0.57), 
“because I want to please other people” correlated with “because I want others 
to like me” (0.44-0.68) and “because it is personally important to me” correlated 
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Table 6. Results from think-aloud interviews (N=7) 
 
  
Motivation Narrative Description Illustrative Quote(s) 
Because it is 
personally the 
right thing to 
do whether or 
not others 
agree 
Respondents elaborated that they 
performed their actions of their own 
initiative, out of self-interest or out of 
a sense of moral propriety or duty. 
One respondent even defined moral 
rightness in terms of obeying one's 
guardian. 
"I go because of my self-interest whether other 
people tell me to go or not" - Respondent 3 
 
 "Our elderly people used to tell us to go for 
work whatever people say, to go for work and 
not to beg food of anyone else. And that is 
why I completely agree." - Respondent 6 
Because I have 
to/I can't 
Respondents conveyed a sense of 
being unconditionally compelled to 
assume responsibility over work, the 
household and their children, because 
nobody else was willing to step in and 
take over the work as well as fear of 
scolding by other family members. 
 
"I strongly agree, because I have children at 
home and so I have to do it to look after 
them." - Respondent 4 
 
"I will have to do this work and anyhow 
nobody will do the work." - Respondent 7 
Because others 
will get angry 
otherwise 
Participants tended to interpret this 
question in terms of the need to 
maintain harmony in the family and 
avoid conflict, scolding or even 
physical abuse. 
"Listen, if you say something and I also say 
something then there might be a fight 
between us. If my guardian scolds me and I 
don't say anything back then she won't fight 
with me and there will be no conflict between 
us." - Respondent 4 
Because I want 
people to like 
me 
Respondents emphasized the ability to 
garner praise and avoid scolding from 
family members. While some 
respondents did not care about non-
family members, others enjoyed 
impressing outsiders. 
"Other people will look at me and will say they 
have visited my home. They will say my home 
is very clean, my children are very good. When 
people get together and talk about me, they 
will say my home is very clean." - Respondent 
6 




Respondents interpreted personal 
importance in terms of either personal 
welfare or necessity, the latter meant 
coping with poverty and taking up 
work that nobody else was willing to 
do. 
"Yes, it is personally important for me to do 
this work, because I am the only one to do all 
this household work at my home." - 
Respondent 7 
Because I want 
to please 
others 
There is no translation of the verb "to 
please" into Nepali/Maithili that 
preserves the submissive connotations 
in the English. The closest translation 
was "Because I want to make others 
happy". Respondents tended to agree 
that they were concerned for other 
people's welfare. 
"I strongly agree, if I don't work outside then 
everybody will be pleased." - Respondent 5 
 
"We should be happy ourselves and also make 
other people happy." - Respondent 4 
 
"Others' happiness is my happiness." - 
Respondent 6 
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Motivation Narrative Description Illustrative Quote(s) 
Because I enjoy it 
There are two possible Maithili translations 
for the verb “to enjoy”, majja and nek. 
Majja connotes fun, celebration, sensuality, 
while nek connotes general goodness and 
appreciation. When asked if their work 
brought them majja, respondents 
vigorously disagreed, emphasizing that they 
were forced by their poverty to work 
despite physical and emotional pain. 
However, when asked if they felt nek about 
their work, respondents readily agreed. 
"Since I am ill, but I still have to do this 
work, how can I enjoy/majja it? ... You 
better write down that I am sick and I 
have to work! Everyone wants to sit 
inside and eat food at home just like 
you people don't like coming out into 
the village to ask us questions." - 
Respondent 3 
Because I will get 
into trouble 
otherwise 
The Nepali/Matihili translation of this 
motivation literally means "Because I will be 
scolded otherwise". Respondents discussed 
their fear of scolding if they contravened 
their guardian's orders or the possibility of 
praise if they fulfilled their duties well. 
“I strongly agree, because people will 
say good things about me if I do my 
work.” - Respondent 1  
 
"I strongly disagree. Since my guardian 
will not permit, then surely I will be 
scolded if I do work outside." - 
Respondent 2 
Because others 
will think badly of 
me otherwise 
Respondents who agreed with this question 
referred to their fear of scolding and the 
opportunity for receiving praise from family 
members. Two respondents did not care for 
others' opinion. 
 "I have to do all of the work, so why 
won't I agree with it? I do all of this 
work, so that I will be praised by 
everyone and so that my family 
members will also appreciate me." - 
Respondent 6 
Because I might 
get punished 
otherwise 
Respondents unanimously interpreted this 
question to refer to scolding. 
"Because I will be punished if I force my 
way outside the home. I will be 
strongly scolded and that is my 
punishment." - Respondent 7 
Because I might 
get a benefit 
Respondents listed the perceived benefits 
in response to this question: Ability to feed 
the family, family happiness and 
cleanliness, alleviation of health problems, 
benefits from group membership such as 
credit and savings. 
“I strongly agree, I will be given 
medicines and if I don’t go to Janakpur 
hospital for treatment, I will have more 
severe health problems in the coming 
days.” - Respondent 1 
Because it is 
valuable 
We found no respondents understood the 
word arthpurn. When using 
jaruri/"necessary" respondents understood 
the question, but this does not capture the 
aspect of value that goes beyond necessity.  
"[jaruri] Yes, this is important. I 
strongly agree. Actually, it is not 
important to me. This work could have 
been done by my daughter or my 
daughter-in-law. Don't you think that 
we should take rest at this stage of 
life? And because my daughters and 
my daughter-in-law don't do this work, 
I have to do it." - Respondent 6 
Because other 
people tell me to 
When "other people" was interpreted to 
mean non-family members, respondents 
tended to disagree and emphasize their 
own will. When "other people" was 
interpreted to mean family members, 
however, respondents tended to agree. 
 "If you are asking me if other people 
are telling me to do the work or not, 
then my neighbours don't tell me to do 
any of the work. Do you really think, 
sister, that my neighbours will tell me 
to do the work?" - Respondent 6 
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Field workers and think-aloud respondents directly informed us of significant 
complaints regarding the repetitiveness and length of interviews. As a result, we 
decided to reduce the interview burden by dropping the statements “because I 
might get punished otherwise”, “because I want to please others”, “so that 
others won’t think badly of me” and “because it is personally important to me” 
(see Section 4.3.4.5 for a summary of all changes to the tool). 
 
4.3.4.2 Ambiguous items in the questionnaire 
References to “other people” among the survey items produced ambiguous 
results depending on whether respondents interpreted “other people” to refer 
to their own family members or to their neighbours. This posed a problem, since 
it made the results of the survey sensitive to potentially uncontrollable, random 
factors affecting respondents’ interpretation of the term “other people” such as 
the intonation and voice used by the interviewer during the interview or their 
perceived relationship to the respondent. 
 
Many respondents remarked that they did not care for the opinions of their 
neighbours and only listened to their family members20. One respondent who 
lived alone with her children while her husband worked abroad as foreign 
labourer repeatedly stated that nobody was there to scold her or punish her. 
Another respondent stated in response to the item “I don’t work outside the 
home, because people tell me not to”: 
 
I strongly disagree/asahamat, because it doesn't matter what other people tell 
me to do, I will only follow whatever my household members tell me to do – 
Resondent 7 
 
This was supported by the quantitative data from the calibration sample. When 
respondents feared punishment, in 95% of the cases it was from a family 
member as opposed to a community member. When respondents feared being 
                                                          
20 For women living in their husband’s home, ‘family’ or parivar in Nepali and Maithili would be practically 
coterminous with ‘household’ and refer to the group which “holds property jointly and observes most life-cycle 
and calendrical rituals together” [22]. It would exclude neighbours, friends and blood or marital relatives living 
outside the household, except where these hold joint property rights such as husbands working as migrant 
labour. For women living in their natal home, parivar would refer to the natal household members living with 
them. 
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thought of badly, 75% indicated that they specifically worried about family 
members thinking of them badly. Social norms in Maithili culture severely 
restrict mobility outside the household for married women of reproductive age 
(Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2). Casual socializing for young married women with 
other people in the village is also strongly discouraged. Feedback from MIRA 
employees also indicated that it was considered disrespectful to prioritise the 
opinions of others over those of the family. 
 
Field workers disagreed with our interpretation that interpretations of “other 
people” had ambiguous effects on respondents’ tendency to agree with 
questionnaire items. They felt that respondents were as likely to be pressured 
by their family members as by society. Indeed, in response to whether her 
household chores were motivated by a desire to be liked by others, one 
respondent also remarked that she enjoyed impressing visitors with the 
cleanliness of her home. Respondents might also have placed equal emphasis 
on obeying family and community power in practice, but responded differently 
in the interview situation due to our choice of phrasing. In the end, we decided 
to ensure removal of any potential ambiguity by changing all references to 
“other people” to “your family members”21. 
 
The statement “because I get a benefit” was interpreted in a variety of domain-
specific ways. This ranged from ability to feed her family (work outside the 
home), family happiness and cleanliness (household chores), alleviation of 
health problems (health seeking) to group-specific benefits e.g. loans from 
credit and savings groups (group participation). According to SDT, this item is 
meant to capture only external, disempowering drivers of behaviour such as 
wage rates (see Section 3.3.2). However, in the local context there seemed to 
be a wide scope for ambiguity regarding the interpretation of this question 
including pro-social, non-material interpretations of the word “benefit”. As a 
result, we dropped this question. 
 
                                                          
21 This change to our measure of agency might cause problems for contexts where women live alone as the only 
adult in their family as such women. In our context, only married women who were not widowed, divorced or 
separated were eligible to take part in the trial and so this issue would not arise. 
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4.3.4.3 Coping with the Likert scale 
It was evident both in body language and speech that respondents struggled 
with the notion of agree vs. disagree as well as different shades of agreement. 
Interviews had to clarify and repeat the words sahamat/“agree” and 
asahamat/“disagree” that were used in the questionnaire. Respondents 
frequently provided clear explanations of their reasoning only to choose a word 
for “agree” or “disagree” that contradicted what they had told us. For example 
when a respondent was asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement “I 
do not work outside the home, because I will get into trouble if I do”, she 
answered: 
 
I strongly disagree/ asahamat with this statement, because my parents will scold 
me, if I do work outside the home – Respondent 7 
 
Sahamat and asahamat are primarily Nepali words, but local translations varied 
from village to village covering phrases such as raji/“agree” vs. nehi raji/“not 
agree”, manjur/“accept” vs. nehi manjur/“do not accept” and machhin/“follow” 
vs. nehi manchhin/“do not follow”. This may have contributed to the confusion, 
although some respondents had not heard of any of the above phrases and only 
recognized more distantly related adjectives such as sahi/”true” vs. 
galat/”false”. Field workers reported that respondents’ difficulty with “agree” 
and “disagree” were major difficulties in conducting interviews. Asking 
respondents to additionally distinguish puri/”full” agreement from nehi 
puri/”partial” agreement only added to the respondent and interviewer burden. 
As a result, the 4-point Likert scale was reduced to a simple “yes/no” question. 
Reducing the scale from 4 to 2 points reduced the complexity of the answers 
and also significantly reduced the duration of the survey. 
 
 
4.3.4.4 English words without exact equivalents in the local language 
The statement “Because it is valuable” was difficult to translate from English into 
Maithili. In English, “valuable” connotes utility, monetary value, worthiness and 
meaningfulness. The direct translation arthpurn/“valuable” is an uncommon, 
intellectual word in the local context. When prompted, no think-aloud 
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respondents had heard the word before and had difficulty understanding it even 
after explanation, regardless of education or socioeconomic background. The 
team discussed using jaruri/“necessary” as a substitute during the pilot phase 
while recognising its distinction from “valuable” because some activities have a 
value in themselves over and beyond necessity. In the end, we decided to drop 
the motivation “because it is valuable”, because of the difficulty of obtaining a 
faithful translation.  
 
For the statement “Because I enjoy it” we could either use the Maithili phrases 
nik lagaai or majja lagaai. While majja has connotations of celebration, fun and 
sensuality, nik is much weaker, connoting generalized associations with 
goodness, likeability and appreciation. Respondents unanimously agreed with 
statements involving nik and disagreed with statements involving majja, except 
one religious group activity, which was described in more sensual terms. They 
were particularly offended at the mention of majja in connection with their work 
perhaps because it was perceived to trivialize daily sacrifices made for the sake 
of their families. As a result, we changed the English wording to “Because I like 
it” to reflect the changes in Maithili. 
 
4.3.4.5 Adaptations to the original tool 
The revised questionnaire incorporated the following changes to the original un-
adapted tool: 1) The 4-point Likert scale was replaced with yes/no questions 2) 
References to “other people” changed to “your family members” 3) Statements 
that were difficult to translate were dropped 4) Repetitive statements were 
dropped including “because I might get punished otherwise”, “because I want 
to please others”, “so that others won’t think badly of me” and “because it is 
personally important to me” 5) The statements “because I want to” and 
“because it is my duty/responsibility” were added. These were added because 
we felt that they conveyed important aspects of internal motivation that were 
neglected by the existing array of questions, namely willingness to engage in or 
refrain from action and the assumption of personal responsibility for one’s 
behaviour. Table 7 shows the final result with a suggested scoring scheme based 
on equally weighting all items relating to external and internal motivation, while 
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avoiding the potentially ambiguous item “because you have to/you can’t”. 
Agency freedom would be calculated as I – E. 








While scores derived from factor analysis may better take local context into 
account and can control for measurement error [251], a fixed scoring scheme 
independent of the underlying data set may offer greater transparency and 
comprehensibility of results [291]. As the correlation between the fixed scoring 
scheme and the factor scores was very high (see Section 4.3.5), the fixed scoring 
scheme was highly attractive for our contexts due to its user-friendliness. 
 
4.3.5 Construct and content validity of the adapted tool 
New think-aloud data with the revised questionnaire revealed shorter 
explanation times, improved respondent understanding and a substantially 
smoother interviewing experience. Importantly, respondents no longer needed 
repeated probing to provide an answer and did not offer multiple, incompatible 
interpretations of the same questionnaire item. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the validation dataset revealed adequate fit 
statistics (RMSEA 0.04-0.08, CFI 0.95-0.99, TLI 0.93-0.99). Factor loadings were 
high (0.72-0.97) across all domains (see Table 8). The exception was the 
statement “because it is your duty/responsibility”, which loaded 0.58 for work 
outside the home and 0.65 for health-seeking and 0.62 for group participation. 
This suggested the motivation “because it is your duty/responsibility” may have 
Statement Scoring 
Because you will get into trouble otherwise +1 to E if answer is Yes 
Because that is what your family members tell you to do +1 to E if answer is Yes 
Because you want your family members to like you +1 to E if answer is Yes 
So your family members won't get angry with you +1 to E if answer is Yes 
Because you have to/you can't 0 
Because you personally think it is the right thing to do 
whether or not your family members agree +1 to I if answer is Yes 
Because you like it +1 to I if answer is Yes 
Because you want to +1 to I if answer is Yes 
Because it is your duty/responsibility +1 to I if answer is Yes 
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been related to a distinct construct from internal or external motivation and 
should not be used in future tools. Cronbach’s alpha for external and internal 
motivation was also high (0.79-0.94) indicating good internal consistency.  
Table 8. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on adapted tool (n=509). 
 
The Pearson correlation between Factor I from this factor analysis and the total 
score on internal motivation from our fixed scoring scheme (in Table 7) was 0.95. 
The correlation between scores on external motivation using our fixed scoring 
scheme and scores from our factor analysis was 0.99. The correlation between 
Factor I – Factor E and the agency score from Table 8 was 0.98. 
 
Figure 8 shows the proportion of participants who agreed with each statement 
in the domains where respondents could be asked either positively or negatively 
worded questions for the validation dataset. The results mirror those found for 
the calibration dataset, where the differences in agreement rates between 
positive and negative domains are considerably larger for internal motivations 
than external motivations. Linear regression with Huber robust adjustment for 
clustering showed strong evidence for a greater number of items agreed to in 
the internal domain (MD 1.28, p<0.001 for work outside the home; MD 1.90, 
p<0.001 for group participation), but not the external domain (MD -0.14, 
p=0.319 for work outside the home; MD 0.08, p=0.715 for group participation). 
  Domain  








Because you will get into trouble otherwise 0.83 0.84 0.75 0.86 
Because that is what your family members tell you to do 0.82 0.72 0.74 0.91 
So that your family members won't get angry with you 0.94 0.97 0.86 0.94 
Because you want your family members to like you 0.83 0.79 0.92 0.85 
Factor I 
Because you want to 0.83 0.88 0.73 0.92 
Because you personally think it is the right thing to  0.78 0.74 0.76 0.80 
Because you like it  0.87 0.85 0.79 0.90 
Because it is your duty/responsibility to do it 0.58 0.84 0.65 0.62 
RMSEA 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.09 
CFI 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.98 
TLI 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.97 
Cronbach’s alpha for external motivation 0.82 0.82 0.94 0.80 
Cronbach’s alpha for internal motivation 0.90 0.79 0.92 0.81 
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Because you will get
into trouble
otherwise
Because that is what
your family members








personally think it is
the right thing to do
whether or not your
family members
agree
Because you like it Because you want to Because it is your
duty/responsibility
External motivation Internal motivation
Work outside the home Group participation Lack of work outside the home Lack of group participation
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4.4 Discussion 
Our results indicated a strong need to adapt the original tool in order to capture 
our notion of agency freedom.  The need for modification raised important 
questions regarding the cross-context sensitivity of existing measures of 
women’s empowerment. Agarwala and Lynch [251] similarly found substantial 
evidence for cross-cultural variation in their CFA analysis of indicators of 
women’s decision-making powers and freedom of mobility. They concluded that 
“it is essential that measures of autonomy remain flexible enough to 
accommodate contextual changes” (p.2095). 
 
Factor analysis and think-aloud interviews revealed an ambiguous mixture of 
interpretations of the motivation “because I have to/can’t” reflecting both force 
of material circumstances, personal responsibility and coercion by household 
members (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.4). This is at odds with our a priori 
interpretation, in which “because I have to/can’t” reflected “amotivation”, a 
state of respondents lacking the intention to act altogether. Participants 
agreeing to the statement “because I have to/can’t” were rather highly 
motivated, but were motivated by a mixture of internal and external forces. The 
motivation “because I get a benefit” also had quite varied interpretations in the 
think-aloud data such as family happiness and alleviation of health problems 
(Section 4.3.4.1). In the Exploratory Factor Analysis, it correlated with indicators 
of internal motivation (Section 4.3.1). According to the framework of Self-
Determination Theory, the statement “because I get a benefit” reflected 
primarily externally imposed financial incentives due to research suggesting that 
financial incentives “crowd out” intrinsic motivation [1]. 
 
Differences between the interpretation of this statement in our study and in 
other studies in high-income settings [292] may be due to context-specific 
differences in the meaning ascribed to incentives. Previous research has shown 
complex effects on intrinsic motivation depending on whether incentives were 
perceived to acknowledge positive individual traits such as skill and talent or 
reflect a lack of control over one’s own life [219,293]. These results suggest 
ambiguities in the cross-cultural understanding of particular questionnaire 
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items. We modified the tool to remove these ambiguities by dropping the 
“amotivation” items, which were scored zero in any case, and the items with the 
phrasing “because I get a benefit”, because of their ambiguous interpretation 
across contexts.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.5, Chapter 3, statements related to fear of others’ 
anger or punishment were supposed to be distinguished from statements 
concerning fears of reputational loss or loss of social standing. While the former 
class of statements were supposed to reflect external barriers to agency 
(external regulation), the latter class was supposed to reflect more internal 
barriers, such as a need for affirmation from others (introjected regulation). 
However, in the context of rural Nepal, where women’s well-being and survival 
depended crucially on being liked by others, it seemed difficult to maintain a 
distinction between external and introjected regulation. Indeed, in our 
qualitative and quantitative data, we found no justification for such a distinction. 
This result was also obtained in the study carried out by Vaz, Pratley and Alkire 
[61] who found that a measure based on only two broad types of motivation 
may capture the same information as a measure based on three types of 
motivation. Consequently, in our revised scoring scheme we only included two 
factors, Factor I for internal motivation and Factor E for external motivation. 
 
Our empirical results using both the calibration sample (Section 4.3.1) and the 
validation sample (Section 4.3.5) did not support a concern that a shift from 
asking positively worded questions (reasons for engaging in behaviour) was 
intrinsically associated with different tendencies for agreement compared to 
negatively worded questions (reasons for refraining from behaviour). If the 
wording of the question itself was supposed to be intrinsically associated with 
higher agreement rates irrespective of the content of the question, then we 
would expect to see higher agreement rates among both external and internal 
motivations. However, chance could only be ruled out for higher agreement 
rates among internal motivations in all samples and domains, while the results 
for external motivation largely showed little difference between positively and 
negatively worded questions. 
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During my later field observations of interviews with respondents (see Chapter 
5), I also noticed that women tended to answer questions using both negative 
and positive wording regardless of how the question was worded. For example, 
if a woman was asked “do you refrain from participating in groups, because you 
do not want to?” a common response was “no, I do want to!” This indicated that 
respondents did not feel constrained by the positive or negative wording of the 
question to answer in positively or negatively in turn. Finally, a blanket tendency 
for positively worded questions to have higher agreement rates than negatively 
worded questions should leave measures of agency freedom relatively 
unchanged, since it would increase external and internal motivation scores 
equally. 
 
The more straightforward interpretation of these data was that, on average, 
women preferred working outside the house or participating in groups to 
staying at home, and thus internal motivation scores were higher for women 
who were able to do so compared to the ones who were unable. This was also 
in line with later quantitative evidence on women’s professed aspirations for 
life, which included 22% of women saying their primary wish for change in life is 
to acquire a job (Chapter 5), and later qualitative evidence where many women 
expressed frustration from being prevented by their family members from 
taking up employment or participating in groups (Chapters 8 and 9). 
 
The high inter-rater variability indicated a potential limitation of our data 
(Section 4.3.2). As field workers were dispersed across a wide geographical area, 
a first explanation may be genuine cultural diversity across villages. Previous 
studies in Bangladesh have found substantial variation in empowerment 
measures explained by village-level fixed effects [210,294] and comparably high 
regional ICCs were also observed in one clinical trial on community mobilization 
approaches to domestic violence prevention [295]. Although a later 
standardisation exercise suggested the risk of bias might be modest (Chapter 5), 
it might still be useful to control for interviewer bias by randomizing interviewers 
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to respondents, or by including random or fixed effects based on interviewer 
identity in the analysis model [296,297]. 
 
In our study, interviewers may have influenced responses subtly through 
changes in phrasing and intonation, respondents might have responded to 
interviewer characteristics such sex, age or ethnicity and different respondents 
may even have consented to participate differently depending on interviewer 
characteristics [296]. With potentially sensitive questions concerning women’s 
agency freedom, interviewers may also have differed in their ability to secure 
privacy for the respondent or establish trust and rapport. Inadequate 
standardization and monitoring of field workers cannot be ruled out as sources 
of this variation. However, the empowerment tool itself may also have been an 
inherently difficult tool to administer compared to standard epidemiological 
surveys, which do not require respondents to reflect deeply on human values 
and freedoms. Indeed, field workers reported that the questionnaire was 
repetitive and took a long time to complete and they had difficulty 
understanding and explaining the concepts behind questionnaire items. 
 
That said, results from linear regressions indicated satisfactory construct validity 
(Section 4.3.3). Direct validation came from the lower pressure experienced by 
women who participated in household decisions. We would not expect a perfect 
correlation between agency freedom and ability to participate in household 
decisions, as the two measures are measuring distinct theoretical constructs. 
However, it would not be unreasonable to expect women who participate in 
household decisions on money and food to be more likely to experience greater 
agency freedom. Similarly, we would expect partial overlap between agency 
freedom and belief in own ability to change life, which is what was found in the 
data. Thus, the partial correlations found reinforce the construct validity of our 
measure.  
 
Our results indicated that women experienced less external pressure when they 
were interviewed in their natal home (Section 4.3.3). They also experienced less 
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pressure when they were older than 18 or had at least one child. This is 
consistent with widely accepted notions of the female life cycle in Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and North India [22,82,83,85,86] and our discussion in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2. 88% of women in our sample were married between 
ages 12 and 18. The group of women falling in the age group 18 years or less 
would likely be considered kanyas or “newly married” in Maithili culture. As 
kanyas would usually only be able to seek refuge in their natal home until they 
had ascended the family hierarchy when they acquired married sons of their 
own (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2), it made sense in our context to see older women, 
women with children or women staying in their natal home reporting greater 
agency. 
 
In our case, education and wealth followed a U-shape with small increases in 
education or wealth leading to increased pressure and only large increases 
leading to reduced pressure (Section 4.3.3). Previous reviews have found 
secondary education to be necessary for material changes to women’s 
household status [105,253] with smaller increases being predominantly 
associated with changes in social class. Evidence from studies in South Asia 
indicate lower female autonomy in middle-class families compared to lower 
class families due to stronger family status-related pressures [96,101,298,299]. 
As put in Bennett [94] “there is an inverse correlation between a woman’s status 
in the community (based on the economic status of her household […]) and her 
status within the household” (p.2, see also Appendix B). This contrasts with the 
findings in Vaz, Pratley and Alkire [61] in Chad who found no evidence for a 
relationship between education level and relative autonomy in their sample of 
women, while wealth was only correlated with autonomy in feeding infants, but 
not in other domains. The differences in findings between the Nepal and the 
Chad context point to the inadequacy of proxy measures such as education and 
wealth as global indicators of women’s empowerment. 
 
In our study, external pressure was positively correlated with internal 
motivation (Section 4.3.3). This is consistent with work on the same scale in Chad 
[61] which found either no evidence for correlation or positive correlations 
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between identified regulation and external regulation, even though Self-
Determination Theory classes the former as internal motivation and the latter 
as external motivation (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2). Similarly, the researchers 
found mostly positive correlations between identified regulation, an internal 
motivation, and introjected regulation, an external motivation, across domains. 
In Bangladesh [276], researchers using the same scale found external regulation 
to be strongly correlated with identified regulations as well. Multiple 
explanations exist for why this correlation was found. 
 
The first explanation may relate to the psychology of motivation itself. In 
addition to having first-order internal and external motivations for behaviour, 
there may be an underlying second-order factor for “general motivation” that 
measures whether participants are generally motivated in their activities. 
Particularly if the statements on internal motivation were strongly coloured by 
meanings of necessity, importance and survival opposed to enjoyment or 
pleasure, then internal motivation may have been cognitively compatible with 
external pressure. Since a second-order structural model with an underlying 
factor predicting Factor E and Factor I is statistically equivalent to a model with 
a simple correlation between Factor E and Factor I, we cannot settle this 
question from statistical data alone, but must continue researching the 
psychosocial channels through which women experience autonomy to 
understand if such a factor exists. 
 
A second explanation would be differential social desirability bias. A qualitative 
study on attitudes to wife beating found polar opposite attitudes expressed in 
survey and focus group data [300]. Where survey results indicated that a high 
proportion of women found wife beating acceptable, women insisted in focus 
group discussions that they did not condone violence against women in the 
home and suggested harsh, sometimes graphic punishments for offenders. The 
researchers concluded that commonly used questions to measure attitudes to 
wife beating may be strongly biased by social norms in survey settings. In our 
context, women who were under greater external pressure from family 
members may simultaneously have been under greater pressure to report being 
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motivated by interest or purpose in their daily activities, even if they did not feel 
so. However, conversations with local employees did not paint a unified picture 
as employees generally believed the social desirability of women’s agency to be 
an individual matter with the community which neither strongly condemned nor 
strongly endorsed agency freedom in women. 
 
In addition, a causal relationship between external coercion and internal 
motivation might exist. In our context, women were often made to internalise 
ideas about their own inferiority since birth and expect to occupy the lowest 
rungs of the status hierarchy after marriage. As discussed extensively in Chapter 
3, lack of individual awareness of unjust aspects of their own circumstances was 
a key subject of debate in both political philosophy, feminist practice and 
international development. Our own conception of agency took a stance on this 
debate that heavily emphasises women’s own subjective interests, but allowed 
for women themselves to reconsider their own interests, values and desires 
through unpressed reflection and dialogue (see Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3). The 
survey-based method was a compromise between the need to obtain an 
accurate measure of women’s agency freedom and the need to obtain a 
representative population sample in a manner that avoid interfering with the 
operation of the participatory women’s group intervention itself. 
 
For future uses of this tool, we recommend complementing surveys with in-
depth qualitative appraisals of carefully sampled groups or individuals. First, we 
recommend disaggregating the intervention effect into its component effects 
on external motivation E and internal motivation I (Table 7) and check if Factor 
I is affected. If Factor I is unaffected, adaptive preferences are not at issue since 
we have not registered a change in preferences. If, however Factor I is affected, 
we need to turn to in-depth qualitative work to evaluate the nature of the 
change in preferences observed according to our concept of basic flourishing 
arrived at through mutually respectful, cross-cultural deliberation. 
 
Finally, the results of our validation study required us to re-consider our notion 
of agency itself. As defined in Chapter 3, we only included agents’ “immediate 
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social network contacts” among the external barriers to their own agency. 
However, in both our quantitative and qualitative data, many respondents felt 
they did not care for the opinions of their neighbours and only listened to their 
family members (Section 4.3.4.2). Rather than defining women’s agency 
freedom in terms of the influence of any social network contact, a focus on 
agency within the household seemed appropriate in our context given the 
powerful influence of women’s family members on their ability to enjoy any 
social support from people outside the home. As such, our change of phrasing 
in the survey tool to focus on family members over “other people” in general 
implied a refinement of our definition of agency from including all “immediate 
social network contacts” among external barriers to agents’ agency to including 
only women’s family members among these. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The current Chapter showed that the development and validation of a 
contextually relevant tool for measuring agency freedom is non-trivial. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis provided evidence for a clear distinction between 
internal and external motivations and qualitative analysis of think-aloud 
interviews indicated good overlap between respondents’ perceptions of the 
meaning of survey items and their intended meanings. Yet, qualitative analysis 
also revealed problems of ambiguity and redundancy when translating abstract 
English concepts into local languages and quantitative analyses indicated a 
potential for low inter-rater reliability. These problems could be ameliorated 
through adaptations to the survey tool and careful attention to standardization 
and training of interviewers. 
 
Further insight into the measurement of agency may be gained from using our 
tool to evaluate an actual intervention. It is to this research that we will now 
turn in Chapter 5, which will add to the evidence base on the mechanism 
through which participatory women’s groups achieve their effects on maternal 
and newborn health by evaluating the impact of women’s groups on women’s 
agency freedom.  
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of Participatory Women’s 
Groups Alone or Combined with Cash or 




This Chapter evaluates the impact of the LBW-SAT intervention on women’s 
empowerment. Participatory women’s groups and community mobilisation in 
general have been described as interventions that function through “community 
empowerment” [51,54,60,301] and certainly a large body of qualitative 
evidence is consistent with the existence of community empowerment in 
women’s groups trials (as defined in Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3). In Nepal, Malawi, 
Bangladesh and India, women’s groups created mother and child health funds, 
started emergency transport schemes, produced and sold clean delivery kits, 
initiated vegetable gardens, showed public video screenings, held health 
education sessions, distributed insecticide-treated bednets, made home visits 
and counselled relatives of pregnant women [53,55-57,302,303]. Group 
members set up their own committees of members organizing collective action, 
or elected leaders from within the group to aid the group facilitators, utilizing 
mostly non-hierarchical and egalitarian leadership styles [53]. Group members 
reported the establishment of greater trust, new networks of association and 
new norms of reciprocal social support in the community [53,55,57]. Group 
members also cultivated skills in establishing partnerships with other NGOs in 
their community [53]. Figure 9 shows photographs taken from some of the 
activities carried out by women’s group members. 
 
However, the evidence base on women’s individual empowerment, particularly 
their agency freedom within the family domain, is considerably less rich. While 
multiple studies have reported greater self-confidence and self-esteem among 
participants [53,57,302,303], the exploratory nature of the reported qualitative 
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studies makes it difficult to establish reliable causal inference. In particular, it is 
difficult to distinguish the case where group participation increased women’s 
self-esteem from the case where already confident women attended group 
meetings. 
 
Figure 9. Strategies implemented by women’s groups – vegetable gardens in Malawi (top), stretcher 




Unconditional or conditional cash or food transfers have also become a popular 
policy tool for achieving a diverse range of outcomes including social protection 
[17,304] and improvements in health, education and nutrition indicators 
[305,306]. Transfer policy usually targets female beneficiaries due to theoretical 
and empirical literature suggesting that such transfers strengthen women’s 
bargaining power in the family sphere [17,34], which in turn enables them to 
spend a greater proportion of the household budget on family and child well-
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being [34,307]. However, despite decades of transfer policy targeting female 
beneficiaries [34], the existing body of evidence is still inconclusive on the 
effects of cash transfers on women’s agency in the family [3,308].  
 
Bastagli et al.’s [308] review of more than 200 evaluations of conditional and 
unconditional cash transfer programmes carried out between 2000 and 2015 
found strong evidence that cash transfer programmes could reduce incidence of 
physical abuse in women, but noted that such programmes could also increase 
the risk of non-physical abuse such as emotional abuse or controlling behaviour. 
In terms of women’s self-reported ability to make decisions on household 
expenditure, four out of eight studies found statistical evidence for a positive 
impact on decision-making power ranging from a 4 to an 9 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of being the sole or joint decision-maker on household 
expenses, while the remaining studies did not find evidence for an effect. Five 
studies investigated women’s self-reported ability to make decisions in non-
expenditure-related domains. One study found a 9 percentage point increase in 
sole decision-making over the use of contraception [214]. Another found a 9 
percentage point decrease in sole or joint decision-making over the use of 
contraception [309]. In all other domains of decision-making (children’s school 
attendance, own health, own employment) and in the remaining studies, no 
evidence for an impact was found. Qualitative evidence on decision-making is 
quite sparse, although one study on PROGRESA from Mexico reported that 
women felt they had a greater say in household matters and better relations 
with their spouses after receiving transfers [3]. 
 
Most existing evaluations of impacts on women’s empowerment have also only 
assessed conditional cash transfers [3,308]. The evidence base on exclusively 
unconditional cash transfers is sparse and inconsistent. Randomized evaluations 
of respectively an unconditional cash transfer programme in Kenya [310] and an 
unconditional transfer programme in Ecuador, which provided food and cash 
simultaneously [311], found no evidence for impacts on decision-making power 
in multiple domains. A non-randomized evaluation of simultaneous food and 
cash transfers in Bangladesh found no impact on decision-making power except 
when combined with offers of female employment [312]. In Uganda, however, 
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evaluations of both mixed food and cash transfer as well as pure cash transfer 
schemes showed evidence for impacts on female decision-making [271,313]. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.2.3, Chapter 3, questions on decision-making 
questions are at best poor approximations of our notion of agency freedom in 
this thesis. None of the studies cited by Bastagli et al. [308] included follow-up 
questions on their decision-making measures to check whether the domains of 
decision-making that they queried were considered relevant to women’s lives in 
the eyes of local women themselves. Given the extremely sparse evidence base 
on the empirical relationship between our notion of agency and women’s 
decision-making power, it is important to investigate the impact of women’s 
group and resource transfer interventions on agency freedom as measured 
using tools based on the RAI. Furthermore, the combination of resource 
transfers with a participatory women’s group intervention is entirely untested. 
In the next two sections, we will discuss the hypothesised pathways through 
which the LBW-SAT intervention may affect women’s agency freedom. 
 
5.1.2 LBW-SAT theory of change 
Currently, no single canonical theory exists of how participatory women’s 
groups achieve their impacts on health outcomes, let alone affect women’s 
agency. Victora [314] commented on the long causal chain from “critical 
consciousness to mortality” and compared the relative lack of theory on how 
participatory women’s groups currently work to the situation of 19th century 
epidemiologists before the discovery of germ theory who had clear evidence for 
an association between poor sanitation and incidence of infectious disease, but 
a poor understanding of the biological mechanism. Existing research has 
attempted to fill this gap. For example, the many qualitative studies cited above 
(Section 5.1.1) have furthered the evidence base on women’s activities in the 
community, while Rosato [53] conducted an extensive grounded theory study 
on how women’s groups work resulting in an elaborate theory of community 
empowerment. Rath et al. [57] used process evaluation data to develop a theory 
of women’s groups build community capacity and reduce neonatal mortality.
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Figure 10. Theory of change for the LBW-SAT intervention (adapted from Saville et al. [74]) 
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However, almost no theory has been developed on how women’s groups affect 
household relations. Rosato [53] only mentioned household relations in a single 
paragraph, where participants in an FGD mentioned local couples feeling freer 
to discuss family planning with each other. Other qualitative studies including 
Rath et al. [57] have largely avoided examining the household domain (Section 
5.1.1). This focus on community change rather than changes in household 
relations may be because agency in the household has been less conspicuous as 
a restraining factor on women’s ability to take up healthy behaviours in previous 
trials. These have taken place in contexts such as the Hills of Nepal [75], tribal 
areas of India [76] or rural Malawi [53], where women’s mobility is considerably 
less restricted than in the Plains of Nepal (Section 2.3.3, Chapter 2). Previous 
trials have also refrained from combining women’s groups with individual 
resource transfers targeted at changing household behaviours.  
 
In this thesis, we draw on the theory of change behind the LBW-SAT intervention 
[74] to hypothesise possible ways in which the intervention may affect women’s 
agency freedom (Figure 10). In this theory, inclusive groups run by skilled and 
respected facilitators first enable local women to participate and learn from the 
faciliator and each other. Over the course of the participatory learning action 
cycle, women’s groups members are expected to engage in collective action to 
prevent low birth weight in the community. This process is thought to develop 
a strong sense of group identity in group members and encourage them to to 
retransmit the lessons learnt in group meetings to members of their own family 
and the community at large. Simultaneously, skilled and respected home visitors 
are meant to carry out visits to women to invite non-attendees to attend groups 
and remind previous attendants to come to new group meetings. Home visitors 
also deliver messages on low birth weight, encourage pregnant women and their 
families to take up health messages, and help problem solve obstacles to 
following their recommendations. 
 
Due to the messages transmitted by group members and home visitors, 
knowledge of women’s pregnancy needs and risks is hypothesised to spread in 
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the community. Combined with the development of group identity in the 
women’s groups and the implementation of group strategies to reduce low birth 
weight, the wider community is thought to gain a sense of collective ownership 
over LBW problems and a greater willingness to support pregnant women. 
Community members might become more willing to lend food or money to each 
other in case of emergency shortfalls in the availability of food or money. 
Community members might also start their own group fund to pay for 
emergency transport and health care. In turn, this is thought to lead to a greater 
community cohesion. The distribution of transfers is thought to reinforce 
resource mobilisation by setting a conspicuous example for community 
members to follow. By directing resource transfers to pregnant women and 
carrying out health promotion activities, MIRA is thought to send a direct signal 
to the community about the value of investing in childbearing and motherhood. 
 
These community changes are thought to promote behavioural patterns in the 
family that support the pregnant women’s uptake of healthy behaviours. This 
includes considerate, respectful and enjoyable intra-household interactions and 
a greater willingness to provide social support, including labour input (allocating 
domestic labour away from the woman, helping take women to the ANC, helping 
take women to attend check-ups for health problems) and resource input 
(allocating more food towards the pregnant woman, spending money on the 
pregnant woman’s food and healthcare).  
 
Pregnant women are also thought to gain a new status as a person who 
participates in community activities and knows about community and health 
issues. Pregnant women’s experience with problem-solving and planning within 
the women’s groups is thought to translate into greater confidence to negotiate, 
solve problems and plan for their own pregnancy at home. This is reinforced by 
women’s improved bargaining power due to the presence of social support from 
women’s group members that improve their fall-back position in case of a 
breakdown in family relations. In the transfer arms of the trial, women’s receipt 
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of resource transfers is thought to further strengthen their hand as the transfers 
are provided directly to them. 
 
The combination of women’s own improved confidence and their family 
members’ increased receptiveness to their requests is thought to lead to 
concrete changes in their health behaviours. These include improved rest, 
better dietary practices, and better health-seeking, family planning and birth 
preparedness behaviours. The home environment is also thought to improve in 
both physical (hygiene, sanitation, bed nets, ventilation) and psychosocial 
(emotional and physical abuse) terms. In turn, these improvements in health 
behaviours drive reductions in low birth weight by addressing the immediate 
biological and psychological determinants of low birth weight. 
 
5.1.3 Hypothesised impacts on women’s agency 
The overall theory of change for LBW-SAT provides multiple entry points for 
changes to women’s agency freedom. First, strong social norms prohibit the 
uninhibited physical movement of newly married women outside the household 
in our context (Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2). Physically leaving the confines of the 
home usually requires explicit permission from one’s mother-in-law or a male 
household member as well as the provision of a suitable escort, while one is 
outside. Women’s requests to go outside need to phrased with a sufficiently 
valid purpose and are not guaranteed to be approved by other family members. 
For example, many daughters-in-law in our qualitative sample (Chapter 6) were 
routinely denied the privilege of visiting other women in the village, visiting the 
marketplace or going home to visit their natal parents. Indeed, women and men 
use a Maithili colloquialism, “the frog in the well”/inaar ke beng, to describe the 
situation of young daughters-in-law in terms of their being trapped in the home 
with restricted life opportunities and a limited to access to information about 
the wider world outside the home. Thus, women who desire to socialise with 
others besides their immediate family members may find their agency freedom 
enhanced by the LBW-SAT, since the instalment of local women’s groups in the 
community makes it easier for them to negotiate leaving the house. 
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On the other hand, family members might begin to force pregnant women to 
attend women’s groups who would otherwise prefer to spend their time in other 
ways. Just like daughters-in-law need the permission of their elders to leave the 
house, so it is often impossible for them to refuse leaving the house, if they are 
told to do so. However, passive participation in women’s groups due to pressure 
from one’s own family members diminishes women’s agency just as much as 
non-participation in women’s groups due to obstructive behaviour by their 
family. As discussed in Section 3.4.2.3, Chapter 3, researchers have heavily 
criticised mobility-based measures of women’s empowerment for assuming 
that women desire greater mobility without asking women if this is the case. 
Given the lack of existing evidence on the actual desirability of physical mobility, 
LBW-SAT may either enhance or diminish women’s agency freedom through 
group participation in our context. It may even be possible that only the few 
women who are already able and willing to move about in public will attend the 
group meetings, while the remaining women stay at home. In this scenario, 
women’s agency freedom would remain unchanged22. 
 
Second, LBW-SAT aims at creating social norm change at both community and 
household levels to promote healthy behaviours during pregnancy such as 
adequate rest, health-seeking, and adequate dietary intake. Both women’s 
group facilitators and home visitors provide explicit messages to family 
members about the importance of these three behaviours for women during 
pregnancy. However, these behaviours are often considered rare privileges for 
young daughters-in-law in our context (Section 2.3.2, Chapter 2), who live under 
the strict supervision of a mother-in-law who needs to be consulted and obeyed 
in almost every decision, while simultaneously being given the hardest and least 
desirable domestic tasks [89] and made to eat least and last in the family [315]. 
In case of a felt need to visit the local health facility, daughters-in-law may also 
                                                          
22 Many women’s groups were already running in our local area dealing with financial issues, but daughters-in-
law were often prevented from attending these (Section 7.1.2, Chapter 7). FCHVs were also already running 
perinatal women’s groups in the area before the introduction of LBW-SAT and continued to run these groups in 
the control area (Section 2.2.1, Chapter 2). These groups met irregularly and without a specific agenda. We are 
not claiming that LBW-SAT might alter women’s agency in group participation by increasing the availability of 
groups; this would be obvious. Rather, we are claiming that participatory women’s groups might enhance newly 
married women’s agency by allowing them to experience participation in groups that they genuinely value and 
regard as important. 
Chapter 5 
The Impact of Participatory Women’s Groups Alone or Combined with Cash or Food 
Transfers on Maternal Agency 
 
137 | P a g e  
 
be denied the financial resources to do so [316]. These daughters-in-law might 
find their agency freedom enhanced by the prospect of choosing to do fewer or 
less arduous domestic tasks, having a greater say over food in the household, or 
visiting the healthcare facility whenever they themselves feel the need for it. 
 
On the other hand, LBW-SAT might only enable the few daughters-in-law who 
already have the support of their household to take up the behaviours that are 
recommended for them. Such a situation would improve our metrics on local 
health behaviours and potentially also health outcomes, while leaving measures 
of agency freedom unaltered. Indeed, daughters-in-law might even experience 
diminished agency if their family members begin to force them to follow the 
recommendations provided by MIRA staff members without ensuring that they 
understand the rationale behind such recommendations. Local residents often 
hold alternate medical beliefs that are not easily challenged by outside NGOs 
[43,44]. If pregnant women simultaneously fail to accept the health advice 
provided by MIRA and are forced to follow it by their family members, the 
agency freedom of these women would be diminished. 
 
Finally, in the “best-case scenario”, the many activities carried out by women’s 
group members and facilitators in the community combine with pregnant 
women’s own experience of attending group meetings to cause broader 
improvements to their bargaining power at home. The acquisition of greater 
forward-looking freedoms through improved bargaining power (Section 3.2.7, 
Chapter 3) might in turn translate into greater backward-looking freedoms, 
when they allow women to seize opportunities for action that align even better 
with their own values, interests and desires than their previous behaviours. 
Women might even experience changes in domains of agency that are unrelated 
to the health promotion activities of LBW-SAT, such as their employment status. 
If we see an increase in agency in such a domain, it may be an indicator of a 
broader transformation of women’s opportunities. 
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5.1.4 Aim of this Chapter 
In this Chaper, we will study the impact of participatory women’s groups either 
alone or combined with unconditional food or cash transfers on:  
 
• Overall agency freedom (primary outcome): The extent to which women’s 
enacted behaviours are in alignment with their enduring interests, values 
and desires in life in general 
• Agency in group participation (secondary outcome): The extent to which 
women’s participation in local groups (or lack thereof) is an active choice 
on their part or a passive result of the external pressures from their family 
• Agency in domestic work (secondary outcome): The extent to which 
women’s domestic tasks at home reflect their own choices rather than 
external pressures from their family 
• Agency in health-seeking behaviour (secondary outcome): The extent to 
which women’s health-seeking behaviour (or lack thereof) reflects their 
own understanding of their own needs rather than family pressures 
• Agency in employment outside the home (secondary outcome): The extent 
to which women’s uptake of work (or lack thereof) is motivated by their 
own goals and values rather than family pressures  
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Sampling and data collection 
Married women between 10 and 49 years of age who had not had a 
minilaparotomy or hysterectomy and whose husbands had not had a vasectomy 
were eligible for menstrual monitoring. The LBW-SAT surveillance team 
conducted a household census in 2013 before the start of the intervention to 
ask for consent to include women in menstrual monitoring. Community 
informants then conducted home visits to all consenting women to record their 
menses. Once a woman had missed two consecutive periods, an SMS was sent 
to an interviewer who would confirm the pregnancy by administering a urine 
test or confirming that the woman looked obviously pregnant. Community 
informants received a financial incentive for reporting each event. Consenting, 
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pregnant women would receive an ID card signifying their enrolment into the 
trial and willingness to receive subsequent visits from field workers interviewing 
them to collect research data. In the combined women’s groups and cash or 
food arms this rendered them eligible to receive transfers, whereas in the 
control and women’s groups only arms they received a NPR 1,000 [USD 9.8] 
compensation if they were found and interviewed by a survey team within 12 
weeks after birth. Further details about enrolment into the trial have been 
provided elsewhere [317]. All surveillance data were stored on a confidential 
server which only the data management team of LBW-SAT could access. When I 
accessed this data, it was only in anonymised form. 
 
Using data from the calibration sample from our baseline survey Chapter 4, I 
calculated an intra-cluster coefficient of 0.07 for the main agency score. With 
400 women per arm, or 1,200 women in total, this implied an 80% power to 
detect a 0.3 standard deviation (SD) increase in the score at the 95% confidence 
level. A shift in decision-making power over food and cash from other household 
members to the respondent correlated with a 0.2-0.4 SD increase in the agency 
score of the respondent (Figure 7, Chapter 4). 
 
To evaluate the impact of the trial on women at immediate risk of giving birth 
to low birth weight babies, we only sampled pregnant women. Customarily in 
Maithili culture, women in late pregnancy would migrate back to their maternal 
home to await giving birth. However, women in early pregnancy had not 
completed their exposure to the trial intervention as food and cash transfers 
continued till end of pregnancy. In order to achieve a balance between ease of 
follow-up and a fair evaluation of the trial intervention, women who were 7.00-
7.99 months’ pregnant at any time between the 15th of June and the 15th of 
August 2015 were included in the sample. 
 
We achieved this range of gestational ages by targeting women for interview 
with an expected date of giving birth between the 15th of July and 15th of October 
and planning field work so that women were visited between one and two 
months before the date on which they are due to give birth. Some women ended 
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their pregnancy earlier than expected due to premature birth, abortions or 
miscarriages. Furthermore, as the method of inferring gestational age from 
women’s last menstrual period is not entirely free from error [318], some 
women might have given birth earlier than expected due to inaccurately 
estimated gestational ages. Women who were no longer pregnant by the time 
they were reached by the field worker were excluded from our sample. 
 
We experienced some in-migration into the cash and food transfer arms of the 
trial from both within and outside the study area as women sought to become 
eligible for the transfers. To control for potential endogeneity bias from 
potentially more empowered women self-selecting into the transfer arms, we 
only included women listed on a census carried out by the LBW-SAT study team 
in 2013 before the start of the intervention. Our inclusion and exclusion criteria 
yielded 1,930 women for our sampling list which allowed sufficient power to 
detect a meaningful difference in empowerment. Due to uncertainty regarding 
the extent of imprecision in estimating dates of giving birth and the level of 
migration to maternal homes near the time of birth, we included the entire 
sample, effectively allowing for 21% attrition to achieve a sample size of 1,200. 
I drew up the sample from the LBW-SAT surveillance system myself. 
 
In April 2015, I conducted interviews with field workers together with the senior 
management team at MIRA to decide on which field workers’ contracts among 
field workers in the existing MIRA surveillance team would be extended. In May 
2015, I selected a team of 12 field workers, 3 supervisors and a single senior 
supervisor, Shyam Sundar Yadav (SSY), from the total pool of applicants whose 
contracts had been extended in collaboration with senior management. This 
team became used for our study on empowerment. We selected the field 
workers and their supervisors based on logistical concerns such as transport 
links and geographical spread and their expressed willingness to be part of the 
empowerment study during interviews. 
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At the same time, I wrote Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) outlining good 
interviewing practice in the field, duties of supervisors and guidance on the 
empowerment tool (Appendix E). SSY translated these into Nepali. SSY and I 
conducted a week-long training with the field team, where field workers 
discussed the concepts of empowerment and agency, received individual copies 
of the SOP, read the entire SOP out loud, read the empowerment questionnaire 
out loud, and discussed the meanings of each questionnaire item. We also 
trained field workers in the use of mobile phones to collect survey data and in 
the use of the GPS to take coordinate positions of each interview. We also 
trained field workers in negotiation techniques to gain privacy for the interview 
due to the sensitive nature of the questions. In a separate closed session, SSY 
and I counselled the supervisors on management and relationship building skills. 
 
From June until August 2015, the team of field workers conducted interviews 
with women from our sampling list. Supervisors accompanied field workers to 
the field during interviews for the entirety of the day and provided feedback on 
their interviewing style, helped trouble-shoot emergent problems, reported on 
problems that could not be solved directly to me and SSY, and provided moral 
support. Field workers were on average seen by a supervisor at least once a 
week. A local staff member from the same village accompanied interviewers 
making contact for the first time to provide a sense of familiarity to the family 
members. Field workers advised parents-in-law of the importance of allowing 
the field worker to be alone with the daughter-in-law for the purposes of our 
research. This enabled greater privacy for interviewees, as 88% of the final 
interviews were conducted alone with the respondent. Field workers assured 
respondents that there were no right or wrong answers and their answers would 
not impact on their relationship to MIRA in any way. As a token of appreciation 
for participating in the study, field workers provided respondents with two bars 
of soap and one small towel at the end of each interview. 
 
I generated a weekly list of women to visit parcelled into daily sub-lists of 
households to visit from Monday to Thursday with Friday allocated to catching 
up on missed households. SSY and I held weekly staff meetings on Sundays, 
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where field workers socialised, raised emergent issues, and received continued 
training on the survey tool. At the end of these meetings, SSY and I provided 
field workers their list households for the upcoming week and replenished their 
supply of soap and towels. SSY and I accompanied field workers daily in the field 
during almost the whole period, where we observed and provided feedback to 
fieldworkers on their interviewing skills. We also held separate one-on-one 
meetings with supervisors to discuss problems with supervision, field worker 
morale, and logistical and technical issues. 
 
SSY and I also separately conducted back-checks on field workers by re-visiting 
random households that field workers claimed to have visited to ask household 
members if they had received the soap and towels and if they had been asked 
questions on empowerment. All households reported being interviewed by our 
field workers and receiving soap and towels. Since the mobile phones recorded 
both start and end times of interviews and their GPS coordinates, SSY and I also 
checked the duration of interviews and their GPS coordinates. We found that all 
interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours with most lasting 1 hour, 
while the GPS coordinates were spread out across study areas in a pattern 
consistent with the household allocation, we had provided our interviewers.  
 
Finally, in August 2015, SSY and I performed a standardisation exercise of 
interviewers using the revised tool to check for inter-rater variability given 
concerns with this raised in our baseline data (Chapter 4). We asked 12 nutrition 
mobilisers to act as respondents for all 12 interviewers. After one interviewer 
called in sick, we rotated 11 interviewers among 12 respondents four times to 
estimate inter-rater variability when holding the identity of the respondent 
constant. We found an ICC of 0.11 for scores on external motivation and 0.00 
for scores on internal motivation. All data collected from this exercise and our 
main empowerment study was anonymous and I stored it in a confidential place. 
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Figure 11. Sampling strategy and trial flow 
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Figure 11 shows a CONSORT diagram for the sample selection process [319]. In 
total, data were available for 1309 pregnant women. 152 cases were excluded 
due to miscarriage/abortion and 104 were excluded as they had already resulted 
in a live or still birth by the time we reached them. 284 cases had temporarily 
migrated back to their maternal home, while 52 had moved elsewhere and 26 
could not be located. The loss to follow-up rates are 22% in the control arm, 22% 
in the women’s groups only arm, 21% in the women’s groups and cash arm and 
23% in the women’s groups and food arm. Four women did not consent to be 
interviewed. 
 
5.2.2 Econometric methods 
5.2.2.1 Scoring agency freedom 
We created domain-specific agency freedom scores by summing only items 
pertaining to one of the four domains. Overall agency freedom was measured 
by summing all the domain-specific agency scores. We used the same scoring 
scheme as the scheme reported in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4.5. Equal weight was 
given to each of the four domains and equal weight was given to participants 
who carried out activities in a particular domain and participants who refrained 
from activity in the same domain. This was because we did not want introduce 
in-built assumptions into our index regarding which domain was the more 
empowering and whether carrying out an activity or refraining from doing so 
was more empowering.  
 
In order to understand intervention effects in greater depth, we also explored 
its effects on component scores of the overall and domain-specific scores. We 
calculated an overall external motivation score by summing all items reflecting 
external motivation across all four domains and an overall internal motivation 
score by summing all items reflecting internal motivation across all four 
domains. We also created domain-specific external motivation scores by 
summing items reflecting external motivations for each domain separately and 
domain-specific internal motivation scores by summing items reflecting internal 
motivations for each domain separately. 
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5.2.2.2 Creation of a wealth index 
We collected a range of respondent and household characteristics in addition to 
indicators of agency freedom in order to assess the socio-economic status of 
households. These included a list of household assets, building materials for the 
household, availability of clean water and sanitation facilities, type of cooking 
fuel and ownership of land. We measured socio-economic status using a wealth 
index by performing a categorical factor analysis on these characteristics 
[320,321]. However, instead of grouping factor scores into quintiles, we retained 
the continuous factor scores to gain maximum discriminatory power. A Q-Q plot 
revealed a good fit to a normal distribution. 
 
5.2.2.3 Primary outcome analysis 
We computed intention-to-treat effect estimates using ordinary least squares 
regression specified as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖 + 𝑫𝒖𝒊 + 𝜖𝑖 (1) 
 
𝑌𝑖 is the dependent variable, the overall agency freedom index for the i
th 
observation. x1i is a dummy variable for residence in the women’s groups and 
cash arm, x2i is a dummy for the women’s groups only arm and x3i is a dummy 
for the women’s groups and food arm. 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 represent the mean effect 
of the women’s groups and cash, women’s groups only and women’s groups and 
food interventions respectively on the agency freedom of pregnant women in 
the community. 𝛼 is an intercept. 
 
ui is a vector of additional regressors used in case of unexpected imbalances 
between trial arms. These were maternal education, head of household, 
separated/joint family, migrant labour of husband, interview at husband versus 
maternal home, caste, maternal age, number of pregnancies, number of sons 
currently alive, socio-economic status, maternal occupation, husband’s 
education, and husband’s age. The parameter estimates for the effect of these 
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regressors on agency freedom are represented by the matrix D. 𝜖𝑖 is an error 
term. 
 
Correlation within trial clusters was corrected using Huber robust variance 
correction [322,323]. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) between 
interviewers in our study was computed to assess inter-rater reliability. If the 
ICC was found to be greater than 0.10, fixed interviewer dummies were added 
to all our models to control for bias due to interviewer effects23 [324]. For ease 
of interpretation, standardized effect estimates were created by normalizing the 
outcome 𝑌𝑖 to mean zero and variance one and reporting effect sizes in units of 
standard deviations, a technique commonly used in education research [325]. 
 
Using intention-to-treat estimates with the treatment variable being residence 
in an intervention arm we evaluated the effect of assigning an entire cluster to 
intervention/control rather than the effect of making an individual woman 
participate in the women’s groups. Similar evaluations have been carried out 
when the main outcome was mortality rather than agency freedom [54].  
 
5.2.2.4 Analysis of secondary outcomes 
We used ordinary least squares regression with clustered robust variance 
estimators to estimate intervention impacts on overall external motivation and 
overall internal motivation. For the domain-specific outcomes, we used 
bootstrap regression adjusting for clustering with re-sampling due to the small 
number of indicators. Estimators were adjusted for the same controls as the 
main outcome. 
 
The range of values for the domain-specific agency freedom index runs from -4 
to +4, while the range of values for domain-specific external and internal 
                                                          
23 Each interviewer in the study was allocated to multiple VDCs spread across intervention and control areas, so 
multicollinearity was not an issue. Indeed, the variance inflation factors were <2.6 for all intervention dummies. 
In addition, sensitivity analysis using a three-level hierarchical linear regression with individuals first grouped 
into VDCs and second grouped into interviewer areas yielded the same results for our main outcome, overall 
agency freedom. 
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motivations runs from 0 to +4. By comparison, the main outcome score ranged 
from -16 to +16. With such a limited range of values for our disaggregated 
analysis, we did not standardize the outcome variables to mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1 in order to avoid any suggestion that our disaggregated outcome 
variables could be well-approximated by a continuous Normal distribution. 
 
Finally, we used measures of decision-making in the domains of large purchases, 
food preparation and serving and women’s own pregnancy as proxies for 
women’s agency. As discussed in Section 3.4.2.3, Chapter 3, questions on 
decision-making power in the household poorly match our target concept of 
agency freedom, because they do not account for respondents’ view on the 
significance of decision-making power in these domains for their own lives. 
However, they may still be used as useful auxiliary measures of agency, if 
interpreted with care.  
 
In our case, we used follow-up questions which asked respondents who did not 
participate in any decisions whether they think they would be able to do so, if 
they wanted to. This allows us to classify respondents’ decision-making power 
into four categories: 1) Sole decision-makers who indicate they are the only one 
making decisions in a particular domain 2) Joint decision-makers who report 
making decisions together with others in the household 3) Women who are not 
involved, but able to be involved if they wanted to be involved 4) Women who 
are not involved and unable to be involved, even if they wanted to be involved.  
 
This hierarchy still does not match our notion of agency well, since it does not 
account for women who do not want to be solely or jointly responsible for 
decisions in a domain (e.g. cooking and serving food), but are nonetheless forced 
to do so, because other household members are unwilling to help. However, 
such questions may still be useful for exploring the reasons why our intervention 
did or did not affect by our main outcome measure. Thus, we also analysed 
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decision-making questions in this study. We used ordered logistic regression 
with controls for the same variables as the main outcome measure. 
 
5.2.2.5 Handling missing data 
5.2.2.5.1 Types of missing data mechanisms 
Missing variables can be either Missing Not At Random (MNAR), Missing At 
Random (MAR) or Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) [326]. When variables 
are MCAR, the occurrence of missing data is stochastically independent of all 
other respondent characteristics and we can drop the respondents with missing 
data without biasing results. When variables are MNAR, the occurrence of 
missing data depend stochastically on unobserved respondent characteristics. 
Controlling for MNAR data requires introducing further parametric assumptions 
that explicitly model the missing data mechanism [327]. When variables are 
MAR, the occurrence of missing data only depend stochastically on observed 
respondent characteristics. Although MAR data can be distinguished from MCAR 
data by examining predictors of missingness, no statistical test distinguishes 
MAR from MNAR data [327], which can be only be decided on based on 
qualitative judgment.  
 
Statistical approaches to handling MAR variables depend on whether they are 
outcome variables or explanatory variables. When explanatory variables are 
MAR, a common approach to dealing with missing data is multiple imputation 
[327]. When outcome values are MAR, we cannot improve bias and precision 
beyond simple covariate adjustment for predictors of missingness, provided the 
statistical model is correctly specified for the respondents with complete data 
[328]. In particular, multiple imputation is not necessary [327]. 
 
In the following sections, we will assess the likely missing data mechanism for 
two types of missing data and recommend appropriate methods for dealing with 
missing data: 1) Survey non-response, where respondents were unavailable for 
Chapter 5 
The Impact of Participatory Women’s Groups Alone or Combined with Cash or Food 
Transfers on Maternal Agency 
 
149 | P a g e  
 
an entire interview 2) Item non-response, where respondents were unable to 
provide answers to some of the questions within the main interview. 
 
5.2.2.5.2 Dealing with survey non-response 
Out of 1930 women on our original sampling list, we were able to interview 1309 
on their empowerment (see Fig. 1). In order to check for bias due to loss to 
follow-up, we compared these women with women who were interviewed on 
empowerment in terms of caste, religion, ethnicity, education, age, number of 
children alive and wealth index. We obtained sociodemographic information on 
the 365 women who were unavailable for interview in our study, we merged 
data from our study with data from a separate sociodemographic survey 
administered to all enrolled women in the LBW-SAT trial. After merging the 
datasets, 41 eligible women remained who had neither been available for 
interview for our empowerment study nor for the sociodemographic survey. We 
revisited these women in August and collected sociodemographic information 
from their households if they were not available. After these revisits, only ten 
cases remained, where neither the women themselves nor their household 
members could be traced by our field workers. 
 
The differences between women who were interviewed on their agency 
freedom and the women who were not are shown in Table 9. Women with 
missing data were on average younger (22.3 vs. 23.5 years), less likely to have a 
child (1.0 vs. 1.4 children) more educated (3.0 vs. 2.5 years), less likely to be 
Hindu (74% vs. 83%) and more likely to be Muslim (26% vs. 17%) than women 
without missing data. Women were also more likely to be of indigenous 
(Janajati) ethnicity (7% vs. 4%), although no evidence for difference in Dalit caste 
and wealth were found (p>0.2). In our context, it is likely that young women who 
were pregnant for the first time were more anxious to leave their usual 
residence and seek the support of their maternal home than older women who 
already had experience of child-bearing and were more accustomed to living 
with their in-laws. 
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Table 9. Respondent characteristics for intervention and control arms, with (n=365) and without (n=1309) missing empowerment data.  








food Control Overall 
p-
value 
Sample size 234 257 444 374 1309  
Education (years) 2.35 (0.31) 2.84 (0.25) 2.23 (0.20) 2.42 (0.22) 2.50 (0.13) 0.12 
Age (years) 23.2 (0.4) 23.3 (0.2) 23.6 (0.2) 23.9 (0.4) 23.5 (0.1) 0.40 
Hindu 0.82 (0.04) 0.83 (0.03) 0.84 (0.05) 0.80 (0.04) 0.83 (0.02) 0.94 
Muslim 0.18 (0.04) 0.17 (0.03) 0.16 (0.05) 0.20 (0.04) 0.17 (0.02) 0.30 
Dalit 0.17 (0.03) 0.13 (0.02) 0.13 (0.03) 0.19 (0.03) 0.15 (0.01) 0.94 
Janajati 0.09 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.09 (0.03) 0.10 (0.03) 0.07 (0.01) 0.26 
No. of children alive 1.34 (0.07) 1.36 (0.08) 1.43 (0.07) 1.48 (0.12) 1.40 (0.04) 0.51 
Wealth index (SD) 0.08 (0.11) 0.06 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) -0.09 (0.09) 0.00 (0.04) 0.28        








food Control Overall 
p-
value 
Sample size 71 118 111 65 365  
Education (years) 3.42 (0.64) 3.87 (0.34) 2.71 (0.33) 3.19 (0.38) 3.30 (0.22) 0.14 
Age (years) 21.9 (0.5) 21.4 (0.5) 22.0 (0.4) 22.3 (0.6) 21.8 (0.3) 0.73 
Hindu 0.73 (0.08) 0.80 (0.05) 0.72 (0.06) 0.68 (0.07) 0.74 (0.03) 0.48 
Muslim 0.27 (0.08) 0.20 (0.05) 0.27 (0.05) 0.32 (0.07) 0.26 (0.03) 0.69 
Dalit 0.13 (0.04) 0.17 (0.04) 0.21 (0.05) 0.17 (0.06) 0.17 (0.02) 0.51 
Janajati* 0.04 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.01) <0.01 
No. of children alive 0.99 (0.17) 0.97 (0.13) 1.16 (0.07) 0.89 (0.11) 1.02 (0.06) 0.10 
Wealth index (SD) -0.06 (0.16) 0.15 (0.10) 0.12 (0.09) 0.00 (0.11) 0.07 (0.06) 0.59 
Means are provided with robust standard errors in brackets and global robust tests for differences across arms. Testing for differences between participants with and without 
missing data, education (p<0.001), age (p<0.001), Hindu religion (p=0.002), Muslim religion (p=0.002), indigenous (Janajati) ethnicity (p=0.027) and number of children alive 
(p<0.001) are strongly related to missingness. However, Dalit caste (p=0.297) and wealth (p=0.223) are not. *Note, only 13 women lost to follow-up were Janajatis 
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Since we found systematic differences between respondents who were included 
in our study and respondents who were lost to follow-up, then the missing data 
mechanism underlying survey non-response was not MCAR. However, 
insufficient contextual knowledge existed to create a credible parametric model 
of an MNAR mechanism, while multiple imputation could not improve precision 
and bias for MAR outcome variables. Our adjusted analysis for the main effect 
(Section 5.2.2.3) also already included a number of controls potentially 
associated with missingness. Further, no additional variables in our dataset were 
plausibly associated with both missingness and agency freedom including 
education, age and socio-economic status. Hence, we did not perform multiple 
imputation or other analyses to control for survey non-response. 
 
Finally, no evidence for a systematic difference in follow-up rates was found with 
a robust test for differences (p=0.83). Tests of interaction between intervention 
arm and missingness also revealed no evidence that patterns of missingness 
varied across trial arms for all baseline characteristics (p>0.3) except Janajati 
ethnicity (p<0.01), but these results are likely an artefact of the small number of 
Janati women with missing data in total (n=13). Thus, even without adjustment 
for covariates, it is unlikely that the presence of survey non-response would 
have greatly affected our results, because the extent and type of survey non-
response in our study did not differ meaningfully between trial arms. 
 
5.2.2.5.3 Dealing with item non-response 
48 of the 1309 cases (3.6%) exhibited item non-response for at least one item in 
the main outcome data. 31 had non-response to a single item, 12 to two items, 
3 to three items, 1 to seven items and 1 to eight items. By comparison, the total 
number of items in our battery was 32. As the level of item non-response was 
low, single imputation would be unlikely to produce bias in our results. We used 
a logistic regression model to perform single imputation and predicted the 
probability of the item being a “yes”. In addition to the controls in equation (1), 
we added female labour participation, private savings, food security, number of 
household chores performed by the respondent, whether women participated 
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in any groups and the type of group that they mainly participated in, decision-
making on food and expenditures and all the responses to the other 
empowerment items with non-missing values. We then chose cut-offs based on 
the observed sensitivity and specificity among participants with non-missing 
responses. The observed sensitivities and specificities ranged from 0.70 to 0.90. 
We did not have any cases with missing data in the control variables for our main 
analysis among respondents who were available for interview by our 
empowerment team.  
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Overall, differences between trial arms in education, age, religion, caste, 
ethnicity, number of children and wealth were negligible (Table 9). Table 10 
shows further descriptive statistics that were collected from women with 
complete data on agency freedom only. No meaningful differences were seen 
between trial arms in these indicators, except the spousal age and education 
differences tended to be slightly larger in the intervention arms compared to the 
control arms. In the control arm, husbands were on average 4.47 years older 
than their wives and had 1.35 more years of education, while husbands were on 
5.32-5.51 years older and had 1.70-2.59 more years of education than their 
wives in the intervention arms (p<0.01 for a difference between arms). 
 
10% of the women who were interviewed on their agency freedom were heads 
of household themselves and 9% lived separately from their in-laws. The 
average age of marriage was 16 years, while the mean number of sons alive 
excluding respondents’ current pregnancy was 0.54. 36% of women had 
husbands who had migrated abroad for employment, while 97% resided in their 
husband’s home at the time of interview. 25% performed work outside of the 
household. 27% had their own savings. 12% lived in food-insecure households. 
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food Control Overall p-value 
Family structure       
Head of household herself 0.11 (0.02) 0.10 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01) 0.10 (0.02) 0.10 (0.01) 0.85 
Living separately from in-laws 0.10 (0.01) 0.09 (0.02) 0.10 (0.01) 0.08 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01) 0.86 
No. of sons currently alive 0.51 (0.04) 0.52 (0.03) 0.55 (0.04) 0.59 (0.04) 0.54 (0.02) 0.33 
Husband migrated abroad 0.40 (0.03) 0.32 (0.03) 0.34 (0.03) 0.38 (0.03) 0.36 (0.01) 0.23 
Woman residing in her 
husband's home 0.98 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) 0.13 
 
Age and education (years)       
Woman's age at marriage 15.9 (0.2) 16.0 (0.1) 16.2 (0.2) 16.1 (0.2) 16.1 (0.1) 0.33 
Husband age minus wife’s age 5.51 (0.29) 5.32 (0.22) 5.41 (0.26) 4.47 (0.22) 5.24 (0.13) <0.01 
Husband’s education minus 
wife’s education 2.33 (0.33) 1.70 (0.12) 2.59 (0.20) 1.35 (0.29) 2.02 (0.12) <0.01 
 
Work and finances       
Working outside the home 0.24 (0.04) 0.23 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 0.27 (0.02) 0.25 (0.01) 0.71 
No. domestic tasks* 3.45 (0.07) 3.21 (0.08) 3.47 (0.04) 3.39 (0.11) 3.36 (0.04) 0.11 
No. social tasks* 1.47 (0.13) 1.52 (0.08) 1.47 (0.09) 1.74 (0.12) 1.54 (0.05) 0.31 
No. outdoor tasks* 0.38 (0.04) 0.35 (0.03) 0.31 (0.04) 0.31 (0.04) 0.34 (0.02) 0.69 
Having private savings 0.28 (0.02) 0.30 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 0.20 (0.04) 0.27 (0.01) 0.20 
 
Health and nutrition       
Would seek care in a health 
facility for a health problem 0.51 (0.05) 0.49 (0.06) 0.61 (0.05) 0.47 (0.05) 0.53 (0.03) 0.24 
Experienced food insecurity in 
the past year 0.13 (0.04) 0.13 (0.03) 0.10 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 0.91 
 
Community interaction       
Any friend outside the home 0.58 (0.06) 0.64 (0.05) 0.59 (0.03) 0.63 (0.05) 0.61 (0.02) 0.78 
Participating in any groups 0.43 (0.03) 0.97 (0.01) 0.91 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.70 (0.04) <0.01 
Participating in a non-MIRA 
group** 0.15 (0.03) 0.07 (0.01) 0.10 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.10 (0.01) 0.08 
 
Engagement with the trial 
intervention       
Heard of women’s groups 0.52 (0.04) 0.97 (0.01) 0.98 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.72 (0.04) <0.01 
Participated in women's 
groups (1-3 times) 0.22 (0.03) 0.11 (0.02) 0.20 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 (0.01) <0.01 
Participated in women's 
groups (4+ times) 0.12 (0.02) 0.85 (0.03) 0.70 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.51 (0.04) <0.01 
 
Mean proportions are presented with robust standard errors in brackets. 
* Domestic tasks comprised cooking, cleaning the house, performing small repairs, washing 
the dishes and doing laundry. Social tasks comprised caring for elderly people, ill children and 
teaching children manners. Outdoor tasks comprised shopping and managing the household 
money. ** Includes women who may additionally participate in MIRA PLA groups. 
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Respondents performed on average 3.4 out of 4 domestic tasks including 
cooking, cleaning the house, performing small repairs, washing the dishes and 
doing laundry. They also performed 1.5 out of 3 social tasks including caring for 
elderly relatives and/or ill children and teaching children manners, and 0.4 out 
of 2 outdoor tasks including shopping and managing the household money. Only 
53% would seek health care in a facility for a health problem comparable to 
severe toothache or headache and only 61% reported having any friends outside 
of the family in the local village. There was no evidence for any difference 
between trial arms in women’s employment, the type of household tasks carried 
out, women’s health-seeking behaviour, or the reported prevalence of food 
insecurity (p>0.1). 
 
Participation in women’s groups differed substantially between intervention 
arms. Only 52% of women in the women’s group only arm had even heard of 
the women’s groups, but 97-98% had heard of them in the women’s group and 
transfer arms. 5% of women in the control arm also reported having heard of 
the women’s groups. 34% of women reported having ever participated in a 
women’s group in the women’s group only arm, while 90-96% reported having 
ever participated in the combined women’s group and transfer arms. 70% of 
women in the women’s group and food arm and 85% of women in the women’s 
group and cash arm had attended four or more meetings. Since transfers were 
distributed at the end of all meetings in transfer arms, this indicates that at least 
70% pregnant women in the transfer arms received four or more transfers. 12% 
of women in the women’s group only arm attended four or more meetings. 
Rates of group participation in groups unrelated to MIRA were low (10%) and 
evidence for a difference in rates of participation in groups unrelated to MIRA 
across trial arms was marginal (p=0.081). This suggests that the majority of 
women who participated in groups in the transfer arms of the trial, only 
participated in the women’s groups. 
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food Control Overall 
Overall agency      
Agency freedom 0.88 (0.44) 1.99 (0.33) 0.58 (0.31) 0.48 (0.45) 1.10 (0.20) 
External motivation 10.50 (0.39) 11.42 (0.39) 12.51 (0.33) 10.72 (0.50) 11.43 (0.22) 
Internal motivation 11.38 (0.22) 13.41 (0.17) 13.09 (0.15) 11.20 (0.18) 12.53 (0.15) 
      
Work outside the home      
Agency freedom -0.51 (0.18) -0.50 (0.13) -0.85 (0.13) -0.73 (0.14) -0.64 (0.07) 
External motivation 2.63 (0.10) 2.84 (0.08) 3.01 (0.07) 2.83 (0.11) 2.85 (0.05) 
Internal motivation 2.13 (0.14) 2.34 (0.11) 2.16 (0.11) 2.11 (0.10) 2.21 (0.06) 
      
Household chores      
Agency freedom 0.92 (0.11) 1.02 (0.09) 0.68 (0.08) 0.89 (0.10) 0.88 (0.05) 
External motivation 2.65 (0.12) 2.76 (0.09) 3.00 (0.10) 2.71 (0.12) 2.80 (0.05) 
Internal motivation 3.57 (0.08) 3.77 (0.06) 3.68 (0.07) 3.60 (0.09) 3.68 (0.04) 
      
Health-seeking      
Agency freedom 0.45 (0.11) 0.60 (0.12) 0.33 (0.10) 0.68 (0.19) 0.51 (0.07) 
External motivation 2.98 (0.12) 3.08 (0.13) 3.40 (0.12) 2.87 (0.17) 3.11 (0.07) 
Internal motivation 3.43 (0.08) 3.68 (0.06) 3.72 (0.05) 3.55 (0.07) 3.62 (0.03) 
      
Group participation      
Agency freedom 0.02 (0.18) 0.86 (0.15) 0.42 (0.10) -0.36 (0.17) 0.35 (0.09) 
External motivation 2.24 (0.14) 2.75 (0.14) 3.11 (0.11) 2.31 (0.15) 2.67 (0.08) 
Internal motivation 2.25 (0.09) 3.61 (0.09) 3.53 (0.08) 1.94 (0.08) 3.02 (0.09) 
      
Large purchases      
Sole decision-maker 0.08 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01) 0.07 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) 
Joint decision-maker 0.26 (0.04) 0.25 (0.03) 0.23 (0.04) 0.25 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 
Not involved, but able to 0.26 (0.03) 0.41 (0.04) 0.33 (0.03) 0.28 (0.04) 0.34 (0.02) 
Not involved and unable to 0.40 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04) 0.38 (0.04) 0.40 (0.04) 0.36 (0.02) 
      
Food preparation and serving     
Sole decision-maker 0.56 (0.04) 0.52 (0.02) 0.56 (0.03) 0.56 (0.04) 0.55 (0.02) 
Joint decision-maker 0.07 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01) 0.09 (0.02) 0.07 (0.01) 
Not involved, but able to 0.23 (0.04) 0.33 (0.03) 0.25 (0.03) 0.23 (0.04) 0.27 (0.02) 
Not involved and unable to 0.14 (0.03) 0.07 (0.02) 0.14 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.11 (0.01) 
      
Own pregnancy      
Sole decision-maker 0.17 (0.03) 0.16 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) 0.19 (0.04) 0.16 (0.01) 
Joint decision-maker 0.27 (0.04) 0.29 (0.04) 0.25 (0.04) 0.29 (0.04) 0.28 (0.02) 
Not involved, but able to 0.27 (0.03) 0.42 (0.03) 0.41 (0.03) 0.33 (0.04) 0.37 (0.02) 
Not involved and unable to 0.29 (0.05) 0.14 (0.03) 0.20 (0.02) 0.19 (0.05) 0.19 (0.02) 
Mean proportions are presented with robust standard errors in brackets. Agency freedom, 
external motivation and internal motivation scores are all raw, unstandardized scores. 
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Table 12. Main trial effect adjusted for interviewer dummies (n=1309).  
 Impact on overall agency freedom  
 
Mean effect 
size in SDs  
Mean effect 
size in SDs 
Treatment allocation  Head of household  
Control - Not the woman herself - 
Women's groups only 0.13* (0.08) The woman herself 0.65*** (0.10) 
Women's groups and cash 0.38*** (0.08) Joint/separated family  
Women's groups and food 0.24*** (0.05) Joint family - 
Maternal education  Separated from mother-in-law 0.29*** (0.09) 
No education - Mother-in-law is no more 0.10 (0.07) 
1-5 years -0.08 (0.09) Husband migrant status  
6-8 years -0.07 (0.10) Not migrated abroad - 
9-10 years 0.14* (0.08) Migrated to India -0.10* (0.06) 
11-13 years 0.46** (0.22) Migrated to Arab countries 0.02 (0.06) 
Socioeconomic status  Migrated elsewhere -0.13 (0.11) 
Wealth index -0.02 (0.03) Current residence  
Wealth index squared 0.00 (0.02) Husband's home - 
Caste/religion/ethnicity  Parental home 0.25 (0.17) 
Dalit - Age of marriage  
Muslim 0.03 (0.10) 18+ years - 
Janajati -0.06 (0.12) <10 years 0.37* (0.22) 
Middle Madhesi -0.02 (0.10) 10-14 years 0.17* (0.09) 
Yadav 0.11 (0.10) 15-17 years 0.04 (0.08) 
Sudi/Teli 0.02 (0.12) 
Age difference between 
husband and wife  
Brahmin/Chettri 0.13 (0.20) Wife same age or older - 
Age of woman  Husband 1-5 years older 0.26 (0.20) 
<20 years - Husband 6+ years older 0.34* (0.20) 
20-24 years 0.12* (0.07) 
Educational difference 
between husband and wife  
25-29 years 0.43*** (0.10) Same level of education - 
30-34 years 0.49*** (0.11) Wife more educated 0.15 (0.10) 
35-39 years 0.96*** (0.19) 
Husband 1-5 years' more 
educated 0.02 (0.06) 
40+ years 1.27*** (0.25) 
Husband 6+ years more 
educated 0.00 (0.06) 
Mean effects presented with robust standard errors in brackets. Effect sizes have been 
standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. The controls that are not shown are: 
number of sons alive (p=0.73), number of previous pregnancies and number of previous 
pregnancies squared (p=0.12), interviewer dummies (joint p<0.001). 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 11 presents descriptive statistics of our primary and secondary outcome 
measures. Women’s overall agency freedom score was near the mid-point for 
the scale on average (1.10 for a scale running from -16 to +16), while scores on 
external (11.43 out of 16) and internal (12.53 out of 16) were on the upper end 
of their respective scales. This pattern persisted throughout the domain-specific 
scores on agency, external motivation and internal motivation. Crude overall 
scores were highest on average in the women’s groups and cash arm (1.99), then 
in the women’s groups only arm (0.88), then the women’s groups and food arm 
(0.58) and then in the control arm (0.48). With respect to reported decision-
making power, the majority of women were not involved in large purchases 
(70%) or in decisions on their own pregnancy (56%), although many reported 
being able to be involved if they wanted to (34-37%). Only 6-16% of women were 
the sole decision-maker in these domains. However, when it came to food 
preparation and serving, 55% reported being the sole decision-maker, while 27% 
reported being uninvolved, but able to involve themselves, if they wanted to. 
 
5.3.2 Impact of LBW-SAT on agency freedom 
The inter-rater ICC in overall agency freedom between interviewers in our data 
was 0.12 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.248). While this ICC was substantially lower than the 
ICC found in our validation study (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2) and close to the ICC 
for external motivation found in our standardisation exercise (Section 5.2.1), it 
was still high enough to merit concern for bias due to interviewer effects [324]. 
Appendix E provides a table-by-table comparison of results with and without 
interviewer effects and analyses of the likely effect of adjusting for interviewer 
effects in our study. The conclusion was that results controlling for interviewer 
effects were on balance more likely accurate than results without such controls. 
 
Table 12 displays the regression results from equation (1) in Section 5.2.2.3 after 
adding interviewer dummies. We found weak evidence for a 0.13 SD increase in 
agency freedom in the women’s groups only arm (p=0.077) and strong evidence 
for a 0.24 SD increase in the women’s groups and food arm (p<0.01) and 0.38 
SD increase in the women’s groups and cash arm (p<0.01).  
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Mean effects with robust standard errors provided in brackets. The same controls are applied 
as in Table 12. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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The latter was a relatively large increase, larger than the effect of 9-10 years of 
education (0.14 SD) and living in a nuclear family separately from the mother-
in-law (0.29 SD). The only effects that were larger were achieving secondary 
school education (0.46 SD), becoming head of the household (0.65 SD), and 
being more than 25 years’ old (0.43-1.27 SD) which constituted quite substantial 
alterations in a woman’s circumstances in our context. Estimating the marginal 
impact of women’s groups and cash transfers over the women’s groups and food 
transfers, we found evidence for a greater impact on empowerment from the 
cash compared to the food transfers (0.13 SD, robust standard error 0.06, 
p=0.030). 
 
5.3.3 Disaggregated impact on components and domains of agency 
Table 13 decomposes the overall effect into domains-specific effects and 
component effects reported in original, unstandardized units. Internal 
motivation was found to increase by 1.71-1.77 points versus control for the two 
transfer arms. External motivation increased in the two transfer arms and 
decreased in the women’s groups only arm, but neither the increase in the 
women’s groups and cash arm nor the decrease in the women’s groups only arm 
were significant at the 10% level. 
 
When it came to domain-specific impacts on agency freedom, impact estimates 
were close to zero for the domains of work inside and outside the house and 
health care seeking. With respect to group participation, we found strong 
evidence for increased agency freedom in all three arms (p<0.01) with twice as 
large of an average impact in the transfer arms (1.14-1.33 points versus control) 
compared to the women’s groups only arm (0.53 points versus control). 
 
Further disaggregated analysis of intervention impacts on domain-specific 
internal and external motivation revealed raised levels of external motivation in 
the group participation domain for the two transfer arms. This indicated that 
women were more likely to ascribe motives such as fear, social pressure or 
avoidance of punishment to their decision to engage in group activity in the 
transfer arms compared to the control arm. 
Chapter 5 
The Impact of Participatory Women’s Groups Alone or Combined with Cash or Food 
Transfers on Maternal Agency 
 
160 | P a g e  
 
With respect to internal motivation, most estimates were close to zero in 
domains unrelated to group participation, although we found a weak effect on 
household chores (0.15 points versus control) in the women’s groups and cash 
only arm. We also found strong evidence for an impact on internal motivation 
in group participation in all three arms of the trial (p<0.01) and impacts in the 
transfer arms were also substantially larger (1.58-1.67 points versus control) 
compared to the women’s groups only arm (0.33 points versus control). This 
indicated that women were also more likely to ascribe motives such as 
importance, desire or enjoyment to their decision to engage in group activity in 
the intervention arms compared to the control arm.  
 
5.3.4 Impacts on measures of household decision-making 
 
Table 14. Impact of LBW-SAT on measures of decision-making (n=1309). 
 Large purchases 
Food preparation 
and serving Own pregnancy 
Control - - - 
Women's groups only 0.07 (0.21) 0.32 (0.23) -0.06 (0.21) 
Women's groups and cash -0.09 (0.21) 0.18 (0.18) -0.09 (0.18) 
Women's groups and food -0.08 (0.19) 0.25 (0.21) -0.13 (0.21) 
 
Log-odds ratios with robust standard errors provided in brackets. The same controls are applied as in Table 11. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
 
Table 14 shows the estimated impacts of LBW-SAT on measures of household 




5.4.1 Interpretation of findings 
Our study found strong evidence for an overall effect of the combined women’s 
groups and transfer arms on women’s agency freedom (p<0.01) and weaker 
evidence for an effect in the women’s group only arm (p=0.077). Both types of 
effects were driven primarily by an increase in agency freedom in the group 
participation domain. A point estimate of 0.13 SD and a standard error of 0.08 
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SD for the impact of participatory women’s groups alone (Table 12) did not rule 
out a moderately small beneficial impact, as the corresponding 95% CI ranged 
from -0.03 SD to 0.28 SD. However, we could rule out larger impacts on the order 
of 0.38 SD observed in the women’s groups and cash arm. 
 
Disaggregated results showed that almost all the impact was concentrated in 
the group participation domain (Table 13). Neither women’s actual health-
seeking and domestic work behaviour (Table 10), nor their agency freedom in 
these domains was affected (Table 13). Similarly, neither women’s actual 
employment status, nor their agency in employment changed due to the 
intervention. In our analysis of decision-measures, we find no evidence for a 
change to women’s decision-making power in the domains of large purchases, 
food preparation and serving, or women’s own pregnancy.  
 
This indicates that LBW-SAT likely did not have a broader impact on women’s 
bargaining power in the family. Indeed, compared to the changes in women’s 
agency freedom with greater age (Table 15), the impacts of LBW-SAT on 
women’s agency seemed quite limited. As predicted by existing anthropological 
evidence (Section 2.3.2, Chapter), greater age was correlated with substantial 
increases in agency freedom across all four domains. In the domain of work 
outside the home and household chores, increases in women’s agency exceeded 
1 SD. This shows that multidimensional change in agency freedom was possible 
(Section 3.4.3, Chapter 3) and could be detected by our survey tool. Thus, we 
could rule out a lack of sensitivity of our survey tool as an explanation for our 
lack of observed multi-dimensional impact. At the same time, the lack of impact 
on agency scores in health-seeking and domestic work and the lack of impact on 
indicators of decision-making power in food and pregnancy-related decisions 
suggested that LBW-SAT did not have an impact in the more restricted domain 
of agency in health behaviours either. 
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The same covariates are adjusted for in the model as in Table 12. Mean effects with robust standard errors 
provided in brackets. All effects are reported in original, unstandardized units.  
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
 
It important to consider why our intervention might not have had broader 
impacts on women’s agency freedom. Within the LBW-SAT theory of change, 
broad impacts on women’s agency freedom were hypothesised to flow from 
enhanced bargaining power resulting from increased social support and altered 
community norms towards pregnant women created by the women’s groups 
(Section 5.1.2). In the cash and food transfer arms, this increase was 
hypothesised to be complemented by the provision of resource transfers. 
However, process evaluation of the operation of the women’s groups suggested 
that the final group strategies involved fairly weak amounts of participation 
[329]. Women’s group members and facilitators overwhelmingly decided to 
implement extra community meetings about the importance of maternal 
nutrition by showing picture cards to the wider community [330]. Coordinators 
reported that meetings to formulate and implement strategies were the most 
difficult to run, and that participants in the transfer arms of the intervention 
were particularly difficult to motivate to take lead roles [329]. In our own 
qualitative interviews with daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law in the women’s 
group and cash arm (Chapter 6), we also found that women came to group 
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meetings, not to discuss and organize work towards improving the conditions of 
women in the village as a whole, but rather to receive cash transfers and health 
education they could implement at home (Appendix K, Section K.4). 
 
Indeed, some women’s groups reported implementing home visits by nutrition 
mobilisers as one of their group strategies, which made it unclear to what extent 
local women really had ownership over the strategy implementation process 
[330]. The general community meetings implemented by women’s group 
members to raise awareness about women’s health issues created little impact 
because social norms made it unacceptable for women to speak in a public 
meeting and women themselves had little prior experience with public speaking 
[329]. A few groups held separate meetings with men, but these were likely too 
ad hoc to change entrenched norms concerning the acceptability of women’s 
speech in public. Even in the women’s group meetings themselves, it was nearly 
impossible to openly discuss the powerful role of mothers-in-law in deciding 
over the welfare of their daughters-in-law, since mothers-in-law often escorted 
their daughters-in-law to group meetings. 
 
This contrasts with past experience of participatory women’s groups in maternal 
and child health, which saw a wide diversity of strategies implemented by group 
members requiring considerable levels of sophistication, coordination and 
participation [53,55-57,302,303]. Differences in context may have played a role, 
as Maithili culture is known to have more restrictive gender norms about 
women’s role in public than the cultures in the Hills of Nepal or the tribal areas 
of Jharkhand in India (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3), where the previous 
participatory women’s groups trials took place [55,57], or the African contexts 
of community mobilisation programmes against domestic violence [331,332]. 
The use of nutrition mobilisers and FCHVs to run group meetings may have been 
less effective than the use of a single trained peer facilitator as in previous 
women’s group trials [55,57]. The introduction of individual material transfers 
into the participatory process may have altered the power relationship between 
women’s group facilitators and women’s group members and corrupted the 
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participatory process (see Chapter 9). In turn, women’s group members in the 
women’s group only arms might have been discouraged from hearing that 
women in other arms of the trial received resource transfers, while they 
received none themselves (as indicated by evidence from process evaluation). 
Finally, the lack of an explicit gender focus in the design of visual aids and 
training materials for group facilitators might have discouraged facilitators from 
discussion issues of power, justice and rights as opposed to healthy foods to eat 
and good hygiene behaviour. 
 
In turn the absence of a strong, coordinated community response to gender 
issues in the household may not have led to the desired change in household 
norms that was originally proposed in the Theory of Change for LBW-SAT 
(Section 5.1.2). Young daughters-in-law likely needed considerable amounts of 
social support from the wider community to substantially alter their position in 
the household. Without such community support, the resource transfers alone 
may have been insufficient to transform the bargaining power of daughters-in-
law at home. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, evaluations of the impact of cash 
transfers on women’s decision-making power showed inconsistent evidence for 
a wider effect. In turn, the lack of wider change in the position of daughters-in-
law at home might have left them unable to demand changes in health 
behaviours for themselves, including changes to their health-seeking behaviour 
and changes to their domestic work burden. 
 
The observed impacts of all three intervention arms on women’s agency in the 
group participation domain relative to control required further interpretation. 
Although such changes might have seemed to be induced by women’s 
willingness to receive incentives at group meetings, this interpretation was 
inconsistent with the observed impact on agency in the unincentivised arm of 
the trial. Furthermore, distribution of material incentives was not expected to 
increase intrinsic motivation a priori in SDT. A large body of experimental 
evidence pointed towards a crowding out effect of material incentives on 
intrinsic motivation [333], while studies of health behaviour generally failed to 
find increases in intrinsic motivation following incentivisation in high-income 
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contexts [334]. The current consensus in SDT stated that material incentives may 
only increase intrinsic motivation, when these were interpreted by recipients 
themselves as enabling and respecting their own autonomy [293]. Our own 
qualitative data was consistent with this interpretation, as many respondents 
saw the cash transfers as an offering of help and support from “the government” 
for poor families to improve their prospects of a healthy pregnancy and a safe 
birth (Chapter 9, Section 9.3.1.1). 
 
We could also partially rule out social desirability as an explanation based on 
extensive evidence that it was not frowned upon for young, newly married 
women to demonstrate obedience to their elders, rather such an attitude was 
actively encouraged. Indeed, respondents felt free to report increased external 
pressure in the transfer arms (Table 13). Furthermore, the section on agency in 
group participation was the last domain to be queried (Appendix C), so 
respondents would have answered many sections with similar questions on 
their agency freedom before reaching these questions. 
 
The most straightforward interpretation seemed to be that usually cloistered 
daughters-in-law genuinely enjoyed getting the opportunity to leave the home 
and attend group meetings (Section 5.1.3). This was supported by later 
qualitative evidence, where many daughters-in-law voiced a sense of joy and 
wonder at being able to move about in the free air and socialise with other 
women in the community (see Chapter 9). For example, 91-98% of daughters-
in-law who participated in women’s groups in the intervention arms agreed with 
the statement “you participate, because you want to”, but only 37-52% of 
daughters-in-law who did not participate agreed with the statement “you did 
not participate, because you did not want to”. This result could have not have 
been predicted a priori (Section 5.1.3), since it was possible that women might 
solely participate, because they felt forced to do so by their family members, or 
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One interesting fact was the finding of a statistically significant (p<0.05) increase 
in external motivation behind group participation in the transfer arms (Table 
13). This suggested that, while daughters-in-law themselves desired and valued 
the opportunity to attend group meetings, they were simultaneously under 
considerable pressure by their family members to attend. For example, 70-80% 
of women agreed with the statement “you participate so that your family 
members won’t get angry with you” in the transfer arms of the trial, while only 
65-70% agreed with the statement “you don’t participate, because your family 
members would get angry with you otherwise” in the same arms of the trial. In 
the women’s group only arm, we observed a non-significant (p>0.10) decrease 
in external pressure (Table 13). Indeed, only 49% of women in the women’s 
group only arm agreed with the statement “you participate so that your family 
members won’t get angry with you”. This suggested that daughters-in-law had 
much more mixed motives regarding group participation in the incentivised arm 
of the trial than the non-incentivised arm and contradicts an expectation that 
linking resource transfers to group attendance might ease family pressure on 
women in the group participation domain. At the same time, it fitted with FCs 
reported experience of having considerably greater difficulty encouraging 
women to take active leadership roles in the transfer arms of the trial, since 
daughters-in-law might have felt somewhat forced into attending these groups. 
 
Finally, the marginal advantage of cash transfers over food transfers in 
increasing agency freedom warranted further explanation. First, it was likely 
that pregnant women in their capacity as the lowest-ranking member of the 
Maithili family were tasked with cooking the SuperCereal that they were 
provided, potentially eating the same food for up to seven months. By contrast, 
women in the women’s groups and cash arm of the trial were encouraged to 
spend their cash on buying fruits and milk, high-status items which were 
considered “special treats” by local women prior to the trial intervention (see 
Chapter 9). Cash may have been easier to hide from demanding family members 
than food. In fact, so common is the practice of married women keeping secret 
money stashed away that Maithili language contains a specific word koseliya 
designating the hidden savings of married women. In addition, women 
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traditionally receive a marital trunk with a lock called a peti on their wedding 
day in which they can deposit their valuables (see Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2). 
 
5.4.2 Study limitations 
The intervention in the transfer arms of the trial combined transfers with 
participatory women’s groups, thus rendering the effects of women’s groups 
and food and cash transfers inseparable. Thus, we should carefully avoid 
ascribing any isolated causal impact to the receipt of material transfers in the 
interpretation of our results. For example, it was possible that if more women 
had attended the women’s groups in the women’s only arm, we would have 
seen similar impacts on women’s agency in the women’s only arm to the 
women’s group and transfer arms. It was also possible that the effect of 
women’s groups interacted with the effect of food and cash transfers on 
women’s agency, if they were told by the group facilitators how they should 
spend their cash transfers (Chapter 9) how they should cook their food transfers. 
 
Further, it should be noted that this study focused on measuring our notion of 
agency freedom, which is an individual-based notion of agency that focuses on 
agency in interpersonal, family relations (Section 4.4, Chapter 4). Process 
evaluation of the trial indicated that poor community mobilisation may have 
been a key weakness of the LBW-SAT intervention, but we were unable to 
confirm this with our own data, because we did not measure empowerment at 
the community level. 
 
Finally, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, Chapter 3, our tool was limited by its 
inability to measure participants’ enduring interests, values and desires and was 
only able to reveal the extent to which their actions are aligned with their 
expressed interests, values and desires. Given limited the evidence base on 
women’s preferences for mobility in general (Section 3.4.2.3, Chapter 3), it was 
difficult to draw firm conclusions on whether women’s expressed enthusiasm 
for participating women’s groups would endure under unpressured reflection 
and dialogue with others. However, most daughters-in-law in our qualitative 
Chapter 5 
The Impact of Participatory Women’s Groups Alone or Combined with Cash or Food 
Transfers on Maternal Agency 
 
168 | P a g e  
 
sample endorsed their participation in the women’s groups and those who were 
not allowed to participate after they gave birth by their family members 
expressed resentment and frustration (Section K.4.1, Appendix K). This indicated 
a modicum of endurance of desires, because we interviewed many of these 
daughters-in-law months after they had given birth, which would have provided 
ample time for them to reflect on their experiences with the women’s groups. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Our study was the first to evaluate the impact of participatory women’s groups 
on maternal agency in the family. Women in the intervention arms of the trial 
reported being freer to pursue valued activities in life compared to the control 
group, but this impact was almost entirely due to increased agency in the 
domain of group participation. Since broad impacts on women’s position in the 
household may be necessary to improve their mental health [335-337], this 
might explain the mixed results of previous evaluations of the impact of 
participatory women’s groups on mental health [57,338,339]. Our lack of broad 
impact was surprising given the positive results of previous qualitative 
evaluations of participatory women’s groups interventions [53,55-57,302,303], 
but several contextual and implementation-related challenges to the delivery of 
the LBW-SAT intervention was noted by the process evaluation team. 
Furthermore, the delivery of resource transfers may have detrimentally affected 
the participatory process as a whole across the study area. In the second half of 
this PhD, we will explore more fully how material transfers and participatory 
approaches may have interacted in the LBW-SAT intervention. 
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Chapter 6 




As we saw in Chapters 3-5, the development and application of quantitative 
indicators capturing women’s agency is non-trivial. Qualitative research 
presents an alternative approach to the study of agency in the household, which 
contains the following advantages over quantitative methods: 
• The open-ended, conversational nature of qualitative interviews allows 
interviewers to adapt their line of enquiry to each participant and to learn 
“when and how to ask sensitive questions” [340]. This allows researchers 
to study phenomena that are secret or less routinely revealed.  
• The small number of respondents and interviewers that are involved in 
qualitative research allow for greater flexibility in the customization and 
adaptation of research protocols to emergent topics [341].  
• The subjective meaning of agency can be carefully analysed. Qualitative 
methods can pay attention to the use of language and the social 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee as objects of 
enquiry in their own right [342].   
• Research questions concerning the process through which interventions 
achieve their impacts can often be explored in greater depth [343]. These 
results can in turn inform questions on how interventions can be designed 
to maximize their impacts [342,344].  
• Qualitative methods allow researchers to elicit the voice of beneficiaries 
themselves in whose name public policies are made [345]. 
Part II of this thesis (Chapters 6-9) focuses on women’s agency in a specific 
domain, namely their financial agency in the household. In particular, it seeks to 
fill gaps in evidence on two key questions: 
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1) What forms of agency24 do young, married women have in their 
households over cash in Dhanusha and Mahottari? 
2) What forms of agency do pregnant women have in their households over 
the cash transfers provided in LBW-SAT? 
 
Because the data collection and data analysis methods are common to both 
these two research questions, we begin in this chapter with describing the 
methods of our research. The next chapter (Chapter 7) will then report 
important qualitative results concerning the local social and economic context 
in which participants lived (with subsidiary information in Appendices J and K). 
Finally, Chapter 8 answers the first research question concerning the forms of 
agency that pregnant women have over cash in general, while Chapter 9 
answers the second research question concerning the forms of agency that 
pregnant women have over the cash transfers provided in LBW-SAT. 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Grounded theory 
We took a grounded theory approach due to its focus on generating or 
“discovering” a theory [341] in settings where little pre-existing theory exists - 
almost no existing sociological theories describe women’s financial agency 
either in general or over the use of cash transfers in low-resource countries (see 
Chapters 8 and 9). Multiple divergent schools of grounded theory currently exist 
[341,346,347], although all of them have a common origin in the writings of 
Glaser and Strauss [348]. We followed the version advocated by Corbin and 
Strauss [341]. This section provides an overview of the basic principles of 
grounded theory. 
 
6.2.1.1 Theoretical sampling 
A central tenet of grounded theory is the principle that data collection and data 
analysis proceed together [341]. Key to this approach is the constant alternation 
                                                          
24 As usual, “agency” is defined in the sense provided in Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3. 
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between the generation of theory through the analysis of existing data and the 
sampling of new data on the basis of generated theory (see Figure 12). After 
each round of data collection, the researcher analyses the data using specific 
procedures (see Section 6.2.1.2) that “generates a theory”, i.e. creates a 
conceptual framework linking all the emergent categories together into a 
coherent whole. Such a process naturally gives rise to further lines of enquiry 
based on gaps in the theory or predictions from the theory that have not been 
verified. The researcher proceeds to collect further data with the specific 
purpose of exploring these emergent lines of enquiry. Since this type of data 
collection is based on emergent theory rather than pre-existing hypotheses, it 
uses a “theoretical sampling” method [341]25. We cannot perform theoretical 
sampling at the beginning of a study, since no data has been collected. Instead, 
sampling takes place at random or on the basis of previous literature [341]. 
Where previous literature is used, it is important to treat it merely as a starting 
point for ideas rather than a source of fixed and unchangeable hypotheses. 
Figure 12. The iterative process of data collection and data analysis in grounded theory. 
 
6.2.1.2 Theory generation 
Data analysis in grounded theory follows a structured approach involving three 
key stages (see Figure 13), which ultimately “generate a theory” of a 
phenomenon under investigation. The first stage, called “memoing”, requires 
the analyst to read the transcripts through in full and write reflective notes 
                                                          
25 Note that “theoretical sampling” does not necessarily entail sampling entirely new respondents for interviews 
or focus group discussions. We may go back to previously interviewed respondents in order to ask new questions 
that we did not ask them in a previous interview. Corbin and Strauss (2008) refer to this as “sampling concepts” 
[341], presumably as opposed to “sampling respondents”.  
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called “memos” during this process. Corbin and Strauss [341] provide a list of 
suggested “analytic tools”. The tools help stimulate reflection and maintain 
objectivity by providing alternative ways of looking at the data. The tools are as 
follows: 
• Questioning absolute statements involving words such as “always”, 
“never”, “all” or “none”. This prevents statements such as “I never ask my 
daughter-in-law for money” or “I always ask my husband for permission” 
from being taken as statements of absolute fact. This is called the method 
of “waving the red flag”. 
• Considering all possible meanings of keywords or metaphors in order to 
make the analyst sensitive to a variety of possible meanings or 
interpretations. For example, a description of women as being “just like a 
bank” could imply control over money by women, as they received and 
kept the “deposits” of their husbands or it could imply a lack of control, 
since “cashiers” are not entitled to use the money customers deposit in 
their bank accounts. 
• Making comparisons between concepts and between respondents and 
deliberately looking for evidence that can confirm or disconfirm an 
emerging theory. This forces the analyst to make the emerging theory 
consistent with all of the data rather than merely the data that fit his/her 
theory. For example, suppose the analysts notices that one respondent 
frequently shares food with her neighbours. By making comparisons with 
the behaviour of both wealthier and poorer respondents, the analyst is 
forced to consider how this behaviour varies by social class. 
 
Figure 13. The three stages of data analysis in grounded theory. 
 
After memoing, the analyst performs “open-coding” on the data. This involves 
breaking it down into chunks of meaningful words (micro-coding) or larger 
sections (macro-coding). During this process, each new section of text is 
Memoing Open-coding Selective coding
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compared with all existing codes to see if any existing codes apply to this section. 
Reflective notes should be written to describe the content of each code. For 
example, a sentence such as “they say, I am a newly married daughter-in-law, 
so I should not leave the house” could be coded “lack of permissions to leave the 
house shortly after marriage” and compared to all other codes pertaining to 
household permissions, marriage or mobility to reveal both commonalities and 
differences. Smaller codes can subsequently be grouped together into larger 
categories, which would be similarly described by reflective notes. For example, 
several codes providing different reasons that daughters-in-law are prohibited 
from the leaving the house could be grouped into a category called “the need 
for regulating the mobility of daughters-in-law”. 
 
The final stage of analysis called “selective coding”. Here, the analysts chooses 
or creates a “core category”. The core category is a category that pulls all the 
other categories together to explain “the main point” of the data. Strauss and 
Corbin [349] provided a list of “criteria” for a core category: It should be related 
to all other categories, appear frequently in the data, be logical and consistent, 
evolve naturally from the data, be sufficiently abstract that it can be used in 
other research areas, grow in depth and explanatory power as it integrates with 
other concepts and be able to explain variation in the data. Although a core 
category might be chosen from a list of existing categories, it might equally be 
created anew if the researcher deemed none of the existing categories 
sufficiently abstract to capture “the main point” of the data. 
 
All open codes that have not been subsumed by the core category should be 
inspected and re-interpreted using a schematic called “the Paradigm Model” 
[349]. The Paradigm Model (see Figure 14) models a phenomenon, which 1) 
takes place within a specific context, 2) arises due to particular causal conditions 
and 3) elicits behavioural responses in humans, also called strategies or 
action/interactions. These strategies are chosen based on particular intervening 
conditions and lead to particular consequences. The schematic is designed to 
stimulate reflection about social processes to avoid creating static, structural 
theories that cannot explain the dynamic complexity of everyday social life. 
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Corbin and Strauss [341] are somewhat vague concerning the exact use of the 
Paradigm Model during selective coding. One the one hand, they do not 
advocate explicitly coding for the components of the Paradigm Model and insist 
that it is merely a “guide” to selective coding. At the same time, they explicitly 
map the central phenomenon in Figure 14 on to their notion of a “core category” 
and insist that all remaining open codes should be “related to” the core category 
in the manner of the Paradigm Model. We decided to take a two-stage approach 
to selective coding: First we coded directly for the Paradigm Model; second we 
revised the codes from the Paradigm Model to fit the data even better. 
 
 
6.2.2 Data collection 
6.2.2.1 Pilot 
Table 16. Characteristics of districts in which interviews were held. 
VDC 
% 












Travel time to 
Indian border 
by motorbike 
Sahku 19.3% 1.6% 48.4% 36.8% 30 mins 30 mins 
Kote 31.6% 3.7% 63.1% 73.5% 2-4 hours >1 hour 
Jamal 13.1% 49.9% 78.9% 46.9% 1-2 hours >1 hour 
Sirsi 20.8% 12.7% 57.2% 41.2% 30 mins 30 mins 
Figure 14. The Paradigm Model from Grounded Theory 
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All districts belonged to the cash transfer arm of the trial. Pseudonyms have been created to serve as 
district names. All % have been estimated from surveillance data in LBW-SAT. Wealth levels were 
derived using the Wealth Index created in Chapter 5. Travel times to the Indian border indicate links 
to foreign trade, while travel times to district headquarters indicate links to domestic trade. 
The roles and responsibilities of myself, UCL staff and MIRA staff for this study 
are outlined in Appendix A. During the pilot phase, I developed two topic guides 
for semi-structured, individual in-depth interviews, one with daughters-in-law 
and one with mothers-in-law, which were translated into Maithili by Neha 
Sharma (NSh) (Appendix H). I also wrote guidelines for conducting semi-
structured interviews which were disseminated to NSh (Appendix G). 
 
In April 2015, nutrition mobilisers (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1) from Sirsi VDC 
helped us identify two daughters-in-law for us to pilot our topic guide and 
interview approach with. NSh conducted the interviews, while I observed. In the 
interviews with daughters-in-law, we found it was difficult to talk to them alone. 
Mothers-in-law often held a supervisory role over the daughter-in-law in the 
Maithili family (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). Mothers-in-law of both our 
interviewees refused to leave when they were politely asked to provide the 
daughter-in-law with more privacy. Mothers-in-law also sometimes responded 
to the interviewer’s questions instead of the daughter-in-law as they felt that 
questions regarding the household should be addressed to them. This made 
daughters-in-law reluctant to tell us about their role in the household economy. 
Nutrition mobilisers also identified one mother-in-law from Sirsi to pilot our 
approach with. Compared to the daughters-in-law, the mother-in-law was found 
to be considerably more assertive and talkative. 
 
To enable daughters-in-law to talk more freely, I decided to conduct pair-wise 
simultaneous interviews [270] using NSh and facilitation coordinator (FC, see 
Appendix A) to concurrently conduct separate interviews with daughters-in-law 
and their mothers-in-law in two separate locations around the household. While 
the NSh would interview the daughter-in-law in her room, an FC would interview 
the mother-in-law in a public place, e.g. the home courtyard. This allowed for 
greater privacy for the daughter-in-law. In case of a death of a mother-in-law, 
the FC would interview the elder sister-in-law instead. Male family members 
were typically at work for most of the day, so they were not a problem for 
obtaining privacy and confidentiality. 
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Table 17. Overview of the data collection process.  




No. of interviews 
translated and 
open-coded 
before the next 
phase  
Phase Period  DIL 
MIL/
SIL FGD DIL 
MIL/
SIL FGD VDCs Basis for sampling Topics 
Pilot April 2015 2 1 0 0 0 0 Sirsi Convenience 
Household management of money 
Use and control of the cash transfer, 




2015 9 9 0 2 1 0 Sahku 
Variation in caste, SES and 
education, minimum three 
cash transfers received 
Household management of money 
Use and control of the cash transfer, 
Support and conflict in the family 
Phase 2 
June-August 
2015 9 7* 0 4 0 0 
Kote 
(except  1 
from 
Sahku) 
Variation in caste, SES, 
education and household 
separation, minimum three 
cash transfers received 
Same as above for 4 DIL+MIL pairs 








2015 4 2** 1 - - - Jamal 
Variation in caste, SES, 
education and household 
separation, minimum three 
cash transfers received 
The experience of pregnancy 
Participation in LBW-SAT women’s groups 
Effects of MIRA on family support for pregnancy  
Understanding of MIRA’s policies around the 
cash transfer 
DIL = daughter-in-law, FGD = focus group discussion with facilitation coordinators. MIL/SIL designates mothers-in-law, and  elder sisters-in-law in families where the mother-
in-law has passed away. Descriptions of the VDCs where interviews were conducted are provided in Table 16. SES = socioeconomic status.  * One mother-in-law refused 
consent, and mechanical failure in the recording device prevented the transcription of another interview. ** Two mothers-in-law refused consent.
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Table 18. Female respondent characteristics in the qualitative data collection on the use of the cash transfers in LBW-SAT. 
 Household characteristics   
Mother-in-law/ 
Elder sister-in-law Daughter-in-law 
Serial 












1 Sahku Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 7 No, baby 5 months 5 
2 Sahku Dalit Low Separated Yes, ME Mother-in-law 0 25 0 No, baby 7 months 5 
3 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Sister-in-law 7 21 8 No, baby 6 months 5 
4 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Mother-in-law 0 21 8 No, baby 4 months 3 
5 Sahku Middle Madhesi Low Separated No Mother-in-law 0 21 7 No, baby 1.5 months 4 
6 Sahku Middle Madhesi Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 21 5 Yes, 7 months 3 
7 Sahku Middle Madhesi High Joint Yes, ME Mother-in-law 0 24 8 No, baby 5 months 5 
8 Sahku Brahmin High Joint No Mother-in-law 7 20 12 No 3 
9 Sahku Dalit Low Joint No Mother-in-law 0 30 0 No, baby 5 months 7 
10 Sahku Middle Madhesi High Separated No MIL refused consent  21 0 Yes, 8 months 7 
1 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 14 Yes, 8 months 5 
2 Kote Dalit Low Separated No Equipment failure  25 5 No, baby 5 months 6 
3 Kote Dalit Low Joint Yes, ME Sister-in-law 0  18 6 No, baby 1 month 6 
4 Kote Dalit Low Joint Yes Mother-in-law 0 25 8 No 5 
5 Kote Dalit Middle Separated Yes, ME Mother-in-law 0 25 0 Yes, 7 months 4 
6 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 20 0 No, baby 1 month 5 
7 Kote Dalit Middle Joint No Mother-in-law 0 22 12 No, baby 7 months 3 
8 Kote Middle Madhesi Low Joint Deceased Mother-in-law 0 20 3 No, baby 2 months 5 
1 Jamal Dalit Middle Joint Yes MIL refused consent 20 0 No, baby 4 months 4 
2 Jamal Middle Madhesi High Joint Yes, Malaysia Mother-in-law 0 25 8 No, baby 6 months 5 
3 Jamal Dalit Low Joint No Sister-in-law 0 25 8 No, baby 3 months 5 
4 Jamal Dalit Low Joint Yes, Delhi MIL refused consent 17 5 No 4 
 
ME = Middle East. Socioeconomic status was appraised by local informants and adjusted based on interview data in case of discrepancies. Joint/separated 
refers to whether the daughter-in-law lived in a nuclear or extended family. Destination country of migration was not reported for respondent 4, Kote and 1, 
Jamal. Ages for mothers-in-law/elder sisters-in-law not provided, as mothers-in-law had difficulties reporting their age exactly, although it ranged from 50-
80 years. All respondents were of Hindu faith. For daughters-in-law 8 from Sahku, 4 from Kote and 4 Jamal, the age of the baby was not reported. 
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I decided to sit and observe the interviews with mothers-in-law in these sessions 
and refrain from observing interviews with the daughters-in-law. This was to 
ensure maximal privacy for a group of respondents who were socially 
constrained in their interactions with men outside the household (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.3.1). Instead, I would conduct debriefing sessions with interviewers 
at the end of the day and discuss emergent problems during interviews. 
Examples of debriefing notes are shown in Appendix I. NSh and the FC recorded 
all interviews on an audio tape after getting informed consent (Section 6.2.4.2). 
 
An overview of the data collection process is provided in Table 17. Apart from a 
“pilot” phase described in this section, we conducted interviews in three more 
phases of data collection. 
 
6.2.2.2 First phase 
This phase lasted from April until May 2015. NSh and an FC interviewed nine 
beneficiary daughters-in-law and their mothers-in-law/elder sisters-in-law from 
Sahku, a peri-urban, relatively wealthy area (see Table 16 and Table 17). NSh 
and the FC discussed similar subjects with both daughters-in-law and mothers-
in-law. These included household management of money, use of and control of 
the cash transfer and support and conflict in the family (Appendix H). 
 
I purposively sampled daughter-in-law/mother-in-law pairs, where the 
daughter-in-law had received at least three cash transfers to ensure a moderate 
degree of exposure to the cash intervention. I sampled both pairs where the 
daughter-in-law was still pregnant and pairs where the daughter-in-law was no 
longer pregnant. While pregnant daughters-in-law were closer to the experience 
of receiving cash transfers, non-pregnant daughters-in-law no longer had a 
personal stake in the cash transfer scheme, as they were not eligible to receive 
further cash transfers at the time of the interview. This reduced the potential 
for social desirability bias.  
 
I also sampled according to the daughter-in-law’s caste, number of years in 
school, wealth and the migrant status of her husband. These criteria were 
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selected on the basis of existing knowledge from our literature review (Chapter 
2, Section 2.3). The sampling was performed by notifying locally resident 
nutrition mobilisers to identify women matching our criteria. These would then 
find such women and inform them of our arrival a few days in advance. By 
relying on local informants, we were able to use local knowledge to identify the 
respondents whom our working partners felt best matched our sampling criteria 
and whom they believed were the most important people for us to interview. It 
also allowed us to sample on the basis of criteria that were not conventionally 
collected in socioeconomic surveys, namely: the number of cash transfers that 
had been received, the migrant status of the husband and whether the 
daughter-in-law lived in nuclear family separately from her in-laws or whether 
she lived in an extended family jointly with her in-laws. 
 
At the beginning of each interview with both daughters-in-law and mothers-in-
law, NSh and the FC also asked a set of questions concerning their respondents’ 
basic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (Appendix H). These were 
used to re-classify respondents’ socioeconomic status, if their status was found 
to differ from the original sampling criterion; only one such re-classification 
happened. A list of all respondents in our semi-structured interviews is provided 
in Table 18. 
 
I performed an initial analysis which revealed the importance of considering 
different living arrangements in our sampling, in particular whether daughters-
in-law lived together with or separately from their mothers-in-law. I also found 
that women’s honour, freedom of mobility and ability to develop friendships 
were potentially entangled with their financial agency. Finally, I found that the 
residents of Sahku frequently visited Janakpur, the district headquarters of 
Dhanusha, to see their relatives, perform religious duties or purchase groceries. 
 
I suspected the close interaction with Janakpur city might have affected social 
norms in Sahku, as gender norms were perceived to be less conservative in the 
cities than in rural areas. I adapted the topic guides (see Appendix H) to include 
questions on household separation, honour and friendships. I also adapted our 
Chapter 6 
A qualitative study of financial agency in the household 
 
181 | P a g e  
 
sampling plan for the next phase to include respondents from Kote, a poor 
district, 2-4 hours’ drive away from Janakpur (see Table 16). 
 
6.2.2.3 Second phase 
The second phase lasted from June until August 2015, I purposively sampled one 
daughter-in-law/mother-in-law pair from Sahku and eight daughter-in-
law/mother-in-law pairs from Kote (Table 18). NSh and an FC conducted four 
interviews using the first phase topic guides and four interviews with the new 
topic guides (Appendix H). 
 
I purposively sampled daughter-in-law/mother-in-law pairs in Kote on the basis 
of the daughter-in-law’s education, wealth and caste and the migrant status of 
her husband. This was done so we could compare women between VDCs who 
possessed similar characteristics. I also added the criterion of household 
separation to our list of characteristics in this phase. In Sahku, a daughter-in-
law/mother-in-law pair was chosen for interview using the new topic guide, 
because the two of them were living separately from each other (daughter-in-
law 10, Sahku in Table 18). Privacy was easy to obtain because the daughter-in-
law lived at an entirely separate location from her in-laws.  
 
However, the mother-in-law refused to be interviewed as she considered 
household separation a deeply private matter. Previously, we did not discourage 
family members from listening in during interviews with mothers-in-law, as we 
did not ask the mother-in-law obviously sensitive questions, and the crowding 
in of family members helped ensure the privacy of the daughter-in-law during 
her own interview taking place at the same time. However, once the topic of 
household separation was raised, I surmised that mothers-in-law might be 
hesitant to talk about separation within earshot of other daughters-in-law.  
Household separation was the sensitive and emotional topic of having her son 
and daughter-in-law move out of her home and leave her behind (Section 7.2.3). 
We tried interviewing one mother-in-law of a separated daughter-in-law under 
a tree (mother-in-law 2, Kote). She spoke relatively freely about her concerns 
regarding her daughter-in-law. After two further interviews with a mother-in-
law and an elder sister-in-law that did not involve spontaneous discussions of 
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separation (respondents 3 and 4, Kote), I decided to conduct all interviews with 
mothers-in-law in a private place either under a tree, in a public field or in a 
nearby shed (respondents 5-8 in Kote) to allow the subject to arise if relevant. 
 
I performed an initial analysis of data from this phase, which confirmed my 
previous hypothesis that the financial agency of daughters-in-law was strongly 
affected by whether they lived in a joint household with both their husband and 
in-laws or separately with their husband alone. It also gave rise to a new 
hypothesis that women’s group facilitators and their supervisors held significant 
power over how household members made decisions about the use of the cash 
transfer. 
 
6.2.2.4 Third phase 
To explore the role of MIRA staff members influencing how the LBW-SAT cash 
transfer was spent, I developed a new topic guide (Appendix H) for interviewing 
FC which was translated by Nsh. NSh conducted one focus group discussion with 
a convenient sample of seven out of sixteen FCs working in the cash arm of the 
trial who were visiting the central office in Janakpur for a meeting.  
 
The focus group discussion enabled us to draw on the perspectives of staff 
members who had worked closely with communities in delivering the women’s 
group intervention since the beginning of the trial. In addition to asking them 
about their own understanding of how women’s group facilitators were meant 
to guide women on the use of the cash transfer, NSh asked FCs about broader 
issues of the impact of the cash transfer and the women’s groups on families. 
 
I also wanted to understand beneficiary households’ perspectives MIRA as an 
organization, particularly their views on what conditions if any, they had to fulfil, 
in order to continue to receive the LBW-SAT cash transfers. I created new topic 
guides focusing on women’s experience of pregnancy during LBW-SAT, 
intervention effects on families, knowledge gained from women’s groups, 
knowledge of MIRA’s policies around the cash transfer and family and 
community pressures to follow such perceived policies (Appendix H). Nutrition 
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mobilisers helped us contact four daughter-in-law/mother-in-law pairs for 
interviews. However, two mothers-in-law refused consent, so NSh only 
conducted semi-structured interviews with four daughters-in-law and two 
mothers-in-law from Jamal (see Table 16 and Table 18).  
 
6.2.3 Data analysis 
6.2.3.1 Flow of data analysis 
Our translators (see Appendix A) translated six interviews with daughters-in-law 
and one interview with a mother-in-law during data collection. I analysed these 
interviews to facilitate theoretical sampling (see Table 17). All the remaining 
data were translated and analysed after all data collection had finished.  
 
I checked the quality of our translations by comparing two translations of the 
same samples of complex dialogue from NSh and Sweta Chaudhary (SwC). SwC 
had translated one audio file into English from a full transcription into Maithili, 
while another had been translated into English directly from the audio file. I 
compared the two translations and found that the quality and level of detail in 
the direct translation was slightly greater compared to the translation of 
transcribed material. As both NSh and SwC were experienced translators who 
had worked extensively for MIRA previously, I decided that it was unlikely I could 
further improve on translation quality through the use of transcription before 
translation. I decided to translate all subsequent audiotaped data directly into 
English from the Maithili audio file. 
 
The translation, coding and analysis of our interview and focus groups data 
followed an iterative process (see Figure 15). I had an on-going dialogue with all 
translators after receiving transcripts. During my analysis, I continually checked 
my understanding of key terms in the translation against their feedback and 
asked for original Maithili/Nepali terms where further clarification was needed.   
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The whole process took place from April 2015 to August 2016. 
*One interview with a mother-in-law was fully analysed already before the daughter-in-law interviews had 
been fully translated (see Table 17). 
 
I also listened to the raw audio files myself when I needed more detailed 
information about the flow of a specific conversation. I performed the coding 
and analysis of the translated data. For each transcript, reflective notes (memos) 
were first written using analytical tools from grounded theory followed by open 
coding of the data. Selective coding for a theory of beneficiary control over cash 
Figure 15. Data translation and analysis flow. 
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transfers took place once after the interviews with daughters-in-law had been 
translated and a second time after selective coding of a theory of financial 
agency had also been generated. I generated codes for both the theory of 
daughters-in-law’s financial agency in general and the theory of their agency 
over the LBW-SAT cash transfers using data from all individual in-depth 
interviews. I only used data from the focus group discussion with MIRA staff for 
the theory of cash transfers. At the end of the analysis process, all the ideas, 
concepts and relationships in each theory were integrated into a single 
“storyline” to check for logical consistency of the story (see Appendix I). All 
coding and memo-ing was managed in MAXQDA 12.0.3. 
 
Table 19. Categories developed during open coding of interviews and one focus group discussion 
Respondent Theory of financial agency 




General circulation of money, economic 
condition of the family, interactions 
with the wider community, quality of 
personal relationships, family dynamics, 
family ideology, personal development, 
concept of self and failed ideology and 
economic reality 
Attitudes towards the cash transfer, 
the process of receiving the cash 
transfer, control over the cash 
transfer, use of the cash transfer 




Mobility of the daughter-in-law, work in 
the family, knowledge and status in the 
family, power and communication 
patterns in the family, money and 
power in the joint family, social support 
for mothers-in-law, other personal 
needs/desires/wants of the mother-in-
law, mother-in-law-daughter-in-law 
relationships, general family dynamics, 






Participation in the women’s 
groups, learning from the women’s 
groups, the effect of the women’s 
groups, relationships between 
facilitation coordinators and the 
communities, community responses 
to the women’s groups intervention, 
operational issues in the cash 
distribution programme, the role of 
socio-economic class and general 
community norms 
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6.2.3.2 Emergent categories during open-coding 
Table 19 shows the categories that emerged during open coding of the data for 
the purpose of generating two theories, one on financial freedom in the 
household and one on beneficiary control over cash transfers. For the theory of 
cash transfers, the same open codes were used for mothers-in-law and 
daughters-in-law, but for the theory of financial agency separate code trees 
were developed. Each category included detailed layers of sub-codes and sub-
sub-codes. An example is provided in Appendix I. 
 
6.2.3.3 Emergent categories during selective coding 
For the selective coding of financial agency for the daughter-in-law, we 
integrated codes from both the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law 
interviews into the components of the Paradigm Model from grounded theory 
(see Section 6.2.1.2). I designated as an emergent “grounded” core category and 
organization of the intra-household economy, economic and social insecurity, 
intervening conditions, alliances and secrets and short- and long-term 
consequences as final categories. After organizing the categories along the 
components of the Paradigm Model, they were re-organized one last time to fit 
the data better. The final major categories were household finances in the 
Maithili family, intra-household financial insecurity, common strategies for 
gaining financial agency, reasons for daughters-in-law’s choice of strategies and 
alternative pathways to financial agency. 
 
For the theory of women’s control over the cash transfers, the core category 
was to a certain extent pre-specified as women’s control over the cash transfers. 
I initially chose this as my core category and created axial categories surrounding 
the core category named causal conditions determining women’s control over 
the cash transfers, strategies for ensuring desirable outcomes, intervening 
conditions and consequences of the strategies pursued. After organizing these 
categories along the components of the Paradigm Model, they were re-
organized one last time to fit the data better. The final main categories were 
messages provided by MIRA, direct reactions to MIRA’s messages, blurred lines 
over access to cash transfers, daughters-in-law’s strategies to control cash 
transfers and evaluating the impact of the cash transfer.  
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6.2.4 Reflections on methods 
6.2.4.1 Subjectivity and reflexivity 
Thinking about my identity, my interactions with the field staff in Nepal and the 
respondents and how they viewed me was important to the research process. 
In particular as the choice of research question, design and implementation of 
data collection and data analysis was primarily driven by my own research 
agenda, it was important to ensure that my results did not become simply a 
reflection of my own pre-existing biases. Throughout the research process, I 
kept a diary in which I noted reflections, thoughts and feelings that occurred to 
me concerning data collection or data analysis. 
 
As a Danish man of Chinese heritage, I have life-long experience with privilege 
in terms of wealth, education, gender and nationality. Combined with my status 
as a researcher from University College London, this created significant 
inequalities in power between me and the MIRA staff members that I worked 
with. While these status differences enabled me to draw on my authority as a 
researcher from London to “get work done”, it also potentially made staff 
members hesitant to contradict me or to inform me of perceived problems 
during data collection. Consequently, I discussed my data and findings with the 
local team extensively and took care to encourage open disagreement with my 
analyses in order to show them that it was safe for them to disagree with me. 
Having a good understanding of Nepali and Hindi/Urdu allowed me to converse 
and engage with a wide range of residents of Dhanusha and Mahottari. Due to 
the closeness of the Maithili language with Nepali and Hindi/Urdu, this also 
enabled me to understand and follow interview conversations reasonably well 
and review translations by listening to the recoded audio files. 
 
During periods of data analysis, I noticed that one of the strongest influences, 
and potential biases, on the research process was my training as a scientist and 
my background in quantitative methodology, which predisposed me to look for 
clean or neat explanations of complex, dynamic and evolving social processes. 
These explanations would use clear definitions of terms setting out crisp dividing 
lines between otherwise amorphous phenomena such as freedom and justice 
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and could ideally be presented in diagrammatic format using causal or pseudo-
causal language. I tried to counteract such reductionist tendencies by 
continually discussing my findings with my translators, MIRA staff and residents 
from Janakpur, while maintaining the anonymity of respondents. Examples of 
field notes taken from these discussions are shown in Appendix I. 
 
However, I also noticed that the effort to counteract reductionism often 
resulted in overwhelming amounts of descriptive detail, which obscured the 
theoretical message of my analysis. In my own discussions with local women and 
men and in the responses provided during the qualitative interviews, people 
were quite comfortable employing simplifications, e.g. when Shyam Sundar 
Yadav told me that “in Nepal, women are just like a bank”, to convey their point 
with clarity. Thus, I also tried to counteract a tendency to provide pure 
descriptive detail by discussing my research with colleagues at UCL who had 
never had any exposure to Nepal and asking them if they could uncover the 
central points made in my writing. 
 
Furthermore, a tension existed between being faithful to the life circumstances 
reported by respondents in our interviews and fitting my analysis of their 
experiences within the larger theoretical framework of this thesis. In Corbin and 
Strauss’ [341] version of grounded theory, a pre-specified research question and 
literature review before undertaking data collection and analysis is permitted in 
order to ensure the research extends existing theory instead of re-inventing 
already known theory. In Glaser’s [350] version of grounded theory, these are 
anathema to the letter and spirit of grounded theory. As stated by Glaser:  
 
“A good GT analysis starts right off with regular daily data collecting, coding and 
analysis. The start is not blocked by a preconceived problem, a methods chapter 
or a literature review … It is critical in GT methodology to avoid unduly 
influencing the pre-conceptualization of the research through extensive reading 
in the substantive area and the forcing of extant theoretical overlays on the 
collection and analysis of data. The pre-study literature review of [Corbin and 
Strauss’ method] is a waste of time and a derailing of relevance for the GT Study” 
(p. 57-58) 
Chapter 6 
A qualitative study of financial agency in the household 
 
189 | P a g e  
 
 
I noticed that the choice to follow Corbin and Strauss’ method and conduct an 
extensive literature review on the conceptualisation of agency and existing ideas 
about gender norms in Nepal limited the direction of my research. The need to 
follow a pre-conceived research question focusing on financial agency in the 
family overlooked the related, but much larger concerns about household 
separation. My analysis of agency over LBW-SAT cash transfers revealed that 
power relations between the MIRA and local households dominated the context 
in which women made choices about the use of their cash transfers, but in my 
theoretical framework, I had already committed to a notion of agency that 
focused in family rather than institutional relationships26. 
 
6.2.4.2 Ethical issues 
All respondents in both our individual in-depth interviews and our focus group 
discussion provided informed verbal consent to participate in our study (see 
Appendix G for consent forms). During our pilot phase, consent procedures 
involving signatures or thumb-prints were also found to cause tension and 
awkwardness between interviewers and interviewees due to high illiteracy rates 
in the population. As a result, we took verbal consent for all our interviews 
during the main three phases of data collection. Consent forms are available in 
Appendix G. NSh and the FCs also asked all respondents if they would like to be 
recorded. No respondents consenting to be interviewed refused to be recorded. 
All the transcripts are stored in a confidential file location that can only be 
accessed by me. 
 
The establishment and maintenance of privacy and confidentiality in our 
interviews were a major ethical issue in our study. In Maithili culture, a 
reputation for family unity in the community was highly desirable and families 
went to great lengths to hide disagreement from community members. Many 
daughters-in-law felt it was inappropriate to share family problems with friends 
                                                          
26 In international relations theory, the terms “high” and “low” politics distinguish between “high” political issues 
that are vital to the security interests of a state and/or generate significant public controversy and “low” political 
issues reflecting the rather hum-drum politics-as-usual management of the state [351]. Thus, when following 
the trajectory set forth by my pre-conceived research questions and my overall theoretical stance on agency, it 
felt like I was focusing on the low politics of access to fruits bought with the LBW-SAT cash transfer compared 
to the high politics of household separation and household-NGO relations. 
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and other community members (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.3). Family members also 
chastised daughters-in-law for revealing family conflict to outsiders and one 
daughter-in-law reported being ostracised by her marital family, partially 
because she had leaked information on domestic violence to the village court 
through her natal parents. 
 
Our “pair-wise simultaneous interviewing” process facilitated the divulgence of 
secrets by daughters-in-law in a confidential and anonymous manner without 
the risk of being overheard by their mothers-in-law. Mothers-in-law were also 
able to share their experiences with our interviewer without being overheard by 
their family members after we started interviewing them in private in Phase 2 
(Section 6.2.2.3). As a result, daughters-in-law, elder sisters-in-law and mothers-
in-law revealed intimate details of their lives including details of domestic 
violence, secret financial arrangements and bitter domestic disputes. 
 
However, such openness required significant trust in our interviewer. For 
example, one daughter-in-law asked for reassurance after she had provided a 
full list of details on how she had spent her cash transfer that her tape recording 
was truly confidential “Sister, can everybody listen to this recording later on?” 
(daughter-in-law 3, Kote). Only after reassuring the respondent a second time 
that the recording was truly confidential, did she admit that she had secretly 
asked her children to buy things for herself without letting anyone else in the 
family know to avoid being obliged to hand over her cash transfer to other family 
members. Another daughter-in-law stated "I am only speaking to you about 
these things [discussed in our interview], but I would not speak like this to 
anybody else" (daughter-in-law 4, Kote). 
 
On the one hand, our respondents might have seen a rare opportunity to confide 
long-held secrets with an outsider, as our interviewer for the daughters-in-law 
was based in Janakpur and had never met most of the interviewees before. On 
the other hand, daughters-in-law could have been exposed to increased risk by 
divulging information that cast their families in an unfavourable light to 
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outsiders. For example, one daughter-in-law was so unnerved by the presence 
of her elder sister-in-law during her interview that the interviewer directly asked 
her if she felt uncomfortable with her sister-in-law (10.3.6.3). Only later, after 
the sister-in-law had left, did the daughter-in-law admit in a low and hushed 
voice that she had been forced to give up her cash transfer to her sister-in-law 
(daughter-in-law 4, Jamal). 
 
On balance, we felt that daughters-in-law would probably be put at greater risk 
of harm if they were interviewed in front of their mother-in-law rather than in a 
separate room. During our pilot interviews with daughters-in-law (Section 
6.2.2.1), we did not engage mothers-in-law using a second interviewer and in 
both interviews, the mothers-in-law observed the whole interview. Yet one of 
the daughters-in-law still volunteered unfavourable information concerning her 
mother-in-law, as she stated that her mother-in-law lacked concern for her 
health during her pregnancy. We felt that if daughters-in-law might speak out 
against their mothers-in-law regardless of whether the mothers-in-law were 
present during the interview, it would be safer for the daughters-in-law to be 
interviewed using our “pair-wise simultaneous interview” design. 
 
Furthermore, we explicitly refrained from including questions on domestic 
violence in our topic guides (as well as our quantitative survey tool). This was 
because, we felt that the acquisition of information concerning domestic 
violence would impose an ethical obligation to support the survivor of violence 
in question, but MIRA did not have the requisite expertise or connections with 
local law enforcement agencies to properly support such cases. Nonetheless, 
multiple daughters-in-law in our sample reported experiencing physical 
violence. For these women, I repeatedly urged my Nepal-based colleagues and 
MIRA staff to reach out to WOREC (Women’s Rehabilitation Centre) Nepal, 
which is an NGO dealing with cases of violence against women that has an office 
in Janakpur. Frustratingly, no action was taken, because MIRA staff felt it was 
not their responsibility to connect these women to WOREC, and I was not 
allowed entry into Nepal, because my visa had expired for the year. 
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One daughter-in-law reported experiencing the violence due to receiving the 
cash transfers in the programme (Section 9.2.6.4, Chapter 9). While it is difficult 
to establish for certain whether such violence arose due to the programme or 
whether the cash transfers merely served as a pretext for her family members 
to act on existing tensions, it is important to discuss the ethics of potentially 
putting women at risk by distributing cash transfers. In medical ethics, clinical 
research is only allowed when there is a “favourable risk-benefit ratio” [352], i.e. 
the risks are minised, the benefits are enhanced, and the benefits are 
proportionate to, or outweigh, the risks. In connection with microcredit 
programmes, Kabeer [209] noted that researchers were often in conflict over 
whether such programmes contributed to or prevented violence against 
women. Kabeer [209] remarked such conflicts could often be resolved by noting 
that an observed average decrease in the incidence of violence could well be 
accompanied by increased risk of violence for women in specific cases. Similarly, 
as noted in Chapter 5, Bastagli et al.’s [308] review of cash transfer programmes 
found strong evidence that on average women’s risk of physical abuse 
decreased, while our example shows that it is possible for individual women’s 
risk of violence to increase following receipt of cash transfers. 
 
However, it is also important to note that medical ethicists have remarked that 
an exclusive focus on patient protection in trial ethics is inadequate, because it 
does not respect the autonomy of participants themselves who may be willing 
to take a calculated risk or who desire to take a potentially non-beneficial 
treatment to advance research that helps other patients [353]. In our context, 
however, daughters-in-law might not have been able to refuse taking the cash 
transfers, if their family members felt strongly that they should be enrol in the 
programme to receive the cash. 
 
6.2.2.3 Effect of interviewer identity 
As mentioned, we used FCs as interviewers to interview the mothers-in-law in 
this study. Their identity as members of the intervention implementation team 
meant they had a stake in and commitment to making the intervention a 
success. Their role as motivators of women, families and communities also 
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meant they were well-known in their communities and their responsibility for 
overseeing the distribution of material incentives provided them with a 
powerful identity. 
 
Indeed, some mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law held a perception that the 
FC was able to help the respondents or their family members acquire a job with 
MIRA, obtain a loan or provide messages to “the government” on their behalf. 
These did not seem to hold an expectation that their personal relationships to 
the interviewer could secure them these benefits, but rather that the FC, as a 
representative of the Nepal “government”, had an inclination to provide for the 
vulnerable. 
 
This potentially introduced an unusual power dynamic into our interviews that 
both aided and hindered our research process. On the one hand, many mothers-
in-law and elder sisters-in-law were willing to discuss sometimes intimate or 
embarrassing details of their private lives with our interviewers, which they may 
not have done if they did not recognize the legitimacy of MIRA’s work to improve 
maternal and newborn health. On the other hand, respondents may have felt 
pressured to provide answers that they believed were pleasing to MIRA. For 
example, some mothers-in-law asked at the end of the interview if they had said 
anything “wrong” during the interview or insisted that all their answers had 
been “the truth”.  
 
However, we should not overestimate the pressure on respondents to please 
our interviewers either. For example, one high-caste, Brahmin respondent 
expressed offense when questions even hinted at family dysfunction, stating 
that social problems in the family such as alcoholism, authoritarian husbands 
and lack of education only occurred among the “lower castes”. When the 
interviewer asked in a round-about way if “anyone” from her household had 
spent the LBW-SAT cash transfer on alcohol or tobacco, she immediately called 
the interviewer out for trying to fish for unfavourable information about her 
family “From your questions, I come to know what you really want to know 
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[about us]” (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku). Similar remarks were made by other 
daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law when they did not approve of the 
interviewer’s questions. Although this happened only sporadically, it showed 
that there were limits to respondents’ desires to please our interviewers. 
 
The discrepancy in power and status between interviewer and interviewee was 
markedly less for our interviews with the daughters-in-law. Our interviewer for 
the daughters-in-law, Nsh, was born and raised in Janakpur and worked full-time 
in the qualitative process evaluation team, rather than as part of the LBW-SAT 
intervention implementation team. Although a few daughters-in-law might have 
recognized her from her work as a non-participant observer of women’s groups 
in Sahku district, she had never met the vast majority of her respondents prior 
to this study. Her young age (25 years) also helped to establish rapport with 
daughters-in-law, many of whom were of a similar age, and one daughter-in-law 
even remarked on how they had become friends during the interview. 
 
However, it is also important to note that NSh had her own stake in ensuring the 
intervention was a success, as she was directly employed by MIRA, who may 
have believed that their funding depended on showing their ability to deliver 
the promised impacts. In contrast to the FCs, NSh had considerably greater 
awareness of the dynamic between NGOs and their funders, as she held a higher 
position within the organisation. However, NSh also had a stake in acting 
professionally, since she was invested in obtaining a useful answer to our 
research questions and she knew that I would be reading the full transcripts of 
all her interviews. In my analysis of the transcripts, I never encountered a sense 
of conflict of interest in the interviews conducted by NSh, but the possibility of 
a more subliminal bias cannot be excluded entirely. 
 
Finally, since the daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law were interviewered by 
both NSh and the FCs, I was able to compare the responses obtained from 
mothers-in-law to those obtained from their daughters-in-law. This would likely 
have created further awareness in NSh and the FCs that their answers could be 
checked and strengthened the robustness of my conclusions on the use of cash 
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in the household. For example, many daughters-in-law stated that they had 
initially offered their LBW-SAT cash transfers to their mother-in-law before 
being refused (Chapter 9). The mothers-in-law of these same daughters-in-law 
usually confirmed their account in our sample by spontaneously stating 
themselves that their daughter-in-law had offered the cash transfers to them 
before they refused to receive them. Such congruences of statements from both 
respondents provided particularly compelling evidence that the behaviour in 
question had taken place and was not a byproduct of social desirability bias. 
 
6.2.5 Interviews with husbands of women enrolled in LBW-SAT 
Due to the key role played by husbands in making household decisions regarding 
women’s economic autonomy revealed by these data, I applied to and won a 
Grand Challenges grant from University College London to conduct an 
independent qualitative study of husband’s attitudes to their wives’ economic 
empowerment in the summer 2015. As a result of this, I hired, trained and 
supervised a male university graduate and native to Dhanusha to conduct 
interviews with husbands regarding their attitudes to their wives’ economic 
empowerment and their role more broadly in obstructing or facilitating their 
wives’ economic freedoms. However, due to a lack of skilled and affordable 
Maithili to English translators, I mostly relied on a single translator for our 
translation needs, so the translation of the husband interviews only completed 
in August 2016. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, I exclusively used the 
husband interviews to feed into my reflective process rather than as a source of 
evidence. The sampling and data collection process for the husband interviews 
is described in Appendix L. 
 
6.3 Summary 
This Chapter described the grounded theory approach taken to collect and 
analyse data relating to the study of financial agency in the Maithili household. 
Through an iterative process of theory generation and theoretical sampling, we 
conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 22 daughters-in-law and 
15 mothers-in-law and 3 elder sisters-in-law out of 22 households. We also 
conducted a focus group discussion with 6 staff members of MIRA called 
“facilitation coordinators” who supervise and coordinate the activities of the 
participatory women’s groups. The analysis generated both a theory of 
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daughters-in-law’s financial agency in the family in general (Chapter 8), and a 
theory of beneficiary women’s control over the LBW-SAT cash transfers was 
created (Chapter 9). However, before turning to the description of these 
theories, we will provide a “thick description” of the social and economic context 
in Chapter 7 guide interpretation in the Chapters 8 and 9.  
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Chapter 7 
Setting the scene: Household and 
community context 
 
7.1 Overview of the economic context 
7.1.1 Household income and employment 
Most households in our sample had to contend with challenging economic 
conditions on a daily basis. Many lived hand-to-mouth and had difficulties saving 
enough from their daily income to accumulate significant savings, instead living 
semi-permanently on credit. Most respondents lamented their lack of access to 
agricultural land, decent shelter and durable assets. Most respondents also 
stressed the challenges of securing food for family members and the difficulties 
of accessing health care. Some households were also vulnerable to natural and 
social disasters. One mother-in-law reported losing the bulk of her wealth to a 
fire (mother-in-law 6, Sahku). Another mother-in-law reported having to pay a 
heavy ransom to rescue her son from a kidnapping (mother-in-law 8, Sahku). 
 
The most common sources of income were livestock cultivation, fishing, dairy 
production, sharecropping and trade in vegetables and fruits. A few wealthier 
families owned enough farming land that they could employ labourers to work 
on their farm. In addition to agricultural labour, income was generated through 
local house construction work and small scale trade through local snack shops, 
tea stalls or rice wine shops as well as stitching and tailoring work at home. Social 
welfare schemes from the government such as the national Senior Citizens’ 
Allowance and the Maternity Incentive Scheme provided additional financial 
support (for additional details see Chapter 2, Section 2.1). 
 
 
While household members with tertiary education occasionally held 
professional jobs in local courts, schools or hospitals, the preferred solution to 
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rural poverty was overwhelmingly male labour migration to India, the Middle 
East or Malaysia. This was a high-risk strategy, as the transaction and transport 
costs involved could only be financed through extensive loans, typically 
borrowed against land or housing. Migrants risked failing to find a job, working 
for financially unviable companies that closed down or suffering from severe 
illness or death due to the harsh working conditions imposed. The consequences 
could be catastrophic for families if the costs of enabling migration were not 
recouped. 
 
In spite of the risks, many households were driven to send family members 
abroad in an attempt to repay large debts incurred for financing marriages, 
funerals, disaster reconstruction or health care costs. Other households were 
attracted by the prospect of comparatively large income streams, the social 
status associated with land purchases and house construction, as well as the 
anticipated opportunity for male migrants to experience the more prosperous 
“city life” abroad. The satisfaction and wonder reported by one daughter-in-law 
from seeing the economic progress of her household showed the pull of foreign 
labour migration for poor rural households: 
 
"Sister, there was nothing in my household, when I came here after my marriage 
… except this house … As my husband started to work abroad we grew a lot ... 
Because previously we did not have housing land, no house to live in, no domestic 
animals like cows and buffaloes. And since he started to work there abroad, we 
have earned these things ... I am very satisfied [with my situation]. I am happy 
because we are making progress in our family and have bought all these things 
that we did not have before" (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku) 
 
Households with successful experiences of male migration reported incomes 
ranging from NPR 20,000-100,000 [USD 195-977] monthly per income earner. 
Local reported incomes ranged from NPR 2,000-10,000 [USD 20-98] monthly per 
income earner, sometimes much less where seasonal agricultural labour or 
casual construction work was not available. 
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7.1.2 Access to financial services 




The Nepali/Maithili word paesa, variously translated as “cash” or “money” in 
this research, referred to both physical coins and notes that were used in 
financial transactions, and verifiable social obligations to exchange such coins 
and notes for goods and services. Aamdani, translated as “income”, referred 
primarily to monetary income and was contrasted with kharcha referring to 
monetary expenditures. Although a few instances of bartering were reported by 
respondents, cash no doubt played a central role in the economic life of the 
Maithili community. 
 
Most households stored some of their cash income at home in a briefcase, 
cupboard or peti, a marital trunk received by women upon marriage in Maithili 
culture, where they could store their private possessions. This held true 
regardless of the gender of the family member who managed household money. 
Some family members made do with a bucket, a purse or the inner folds of a 
saree/baxa, but they felt this was risky as children or spouses could take their 
money without permission and thieves could steal their money as well. For this 
reason, several families preferred investing their savings in livestock, jewellery 
or loans with interest to community members, payable in cash. Mothers-in-law 
from poorer families also kept a small pile of grain at home, which could be sold 
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or bartered in times of need. Wealthier families often used life insurance 
products which allowed families to deposit regular savings into an account 
which could be withdrawn upon maturity of the account, while simultaneously 
insuring the family against risk of death of family members. In peri-urban G, 
families also reported depositing their savings in a bank in Janakpur, which could 
also be used to receive remittance money sent from abroad. 
 
Participation in savings, credit and micro-business groups was a popular activity 
among senior women in the household. In Sahku, many mothers-in-law 
reported participating in credit and savings groups run by “The Women’s 
Development Centre” [89] which complemented financial services with 
vocational training, financial literacy training and training in income-generation. 
Similar groups operated in Kote and Jamal. Mothers-in-law found savings groups 
helped them commit to saving where money kept at home could easily be spent, 
when crying children wanted money spent or needy spouses asked for cash.  
 
“We keep our money [in the savings and credit group], because we cannot save 
NPR 100 [USD 0.98] in our household. There are so many expenditures, like 
sometimes my son cries in order to get me to buy him a note-book … but if we 
put our money in a group then we can save money there” (mother-in-law 6, 
Sahku)  
 
However, participation in savings and credit groups carried a certain amount of 
risk as respondents from both Sahku and Kote reported scams where group 
coordinators refused to pay back or absconded with villagers’ savings. 
 
“There was a group who [ostensibly] came to help us save money for buying a 
buffalo but … they left the village after taking people’s money” (elder sister-in-
law 3, Kote) 
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Families in financial need invariably had to take out loans from other households 
or from banks or local credit groups. Strong social norms promoted community 
support in times of need “Everybody helps each other in need. In trouble, people 
give and take from each other, why wouldn’t we help them? We definitely help 
each other” (mother-in-law 1, Sahku). In practice however, strong community 
support was only consistently mobilized during natural and social disasters, as 
families had a responsibility to their own household over and above the needs 
of the community. Chronically poor households reported feeling mostly ignored 
by the community, rather than supported. 
 
“Nobody will give you [anything] if you do not earn any income yourself, no? If 
we want something from others then we have to work for it” (daughter-in-law 2, 
Kote) 
“Everybody eats their own food. They have enough for themselves but not 
enough to give poor people … [When] we did not even have a house to live in, 
we did not receive anything.” (mother-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
The amount of obtainable credit from savings and credit groups was limited by 
the size of the pooled group savings. The maximum reported loan from a credit 
and savings groups was NPR 18,000 [USD 176], but daughters-in-law and 
mothers-in-law reported households taking out loans on the order of NPR 
100,000-700,000 [USD 977-6,839] to finance foreign labour migration, 
marriages or house construction work. These loans were almost always financed 
by community moneylenders/mahajan, although a few of the wealthier families 
also obtained loans from a bank or the work place of a male family member. 
 
In the absence of formal credit histories, good personal relations with 
moneylenders were key to obtaining loans in the Maithili community. As a 
result, households preferred borrowing from and lending to their own relatives, 
or at least consistently interact with the same households. One mother-in-law 
(8, Sahku) remarked how she had borrowed from and lent to the same person 
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for nearly 40 years. In this context, it was extremely important to maintain a 
reputation for “creditworthiness” in the community. 
 
“It is due to people’s faith in me that they provide me loans. Everybody knows 
that I pay back loans on time. Presently … I can borrow as much from creditors 
as I’d like to borrow” (mother-in-law 7, Sahku) 
 
Indeed, one family had to travel to a neighbouring VDC to try to obtain loans as 
they had been indebted for so long that local villagers had lost faith in their 
ability to repay (elder sister-in-law 3, Kote). 
 
Figure 17. Pictures of traders in Dhanusha and Mahottari. 
 
From the top left-hand corner, clockwise: 1) A fruit vendor from Umgaw market by the Indian border 
2) A travelling kavari selling used pots and pans 3) A travelling salesman selling cosmetics (usually 
female, but here male) 4) A travelling kabarniya selling mangos. 
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7.1.3 Organization of commodity markets 
Most rural households in the Maithili community preferred to rely on local 
markets/haat bazaars to supply them with daily supplies. None of the local tea-
stalls and shops provided the fresh produce needed for cooking daily meals for 
the family, instead providing dried snacks, chocolate, biscuits, tea, soft drinks, 
alcohol, toys and notebooks for children. Thus most fresh food products (meat, 
fruits, and vegetables) as well as other goods such as rice, oil, spices, clothes, 
soap and cosmetics were purchased from the market. Vegetables and fruits 
could be purchased directly from neighbours, but this was more expensive. 
However, milk could often be purchased cheaply from local cattle-rearing 
neighbours. 
 
Households could not always access market places however, since they were 
open only twice a week and only in specific locations deemed important 
commercial traffic nodes. Travelling sales(wo)men from specialized castes filled 
the demand for goods on off-days and went door-to-door selling fruits and 
vegetables (kabarniyas), pots and pans (kavaris), milk (goarniyas) or cosmetics 
and jewellery (dafalniyas). Other travelling traders included Muslim tailors who 
went door-to-door selling carpets and Indian traders who crossed the border 
and visited towns to sell their own goods. Whichever goods they were selling, 
travelling traders were a particularly useful avenue for young, married women 
to obtain market goods, since they often stayed at home during the day in order 
to tend to the household and were barred from accessing local markets due to 
female seclusion norms (Section 7.3). 
 
7.2 Overview of the social context 
7.2.1 Guardianship in the Maithili family hierarchy 
“For them I am the guardian. The importance of living with a guardian is only 
understood by those who live under a guardian’s guidance. Whichever difficulties 
and problems are faced by the guardian, should be faced by the guardian alone.” 
– Mother-in-law 8, Sahku 
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In line with previous descriptions of Hindu culture in Nepal and comparable 
regions (Chapter 2, Section 2.3), the Maithili family hierarchy was in theory pre-
determined through a system ranking male above female family members and 
within each gender, older above younger family members  
 
“My father-in-law has the most power and authority in the family; next to him, 
my [elder] brother in-law, then my husband, then my mother-in-law and then us 
[daughters-in-law]” (daughter-in-law 4, Sahku) 
 
“Guardianship” designated an important emic concept in the Maithili family. 
Each lower-ranking family member had one or two designated higher-ranking 
family members who took on the role of a “guardian”. For example, an elder 
sister-in-law explained: “For [my younger sister-in-law], I am there to make 
decisions, but I too have my own guardian and my guardian also has his 
guardian” (elder sister-in-law 3, Kote). Guardianship imbued a guardian with 
rights to supervise the conduct of lower-ranking family members, but also 
conferred responsibilities on her to protect lower-ranking family members and 
ensure their physical and social well-being. 
 
“Since we are daughters-in-law we do not have the right to think [about buying 
what we want to eat]. Daughters-in-law cannot follow their own heart, but 
should always follow what is said by their respective guardian” (daughter-in-law 
1, Jamal) 
“I was responsible for all [my daughter-in-law’s] actions and her well-being and 
I fulfilled all her desires” (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Communication between lower-ranking family members and their guardians 
was often hierarchical in nature and lower-ranking members needed to couch 
their speech in the language of permission as they risked losing financial or 
practical support from their guardians otherwise. 
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“After we had argued over spending too much phone credit, I worried that [my 
elder sister-in-law] might not support me financially during the delivery of my 
baby” (daughter-in-law 3, Kote) 
“I was told to speak less and stop interfering in household decisions” (daughter-
in-law 7, Kote) 
 
Typically, mothers-in-law acted as guardians to daughters-in-law and husbands 
acted as guardians to their wives. However, note that guardianship was a 
contested role that could shift with changes in personal factors including age, 
personal income and education. For example, the relationship between mothers 
and their married sons was often ambiguous. Some mothers-in-law eagerly 
conceded that they had to listen to their sons, some complained bitterly that 
their sons did not follow their advice and some reported having absolute 
authority over their sons. Multiple factors accounted for such shifts in the 
authority of the guardian of the family. 
 
First, economic resources were clearly linked to power in the household from 
the perspective local women themselves. Many mothers-in-law were conscious 
that guardianship arrangements could quickly shift if the economic bases of 
power changed. One mother-in-law directly expressed the view that she only 
acquired social support from her sons by virtue of her material holdings. 
 
“If I did not have my own savings, then nobody would look after me in my old 
age … If I did not have my own money then my sons would tell me that they 
would not look after me and they would not serve me, because of a lack of 
money” (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Conversely, several daughters-in-law remarked that their lack of voice in the 
household was connected to their lack of income. One daughter-in-law 
speculated that she would never be allowed to take up employment, because 
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her in-laws feared she would stop listening to them if she got a job (daughter-
in-law 1, Kote). Another daughter-in-law was repeatedly told by her in-laws that 
she had no right to “interfere” in household decisions because she did not earn 
an income herself. 
 
“As I do not earn for the family, I do not have a right to ask [my in-laws] 
questions. The person who does not earn does not have a right to ask questions” 
(daughter-in-law 9, Kote) 
 
In fact, one mother-in-law lost her guardianship when her husband, the main 
income earner of the household, died. Even though her eldest daughter-in-law 
would traditionally be considered her inferior in the Maithili family hierarchy, 
this daughter-in-law took over as head of the women in the family, since her 
husband became the new main income earner for the household. The mother-
in-law herself was ostracised and sent to live in a small hut outside the main 
family house. 
 
“No, I am not [my daughter-in-law’s] guardian, she is actually my guardian. 
People say, it depends on the behaviour of a woman … [My sons and daughters-
in-law] do not obey me. For them, my words have no value … I am helpless … I 
expect nothing from my sons. They are my sons, but in name only” (mother-in-
law 7, Kote) 
 
Second, a steady increase in school enrolment rates in Nepal over the past 30 
years [354] had produced a large class of daughters-in-law (and sons) who had 
completed primary or secondary education while living with mothers-in-law 
who rued missing out on education in their own childhood (see Table 18)  
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“I regret not getting an education. My brother used to go school and I used to 
carry his lunch for him. There teachers used to tell me about the importance of 
studying, but it was my bad luck to miss out on studying” (mother-in-law 2, 
Sahku) 
 
Education was seen to provide respect, status and power in the community as 
well as increased status in the family. One mother-in-law emphasized asking for 
advice from her second-eldest (as opposed to her eldest) son, because he was 
the more educated of her children (mother-in-law 9, Sahku). Another mother-
in-law who did not have an education described herself rather matter-of-factly 
as a “fool”/murkh. A third described herself as “the frog in the well”/inaar ke 
beng, a term signifying parochialism, narrow-mindedness and ignorance, as 
discussed in Section 5.1.3, Chapter 527.  
 
“Interviewer: “Up to what level of education have you studied?  
Mother-in-law: I am not educated. I am a fool/murkh” (mother-in-law 1, Sahku) 
“I am like the frog in the well … [I do not participate in group activities because,] 
I do not understand the things taught there” (mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 
However, the effect of education on household status was not universal as many 
well-educated daughters-in-law still had little say in their household. 
 
“I don’t understand other people. I could get NPR 1,000 [USD 9.8] or NPR 2,000 
[USD 19.5] if I got a job, but they won’t let me. You ask me how I feel, I feel like 
a fool living at home after getting an education. My father and mother got me 
an education so that their daughter could earn” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
                                                          
27 The term is frequently applied to Maithili women, particularly daughters-in-law, who are assumed to be 
ignorant of the wider world due to female seclusion norms. However, the term has found remarkably 
widespread usage across the Asian continent in countries as diverse as India [84], Sri Lanka [355], China [356], 
Cambodia [357] and Japan [358] with similar connotations of ignorance due to social isolation. 
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Finally, a substantial number of families in our sample did not fit the traditional 
kinship structure of mother-in-law and father-in-law heading a joint household 
with multiple married sons and their wives. Households could have no mothers-
in-law, if she had died or a household separation had occurred (see Section 7.2.3 
for the latter), or multiple mothers-in-law when the household was polygamous 
(1, Kote). In either situation, daughters-in-law and fathers-in-law often played a 
much larger role in managing the family “My mother-in-law is no more, hence 
we tell our father-in-law to buy gifts for visiting guests, because men do not know 
how to handle these things” (elder sister-in-law 3, Kote). Similarly, the balance 
of power in the family also changed when male family members migrated 
abroad. Mothers-in-law often took over as head of the household in the absence 
of their sons “After my sons went abroad, I became the person responsible for 
the welfare of the family” (mother-in-law 1, Sahku). 
 
7.2.2 The division of labour in the Maithili family 
Although all members of the Maithili family were required to contribute to the 
economic functioning of the household, different roles were played by 
daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law and male household members. The majority 
of families relied exclusively or primarily on male family members for cash 
generation, optionally supplemented by sharecropping and small scale trade 
work by senior females. However, in a substantial number of households, 
mothers-in-law were effectively the main income earners after male family 
members passed way, became incapacitated or refused to work. 
Fathers-in-law often worked as casual labourers or small scale traders, although 
many were also unemployed in our sample. Young, married men were expected 
to migrate for foreign employment or take up casual local labour as soon as they 
were able. Educated, married men also worked in professional jobs. Being 
supported by one’s married sons was considered a matter of pride and a just 
reward for the effort expended in raising children and only “irresponsible 
vagabonds”/awara reneged on their duties.  
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“Do you know, why people plant trees? People plant trees to get shade from 
them and to eat fruits like mango or guava from those trees. This is the same 
thing. People raise children to get something back from them” (mother-in-law 8, 
Kote) 
 
Both wealthy and poor households professed to follow the traditional 
inside/outside division of labour between guardians of daughters-in-law and 
daughters-in-law themselves “All the work which is to be performed inside the 
home is her duty and all the work which is to be performed outside the home … 
is my duty” (mother-in-law 4, Kote). Daughters-in-law were the main or only 
members responsible for cooking, cleaning and child care, while female 
guardians and male household members had few domestic duties. Instead, 
female guardians were expected to escort daughters-in-law around in public and 
manage the finances of the household (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.1 for more on 
this). This division of labour was seen as the most practical arrangement and was 
widely valued by senior family members. 
 
“No, no, if she starts going to group meetings [to learn vocational skills] then 
who will cook for me? It will be difficult for me to get a plate of food. My son is 
also working and if she starts earning too then where do I keep such a huge 
amount of money? I do not need more money” (mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 
While male employment was a given in households across the wealth range, 
expectations of female employment differed between poor and wealthy 
households. In both the lowest and the middle wealth ranges, mothers-in-law 
performed sharecropping work or other forms of agricultural labour. Mothers-
in-law usually considered this an undesirable responsibility carried out in an age 
where they should have retired and been looked after by their own children. 
 
“Interviewer: How do you feel about [sharecropping]?  
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Mother-in-law: What should I feel about it? I do my work, but I am not happy 
about it, I am doing it with sadness, but as it is my responsibility to look after [my 
family members], I have to do it” (mother-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
By contrast, wage employment was seen as a highly desirable means to financial 
independence, security in old age, dignity and purpose as well as subjective 
enjoyment. When asked about her feelings about earning an income, two 
mothers-in-law opined: 
 
“If I earned money then I could spend it as I liked. If I wanted to eat something 
then I would not have to wait for others to give me money … We have to live a 
long life and for that we need money” (mother-in-law 4, Sahku)  
“Everybody feels good about earning their own income” (mother-in-law 1, Kote)  
 
In extremely poor households, daughters-in-law were also reported to engage 
in agricultural labour outside the household. However, for most households 
falling in the middle wealth range, daughters-in-law’s employment in joint 
families was only given serious thought by the mother-in-law in the absence of 
earning male family members. Yet, in such households, mothers-in-law still 
cajoled, cried for and scolded their sons and husbands to get them to work.  
 
“My son is an irresponsible person/badmas therefore I thought about sending 
[my daughter-in-law] back to her parents so that she could learn stitching there 
… I used to be worried because my son did not work, even though work is 
important ... Although I cried in-front of him, he did not listen me” (mother-in-
law 6, Sahku) 
 
This was likely because agricultural labour for daughters-in-law was considered 
highly damaging to the family reputation. Many daughters-in-law and mothers-
in-law made reference to the status of the daughter-in-law as a “newly married 
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women” as prohibiting them from seeking employment (female seclusion is 
explored in-depth in Section 7.3). 
 
In this context, education was often seen as an essential tool for women and 
men to obtain high-status, “dignified” employment. In contrast to sharecropping 
and other forms of manual labour, “office work” was work that enhanced a 
woman’s honour rather than reduced it. As a result, daughters-in-law, who were 
sufficiently educated, and who had sufficiently cordial relations with their 
parents-in-law, were often encouraged them to obtain professional 
employment or study further. 
 
“Of course it enhances her honour, when an educated woman goes and earns 
money … she might get a job from the government” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote).  
“She needs all the support in the world for her studies. She has passed the 
intermediate level and now she needs to pass the admission test for the graduate 
level too. She still needs to study more” (mother-in-law 8, G) 
 
7.2.3 Household separation in the Maithili family 
“Household separation” is the process by which a married couple came to move 
out of their in-laws’ house and take their legal share of property with them. In 
the traditional Hindu family, sons are meant to stay with their wives in their 
parents’ house for their lifetime, hence household separation is often seen as 
something of an aberration28. 
 
Yet, many of our respondents stated that family members “usually” separated 
when the sons and their wives had become older (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku), or 
that “nowadays” family members had a greater desire for living separately from 
their parents and in-laws (mother-in-law 5, Kote). 
 
                                                          
28 In fact, in India, the Hindu Undivided Family is an officially recognized legal construct for tax and inheritance 
purposes [359]. 
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Although deaths of senior family members, contributed to household 
separation, this was usually not a sufficient cause in itself as surviving family 
members often continued the joint family after designating a replacement for 
the deceased guardian. Rather, the process of household separation was usually 
set off by social conflict and discontent on the part of some household members. 
For example, all daughters-in-law in our sample who reported physical violence 
from their in-laws  expressed a desire to separate "I told [my husband] whether 
he liked to see me beaten every day or whether it was better to live separately" 
(daughter-in-law 9, Sahku). 
 
Disagreements over the allocation of work and household chores could also 
erupt into heated conflicts contributing to household separation. One daughter-
in-law explained that other family members’ attempt to force her to work 
outside the household and perform an unfair share of household duties made it 
impossible for her to care properly for her child. 
 
"That was also a big reason for separating ... My son was not keeping well. Most 
of the time he was falling ill. I had spent NPR 50,000 [USD 489] and travelled 
everywhere for his treatment … Should I look after my child or do housework? 
They wanted me to go and work on other people’s farm and they wanted me to 
do housework too. But my children needed me to take care of them as they were 
very small" (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Once started, the process of household separation was usually dominated by 
continuing struggle. For example, one mother-in-law fought hard to negotiate 
peace in the family and even called on neighbours and friends to help her 
manage her daughters-in-law. However, the mother-in-law was ultimately 
unsuccessful when the daughters-in-law staged a “coup” behind her back. 
 
“[My daughters-in-law] only wanted to cook food and work for themselves, but 
not for others … Each of them were saying that they were doing more work than 
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the other … What could an old woman do? If I said something to one daughter-
in-law then the other daughter-in-law said that I was taking sides … I used to talk 
to each of them in order to dissuade them from fighting, but no-one listened to 
me … When [my neighbours] came and told my daughters-in-law to stop fighting 
then [my daughters-in-law] would ask them why they were interfering … [and 
they would] go back and never get involved again … My daughters-in-law did not 
say anything to me [for a while], but they talked to each other and [finally] 
agreed that they wanted to be separated from me” (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Similarly, economically vulnerable daughters-in-law in danger of being 
separated fought back against in-laws who wanted to abandon them. In one 
case, a daughter-in-law contacted her natal parents for help after repeated 
physical, economic and psychological abuse. Her natal parents ultimately 
involved a local village court/panchayat in mediating the dispute. 
 
“[In my maternal home,] I shared [my problems] with my parents and my parents 
shared them with the people of our society ... My parents shared with our 
community that my father-in-law had beaten me and [verbally] abused me and 
that my brother-in-law had [verbally] abused me too. And when my mother-in-
law and father-in-law heard that my parents had discussed these things with our 
community then they became angry … My father-in-law phoned my father and 
told him to keep me [in my maternal home] forever and that I was not allowed 
to return [to my husband’s home]. Then my father and my father-in-law argued 
over the phone. My father said that he would not allow them to abandon his 
daughter and for this, he called a village council/panchayat. My father-in-law 
came to my father’s house with two more people for the panchayat. And there I 
had shared everything about my family members’ behaviour towards me” 
(daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
Afterwards, the in-laws were so furious that the daughter-in-law had made their 
family problems public that they decided to separate her from them and cut off 
all financial and social support. The daughter-in-law was subsequently forced to 
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start begging in the neighbourhood as she struggled to feed herself and her 
children. However, her in-laws continued to materially support her husband 
whom she bitterly denounced for continuing to go to her parents’ house at meal 
times in order to receive food that was unavailable to her and her children. 
 
“[My husband] does not want to eat food cooked by me, because my children 
and I will eat whatever leftovers I scrape together … my husband still goes over 
to his parents’ house and eats there” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
In general, once household separation was inevitable, household members 
needed to divide up the inherited land and property between household 
members. Household members also needed to create a separate living space for 
the new nuclear family. The most time-consuming and divisive aspect among 
the two was often the partition of land and inherited property. One daughter-
in-law continued to bargain and negotiate with her separated brother-in-law 
over rights to land long after she had moved into a separate building (daughter-
in-law 2, Kote). Another daughter-in-law bitterly lamented the fact she did not 
receive any land during the separation of the household, despite the promises 
of her mother-in-law (daughter-in-law 2, Sahku). Perhaps due to the potential 
for prolonged conflict, the local village court/panchayat could be involved in 
mediating the division of household property (daughter-in-law 5, Kote). 
 
Separated households also needed to move into a separate living space. Since 
house construction was an expensive and time-consuming process, many 
families started out with setting up a dividing wall within the house and 
designating an area as a new kitchen area. Once family members moved into a 
new house, they often did not move far away. During my field observations of 
interviews, I noted how all the separated families, we interviewed, lived at most 
10-15 m away from their original extended family. Often these families moved 
into neighbouring houses on the same street or surrounding the same courtyard 
as the original house for the extended family. 
 
Chapter 7 
Setting the scene: Household and community context 
 
215 | P a g e  
 
Despite their physical proximity, separated households experienced strong 
social consequences. The separated nuclear household was considered to be set 
on a separate, independent path in life and it no longer had the same obligations 
and responsibilities towards the former extended family. This held true for both 
poorer and wealthier households in our sample. For example, one mother-in-
law explained how her son became “like a neighbour” after household 
separation, implying that her son no longer had any obligations to support her 
above and beyond the support offered by community members towards each 
other. The latter could be quite limited, as family members had a duty to 
prioritise the needs of their own family above that of the community (see 
Section 7.2.2). 
 
"As we live separately from each other, we are like neighbours now. Everybody 
knows that if your son is separated from you, then he will be like a neighbour for 
you, but nothing more than this" (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
In particular, respondents were clear that any material support offered by 
separated family members was a charity based on personal discretion and 
emotional appeal rather than a duty. Mothers-in-law often worried about 
obtaining financial support when their children no longer had an obligation to 
support them. Daughters-in-law equally felt exhausted from coping with a 
household without the support of their former in-laws. 
 
"if my son from abroad told my daughter in-law to give me NPR 200 [USD 2.0] or 
500 [USD 4.9], then only then she would give me … and some misers do not like 
to give money. Even if she was told to give money to me, she would not give me 
if she did not want to" (mother-in-law 2, Sahku)  
“Interviewer: Does anyone help you out at home in either practical matters or by 
providing you with advice? 
Daughter-in-law: Nowadays who helps anyone? … I do everything myself” 
(daughter-in-law 2, Sahku) 
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The bitter emotional impact of many family separations could also make 
mutually charitable feelings seem a remote possibility. This was underlined by 
the fact that offers of support might even get rejected as a statement of 
disfavour. 
 
“When I offered [my in-laws] money, they did not take it. They said that I was 
[no longer] their daughter in-law and they were not my mother-in-law and 
father-in-law” (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku) 
 
However, household separation did not always result in the breakdown of 
relationships between the nuclear family and the former extended family. In one 
household (5, Kote), relations improved as both daughter-in-law and mother-in-
law from reported substantially lower levels of conflict and psychological 
distress, as family members found themselves to be “at peace”. The separated 
husband continued to stay in touch with his natal family on the phone, while her 
mother-in-law admitted to still worrying about her son’s welfare. The mother-
in-law also continued to assist the separated couple in obtaining loans in the 
community or retrieving foreign remittances from the bank, and the daughter-
in-law continued to share her food with the former extended family to show 
hospitality and generosity. This shows that the separation of obligations and 
duties resulting from separating into detached nuclear families could allow 
family members the mental and social space to re-establish co-operation. 
 
"Now we are all well ... Now I do not have any tension [psychological distress] 
regarding them. I do not have to take care about them and I do not have to think 
about them too" (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
However, daughters-in-law experienced radical impacts on their lives, as they 
escaped the humiliation of occupying the bottom rung of the family hierarchy, 
and suddenly became the seniormost female of their own household. These 
daughters-in-law felt they were able to “follow their heart” (daughter-in-law 1, 
Jamal) or to “live life in my own way” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) and mothers-in-
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law acknowledged that they no longer held the same power over their 
daughters-in-law. 
 
 “They do not want to live together with me and they do not want to follow my 
decisions. Then what else can be done … Previously when she was under a 
guardian, then the guardian had to manage everything, but now all are free to 
do what they want" (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Indeed, both poorer and wealthier separated daughters-in-law reported how 
they could cook, eat and work however they pleased, as social custom no longer 
obligated them to obey the orders of their in-laws. 
 
"I can do whatever I want to do. Whenever I want to eat, I eat and whenever I 
want to work, I work" (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku) 
"It is the rule of the community that if you live separately from your family, then 
you also want to take your own decisions" (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
7.3 Overview of the community context 
7.3.1 Honour in the Maithili community 
All daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law who were asked about the importance 
of “honour” in their lives uninamously agreed that it was of paramount 
importance to them “Everybody tries to achieve honour in their life. No-one 
would not try [to so do]” (mother-in-law 6, Kote). Being considered an 
honourable woman reflected a community’s validation of her goodness of 
character and it was often difficult to distinguish the community’s ideas of 
honourable women from its ideas of good women in general Being considered 
an honourable woman reflected a community’s validation of her goodness of 
character and it was often difficult to distinguish the community’s ideas of 
honourable women from its ideas of good women in general. Some common 
examples of traits of honourable women included honesty and altruism, while 
examples of dishonourable behaviour included embezzling public funds and 
stealing in the market place. 
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“As you [the interviewer] have given [the MIRA cash transfer] to [us] then people 
must say that you are an honourable woman ... You were not greedy and took 
others’ money” (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
“There are some [dishonourable] women who steal things in the market and they 
get beaten” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Honour also had a strong association with being well-behaved or well-
mannered. Honourable women were both civil and polite in both public and 
private. Daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law described such women as 
shwoing appropriate hospitality towards guests and avoiding rudeness. 
 
"If people beat each other and insult each other, then it is not considered a good 
thing, hence we should protect our own honour by avoiding relations with such 
dishonourable people" (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
"For example, as you have come to my household then if I provided you a good 
place covered with a bedsheet to sit and I offered you food to eat and water to 
drink, then it would be considered good behaviour, no?" (mother-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
Sexual fidelity to one’s husband was a particularly strong component of 
women’s honour. A common immediate answer to any question about women’s 
honour in our interviews with both daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law was 
the assertion that our respondents had “kept their honour safe”, i.e. kept their 
sexuality safe from men other than their husbands. One mother-in-law 
immediately referred to her notions of monogamy and fidelity when asked to 
explain why honour was important to her: 
 
“God made both Man and Woman. And for each man, He made one woman. 
God created The Couple, but people take interest in having outside partners. 
They get involved with other men or women and leave their spouses. Is that a 
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good thing? Is it better if a person lives with their own spouse or with someone 
else’s spouse? It is better to live with one’s own spouse” (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
 
The moral imperative for wifely devotion to the husband was starkly illustrated 
by the case of one daughter-in-law who spent the greater part of the interview 
describing in detail how her husband had verbally abused her multiple times and 
tried to throw her out of the family as well (daughter-in-law 2, Kote). Yet, when 
asked to provide her own views on the concept of honour, she remarked that 
she had thought about remarrying, but was extremely worried about losing her 
honour as a result. 
 
"We should only think about our husband but no other man … Regardless 
whether my husband has supported me, loved me or taken care of me, I have 
always taken care of him and followed his instructions. I have kept my honour 
safe … I have a huge amount of tension [psychological distress] regarding my 
honour. I am very worried about losing honour … if I went through with a second 
marriage and left my husband" (daughter-in-law 2, Kote). 
 
Finally, an important component of honour rested in women’s ablity to exhibit 
dutiful obedience to one’s husband and in-laws. Honourable daughters-in-law 
refrained from arguing with their husband and in-laws and performed their 
household duties without complaint. Honourable women were also quiet and 
refrained from asserting their voice unless they were directly asked to do so by 
others. 
 
"We should respect our elders and my sisters-in-law are my elders, hence I should 
respect them too" (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku), 
"A woman is also called honourable if she lives in her household and does her 
housework" (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
Chapter 7 
Setting the scene: Household and community context 
 
220 | P a g e  
 
"In the village a woman is known as an honourable woman when she does not 
speak with everyone, but speaks only as much as is asked of her … She should 
not speak haphazardly" (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
Communities often put significant pressure on its members, particularly women, 
to maintain a reputation for being honourable women. Although honour was 
partially seen as an invisible internal character trait, community members 
believed dishonourable members to be at risk of being caught, while honourable 
members would be recognized by the community for their good character. 
Hence, honour was closely related to one’s community reputation. 
 
"If a person does something bad secretly, e.g. if a thief steals things in secret then 
he will be successful only a few times, before he is caught. If a person plants a 
flower in a pot, then it [still] smells the same no matter how it is planted" 
(mother-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
The impact of dishonour extended to other family members including husbands 
and in-laws. For example, one elder sister-in-law explained that she would not 
visit the local village market, an act that could result in damage to a woman’s 
reputation (Section 7.3.2), because it would reflect badly on her husband’s 
honour. 
 
“I would not go to [the local village market], because it is about my husband’s 
honour … people might say things behind my back if I went there (said in an extra 
soft voice to prevent other people from overhearing)” (elder sister-in-law 3, 
Sahku) 
 
Community members felt a certain collective responsibility to discourage 
dishonourable behaviour with punishments increasing in proportion to the 
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perceived extent of the violation of the community’s notions of honour. One 
daughter-in-law reported how women caught stealing would be beaten by 
community members (daughter-in-law 5, Kote). In another instance, community 
members wanted to throw a woman reported to have an extra-marital affair out 
of the village (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku). On an everyday level, women 
perceived to be dishonourable risked verbal and physical harassment. 
 
"People spit on such women" (daughter-in-law 5, Kote)  
"Luckily for me, I don’t face the type of comments [that dishonourable women 
face]" (daughter-in-law 1, Kote) 
 
7.3.2 Female seclusion and mobility 
Daughters-in-law living in joint families with their mother-in-law almost never 
reported full freedom to move or to stay at home, wherever they wanted for 
whatever purposes they desired. This held for both poorer and wealthier 
daughters-in-law. Such freedom of movement was usually only provided to 
wives living in nuclear families or daughters-in-law living in joint families where 
the mother-in-law had passed away. The notion of mothers-in-law and 
husbands as guardians of the daughter-in-law also included a joint responsibility 
for keeping the daughter-in-law at home to the fullest extent economically and 
physically possible and only allowing the daughter-in-law to go outside if it was 
“necessary”. 
 
“I have the ability to keep her at home. I would not allow her to leave the house 
and I would keep her at home at least another ten years. People should be able 
to keep their daughter-in-law at home for a long time. Those people who cannot 
keep daughter-in-law at home and provide for her send their daughter-in-law to 
cut grass and bring husk for cattle … But at present I have the ability to keep her 
at home, so I am keeping her at home” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Daughters-in-law in such families were expected to ask for permission before 
leaving the house, even if they had legitimate reasons to do so, and failure to do 
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so constituted a serious breach of protocol. A key anxiety concerning women’s 
mobility were the reputational ramifications of allowing their daughters-in-law 
to be seen in public, i.e. the consequences of such activity on family honour 
“People would laugh at me if [my daughters-in-law] left the house ... It is also 
about our honour” (mother-in-law 4, Sahku). This anxiety was closely related to 
the risk of daughters-in-law coming under suspicion of infidelity to their 
husbands and sexual impropriety. Daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law were 
emphatic in our interviews that activities outside the household such as work or 
market purchases were not intrinsically dishonourable for women, unless they 
positively committed theft or fraud. However, they were risky due to the risk of 
allegations of sexual impropriety. 
 
“You [the interviewer] are an educated person and you have come here too for 
your work. You also go around to other villages. If you did not have any honour 
then various men would follow you and then what type of honour would you 
bear? But since you are an educated woman and … you do not do anything else 
except your job, then no-one can say that you are a characterless/do nambari 
woman … But I do not know how to do jobs like yours so I could not go work in 
other villages” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Thus, mobility restrictions varied by where daughters-in-law wanted to go, how 
they went about in public and for what purpose they went. Many mothers-in-
law would state categorically that their daughters-in-law could never be allowed 
out of the house either by themselves or their sons, while subsequently 
admitting to exceptions in case of visits to health care centres, natal villages, 
religious centres or well-paid employment. 
 
“Interviewer: Okay sister, what about your younger daughter in-law? 
Mother-in-law: She has a newborn child [to take care of] so she is not going 
anywhere. Sister, even though you know that she is newly married/kanya, you 
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are still asking me this … Her husband is telling her not to leave the house 
therefore she does not leave the house … 
Interveiwer:  What would you do if she fell sick? 
Mother-in-law: Then I would allow her to go to the doctor” (mother-in-law 1, 
Sahku) 
 
In fact, families had numerous means of shielding themselves from community 
gossip. The most common means was the provision of companion travellers, 
either a chaperone such the husband or the mother-in-law or a group of female 
neighbours. Providing companion travellers sent a signal to the community that 
the daughter-in-law was leaving her household with a clear purpose, where 
daughters-in-law travelling alone could give the mistaken impression of sexual 
availability. 
 
Daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law also reported that various forms of more 
anonymous movement were acceptable. This included visits to shops and 
market places in the district capital, Janakpur, and visits to relatives and friends 
during the night. These forms of movement were often perceived to carry a 
reduced risk of being identified by local villagers and generating community 
gossip. 
 
“Usually, I do not go anywhere, only sometimes I go visit my sister who lives 
behind my house. After my children have been put to sleep then I go visit her for 
some time, [but] soon after I come back” (daughter-in-law 8, Kote). 
 
While reputational concerns were often significant, mothers-in-law also worried 
about completion of household chores and ensuring small children were looked 
after. Some mothers-in-law also worried about the risk of their daughters-in-law 
getting cheated, falling victim to assault or simply getting lost. 
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“How can she go [to the antenatal clinic] if she has not seen where it is? In such 
a situation she has to go with other people. If she went on her own, she might 
get lost? … [And] sometimes people are afraid of going on their own, so it is 
better to go together” (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
The mobility of mothers-in-law provided a stark contrast, as mothers-in-law 
typically performed agricultural work outside the house, managed loans and 
savings in the village and performed purchases for the household (see Section 
7.3.2). Daughters-in-law who gradually transitioned into becoming mothers-in-
law would also gradually gain greater mobility in the family. However, such 
freedoms could take many years to materialise, as one daughter-in-law 
estimated that she would have to wait another seven years in addition to the 
seven years that had already passed, before she was allowed outside her house 
by her in-laws (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku). Indeed, the stigma of female mobility 
seemed to have stayed with some mothers-in-law as they reported feeling “shy” 
in their old age and sought out market places for their shopping rounds far away 
from the local village to avoid being recognized. 
 
7.3.3 Social isolation and lack of friendships 
Restrictions on daughters-in-law’s ability to form social connections outside 
their households impacted critically on their ability to access credit, marshall 
support in case of a divorce or a separation from one’s in-laws or even simply 
access emotional support in times of family conflict (Chapter 8). As a result, it 
was worth exploring the extent to which daughters-in-law were able to make 
friendships and social connections. 
 
Due to the Hindu custom of village exogamy, many newly married women had 
recently left behind their friends in their maternal village and entered a new 
village, where they did not know anyone and had little opportunity to get to 
know people. Daughters-in-law lamented the fact that they had few or no 
friends outside of the household except possibly close relatives such as cousin 
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sisters-in-law or aunts-in-law, where in the past they made friends freely in their 
maternal home. 
 
"I don’t talk to anyone. I don’t know anyone here. I usually stay at home and 
cook and serve food, besides that I don’t do anything. If I went outside I could 
make friends, but since I don’t that’s why" (daughter-in-law 1, Kote). 
 
Mobility norms constrained daughters-in-law’s freedom to visit friends. One 
daughter-in-law also reported that there was a general notion in the community 
that women who visited other people’s households were out to make trouble, 
perhaps even seeking extramarital sexual or romantic relationships 
 
“My husband is not here and he cannot see everything that I am doing, so it is 
up to me how I live here. A woman is also considered an honourable woman, if 
she lives at home, does her housework, but does not take interest in what other 
women are doing in her community”  (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Family members would also often explicitly forbid daughters-in-law to go 
outside and make friends on the basis of mobility norms "This is not a city … In 
the cities, people … have different views [on public behaviour]. Now [my parents-
in-law] don't allow me to go out" (daughter-in-law 1, Kote). The resultant social 
isolation often created feelings of loneliness, as daughters-in-law felt they 
lacked access to trusted confidantes with whom they could share their feelings. 
 
“Interviewer: What do you do when you have many private worries and fears? 
Who do you approach?  
Daughter-in-law: I usually mange my own thoughts, but I don’t share my 
thoughts with anyone else. Whom should I share them with?” (daughter-in-law 
3, Kote) 
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Yet, some daughters-in-law reported that they did manage to make friends. 
Rather than visiting friends at home, it was common to casually socialize during 
work in the fields, while waiting for the communal toilet or in other public 
locations29. Such forms of socializing avoided the common criticism from family 
members that daughters-in-law were neglecting their household and child care 
duties, while simultaneously allowing them to establish social contacts outside 
of their family "If I went out [to visit friends] then they’d say that I hadn’t cooked 
roti, my husband was starving and so on" (daughter-in-law 7, Kote). 
 
Daughters-in-law who made conversation in the village spoke in hushed tones 
and stayed silent when other people passed by, but were reported to have 
carefree conversation when they were alone (daughter-in-law 3, Kote). Casual 
conversation also had an economic side, as daughters-in-law would share 
information about market prices and financial operations in the village that they 
were sometimes denied by their own family members. 
 
“[My family members] say that I do not know anything ... They do not share 
things with me about loans and savings ... But they used to tell other people in 
the village and these people would tell me” (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku). 
 
Yet, family members worried about family secrets being shared to others in the 
village, thus risking family honour. Perhaps for this reason, many daughters-in-
law expressed the view that it was inappropriate to share family problems with 
the majority of their friends. Intimate discussions on private worries and fears 
were also more likely in the privacy of the night, where friends outside of the 
household were unavailable “During the night, when I need someone for support 
then [my friends] would not come, but my own family members supported me” 
(daughter-in-law 5, Kote). 
                                                          
29 One daughter-in-law had exceptionally married into her own maternal village, so she had made many friends 
from before she was married (daughter-in-law 8, Sahku). One daughter-in-law from a wealthy family who was 
still attending university also made friends on campus, but were forbidden by her parents to visit them or see 
them outside of campus (daughter-in-law 1, Kote). Only separated daughters-in-law regularly visited friends. 
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However, some daughters-in-law did report seeking emotional support and 
advice from their closest friends in times of conflict in the family. For example, 
one pregnant daughter-in-law sought out the advice of a friend when she 
worried if her elder sister-in-law would provide financial support at the time of 
giving birth (daughter-in-law 3, Kote). Another daughter-in-law (9, Sahku) was 
even able to draw essential economic support from her friends by secretly 
sending her children to borrow from them after family members denied her 
money for food for herself and her children.  
 
The same daughter-in-law planned on garnering enough support from her 
friends to separate from her in-laws with her husband. For the same reason, 
family members were often opposed to daughters-in-law making friends in the 
village as they worried that a strengthened bargaining position could lead 
daughters-in-law to become less compliant. 
 
“If I made friends here … then my mother-in-law, father-in-law and other family 
members would not support me. They would think that I was trying to oppose 
them … If I made friends here then I would have to share things with them which 
were not always in agreement with my in-laws. So I cannot make friends” 
(daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
7.4 Summary 
Our results took place in an economic context in which many households lived 
in significant poverty due to their lack of access to well-paid domestic 
opportunities for earning an income, which led many households to send adult 
male members to India, the Middle East or Malaysia for foreign employment. 
Our results also revealed a social context in which Maithili families were 
regulated by a formal hierarchy that typically installed mothers-in-law as the 
“guardians” of daughters-in-law. The role of guardian entailed a right for 
mothers-in-law to supervise the conduct of the daughters-in-law, but also a 
responsibility to prevent them from enduring harm. The concept of “honour” 
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played an important role in regulating community life. Honour for women was 
closely associated with general notions of good character including honesty, 
altruism, civility, respect for tradition and sexual fidelity to one’s husband. Social 
norms favoured the seclusion of newly married women in order to avoid 
allegations and gossip concerning their sexual behaviour. 
 
With our examination of the economic, social and community context in mind, 
we will now turn to one of our main results in Chapter 8, a grounded theory 
exploration of the financial agency of daughters-in-law. 
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Chapter 8 




In development discourse, women’s economic empowerment has primarily 
been conceptualised using economic bargaining theory [4,268]. However, 
spousal bargaining power suffers from multiple conceptual and methodological 
defects (Section 3.4.2.2, Chapter 3) and it is important to explore alternative 
notions of empowerment other than women’s bargaining power that place 
greater emphasis on women’s own values, desires and interests. As shown in 
Chapters 4 and 5, such interests are not always directly identifiable from survey 
answers. By drawing on the qualitative method, we can explore women’s agency 
with finesse by paying attention not only to women’s general statements on 
their values and goals, but also the actions that women take to achieve their 
goals.  
 
This Chapter thus seeks to develop a theory of the financial agency of Maithili 
daughters-in-law in the household. Little existing theory has been published to 
our knowledge which studies women’s agency over cash in the household using 
a perspective on agency that is congruent with our definition of agency in this 
thesis. A few studies have reported on systems for managing cash in households 
with female garment factory workers in urban Bangladesh [360,361], while a 
report investigated the use of cash in rural Bangladesh among households 
involved in an agricultural technology intervention [362]. This is partly because 
past research has focused predominantly on female labour force participation 
[100,269,363] and engagement with economic self-help groups [364]. 
 
The main theory of this Chapter runs as follows: Almost all Maithili daughters-
in-law initially live in joint families where a specific person, the “financial 
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guardian”, usually receives and manages the majority of household income 
(Section 8.2.1). This financial guardian who is usually the mother-in-law does 
develop supportive relationships with the daughter-in-law in rare cases (Section 
8.2.2). However, in the majority of families, daughters-in-law are discouraged 
from participating in financial matters in the family and are left vulnerable to 
financial insecurity as a result (Section 8.2.3). Nonetheless, husbands are often 
willing to help achieve their wives’ financial goals by providing them with secret 
savings and speaking on their behalf to the rest of the family (Section 8.2.4). At 
other times, their wives keep secrets from their husbands, often partially with 
their tacit consent (Section 8.2.5).  
 
However, a few daughters-in-law have such compromised relations with both 
their husband and their in-laws that they can only fall back on their natal family 
for help (Section 8.2.6). On the side of the daughter-in-law, constraints on their 
access to credit and employment leave them with few other options than to 
obtain cash through their relationships to family members (Section 8.2.7). On 
the family members’ side, common incentives between husbands and their 
wives for eventual household separation often lead them to side with their 
wives financially, while simultaneously encouraging mothers-in-law to see their 
daughters-in-law as potential enemies (Section 8.2.8). A diagram representing 
the generated theory is presented in Figure 18. 
 
8.2 Results 
8.2.1 Financial management norms in the Maithili family 
8.2.1.1 Personal property vs. central planning 
Within the Maithili family, the allocation of resources to meet the needs of all 
family members was seen as the duty of the main decision-makers in the family. 
 
“As I live under my guardian, it is their responsibility to make food available for 
me ... it is their duty to fulfil my needs" (daughter-in-law 1, Jamal)  
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Figure 18. Grounded theory model of the financial freedom of daughters-in-law in the joint household 
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Money was supposed to be shared freely without concern for reciprocation. 
Family members were adamant that they did not expect other family members 
to return money exchanged within the household and even if they did, there 
should be no interest taken. Indeed, the fulfilment of family members’ needs 
reflected the love and care that family members held for each other and 
prevented them from begging or taking out expensive loans from the 
community. 
 
"It's all about loving and caring, why should I ask [my son] to give my money 
back? ... I feel good and I am positive and honest that's why I give my money to 
them" (mother-in-law 7, Kote) 
"Let’s suppose my grandson asks for money from you, then is it considered a 
good thing? No, it is not considered a good thing" (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
 
The practicalities of this imperative to share resources and fulfil the collective 
needs of the family established two broad norms: 1) A “personal property” norm 
where individuals had a right to their own private money, particularly earned 
money, which they could dispose of however they liked 2) A “central planning” 
norm where a key “financial guardian” physically received and managed 
household income, including purchasing and dispensing goods and services to 
family members on demand. 
 
When it came to personal property, many respondents operated with a notion 
of a “right” to private money. This “right” implied an idea that family members 
who were given money from other family members or from economic activity 
outside the household should be able to dispose of that money however, they 
liked. In particular, other family members, including higher-ranking family 
members would be morally “wrong” to seize the given money. 
 
"Interviewer: Who kept the money that she got from selling mango?  
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Mother-in-law: Look, whose right is it to take money? Only those who have 
invested money in something can take its profits” (mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 
“Interviewer: If [your daughter-in-law] got money from her husband, her 
maternal house or from others, then would you have anything to say about that? 
Mother-in-law: That is her money, why does she need to give that money to me?” 
(mother-in-law 1, Sahku) 
 
The right to personal property was further indicated by the fact that family 
members often had individual personal lockers in which they could store their 
own private money. In particular, women stored their private possessions in 
their marital trunk/peti (see Chapter 7, Section 7.1.2). 
 
"This is my personal briefcase [for storing money] … and my daughter-in-law has 
her own peti" (mother-in-law 5, Sahku)  
 
In contrast to the personal property norm, the central planning norm required 
household members to send most or all of their household income to one key 
person, I have designated the “financial guardian”, who would have the primary 
responsibility for making day-to-day decisions concerning the purchase of 
household goods and their allocation among household members. 
 
“I am the one who receives [my son’s money]. I manage everything in the 
household myself and I arrange for every purchase myself … [My son] gives me 
money from his earnings … to run our household … He gives me money to buy 
food like rice, pulse, vegetables, spices and many more things for the kitchen and 
also to pay for health check-ups and medicines” (mother-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
In the extended family, the mother-in-law was usually the financial guardian, 
while wives were the financial guardian in nuclear families (see Section 8.2.1.2). 
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Financial guardians justified their power by clearly indicating that the income 
they received should not be spent on their own personal pleasure. 
 
"No, no, we are five people in our household, I have to spend money on the 
upkeep of these five. If instead of doing this, I kept my own savings, then it would 
be considered a bad thing" (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
 
Rather, it was the role of the financial guardian to be one of the most fiscally 
responsible members of the family. Mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law 
often explicitly stated that they were better at saving money than either male 
or junior female household members. 
 
"I do not spend more money than we earn … You know, that ladies can save a lot 
of money, but men cannot" (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku)" 
"If [my daughter-in-law] wanted to buy things worth NPR 5,000 [USD 48.9] then 
where would I get such an amount from? It is better not to allow her to go out 
and purchase things (said laughingly)" (mother-in-law 8, Sahku) 
 
For this reason, financial guardians often felt that household income should not 
be shared with other household members. Rather, individual household 
members’ personal needs were to be met through purchases decided on by the 
financial guardian. 
 
"Why does [my daughter-in-law] need to keep money with her? Presently, we 
are there to do everything for her. It will happen when the appropriate time 
comes" (mother-in-law 4, Sahku)  
“[My mother-in-law] is asking us, why we need personal money as all 
expenditures are being done in combined form in this household? … She does not 
want me to have personal money” (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku) 
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In practice, only one family followed a “pure” central planning paradigm, where 
no family member was allowed to own any cash except the financial guardian 
who in fact threatened family members with physical punishment if they were 
caught trying to accumulate their own personal money. 
 
"No, we are not allowed to keep our own money ... If we talked about keeping 
own money then we would be beaten and we would also be told to leave the 
house" (elder sister-in-law 3, Kote) 
 
Conversely, only one family followed a “pure” personal property norm where 
income earners retained control over their own income, but alternated in 
contributing to the family fund. 
 
 “There is no guardian of the household … My mother-in-law and father-in-law 
… have told us to keep our earnings ourselves, [and] to spend money jointly on 
the household … According to our agreement, in one month [the other daughter-
in-law] spends money and the next month I do … And if none of us has any 
money, then my mother-in-law and father-in-law spend their own money” 
(daughter-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
All other households in our sample reached a compromise between the need 
for central coordination and the need for individual flexibility by allowing 
individual household members to keep a small portion of household income for 
their personal needs, while handing over the majority of household income to 
the financial guardian. 
 
“[My husband] gives me NPR 500 [USD 4.9] or 1,000 [USD 9.8] to keep, because 
I have to look after my children and they might need something at any time … 
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How many times should we have to ask for money from our guardian? Therefore 
he gives me money to spend myself” (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
"You also know that nowadays women do not want to depend on their guardian. 
They want to have their own money, so they take from their husbands" (mother-
in-law 7, Sahku) 
 
The process of reaching a compromise was by no means uncontentious. 
Mutually mistrustful relationships could spiral into enmity and both men, 
women and children were reported to take money or other goods of material 
value without prior consent. 
 
"I do not give my own money to any of [my family members] because they do 
not give their money to me. I used to be hurt … [My family members] said that 
they would share with me if they had any money. Then I asked them why they 
ate food grown on my farm … But they did not stop taking my goods. They took 
my goods from me by force” (mother-in-law 7, Kote)  
 
For this reason, women and men often held stores of secret cash. Indeed, 
Maithili language contained a term, koseliya, specifically denoting savings that 
were held secretly by married women. In our sample, both poorer and wealthier 
daughters-in-law reported keeping koseliya. Koseliya was usually hidden from 
married women’s husband, in-laws, or both. Male family members also kept a, 
sometimes hidden, portion of earned income for private consumption, called 
pocket money. However, whereas koseliya usually served an accumulative 
purpose, as women were perceived as enlarging their stores of koseliya in secret 
over the years of their marriage, pocket money was regarded as quick money 
that was consumed within a short span of time, rather than accumulated. 
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“I keep my koseliya secretly in the peti of my own room … Nobody comes into my 
room to see what I am doing inside [when I put money into my peti]” (daughter-
in-law 5, Kote) 
 
8.2.1.2 “Financial guardians” as guardians of central resources 
In the Maithili family, the “financial guardian” was usually the mother-in-law. 
When the mother-in-law had passed away, this task befell the oldest daughter-
in-law in the family, while daughters-in-law living in nuclear families became 
“financial guardians” themselves. The financial guardian was male in only three 
cases and in both cases, the financial guardian was the father-in-law30. The 
financial guardian was recognized by family members as carrying the larger 
share of responsibility for household finances. In particular, the financial 
guardian was responsible for deciding on daily household expenditures such as 
food, clothing or medicines and often purchased them in person herself. Once 
the goods had been purchased, the financial guardian also played a major role 
in distributing them among members of the family. 
 
“It is [my mother-in-law’s] duty to make purchases, because she is the guardian 
of the family and she has [the household] money. If I wanted to go make 
purchases then I would have to manage money myself too" (daughter-in-law 4, 
Kote)  
 “[My mother-in-law] used to distribute all the food equally between me and 
other daughter in-laws … In this way sometimes she purchased things and 
sometimes not when we lacked money. I did not always get to eat the food which 
I wanted to eat” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
                                                          
30 In one case, the father-in-law took over after the mother-in-law passed away. Moneylenders were threatening 
the family with court action if their loans were not repaid soon and the father-in-law maintained tight control 
over cash in the family by threatening family members with physical violence if they were found to keep private 
stashes of cash (3, Kote). In another instance, a father-in-law ensured that neither the mother-in-law nor any 
female family members were closely involved in financial transactions in the household. The mother-in-law 
credited the decision to do so to her husband’s “traditional mind-set” (mother-in-law 4, Sahku). 
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Financial guardians were also involved in saving money for the future. This 
usually took place in savings and credit groups, using life insurance products or 
through the purchase of livestock, as savings kept at home were not always safe 
from the demands of husbands and children (Chapter 7, Section 7.1.2). 
 
 
"You know I have three children. I have two daughters so I have to educate them 
well so that they could get an educated husband. Otherwise she would become 
like me, uneducated. I am saving money for them" (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku). 
 
"I want to have more goats to increase my income … I have a daughter, a 
daughter-in-law, a son at home. I [currently] have livestock in case they fall ill so 
we can spend money on their treatment" (mother-in-law 6, Sahku). 
 
Financial guardians were also closely involved in making decisions on loans 
either jointly with other (male) family members or alone "When I need money 
for any purpose, then I ask my sons and they tell me to take loans from creditors" 
(mother-in-law 7, Sahku). Male household members had a stake in decisions 
regarding loans as they generated the income to cover the interest incurred, 
however family members often trusted the financial guardian with extensive 
powers to take loans as she saw fit "[My husband] usually told me to do 
whatever I wanted to do" (mother-in-law 6, Sahku). This was partly because 
financial guardians had often spent years building relationships with potential 
moneylenders, partly because families widely perceived loans to be inevitable 
anyway given widespread poverty and continual demand for expenditures. 
 
"After the death of my mother-in-law, I starting mixing with the people of our 
community and we got to know each other. Then afterwards I took a loan worth 
500,000-600,000 NPR [USD 4,885-5,862]" (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
"We were born as poor people therefore it has been a must for us to take out 
loans" (mother-in-law 4, Kote) 
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The involvement of male household members in the decisions of the financial 
guardian varied substantially by the type of decision and by the household in 
question. Male family members were also usually involved in large financial 
decisions with broad economic impacts such as decisions concerning house 
construction, business investments, or, as illustrated above, loans. 
 
"All three brothers used to consult each other [regarding large expenditures]. 
No-one can take such a decision alone ... because this is not anyone's single 
business, it's common to all" (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
However, when it concerned the day-to-day running of the household economy, 
the role of male family members depended on their relationship to the financial 
guardian. In a few households, mothers and sons clashed as the sons refused to 
hand over their earnings to spend on the welfare of the extended family “I have 
full rights over my husband’s income, but over my son’s income I do not have any 
rights” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku). In a few other households, sons and husbands 
needed to be continually informed about the decisions taken by the financial 
guardian, but were rarely actively involved in making day-to-day decisions "I tell 
[my husband] whether it is day or night … [but] he never says no [to my 
decisions]" (mother-in-law 6, Sahku). 
 
However, in the majority of households in our sample, the financial guardian did 
not report feeling the need to consult anyone in financial matters "No-one 
disagrees, because I am the one who takes decisions in my household" (mother-
in-law 4, Kote) "No, I do not need to consult anyone" (mother-in-law 6, Kote). In 
these housholds, the fathers-in-law were uninvolved due to a lack of interest in 
financial decisions or mental degradation in old age, while the sons were 
considered too inexperienced to make their own decisions. 
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"My husband doesn't do anything, he has left everything for me to do. If anybody 
asks him anything, then he tells them to consult with me" (mother-in-law 7, 
Sahku) 
"My son is not a wise person. He does not think about how to run a household or 
how to earn money for a family … He does not know about such things. I have 
come home from work as a labourer, only to find him playing cards over there" 
(mother-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
8.2.2 Strategy 1: Capitalising on supportive financial guardians 
In theory, financial guardians were responsible for fulfilling the needs of the 
daughter-in-law and so daughters-in-law should be able to ask them for help 
whenever they needed anything purchased. In practice, only a few enjoy 
sufficiently strong ties with their financial guardian to benefit from this system 
(6 and 8, Sahku; 8, Kote). In all three cases, the financial guardian of the family 
was their mother-in-law. 
 
These daughters-in-law commented on how freely they shared their savings 
with their mother-in-law, as they did not feel threatened by them in the financial 
realm. These daughters-in-law also stated that they communicated openly with 
their mothers-in-law on sensitive or secret matters and did not feel inhibited in 
voicing their opinion in the family. 
 
"My mother-in-law never spends my money. She is not like other mothers-in-law 
who take their daughters-in-law’s money … I feel happy [giving my money to her 
to buy oil] … It does not matter, if I have given her my money for buying oil. She 
also does a lot of work for us … I [also] share every secret with her … there is no 
restriction about speaking in the family. I can say whatever I want to” (daughter-
in-law 8, Kote) 
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Conversely, these mothers-in-law trusted their daughters-in-law to a greater 
extent than all the other mothers-in-law in our sample. These mothers-in-law 
let their daughters-in-law look after the family savings. 
 
“I keep money myself and I give some to [my daughter-in-law] too. She does not 
misplace money, but keeps it wisely [keeps it safe and doesn’t spend it 
wastefully]. When I return from the market, then I give her money to keep … 
safely. The next time [I needed to go to the market] she would give me the money 
back. No-one else can take that money” (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
 
Importantly, these mothers-in-law included their daughters-in-law in family 
decisions with major financial impacts. One mother-in-law involved her 
daughter-in-law in decisions concerning a suitable groom for her daughter 
(daughter-in-law 6, Sahku). Another mother-in-law accepted her daughter-in-
law’s suggestions for the organization of a ceremony celebrating the birth of her 
son that involved inviting people from the whole village for dinner (daughter-in-
law 8, Sahku). The third mother-in-law left it up to her daughter-in-law to decide 
if she wanted to remarry and live with another mother-in-law after the death of 
her husband (daughter-in-law 8, Kote). 
 
“A boy had come here … to watch television ... I was not at home, I had gone to 
work on the farm. The parents of that boy had visited my house and talked about 
marrying my daughter with their son. When I returned back to my house, my 
daughter-in-law asked me to marry my daughter Reshma with that boy … She 
told [the parents] that she had agreed to their marriage proposal, as she was 
also a decision-maker in this house [and I agreed]. So both of us, mother-in-law 
and daughter-in-law, take the same decisions. My decisions are accepted by her 
and her decisions are accepted by me” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
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These mothers-in-law also planned carefully for their daughters-in-law’s 
financial future. Two mothers-in-law opened and maintained savings accounts 
in the name of their daughters-in-law, either in a life insurance account 
(daughter-in-law 6, Sahku) or a rotating savings group (mother-in-law 8, Sahku). 
In one family, the parents-in-law invested heavily in tertiary education for their 
daughter-in-law, so she could obtain a teaching job (8, Sahku) and in another 
family, the mother-in-law tried to clear off family loans and open a small shop 
(separate from the wine shop already opened by her brother) to secure the 
future livelihood of the daughter-in-law (8, Kote). 
 
Finally, these mothers-in-law were some of the few mothers-in-law in our 
sample who expressed being heavily emotionally invested in their relationship 
with their daughters-in-law. One mother-in-law expressed it as being “partners 
for life” with her daughter-in-law. 
 
“My daughter-in-law will live with me during my whole life so I like living with 
her. Daughters leave home, but daughters-in-law come to our house to live with 
us and become our friends forever ... we are partners for life” (mother-in-law 6, 
Sahku) 
 
This impacted on how mothers-in-law made financial decisions. Where other 
mothers-in-law or elder sisters-in-law in our sample sometimes expressed 
entitlement to use the savings of the daughter-in-law in their capacity as 
financial guardians, one mother-in-law explained that she could not take her 
daughter-in-law’s savings by force, because the daughter-in-law might get hurt 
by this. 
 
“Look sister, if I took her savings [by force] then she might be hurt, don’t you 
think so?” (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
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Thus, the choice of relying on their mother-in-law to provide for their financial 
needs was a clear expression of agency on the part of the daughter-in-law given 
the many benefits involved in this choice and the clear sense of satisfaction 
expressed by daughters-in-law over their life situation. 
 
“Interviewer: Are you satisfied with the way in which decisions are being made 
in your household? …  
Daughter-in-law: I am completely satisfied with my father-in-law and mother-in-
law” (daughter-in-law 8, Sahku) 
 
8.2.3 Intra-household financial insecurity 
8.2.3.1 Lack of voice over household finances 
Most daughters-in-law, both wealthy and poor found themselves dissatisfied 
with the existing system. These reported that their mothers-in-law were not 
always willing to help and rarely bothered to offer explanations when they 
refused requests for cash. For these daughters-in-law, it felt both felt both 
awkward and humiliating to have to ask for petty cash from others (including 
their own husband) constantly. 
 
"It is obvious that it would be difficult to tell others every time you wanted to eat 
something. People might feel shy about expressing their desire for food all the 
time. Sometimes, it is difficult" (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal)  
"If I was earning money myself then I did not have to ask for money repeatedly 
from my husband. I would spend my own money myself ...  I would never have 
asked him to give money to me if had my own money" (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
As a result of feeling awkward and embarrassed, these daughters-in-law 
refrained from asking for money entirely. Other daughters-in-law refrained from 
asking for simple things such as purchases of extra food or other daily household 
products, because they did not expect other family members to listen anyway. 
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"I do not ask her [my mother-in-law] to give me money. I do not have a habit of 
begging, because I feel embarrassed" (daughter-in-law 8, Kote)  
“Daughter-in-law: I don’t go outside to buy things … because I do not have money 
to make purchases … I am [also] not allowed to buy things …  
Interviewer: If you needed things like a saree or bath oil or … clothes for your 
baby, then whom would you ask to buy these things? 
Daughter-in-law: I do not tell anybody to buy me things. I live my life without 
their help” (daughter-in-law 3, Kote)  
 
When daughters-in-law reported receiving cash from their financial guardians, 
the reported sums were usually comparatively small and ranged from NPR 50-
100 [USD 0.5-1.0] to go see a local fair (daughter-in-law 4, Kote) to NPR 400-500 
[USD 3.9-4.9] to buy special foods (daughter-in-law 1, Sahku) to NPR 500-1,000 
[USD 4.9-9.8] to buy new clothes (daughter-in-law 6, Kote). Receiving cash from 
financial guardians did not seem to be restricted to the least poor families, as 
the three aforementioned daughters-in-law from families across the wealth 
range. 
 
While more expensive goods and services could be purchased for the daughter-
in-law by the financial guardian, daughters-in-law had no control over when 
such purchases were made or which purchases were made when they 
happened. For example, one elder sister-in-law, who was the financial guardian 
of a household, received NPR 25,000 [USD 244] from the husband of the 
daughter-in-law to pay for the daughter-in-law’s birthing services. She decided 
to spend NPR 16,000 [USD 156] of it on the actual birth and did not tell the 
daughter-in-law what happened to the remaining NPR 8,000 [USD 78]. The 
daughter-in-law in turn felt too intimidated to even ask about the remaining NPR 
8,000 and was just relieved that the elder sister-in-law had agreed to spend any 
money at all on her (daughter-in-law 3, Kote). 
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Daughters-in-law widely refrained from questioning decisions, expressing 
disagreement or insisting against the wishes of family members in financial 
matters. Indeed, some daughters-in-law even refrained from asking their 
financial guardians seemingly trivial questions such as questions on the the price 
of food bought at the market for fear of appearing to challenge their guardian’s 
authority and illustrate a lack of respect. 
 
“[Until now,] I’ve thought “Why should I ask her [about her financial decisions] 
and what should I ask?” As I do not earn money for family, it is not my right to 
ask them questions" (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku)  
"No, I do not ask [about the prices of foods] … They might think that I am taking 
a balance record of her purchases … she says this [to me]. Don’t you know the 
rules of village?" (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
Thus, a social structure that gave little to no right to participate in financial 
decisions in the household left many daughters-in-law feeling dissatisfied, 
ignored and excluded. Yet, many daughters-in-law expressed a desire to be 
listened to. This gave rise to a sense of despondency, as they felt unable to 
express their opinions to other members of their own family. 
 
"If you thought something was impossible, then would you tell your family 
members to do that? No, you would not" (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
"I am suffering from a lack of money ... No-one can understand it except me … 
[as] I can’t express my feelings to anyone else. Who would I share my feelings 
with? No-one would believe me" (daughter-in-law 4, Kote) 
"Interviewer: How did you feel about being left out of money matters in the 
household? 
Daughter-in-law: I felt very bad. I used to feel stressed and worried. Those times, 
I did not want to talk with anyone and I used to think too much. I did not even 
want to see the face of my children" (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
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Daughters-in-law desired a degree of control over not only the outcome of 
purchases, but also the process of purchasing itself including both the physical 
process of making purchases and the decision-making process of choosing what 
to buy and when to buy it. One daughter-in-law wistfully compared her life 
before she married to her current living conditions, as unmarried women in 
often had considerable greater freedom in making decisions on purchases, 
savings and investments than married women. 
 
 “I used to buy things from the market myself, and I used to make different hand-
made things myself with material that I bought from the market. I made 
something with wool and other materials to bring with me as my dowry. I used 
to do all these things myself, when I was unmarried. But since my marriage two 
years ago, I have [stayed at home and] done nothing" (daughter-in-law 3, Kote) 
 
However, daughters-in-law reported few expectations of accruing greater voice 
in the family over time and many mothers-in-law similarly expected holding on 
to their financial guardianship as long as they “remained alive”. The existence of 
daughters-in-law who had lived with their mothers-in-law for 7-15 years without 
being allowed to make even minor decisions in the family (see Appendix J, 
Section J.3.1) suggested that “as long as I remain alive” could refer to a very long 
time period indeed. 
 
“I am the only manager of everything related to housework and purchases for 
this household. I will make purchases [for the household] myself for as long as I 
remain alive” (mother-in-law 4, Kote, lived with daughter-in-law for 8 years)  
“I do not have any idea about [when I am allowed to make purchases] because 
at present, we are living in a joint family. I think it takes at least another 5 or 10 
years. My mother-in-law and father-in-law are there to take decisions and they 
will do it as long as they remain alive” (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku, lived with 
mother-in-law for 8 years) 
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8.2.3.2 Risk of neglect and exploitation 
Daughters-in-law who lacked voice over financial matters in the family might 
have been somewhat appeased if they trusted their financial guardians to do 
the best they could to fairly balance the interests of the whole family. In such a 
situation, the denial of requests for cash signalled an inability to accommodate 
the interests of all family members rather than an unwillingness to help. 
However, daughters-in-law were often cynical about the motives of their in-
laws. 
 
"If there is money in your hand then everybody loves you, but if not, then no-one 
loves you" (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
“It is out of compulsion that I live with [my in-laws] … [My mother-in-law] only 
loves me if I have money" (daughter-in-law 4, Kote)  
 “[My mother-in-law] does not love me" (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku)  
 
The cynicism was not unfounded, as multiple daughters-in-law reported 
episodes of neglect from the withdrawal of financial and practical support in 
health emergencies. For example, one daughter-in-law explained how her 
husband warned her about staying with his family during her pregnancy, as no-
one from his family was willing to help her near the time of birth. When the 
interviewer asked her if she was able to ask for material support, she replied 
that they would never support her, even if she was near death, because they 
blamed her for her husband’s unemployment. 
 
“Daughter-in-law: [My husband’s] view was that no-one would help me. “If you 
get sick, then no-one will provide you food. No-one will understand your 
problems. So you should go [back to your parents’ home] … 
Respondent: Are you able to ask for money from your family members? … 
Daughter-in-law: No, they don’t give me [money] … They openly tell me that my 
husband doesn’t earn any money … I can’t ask [for money]. Even if I was about 
to die, they wouldn’t give me" (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
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Ironically, the same daughter-in-law had handed over all her previous earnings 
to her financial guardian when she worked as a road maintenance manager. She 
explained that if she had insisted on keeping her money, she would have 
suffered from physical violence. 
 
“[The in-laws] have the power … I have now been employed for 6 months, so I 
share kitchen supplies with them. Whatever the agenda of the guardian, I have 
to give them [my money]. If I will not give them then they will fight with me and 
beat me" (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
When the same daughter-in-law’s children fell ill and the financial guardian of 
the household refused to provide her money to buy medicines to treat their 
illness, she felt justified in accumulating secret savings of her own. 
 
“The guardian of the household didn’t give me any money. I waited, but they 
didn’t give me … I have two children at home … who get sick and a guardian who 
doesn’t have money for me … Then why isn’t it a necessity for me [to keep secret 
savings]? In such a situation, if a daughter-in-law had [her own] money, wouldn’t 
she spend it on medical treatment for her children? And wouldn’t that be a good 
thing?" (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
The example demonstrated that pervasive financial and social insecurities made 
it necessary for daughters-in-law to “hedge” against the risk of exploitation or 
abandonment by finding alternative means of securing their financial interests. 
 
8.2.4 Capitalising on supportive husbands 
8.2.4.1 Strategy 2: Using the husband as a go-between 
As daughters-in-law often found it difficult to trust their financial guardian, the 
husband became the main, high-ranking household member with whom 
daughters-in-law developed informal, caring relationships (see Appendix J, 
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Section J.4.1). Indeed, daughters-in-law had considerably greater influence over 
the consumption habits of the husband than that of any other adult household 
member. Examples of husbands agreeing to change their consumption habits 
after their wives explained to them that it was detrimental to the well-being of 
the family were frequent. 
 
 “Sometimes, he asks me whether he should buy some [expensive] foods or not 
then I tell him to buy [the food] next time and he usually agrees with me …If the 
prices of things are high then I tell him to not buy” (daughter-in-law 5, Sahku)  
“There are so many things [that I refuse to buy]. Like, when he wants to drink 
alcohol, he says, “Please give me money”. Then, I refuse him … And, he becomes 
upset because of it. Yet he also cools down later” (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
Thus, daughters-in-law often sought to indirectly gain a modicum of voice in the 
family using their husband as an intermediary. This avoided the risk of upsetting 
the in-laws by boldly putting forward propositions that might contradict their 
opinions, while still allowing a channel of communication to remain open. Many 
daughters-in-law also commented that it was difficult in any case to secure 
family support without the consent of the husband, particularly concerning large 
financial decisions which primarily involved discussions among the male 
members of the family. In turn, if the husband did make a request, it put 
pressure on family members lower in the family hierarchy, which sometimes 
included the mother-in-law, to follow his wishes. 
 
“I tell my husband [when I need money] and he tells his mother to give money to 
me, then she gives me” (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
"If anyone's husband does not agree with her, then nobody else would agree 
with her, no sister?" (daughter-in-law 2, Kote)  
"All of them [male family members and in-laws] take decisions themselves, but I 
do not interrupt them” (daughter-in-law 4, Sahku) 
Chapter 8 
Exploring the financial agency of daughters-in-law 
 
250 | P a g e  
 
 
Using the husbands to communicate one’s proposals also circumvented sexual 
taboos that were practiced in some of the households in our sample, which saw 
verbal and physical contact of any kind between daughters-in-law and elder 
brothers-in-law/fathers-in-law as potentially loaded with sexual undertones 
(Appendix J, Section J.4.2). In these families, the use of the husband was seen as 
merely the use of “proper channels”. 
 
“[My elder sister-in-law] says is it not okay [for me] to ask her husband [for 
money]. [My husband] should tell to her [that we need money]. When money 
gets withdrawn for any purpose, then she tells [my husband] to give me money 
and then he informs me” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
One daughter-in-law even used her husband as an advocate to successfully 
“lobby” for the suspension of plans to build a roof using common family money 
that was initially proposed by her elder sister-in-law and her husband. When 
queried about whether she had directly voiced her concerns with contributing 
to this fund, she was quick to deny speaking to her elder brother-in-law and 
maintained that she used her husband to communicate her message. 
 
“Daughter-in-law: They wanted to construct a concrete roof and thus asked for 
money. [My husband] said, he would give them money. But I said, “I don’t want 
to build a roof, I need this money now”. Then [my husband] agreed. [My in-laws] 
were a little bit angry, but then said, “Leave it” … [Till now,] the roof has not been 
built …  
Interviewer: Did you tell them yourself or did your husband tell them? 
Daughter-in-law: I do not speak in front of my elder brother-in-law. Thus, I told 
[my husband] and then he told [my in-laws]” (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
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Given the clearly expressed desire by this daughter-in-law to save money rather 
than spend it on a new roof, this example also demonstrates a strategy for 
exerting agency. 
 
8.2.4.2 Strategy 3: Keeping secrets with the husband 
An alternative strategy for daughters-in-law to gain financial agency was 
through the accumulation of private savings provided by their husbands. 
Daughters-in-law typically exhorted their husbands to set aside large amounts 
as private savings for themselves and their children. Such amounts could usually 
only be achieved through a reduction in contributions to the financial guardian, 
something the husband was not always willing to do. 
 
“My husband gives NPR 200,000 [USD 1,954] to his mother for general 
household expenditures [every two months] whereas my brother-in-law [only] 
gives NPR 100,000 [USD 977], so I wanted my husband to keep some money 
separate for other purposes. I wanted him to save for the future. But he does not 
want to save” (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku) 
 
However, many husbands working abroad did decide to transfer a portion of 
their income to their wives in such a manner that it was difficult for the financial 
guardian to control the income transmitted. This was done by sending income 
in the name of the wife’s natal father or mother without letting the in-laws know 
about the amount of income transmitted or even the existence of the 
transmission in the first place. 
 
“[My husband] sends money for me and my children, for our medicines and other 
expenditures … My [natal] father takes that money from the bank, my husband 
sends that money in the name of my father, and my father gives it to me [in my 
husband’s home]” (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku)  
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“[When we were living in a joint family, my husband] used to send money [to 
me] separately from the money that he sent other household members. It was 
not known to the other household members … He used to send money to me on 
my own father’s name” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
The amounts transferred in these instances were considerably larger than the 
amounts provided by in-laws and husbands for small daily purchases. One 
husband secretly transferred NPR 5,000-6,000 [USD 49-59] to his wife on a 
periodic basis before they separated from their in-laws (daughter-in-law 5, 
Kote). Another daughter-in-law reported receiving NPR 10,000-15,000 [USD 98-
147] every two or three months from her husband in personal income 
(daughter-in-law 7, Sahku). These amounts were much larger than the 
occasional contribution made by husbands and in-laws in response to 
daughters-in-law’s “public” requests for cash (NPR 50-2,000 [USD 0.5-19.5]). 
 
Using entirely separate channels to transfer income to the wife was often a wise 
strategy, as daughters-in-law risked losing their access to their husband’s 
transfer, if in-laws got wind of it. In one household, the mother-in-law had 
passed away and the father-in-law had taken over as the financial guardian of 
the household and the elder sister-in-law had taken over the role of the guardian 
of the daughter-in-law. The daughter-in-law’s husband decided to send money 
to her using public channels, and the daughter-in-law described how her elder 
sister-in-law simply took the money from her, when they found it. 
 
“[My husband] had sent NPR 2,000 [USD 20] through his sister’s husband… he 
had sent the money into his sister’s husband’s account … then I received that 
money in my hand, but all the family members knew about it … since my husband 
had sent it through his sister’s husband, he had told other family members about 
the money … then [my sister-in-law] asked me to give the money to her … and 
took that money from me” (daughter-in-law 3, Kote) 
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A second reason for keeping such transfers secret was the fact that the wider 
family often disapproved. One of the aforementioned daughters-in-law who 
received secret income from her overseas husband explained how concerned 
she had been that her secret would be discovered by her family members. She 
felt that other family members might have considered it deeply unfair that they 
gave up income in order to help repay the family’s loans, while she spent part of 
her husband’s income on her own and her children’s welfare. 
 
“I was worried about that ... It could become a big issue in the household that a 
husband had sent secret money to his wife … They might think that although 
there were lots of loan to be repaid, my husband was sending me [individual] 
allowances for me and my children … I [also] did not want to create differences 
among us sisters-in-law so I did not tell anyone” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Given the extremely high risks associated with being discovered, it is unlikely 
that these daughters-in-law would have engaged in such secret strategies unless 
they truly saw a clear purpose and value to these strategies. Thus, we also 
consider the use of such secret alliances by daughters-in-law a form of agency.  
 
8.2.5 Strategy 4: Keeping secrets from the husband 
Husbands did not always side with their wives in household disputes or agree to 
their urgings to save up money for themselves and their children. In order to to 
accumulate private savings beyond the amount, their husbands managed to 
provide, daughters-in-law very often asked for money to cover household 
expenditures which they subsequently saved in part or in full. 
 
 “When he gives me NPR 1,000 [USD 9.8] or NPR 1,500 [USD 14.7] to spend, then 
I would save that money and if he ever asked me about that money then I would 
say that the money was spent on food or medicines for my children” (daughter-
in-law 9, Sahku) 
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However, this method accumulated savings only slowly, as the purchases for 
which husbands provided their wives petty cash were usually low value items 
(food, soap, oil, etc.) with little potential for large savings. The reported amounts 
of money provided by husbands to cover the costs of food, cosmetics, jewellery 
or clothes for daughters-in-law in joint families ranged from NPR 500 [USD 4.9] 
to NPR 2,000 [USD 19.5]. Although some daughters-in-law reported saving all of 
it, usually daughters-in-law would have to spend part of it on actual market 
goods so as to convince their husbands that they were not just funnelling money 
away to their secret stores of cash. 
 
In order to acquire large amounts of cash more quickly, a few daughters-in-law 
employed more unusual strategies. One daughter-in-law sent friends and 
children out to secretly arrange for loans when she was in urgent need of cash 
for her family (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku). Another daughter-in-law opened a 
secret life insurance account to deposit the husband’s income into. 
 
“Half of [my husband’s income] is spent and whatever is left, I keep it secretly … 
because when money is seen, it gets spent and when it is not seen, it does not 
get spent. I have opened an account in [Life Insurance Company] secretly and I 
have put my money in it” (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
She reported that she had once been caught by her husband depositing his 
income into a similar account. However, rather than get angry or take action 
against her, her husband simply turned a blind eye. Indeed, the daughter-in-law 
explained that a tacit understanding existed between the two of them that her 
husband trusted her to look after household money on his behalf. 
 
“When [my husband] asks about our expenses then I say “I will give you all the 
details someday. I will give you more, do not worry.” Then he does not ask any 
more questions, he understands that money is being saved somewhere” 
(daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
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Hence, she went on to open another secret life account for the same purpose. 
At the time of the interview, the husband had still not learned about this second 
life insurance account. As this example shows strategies involving secrets from 
the husbands were not necessarily opposed by the husband himself.  
 
At the same time, such strategies clearly involve directing the use of cash in the 
household towards purposes that are more in line with one’s own values, goals 
and interests. Thus, we also consider such strategies a form of agency exerted 
by daughters-in-law. 
 
8.2.6 Strategy 5: Relying on the maternal home 
Although in theory, daughters were paraya dhan or “borrowed property” to 
their natal family (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku) and “belonged” to the husband’s 
family after marriage, most daughters-in-law in our sample retained close links 
with their natal families after marriage. Daughters-in-law would either actively 
try to visit their natal families or phone them for advice and support when 
encountering problems in their husband’s home. The relationship between 
daughters-in-law and their natal families was often one of care and love “You 
should be aware about the love of a mother” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote).  
 
In non-crisis periods, it was indeed quite common for natal families to provide 
daughters-in-law special foods and small amounts of private money (NPR 100-
1,000 [USD 1.0-9.8] reported) as gifts during such visits. The gifted money was 
usually kept hidden from in-laws and formed part of the secret savings/koseliya 
of daughters-in-law. During periods of unemployment of the husband or conflict 
with the extended family, natal parents were also reported to cover daily 
household expenses such as food, milk and other household products. During 
these periods, the amounts of money provided could also be slightly larger, as 
one daughter-in-law reported receiving NPR 1,000-5,000 [USD 9.8-48.9] from 
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However, due to the practice of village exogamy, Hindu daughters-in-law often 
lived relatively far from their natal families and could only access help during 
their visits to their natal village. Daughters-in-law usually needed to obtain 
permission from their husband and in-laws before carrying out such visits, which 
might be rare under normal circumstances. One daughter-in-law stated that her 
husband would not let her visit her natal family more than once every one to 
two years (daughter-in-law 7, Sahku). Most visits to natal families reported by 
daughters-in-law in our sample were connected to special occasions such as 
their own pregnancy, deaths in the family or special festivals. 
 
Yet, one of the most important functions of the natal family was as a “fail-safe” 
in times of crisis where both the husband and the senior in-laws were unable or 
unwilling to help. As it was rare for daughters-in-law to have close social 
contacts to rely on in their husband’s village (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.3), their 
maternal home was usually the only possibility for support outside of their 
husband’s home. Several daughters-in-law recounted stories of returning back 
to their natal home during periods of crisis, where they received shelter and care 
for years on end. 
 
For example, one daughter-in-law explained how she had suffered repeated 
physical violence at the hands of her father-in-law who also blamed her for her 
husband’s unemployment. After reporting the violence to her natal parents who 
called on the local community court/panchayat to listen to her case and provide 
help, her parents-in-law became furious with her. They enacted a household 
separation and ceased all financial support to her family (Chapter 7, Section 
7.2.3). Shortly afterwards, her husband went to jail for three years after getting 
into a violent brawl with another man. The daughter-in-law explained how her 
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“While my husband was in jail for three years then my mother and father took 
care of me and provided my family food and shelter” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
After coming back from jail, her own husband tried multiple times to throw her 
out and forbade her to reach out to her natal parents, saying that she had to 
choose between them or him. She became pregnant four times, but at the time 
of the birth of her last baby, she was informed that she needed a Caesarean 
section. She could not afford to pay for it and her husband did not step in to 
contribute. Her parents were worried that she might die without the operation 
and decided to call her brother to cover the costs of the Caesarean in full. 
 
“In Janakpur hospital … the doctors told me that a normal delivery was not 
possible. But I did not agree to having an operation, because I did not have 
money that time. My husband was there and he did not say anything, but my 
parents … said that if the delivery was not done through a C-section, I could die. 
My parents called my brother and then he came to the hospital and signed the 
documents [for the C-section]. My brother paid all the money … at the time of 
discharge … My mother and father [and brother] saved my life" (daughter-in-law 
2, Kote) 
 
The amounts of money involved were large during such crisis periods were often 
large. For the aforemention daughter-in-law (2, Kote), the C-section was 
reported to cost NPR 50,000-60,000 [USD 489-586], but the natal parents also 
provided NPR 12,000 [USD 117] to cover medical expenditures when the son fell 
ill and NPR 7,000 [USD 68] to purchase a calf to support her livelihood after her 
parents-in-law had separated her from them. For another daughter-in-law (8, 
Kote) who lived in a poor family, her natal elder brother provided NPR 20,000 
[USD 195] for the medical treatment of her late husband and another NPR 
20,000 [USD 195] for opening a wine shop when her husband died, while her 
younger, unmarried brother provided NPR 10,000-12,000 [USD 98-117] 
regularly for her upkeep and her own parents provided by an additional NPR 
2,000-3,000 [USD 20-29] from the earnings of the younger brother. 
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While the degree of agency exerted by daughters-in-law calling upon their family 
members to help them survive is rather diminished, it is still agency, because 
these daughters-in-law would arguably rather have their family members 
support them in such a situation than not. Thus, in its own extremely limited 
way, we also class this type of action by daughters-in-law as a form of agency. 
 
8.2.7 Wider financial constraints on daughters-in-law 
8.2.7.1 Ruling out larger sums of credit 
In principle, daughters-in-law could have gained further financial agency, 
particularly in emergency situations, through access to credit. In practice, this 
was exceedingly difficult to do. Husbands, elder sisters-in-law and mothers-in-
law all did not approve of daughters-in-law taking out loans on their own. 
Daughters-in-law were seen to be too junior to take on a task that had 
ramifications for the whole family, including burdens on male income earners 
who were left with the responsibility of repaying such loans. 
 
“It is not about NPR 100 [USD 1.0] or 200 [USD 2.0]. If anyone took a loan worth 
NPR 5,000 [USD 48.9] or 10,000 [USD 97.7] then they should ask their husband 
[first] … as he would have to pay for the loan … It is hard work to pay back a 
loan” (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
Daughters-in-law were also perceived to be unlikely debtors, as their almost 
complete lack of social connections outside the household (Chapter 7, Section 
7.3.3) made it implausible that anyone in the community would trust them 
enough to provide them with a loan. 
 
 “[My daughter-in-law] does not go anywhere. Nobody knows her. Who will 
provide her loans?” (mother-in-law 7, Sahku) 
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Even if daughters-in-law were able to find a willing creditor, family members 
often did not allow them to go in search of credit for fear of detrimentally 
impacting on the family reputation by violating female seclusion norms in the 
community. 
 
“[My relatives] would say, “She is the new daughter-in-law. When she is older, 
then she will surely go… now, she is a new daughter-in-law, so she should stay 
at home… why does she need to go?”” (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
For time-consuming activities such as participation in savings and credit groups, 
these were also seen as being in direct conflict with daughters-in-law’s 
obligations to perform child care and housekeeping duties. 
 
 “Currently, she is looking after her child and it is a big and hard job in itself to 
look after a baby” (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
A few daughters-in-law in some families did report being able to obtain a type 
of loan. These were small, interest-free exchanges worth up to NPR 5,000 [USD 
49]. The majority of the loans were exchanged with husbands, sisters-in-law, 
brothers-in-law or parents-in-law, although one daughter-in-law reported 
borrowing from her aunt. However, due to their small size these loans tended 
to provide limited financial agency beyond what daughters-in-law could also 
obtain through secret savings. 
 
“After the birth of my son, I used to buy milk for him from the travelling milk 
woman/goyarnia. The milk woman told me to give money for milk … [so] I had 
borrowed NPR 1,000 [USD 9.8] from my aunt to give money to the milk woman” 
(daughter-in-law 7, Sahku) 
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8.2.7.2 Lack of feasible employment 
A second source of financial agency for daughters-in-law might have been 
employment. By far the most desirable form of employment for local daughters-
in-law was “office work” either in the form of the civil service, work as a teacher 
or work in the medical profession (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.2). However, 
daughters-in-law in all but the wealthiest families faced formidable barriers to 
professional employment, as they lacked education and training and were 
burdened with heavy household and child care duties. For example, one 
daughter-in-law explained that her husband told her she would not be able to 
obtain any kind of work, because she did not have a formal educational degree. 
 
“According to [my husband], I could only work if I had a degree from a course. 
Without any qualifications, I would not be able to take up any kind of work … 
my husband says” (daughter-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
On the other hand, agricultural labour for women was considered highly 
damaging to family status in families in the middle wealth range (Chapter 7, 
Section 7.2.2). Thus families that were wealthy enough not to require daughters-
in-law to take up agricultural labour usually prohibited them from taking up any 
employment.  
 
Daughters-in-law could in principle earn income through home production of 
goods by e.g. making incense sticks, weaving baskets or stitching clothes. 
However, household members in households in the middle wealth range also 
concluded that employment was simply not the best use of their daughter-in-
law’s time, because women’s work was less well-paid than men’s work 
anyway31. 
                                                          
31 This impression may partially have arisen through the substantially higher wage rates earned through male 
foreign labour migration which made women’s local income earning opportunities seem meagre in comparison 
(Section 7.1.1). Women in Nepal are rarely considered as candidates for foreign labour migration. This is partly 
due to fears of trafficking and other forms of violence against women (in fact, the Nepalese government banned 
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“My husband is stubborn … He says, what work could I do? According to him, I’m 
not able to do anything and even if I did, I would earn much less than him. He 
does not want me to go outside to earn an insignificant amount of money” 
(daughter-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
Daughters-in-law rarely agreed with the assessment of the rest of the family. 
The vast majority of daughters-in-law living in families where they were 
forbidden from obtaining employment voiced a desire to do so. When the 
aforementioned daughter-in-law was asked by the interviewer if she had 
wanted to earn money, she immediately replied “Who does not want to earn 
money?” (daughter-in-law 2, Jamal). Other daughters-in-law families positively 
pleaded with the interviewer to provide them a job at the end of the interview. 
 
“I want to earn income myself … I would be willing to do any kind of work from 
the government like making soap, stitching clothes, making incense sticks and 
so on. If Sisters like you or the government provided me with any kind of job … 
then I would be ready to do it” (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
 
8.2.8 Financial incentives for family alliances/oppositions 
The extent to which husbands and mothers-in-law were willing to support or 
oppose the financial goals of the daughter-in-law was strongly influenced by the 
financial incentive structure of the family. One of the enduring sources of friction 
between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law concerned competition for the 
earned income of the husband of the daughter-in-law. While wives often gained 
financially from a household separation as it improved their access to their 
husband’s income, in-laws often lost financially from losing access to the same 
source of income. In two out of three cases where daughters-in-law reported 
supportive relationships with their mother-in-law, this conflict of interest was 
absent. In one family, the husband refused to share his income with any other 
                                                          
female foreign labour migration to the Middle East from 1999 to 2003), partly because women are perceived to 
have a duty to stay at home and look after children and the household in the absence of their husbands [365].  
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members of his family anyway including his mother and his wife (6, Sahku). In 
another family, the husband had passed away (8, Kote). Outside of these three 
cases, mothers-in-law mostly opposed the regular provision of private savings 
for their daughters-in-law from their family income (see Section 8.2.1).  
 
In contrast with financial guardians, husbands often approved of opportunities 
for their wives to accumulate private savings. There was a strong sense that 
savings held by a wife could be easily accessed by both members of the couple 
and would be spent on the welfare of the family anyway.  
 
“All women keep secret money/koseliya for their children’s bright future” 
(daughter-in-law 5, Kote) 
“Since both of us are saving money, when we receive the saved money then it 
would belong to both of us” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Indeed, husbands and their wives often had aligned incentives to “rebel” against 
the in-laws in the joint household. In many joint households, husbands were 
equally powerless to influence financial decisions in the family as compared to 
their wives, because they were also under an obligation to obey the financial 
guardian who received and managed all household income. This frequently 
created increasing levels of dissatisfaction in husbands who desired to make 
their own decisions concerning their own income. In this situation, the most 
direct way to gain control over one’s own income was to enact a household 
separation (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.3), as this conferred full rights on the nuclear 
couple to control their own income. 
 
"[My husband] told me that when he comes back [from his stay in the Middle 
East], then he will talk to other family members about separation … He does not 
like how things happen in our family … We do not have a house to live in. And 
my husband told my father-in-law [the financial guardian] to give me NPR 5,000 
[USD 49] [from my husband’s income to repay a loan], but my father-in-law 
refused. That’s why he became angry" (daughter-in-law 3, Kote) 
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In all the households in our sample where the nuclear family had initiated the 
family separation, either the daughter-in-law, or the mother-in-law, or both 
cited financial discontent as one of the major causes of family conflict. For 
example, one daughter-in-law explained how she and her husband had initially 
lived in a joint household with her elder brother-in-law, as her husband had 
already separated from his mother before even marrying. However, after being 
forced to pay off loans that had been taken by the elder brother-in-law worth 
NPR 400,000-500,000 [USD 3,908-4,885] using the personal savings of the 
daughter-in-law, the couple decided to separate from their elder brother-in-law 
and avoid such obligations in the future. 
 
 “I paid [the elder brother-in-law’s] loans with my personal savings … they had 
taken a loan and we paid it off instead of them, so it caused a lot of tension for 
us … according to them, as [my husband] was living jointly with them, it was his 
duty to pay off their loans” (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku) 
 
However, household separation was also expensive as the separated couple 
needed to move out and set up a new life for themselves without the financial 
support of the in-laws, something that often involved expensive land purchases 
and costs of house construction. For example, one daughter-in-law who suffered 
repeated physical and emotional violence at the hands of her brother-in-law 
explained how her husband refused to enact a household separation due to the 
belief that such a move would be financially unviable. 
 
“My husband said that he could not live separately [from his parents] because 
there were so many expenses associated with living separately. We would have 
to buy grains like rice, wheat and we would also have to arrange fuel to cook 
food … Here while living in the joint family, we only buy vegetables, but other 
things like rice and wheat, we get from [our in-laws]” (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku)  
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In this context, it was understandable that family members often treated secret 
savings provided for the wife with extreme suspicion32, as it could indicate the 
couple was “saving up” for a household separation (see also Appendix J, Section 
J.4.2). One daughter-in-law was immediately accused of getting secret money 
from her husband when she returned home with the LBW-SAT cash transfer 
(daughter-in-law 7, Kote), while another daughter-in-law hid the money she 
received from her natal parents from her in-laws for fear that they would make 
precisely such an accusation if they found the money (daughter-in-law 3, Kote). 
Another mother-in-law explained that she did not want her son to give his 
income to his wife, because she would immediately want to separate from the 
extended household if she started accumulating her husband’s earnings. 
 
“If her husband started to give money to her then she would not live with us and 
she would not obey us” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
Conversely, the husbands who were uncooperative often were unemployed 
husbands who depended financially on their own parents for their upkeep (see 
Appendix J, Section J.4.3). 
 
8.3 Discussion 
8.3.1 Substantive findings 
Existing feminist discourse on women’s property rights in rural South Asia has 
often focused on rights in land and assets brought to marriage to the exclusion 
of cash savings33. Minturn’s [83] ethnography of high-caste women from Uttar 
Pradesh devoted an entire chapter to land and dowry. Bennett’s [22] detailed 
ethnography of women’s status in Nepal only briefly mentioned women’s 
property in connection with gifts provided during the wedding ceremony. 
Agarwal’s [9] study of women’s property rights in South Asia specifically 
concerned women’s rights in land. 
 
                                                          
32 In general, the scheming wife that lures her husband away from the extended family is a well-established 
cultural trope in Nepal [22]. 
33 Even at a global level, Deere & Doss’ (2006) survey of gender gaps in the possession of wealth world-wide 
focused largely on assets brought to marriage and land rights to the exclusion of ownership over cash [12]. 
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However, where authors have made occasional references to women’s control 
over cash, their remarks reinforced the conclusions of this study. For example, 
Agarwal [9] noted that women’s “access to the cash economy and (in areas of 
strong female seclusion) to the market place itself, is constrained and often 
dependent on the mediation of males” (p.63-64). Minturn [83] noted that 
daughters-in-law increasingly controlled their own cash to the displeasure of 
their mothers-in-law. Naved [362] reported that respondents in Bangladesh felt 
contemporary women “handle more money, which includes their own as well 
as their husbands’ earnings … [and can] freely handle and use money for daily 
expenses … because vendors now come to the door to sell goods” (p.29). 
 
The focus on land rights has been understandable given the importance of land 
as a productive asset for the largely agrarian economy of rural South Asia [9]. 
Female land ownership has been associated with improved female decision-
making power and child nutrition [366] and reduced incidence of domestic 
violence [367,368]. Similarly, control of assets brought to marriage is of interest 
given evidence for a role of such assets in enhancing women’s bargaining power 
[4] and reducing the incidence of domestic violence [369,370]. However, an 
exclusive focus on land ownership and assets brought to marriage potentially 
overlooks an important role of cash in shaping family politics in rural South Asia. 
 
Most prominently, struggles over the control of cash played an important role 
in contributing to the sense of dissatisfaction that could ultimately lead to a 
household separation in the Maithili family (Section 8.2.8). In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, Bailey [371] and Epstein [372] hypothesized that a shift from feudal 
land practices to competitive cash-based economies in South Asia could be 
accompanied by the break-up of the joint family, as sub-factions began to 
dispute the allocation of money or refuse to put their external earnings into a 
common family budget. However, studies of household separation since then 
ignored the role of intra-household conflict over cash and instead focused on 
other causes of household separation such as the death of household heads, 
overcrowding or migration, general “family discord” or general “economic 
pressures” [111,373-375]. 
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Although the demise of the joint family has not come to pass as predicted by 
Bailey and Epstein, the politics of intra-family control over cash seems to have 
persisted till this day. In fact, a Supreme Court Ruling in India in October 2016 
confirmed the divorce of a Hindu son from his wife who was ruled by the 
Supreme Court Judge to have tried to “pry him away” from his “pious obligation” 
to live with his parents “for the sole reason” that she wanted to enjoy his entire 
income, a practice that was considered to reflect foreign “Western thought” 
[376]. The fact that the highest court of India would explicitly refer to the politics 
of intra-family control over cash in justifying their decisions shows the enduring 
power of a discourse, which is entirely overlooked by an exclusive focus in 
development theory and practice on land- and dowry-based assets. 
 
On a day-to-day basis, our current study found that women living in joint families 
engaged in a number of strategies to exert financial agency. First, we found that 
Maithili language contained a specific word for the secret savings of married 
women, koseliya, which were accumulated through the strategic manipulation 
of information in the family (Section 8.2.1.1). The use of “management of 
information” [360] to accumulate private savings have been noted by a number 
of researchers working in Bangladesh. Naved  [362] reported that rural villagers 
in Bangladesh also used a specific word, zolaitta, to refer to the secret savings 
kept by married women which was hidden from their husbands. Both Kibria 
[361] and Kabeer’s [360] studies of garment workers in urban Bangladesh found 
that women would secretly withhold a portion of their wages from their 
husbands as a form of protective insurance for themselves.  
 
Most spectacularly, women’s accumulation of secret savings came to light in 
November 2016, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that all 
existing Indian bank notes worth 500 or 1,000 rupees would become invalid as 
legal tender from midnight on the same day and that new bank notes worth 500 
and 2,000 rupees could be exchanged for the old bank notes at formal bank 
branches. Although designed to curb corruption and fight terrorism, an 
unintended consequence of the policy was widespread revelation of married 
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women’s secret savings to their husbands who were often required to help them 
exchange it for the new currency [377]. While some husbands were shocked at 
the discovery of their wives’ secret savings [377], others had tacitly accepted 
their wives’ secret accumulation as a form of private insurance [378]. 
 
Interestingly, sociological studies of the history of Western countries have 
shown similar findings concerning the strategies used by married women to get 
access to money in a context of unequal access to income-earning opportunities 
and decision-making power in the family. Hertz [270] found that American 
couples kept secret financial information from each other including secret 
savings and secret income, while Zelizer’s [379] study of American households 
from 1870 to 1930 concluded 
 
“A wife’s chances of additional cash were limited to … asking, cajoling, 
downright begging, and even practicing sexual blackmail. If these techniques 
failed, there was also a repertoire of underground financial strategies, ranging 
from home pocket-picking to padding bills” (p.357) 
 
The results of our study showed that although the daughter-in-law was usually 
the subordinate party in highly unequal power relationships with other family 
members, we should not dismiss her ability to exert financial agency either. One 
daughter-in-law in our sample reported having a role as the family “accountant” 
since she was the only family member at home who was literate enough to keep 
written accounts of income and expenditures. When the family received 
remittance income worth NPR 10,000 [USD 98], she redirected it towards the 
repayment of outstanding loans (daughter-in-law 1, Sahku). Other daughters-in-
law blocked the construction of a roof (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku), initiated the 
marriage of a sister-in-law (daughter-in-law 6, Sahku) or persuaded the parents-
in-law to sacrifice a goat upon the birth of her son (daughter-in-law 8, Sahku). 
Other daughters-in-law again banded together and forced a household 
separation on their mother-in-law (mother-in-law 5, Kote). 
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However, the examples provided by daughters-in-law in our study for what they 
did achieve in the financial realm were also quite limited. While the ability to 
strategically influence other family members allowed daughters-in-law to obtain 
some financial agency “by proxy”, it left their agency dependent on ingratiation, 
persuasion, deception and manipulation, manoeuvres known as “weapons of 
the weak” [380]. Daughters-in-law needed to continually maintain the 
impression that any financial agency they exerted would ultimately benefit the 
family member with whom they had allied themselves. Thus, these results echo 
the concerns of feminists over allowing the notion of indirect freedom to form 
part of a definition of empowerment (Section 3.2.5, Chapter 3). 
 
Many daughters-in-law often considered it an achievement to convince their 
family members to provide them private allowances, to take them along on a 
shopping trip to a nearby market or to provide them with small luxury items 
such as clothes or cosmetics. By comparison, mothers-in-law reported making 
daily decisions regarding what loans to take and who to borrow from, whether 
to send sons abroad for employment or not and where to direct investments in 
local family business. Daughters-in-law were frequently prohibited from 
involving themselves in all of these decisions. 
 
Studies in both Bangladesh and Pakistan have indeed suggested that fear of 
abandonment by husbands, limited outside options for married women and 
strong ideologies of “togetherness” in the family prevented women from 
exercising control over cash in the family, including control over their own 
earned income [252,360-362]. Echoing our findings on financial guardians 
(Section 8.2.1.2), Kibria [361] noted how female garment workers who handed 
over their wages to a male household members would justify it in terms of his 
duties to spend the household income on the welfare of the household 
members rather than himself. 
 
Again, sociological studies of the history of Western countries have shown 
comparable findings concerning the gendered management of money. Under 
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the law in both the United States and the United Kingdom, all property in a 
married family belonged to the husband, and wives lost the right to any property 
they brought to marriage or earned subsequent to marriage until new legislation 
was introduced at the end of the nineteenth century [12]34. 
 
Similarly when Shyam Sundar Yadav, a senior field coordinator from MIRA, was 
asked to explain why so many of our respondents indicated that the wife or the 
mother-in-law received the household income, he explained that “in Nepal, 
women are just like a bank”. He elaborated that husbands and sons usually 
handed over their income to their wives or mothers, trusting that these would 
better care of their money than they could even take care of it themselves. This 
was remarkably similar to Zelizer’s [379] description of how low-income 
husbands appointed their wives to act as “cashiers” for the family, as they 
handed over their earned income to their wives in the expectation that they 
would subsequently administer the collective income skilfully. 
 
Finally, Vogler and Pahl’s [257] taxonomy of domestic money management 
systems in British households could be productively applied the households in 
our study. In her description of the “female whole wage system”, the husband 
was responsible for earning an income and would hand over his entire wage 
package to his wife minus “pocket money”, while the wife was responsible for 
budgeting and household expenditures. In our setting, this resembled the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities between the financial guardian and male 
income-earners of the family35. 
 
                                                          
34 Zelizer’s [379]study found evidence that American courts continued to uphold husband’s rights over 
property brought marriage or earned by their wives until the 1920s. 
35 Vogler and Pahl [257] also noted how the wives’ role as managers of household money in low-income 
households in the UK was not experienced as empowering, because the household budget was so constrained 
that few choices were available in the first place. Indeed, the division of labour allowed husbands to blame their 
wives for “mismanagement” of funds when their own incomes were insufficient [257]. Many mothers-in-law in 
our sample similarly voiced feeling considerable psychological distress in trying to manage entire joint 
households comprising multiple, often squabbling, sons and daughters-in-law who felt unfairly treated one way 
or another in the allocation of household resources. 
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However, there are limits to how far, one can stretch the analogy between 
Western married couples and Hindu extended families. Daughters-in-law in 
Hindu extended families had to contend with the simultaneously implications of 
gender and age inequalities in access to financial power in the household. While 
Zelizer’s strategies of “asking, cajoling, downright begging or even practicing 
sexual blackmail” (p.357) might have worked on the husband, they were less 
likely to work on mothers-in-law with whom daughters-in-law tended to have 
considerably more fraught relationships than their husbands (Appendix J). They 
were also less likely to work on sisters-in-law with whom they might have more 
competitive relationships than their husbands (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2.3 for 
an example). Our study showed a different repertoire of informal strategies for 
dealing with financial guardians including using the husband to put forward 
one’s proposition, keeping secrets from the mother-in-law or capitalising on a 
supportive relationship with the mother-in-law. In the long term, daughters-in-
law might also have hoped that, they would eventually become a mother-in-law 
themselves and acquire greater status in the family. As noted in Section 8.2.3, 
many daughters-in-law seemed to expect their mothers-in-law to hold on to her 
authority as long as she was alive. 
 
Unfortunately, the use of generalized statements on the power of women “in 
general” to control household finances have not been uncommon in South Asian 
development writing. Naved [362] reported that “women” in Bangladesh were 
now perceived to “freely handle and use money for daily expenses” (p.29) 
without clarifying whether these women included any daughters-in-law or if 
they were only mothers-in-law. Among studies published in the last 20 years on 
the financial power of women in South Asian families, only two studies 
specifically addressed generational and gender influences simultaneously, one 
from urban Bangladesh [360] and one among immigrant South Asian families in 
London [381]. Both studies noted the active involvement of senior women in 
managing finances on behalf of junior women in ways similar to the roles of a 
financial guardian. However, none of these studies paid attention to the 
strategies used by junior women to subvert the power of senior women. Yet, as 
demonstrated in this study, the power struggle between junior and senior 
women was an important part of the overall picture on financial family politics. 
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Our analysis of gender dynamics in the household was based on the reports and 
perspectives of female respondents only. While the incorporation of male 
perspectives was possible (see Appendix L), the translated data arrived too late 
to form part of this thesis. This potentially limited our ability to study the social 
dynamics between male household members, as many women reported having 
limited access to discussions among men in our households (see Appendix K, 
Section K.4.2). Future work will make use of the data from husbands of women 
participating in our study to explore their perspectives on women’s financial 
agency in the household. 
 
A second key concern related to the ability to generate evidence by relying 
exclusively on spoken, linguistic data. As discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.4.2, 
respondents might omit mention of details of their lives that they felt 
uncomfortable discussing or which they felt cast them in an unfavourable light 
towards the interviewer. As a reputation for family unity and harmony was 
strongly valued in the Maithili community, many respondents may have felt 
uncomfortable discussing conflicts in their family with our interviewer. We 
addressed this issue by carefully explaining the purpose of our research 
programme to them, by assuring them of the confidentiality of their interviews 
and by separating daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law from each other during 
interviews by simultaneously interviewing both in separate rooms. 
 
Ethnographic research of household dynamics involving years of participant 
observation while residing in a local village [83] or in a Maithili household as an 
“informal family member” [22] could have partially resolved these problems. 
Family members would have found it considerably more difficult to perform 
“impression management” over prolonged periods of observation and they 
might have had less of a desire to do so anyway, as they learned to trust the 
motives and goals of the researcher. Participant observation might also have 
facilitated the understanding of intricate, informal pathways of influence in the 
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Maithili household that might have been difficult for respondents to verbalise in 
linguistic form. Given my identity as a male researcher and the strongly sex-
seggregated social norms of Maithili society, it would have been nearly 
impossible for households to allow me to sit in their home and observe women’s 
daily domestic routines. However, a female co-researcher might have been able 
to help with such research.  
 
Ethnographic research or repeated qualitative interviews with participants over 
a prolonged period would also have enabled us to assess the extent to which 
the implict values and goals endorsed by women’s strategies would endure over 
time (Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3). By looking out for changes in women’s strategies 
over time, we might for example conclude that a goal of saving up for a 
household separation had been substituted for a goal of securing strong 
interpersonal relations with the mother-in-law. Women’s expressed desires and 
goals might also change as they realised they were more or less comfortable 
with their assigned role in the household. However, the limited timescale of this 
project precluded such long-term data collection processes. 
 
A final issue concerned the generalizability of our findings to other contexts. 
Although much qualitative work seeks to understand a a particular sub-culture 
or a small set of individuals in rich detail rather than establish universal rules and 
laws of human nature [382], our work sought to generate policy-relevant 
evidence for improving development practice in health and gender policy 
beyond the specific Maithili population in this study. This requires a form of 
“transferability” or “fittingness” of our results which refers to the extent to 
which our conclusions can “be transferred to” or “fit” other contexts [382]. 
 
In this study, we provided a detailed description of both context and main 
findings to help readers to judge for themselves whether our results transferred 
to their own setting [382]. Many of our results semed to “fit” logically within the 
context of findings from anthropologists working in India, Pakistan or 
Bangladesh, as well as other areas of Nepal (Chapter 2, Section 2.3). However, 
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future work could strengthen the transferability of our results. In particular, our 
sample of interview respondents were exclusively Hindu women from the Plains 
of Nepal. This was an important limitation of our study and future replication 
studies could investigate the transferability of our findings to related 
populations such as Muslim women, women living in the Hills of Nepal or 
women living in other South Asian countries. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
One of the main findings of this study concerns the active role played by young, 
rural daughters-in-law in accumulating and controlling their own cash savings. 
While access to credit and employment was often limited, daughters-in-law 
were able to exercise agency in five distinct ways: 1) Capitalising on supportive 
financial guardians 2) Using the husband as a go-between 3) Keeping secrets 
with the husband 4) Keeping secrets from the husband 5) Relying on the 
maternal home. However, a clear pattern that emerged from these strategies 
was the extent to which daughters-in-law were almost entirely dependent on 
the goodwill of either their husband, mother-in-law or natal family to exert their 
own agency. 
 
Having examined the processes and determinants of financial agency in the 
Maithili household in general, we will now turn to the specific issue of 
daughters-in-law’s control over the cash transfers provided in the LBW-SAT 
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Chapter 9 
Exploring financial agency over LBW-SAT 
cash transfers in the household 
 
9.1 Introduction 
A major concern in the design and evaluation of microcredit, microsavings and 
cash transfer programmes has been the potential for income appropriation by 
husbands and other family members [37,209,212,383,384]. Even where these 
have not directly seized the income of the female earner, they may have 
compensated for the increased income of the female earner with a 
corresponding reduction in financial support from their side [5,211,261,385]. As 
regards cash transfers, the existing evidence finds mixed evidence for an impact 
of either conditional cash transfers (CCTs) or unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) 
on measures of women’s decision-making power, whether in the domain of 
household expenditures or in other domains [214]. At the same time, RCTs 
randomising the recipient to male or female beneficiaries have found mixed 
results with some RCTs showing a gender difference [34] and others finding 
virtually no gender differences in budget allocations [386,387]. In the latter case, 
it has been speculated that the lack of difference was because husbands seized 
the cash transfer and prevented their wives from making decisions on its use 
[388].  
 
However, qualitative evidence on the reasons why women have or have not 
been able to retain control over their cash transfers has been sparse. 
Importantly, no existing qualitative study on beneficiary women’s own agency 
over received cash transfers has been carried out in the South Asian context. 
One study on a CCT from Mexico reported that men had no problem with 
women receiving money, because women were thought to be more responsible 
with money and spend it on the family rather than alcohol [3]. Another study on 
a UCT in Lesotho [389] found that conflicts over the cash transfers were 
primarily between parents and their children rather than between husbands and 
wives, as women were expected to manage household money in their context 
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anyway. Another in Kenya [345] of a UCT found that most men saw the money 
provided by the cash transfer as belonding to the recipient women and felt that 
it was spent on things like family welfare, which they valued anyway. However, 
one case of conflict where the husband seized all the money from the transfer 
and kept with himself was also reported [345]. A final study of a CCT in Turkey 
[90] found that men disapproved of women being given cash, and women often 
offered the cash transfer directly to their husbands, alshouth some women also 
felt the money was their right, because it was their “salary” for fulfilling 
conditionalities attached to the cash transfer. 
 
The existing set of qualitative studies paint a mixed picture of women’s agency 
over cash transfers with some contexts finding few restrictions on their use and 
others finding the cash transfer being largely controlled by male household 
members. However, women’s agency over their received cash transfers was not 
the primary aim of these studies, thus none of the existing studies proposed any 
theories of why women were or were not able to retain control over the cash 
transfer, since. This Chapter thus seeks to present a new theory of how women 
were or were not able to exert agency over the cash transfers. 
 
The main theory of this Chapter is as follows: MIRA staff provided health and 
gender messages focusing on how the cash transfer ought to be used (Section 
9.2.1). While MIRA held levels of local legitimacy (Section 9.2.2), MIRA staff also 
took active steps to pressure families into spending the cash transfer as advised 
and encourage community pressures to uphold the advice provided by MIRA as 
well (Section 9.2.3). The small size of the cash transfer reduced the stake family 
members felt they had in influencing the use of the cash transfer (Section 9.2.4). 
Households responded by being motivated to invest in the nutrition of the 
daughter-in-law and respect her “property rights” in the cash transfer (Section 
9.2.5). This provided a new, unusual context for many daughters-in-law to exert 
financial agency. The strategies used by these daughters-in-law included 
choosing freely in separated families, honouring the financial guardian by 
offering them the cash transfer, using inconspicuous subversion, and using 
confrontational tactics (Section 9.2.6). However, in extremely poor families, 
daughters-in-law seemed to lack any meaningful agency over the cash transfer 
(Section 9.2.7). The whole theory is diagrammed in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Theory of financial agency over cash transfers 
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9.2 Results 
9.2.1 MIRA provides gender and health messages 
9.2.1.1 Ensuring a varied diet for pregnant women using the cash transfers 
In accordance with the manual for the women’s group facilitators, FCs reported 
teaching pregnant women about the importance of caring for the pregnant 
woman and spending the cash transfers on her. In particular, FCs reported 
teaching a set of nutritional lessons emphasizing cost-savings through home 
production of vegetables and ensuring food diversity by covering all the “four” 
major food groups (fruits, vegetables, grains and protein). 
 
"Mostly in the villages, there is lots of green spinach, but … they did not know, 
how good it was. But they learned about it from our meetings … We tell them 
about the four main types of food. [And] we tell them about the locally available 
fruits” (FGD) 
 
Figure 20. Picture from the second women's groups meeting showing the variety of food products that 
a healthy pregnancy requires. 
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However, daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law widely 
reported receiving a somewhat different nutritional message promoting 
primarily the consumption of fruit and dairy with the occasional inclusion of 
other foods. In particular, apples or pomegranates were almost universally 
mentioned by daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law alike, 
who reported that these should be given to the daughter-in-law “in maximum 
quantity” (elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal). 
 
“In the women’s group meetings, they had told us to eat pomegranates and 
apples and others things too” (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
"The money was given by the women’s group in order to buy apples and 
pomegranates to eat" (daughter-in-law 8, Kote) 
 
The salience of these fruits was likely due to their relatively high price which 
made them “luxuries” in many households “The Sisters had told us to eat good 
things and you know that good things cost a lot” (daughter-in-law 6, Sahku), 
although family members likely also genuinely believed in the beneficial 
nutritional properties of apples and pomegranates, particularly the latter which 
was believed to help build blood for the baby (FGD). One mother-in-law also 
lamented how she had wasted money on buying pomegranates and apples for 
her daughter-in-law only to have them turn stale when the daughter-in-law did 
not enjoy eating them. 
 
“When apples and pomegranates were about to turn stale in her room then she 
used to give them back to me ... I asked her … why she not had eaten them and 
lambasted her for not eating. Then she told me that she did not [actually] like 
those fruits” (mother-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
9.2.1.2 Budgeting with the cash transfer 
FCs also reported making detailed recommendations concerning the use of the 
cash transfer in the domain of budgeting. These recommendations were not 
planned in advance by the lead LBW-SAT team, but were installed by the FCs at 
their own initiative, as they feared beneficiary women and their families might 
“mismanage” the cash transfer by e.g. spending all of it in one go on an 
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expensive meal. To prevent such occurrences, FCs recommended stretching the 
cash transfer over a whole month by spending approximately NPR 25 [USD 0.24] 
a day on either spinach, green vegetables or milk. Women’s group facilitators 
even used a calendar to clarify for participants how the cash transfer could best 
be stretched out over a full month. 
 
“For example, we gave them NPR 750 and if they spent that money to eat 1 kg 
meat in one day, then it would not work. Instead we told them that daily, NPR 
25 should be invested in the kind of food that was unavailable at home … They 
have been focusing more on green spinach, vegetables and milk because it also 
fit our criteria. NPR 25 per day is enough for them to buy food that is nutritious 
and easily available … We told them to calculate their daily expenditure and 
ensure that NPR 25 per day was spent … We also had a picture of cash and used 
a calendar … we showed them from when to when, what amount should be spent 
… Our rule was that the money was to be spent over one month” (FGD) 
 
Although the rule of spending NPR 25 a day helped provide structure to 
women’s expenditure, it was a rather inflexible framework in practice. Poorer 
families complained that they could not justify spending the entire cash transfer 
on only milk, when they could not afford staple foods, while wealthier families 
wanted to make bulk purchases of the more expensive fruits. In response to such 
requests, FCs again modified their recommendations by their own initiative. For 
poorer participants, they recommended spending half of the money on milk and 
the other half on staple foods. For wealthier participants, they recommended 
planning ahead so that expenditures averaged out to NPR 25 a day.  
 
"[The poorer participants] ask us if they drink half a litre of milk every day, all the 
money will be spent on that and then what else can they do [for food]? We tell 
them to buy milk from half of the money and spend half, that is, NPR 12.5 [USD 
0.12], for sometimes pulses, [sometimes] spinach” (FGD) 
 
“If [richer participants] spend 25 rupees per day, then they can’t buy apples and 
pomegranates. So we tell them to … consider how long it would last. For 
example, if they buy 1 kilogram for NPR 100 [USD 0.98] then they will eat for four 
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days, which makes NPR 25 [USD 0.24] rupees. That is how they should eat the 
fruits” (FGD) 
 
9.2.1.3 Daughters-in-law should control the cash transfers 
FCs observed early on during the trial that daughters-in-law often handed over 
their cash transfers directly to the mother-in-law as soon as they received them 
“the first time we gave them the money, they gave it to the mother-in-law 
immediately” (FGD). The FCs were concerned that this would diminish the 
impact of the LBW-SAT programme, as the cash transfer might be divided too 
thinly between household members, or the cash transfer might not be spent on 
the daughter-in-law at all. Consequently, the FCs decided to announce a new 
“rule and regulation” that daughters-in-law had to keep the cash transfers with 
themselves and instructed all the women’s groups participants that the cash 
transfer was for the personal use of the daughter-in-law. 
 
“In my second women’s groups meeting, my question to [the daughters-in-law] 
was that they had taken the money and so how did that money benefit them ... 
We asked them what the benefit was and what they did with [the cash transfer]. 
They said that the money should be in their hands … Afterwards our rules and 
regulations were made … The money [now] goes directly into the hands of the 
pregnant women so that they do not have rely on the hope that others would 
provide them with food … This is what we tell them, that the money is given to 
them for their personal use. That’s how we distribute the money” (FGD) 
 
9.2.2 High levels of NGO legitimacy promote uptake of messages 
MIRA held a perceived expertise in matters of maternal and child health. Many 
daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law remarked how MIRA provided a chance to 
learn from members of society who were perceived to be more educated and 
more knowledgeable than themselves.  
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 “If a frog is inside the well then it thinks the world is so small, but when it comes 
out, it realizes that the world is enormous … Like that, we can also learn if we 
come out of our homes and you teach us … [but] I suppose, I am still inside the 
well” (mother-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
Many daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law particularly valued the social nature 
of the learning process, as it provided an opportunity for many secluded 
daughters-in-law to simultaneously socialize and learn from other women. 
 
“Daughters-in-law do not know much. Only when knowledgeable women share 
their knowledge with us [in the women’s groups] do we become more aware … 
When we go [to the women’s groups] then we meet other women out in the fresh 
air and we feel free … it is obvious that you’d feel better and … you can talk to all 
sorts of people” (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
 
Daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law in the study area also did not distinguish 
sharply between MIRA as a non-governmental organization and the Nepal 
government, partly because local residents were used to seeing only 
government actors distributing large amounts of food or cash for free. Indeed, 
one mother-in-law saw the LBW-SAT cash transfer as just another government 
scheme similar to the universal Old Age Pension Scheme (mother-in-law 8, 
Sahku). The association with the Nepal government likely lent the LBW-SAT 
intervention an air of authority. For example, one daughter-in-law explained 
that if the government had provided money for the purpose of purchasing food 
then households should not contravene the purpose of the cash transfer by 
purchasing non-food items. 
 
"If [the LBW-SAT cash transfer] was provided to buy food then one should buy 
food with that money. One should not spend it on other things. [Sometimes,] 
people cannot eat, because they do not have enough money, but if money is 
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given by the government, then every woman should spend it on food" (daughter-
in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
Another mother-in-law concluded that the LBW-SAT programme must have 
been designed by competent designers, because the government was behind it. 
This created greater trust in the ability of the LBW-SAT programme to effect 
positive improvements in pregnant women’s conditions. 
 
"If there were no advantages to running the programme then how would such a 
programme get off the ground? ... Is the government a fool? The government 
has run this programme and I am sure the government must have thought it 
would improve the conditions of pregnant women" (mother-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
Finally, the provision of cash transfers strengthened the acceptability of the 
programme. Many families remarked on finding encouragement and support in 
the cash transfer in our interviews. For example, one mother-in-law who had 
lived through a kidnapping of her younger son and the loss of fortune to the 
2015 Nepal earthquake explained that the cash transfer provided “hope” for 
poor people. 
 
“Tell me, are those NPR 700 [USD 6.8] enough to cover these things [marriages, 
loans and other large expenditures]? But it provides hope for us. The Old Age 
Pension is NPR 500 [USD 4.9] monthly, nothing can be achieved with that 
amount, but also it provides hope for people" (mother-in-law 8, Sahku) 
 
Indeed, FCs felt an important reason why communities did not simply reject the 
health messages of LBW-SAT was the provision of cash transfers. During a 
previous women’s group trial in Dhanusha and Mahottari, women’s group 
facilitators also exhorted households to ensure the availability of adequate food 
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and nutrition for pregnant women in the household36. As these facilitators were 
unable to provide households with money to spend on the things that they 
recommended, some community members felt they were being asked to spend 
money on things that they could not afford. 
 
"When we gave awareness and nothing else [in the previous women’s groups 
trial in the same area] they used to say that they did not have any money or 
anything, so from where would they find money to buy food to eat … The 
distribution of cash protected us against such criticisms" (FGD) 
 
9.2.3 NGO behaviour promotes uptake of messages 
9.2.3.1 Direct action in group meetings and during home visits 
MIRA staff took direct action to promote uptake of its health messages. For 
example, one FC provided a message to her community on her own initiative 
that if they wasted her time by ignoring her advice regarding how to spend the 
cash transfers and gave birth to low birth weight children, then she would stop 
coming and then the community would not receive any further cash transfers. 
 
“We told them that there wouldn’t be any further cash transfers, if we did not 
come and sit with them, and we had chosen to spend so much time there so that 
their children could grow up healthy and sound. If the children didn’t grow up 
healthy, then it was of no use to us to come and spend so much time. The women 
who were not pregnant, like the mothers-in-law, they were telling the pregnant 
women that if they were not willing to come to the women’s group, there would 
be too few people in the group and [the FCs and the facilitators] would not be 
coming any longer and the money would not be given, and they would be 
banished from that money. That was why, they should spend the money [as 
instructed]” (FGD) 
 
                                                          
36 The previous trial focused on improving detection, treatment and management of neonatal sepsis using 
participatory women’s groups. The results of the trial are currently pending write-up and publication. Note, the 
clusters used for the evaluation of the LBW-SAT trial were specifically chosen to be non-overlapping with the 
clusters used in this previous trial in order to remove confounding effects from this previous trial. 
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A second FC promised women the translation of the LBW-SAT intervention into 
permanent policy if only beneficiaries demonstrated the potential for the 
intervention to prevent low birth weight to the relevant authorities. In fact, no 
such agreement existed with the Nepal government or any other implementing 
organization. 
 
“We also told them that if they spent this money properly and gave birth to 
healthy children, then in the future this would be a system for all pregnant 
women. For example, they are getting iron capsules for free now, later all 
pregnant women in the whole district would get NPR 750 [USD 7.3]. That is also 
how we encouraged them (laughs). We told them that we were trialling four 
different manners [of preventing low birth weight] and the most successful 
manner … it would be implemented in that manner” (FGD) 
 
In other cases, FCs deviated from their assigned role as open-minded group 
facilitators into a more “interrogater-like” role. Each women’s group meeting 
ended with a review of how members had spent their cash transfer in the 
previous month. One FC described how she asked group members “cross-
questions” in such meetings because she wanted to be sure they had not spent 
their cash transfer on clothes or jewellery. Another FC lamented how 
participants only ended up spending the cash transfer on food after she “again 
and again told them to spend the money on food to eat” (FGD). A third FC 
reported how she had admonished a women’s group member and told her she 
had not done what she was “supposed” to do, when the member explained that 
she had spent her cash transfer on medicine instead of on food (FGD). 
 
Similarly, some FCs saw the use of home visits by nutrition mobilisers and FCHVs 
in LBW-SAT as an opportunity cross-check beneficiaries’ usage of the cash 
transfers. Although these home visitors were only supposed to counsel families 
in polite and open-ended ways on use of the cash transfer, some FCs preferred 
them to have a much more interventionist role. Sometimes, FCs would even 
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personally visit households to “catch out” beneficiaries who did not spend the 
cash transfer as instructed. 
 
This clearly made an impression on household respondents. For example, one 
daughter-in-law narrated how a well-known community member would 
repeatedly grill her in her capacity as a home visitor on her spending behaviour. 
In order to indicate the level of detail at which she felt questioned, the daughter-
in-law used the colloquial term "She knows how much salt, I put in pulse while 
cooking" (daughter-in-law 3, Jamal). The same monitor would ask her to 
physically show her the fruit she had purchased as if trying to catch her out, an 
experience that the daughter-in-law did not appreciate. 
 
"No, I had not spent the money on anything else [than food], [the home visitor] 
used to come to my household, but she found nothing ... I showed her the fruit 
that I was eating" (daughter-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
Furthermore, FCs enforced their policy of daughters-in-law retaining control 
over their cash transfers by trying to catch out families where this did not 
happen. Specifically, FCs decided on their own initiative to train women’s group 
facilitators to perform three functions: 
  
1) Facilitators would ask women’s group members during group meetings if the 
mothers-in-law let their daughters-in-law keep their cash transfers. 
2) Facilitators would double-check with daughters-in-law during if they were 
observed to hand it over to their mothers-in-law after receiving it. 
3) Facilitators would use home visits as an opportunity for raise questions about 
whether family members had taken daughters-in-law’s cash transfers away 
from them. 
 
Finally, an inadvertent source of pressure may have arisen from the surveillance 
and evaluation team. Near the end of the trial, mobile survey teams were rolled 
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out across the study area to measure and weigh newborns in order to obtain 
information on the primary outcome of the trial, newborn birthweight. FCs did 
not see these survey teams as serving a purely evaluative function. Instead, FCs 
reported how they felt surveillance team members ought to motivate women 
to follow their nutritional advice by holding up examples of low and proper 
birthweight to the communities “[The women] should be motivated with 
examples. Especially by the surveillance team members who come here and do 
their surveys” (FGD). Thus, one elder sister-in-law reported being told by the 
group facilitators that the nutrition clinics were installed with the explicit 
purpose of monitoring households’ spending behaviour. 
 
"The [women’s group facilitators] told the daughters-in-law that … they had 
given money to pregnant ladies to eat things during their pregnancy, and if they 
would not eat their fruits then later it could be checked, because … their baby 
might become low birth weight. After the delivery of the baby, the weight of the 
baby would be checked by [MIRA staff] … [Indeed,] after delivery they had come 
to check my grandson. At that time my sister-in-law’s delivery had not happened 
yet, so her child was not checked, but my grandson was weighed at that time" 
(elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
9.2.3.2 Engendering community pressures 
Communities also contributed to pressuring households into complying with the 
messages provided by MIRA. First, the LBW-SAT intervention itself created social 
pressures to enact behaviours that promoted the interests of the women’s 
groups. For example, one FC recounted a case where group members went en 
masse to the home of a beneficiary whose husband was rumoured to have spent 
the cash transfer on alcohol for himself. The women’s group members 
threatened the husband with termination of the cash transfer and exclusion of 
his wife from the women’s groups meetings, unless he promptly stopped 
misusing her cash transfer. Events such as this might have helped maintain an 
impression in the community that households were at risk of losing the cash 
transfer if it was not spent in accordance with its recommended usage.  
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“[This husband] was a little notorious. [The family members] took the cash 
transfer forcibly and spent it on drinks. The people from the women’s group 
[came to the household and] asked them about why the money was wasted in 
that way. They told [the husband] that if he misused the money like that, his wife 
would not come to the meeting and she would not be given money at all and 
would be sent home by the head office” (FGD) 
 
At the same time, community members outside of the women’s groups were 
likely also involved in enforcing the messages provided by MIRA. Households in 
our sample were widely aware of the purpose of the cash transfer and all types 
of respondents from both poorer and wealthier backgrounds emphasized that 
“frivolous” violations were unacceptable "They give money for one purpose only 
[to buy food]. If I bought a sari with that money that would not be good" 
(daughter-in-law 1, Kote). When one daughter-in-law was asked if she wasn’t 
free to spend the cash transfer however she liked, she immediately answered 
“No, someone might have a problem with this” (daughter-in-law 1, Kote). An FC 
also expressed the idea that “we give them the money to buy food, thus they feel 
that they have to buy food with it” (FGD). 
 
Thus, elder sister-in-law explicitly noted how community members would 
accuse pregnant women’s guardians of taking cash transfers away from them, if 
children were found to be low birth weight. 
 
“People used to complain if a child was born low birth weight. Although we had 
given our daughter-in-law lots of food, if she did not keep well or if her baby was 
not healthy, then people might say that we had not spent the cash transfers on 
our daughter-in-law, but instead taken her money” (elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
Chapter 9 
Exploring financial agency over LBW-SAT cash transfers in the household 
 
288 | P a g e  
 
A mother-in-law also stated that if her daughter-in-law was still living in a joint 
family with her and she took her cash transfer from her, then the people might 
start gossiping about her in the village. 
 
“If she lived with me and I had been taking her money then people might starting 
talking about the fact that her mother-in-law had taken all her money” (mother-
in-law 5, Sahku) 
 
Furthermore, FCs remarked that women would feel awkward and embarrassed 
if it was revealed that they had spent the cash transfer “in violation” of its stated 
purpose “They would feel awkward [and] embarrassed [in the community] that 
the money they had been given to spend on food to eat had been spent on 
something else" (FGD). One FC mentioned off-tape that she believed women 
feared both personal and social feelings of guilt and shame accompanying giving 
birth to a low birth weight baby, citing the Nepali proverb “It is not the tiger of 
the forest that eats you alive, but the tiger of your own mind”/ban ko baghle 
nakhaeko, man ko baghle khaeko.  
 
9.2.3.3 Displaying bureaucratic power 
In order to ensure timely delivery of cash transfers to eligible women, MIRA 
needed to operate an effective bureaucracy, the implementation of which 
occasionally necessitated demonstrations of power. In one case, conflicts 
between wealthier and poorer households erupted after wealthier households 
refused to send their daughters-in-law to the women’s groups for fear of 
damaging their family honour. Wealthier households demanded door-to-door 
delivery of the cash transfers, but poorer households felt powerless to make 
such demands of MIRA because they needed the cash urgently to feed their 
families. In order to treat households equitably, MIRA policy was revised so only 
women who were physically unable to come to the women’s groups meetings 
were eligible to have home visitors deliver cash to their doorstep. This created 
clashes with local power brokers who continued to demand that MIRA deliver 
cash transfers to their doorstep. The FCs insisted on following the rules and 
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regulations of MIRA policy throughout, which made even a local party secretary 
realise that he could not affect the implementation of this policy, despite his 
influence in the community. 
 
“The mothers-in-law previously really did not want their daughters-in-law to go, 
they only wanted them to register [for cash] without going [to meetings] … [The 
family members] said that they did not want to send their daughters-in-law to 
the women’s group. [Instead,] they should be given money at home … There was 
one party secretary/sachiv in ward number seven … When we said no, we won’t 
give [you the cash transfer at home], he was angry, but later he asked his 
daughter-in-law to come and take the money, which he did not do before 
(laughing)” (FGD) 
 
In another case, a few pregnant women registered for both cash and food 
transfers by commuting between VDCs in the study area. In total, only a small 
handful of such cases were ever detected, but FCs had to systematically seek out 
and cancel the registration cards for “double registrants” (see Appendix K, 
Section K.3.3) in order to ensure a fair distribution of transfers and preserve the 
integrity of the trial itself. When one daughter-in-law’s registration card was 
electronically cancelled, her mother-in-law was so incensed that she called on 
local party representatives to force MIRA to continue paying her daughter-in-
law. However, local MIRA staff took the party representatives to the Janakpur 
head office to show them electronic proof that the daughter-in-law was indeed 
a double registrant. 
 
"Her mother-in-law spread [her complaint] all over the village and made a big 
debate out of it … A ward meeting was held after that and we clarified the 
situation. She had even called the local party representatives, but she had not 
told anyone that her daughter-in-law was getting food from another place, she 
had told everyone that she only got cash. And the party representatives were 
angry because they thought we had made one rule, but followed another … The 
same day when the ward gathering happened and the party representatives 
came, I clearly explained everything to them. After that they asked me if I was 
telling them the truth and I told them that I would show them the proof in the 
Chapter 9 
Exploring financial agency over LBW-SAT cash transfers in the household 
 
290 | P a g e  
 
[Janakpur] office. I came to the office and I showed them the list and when I did 
that, then they understood that I was right and that she should not get the 
money" (FGD) 
 
As MIRA staff were forced to assume a more authoritative role to discourage 
women from registering twice, this might inadvertently have affected their 
relations with women’s group members, as facilitators demonstrated a capacity 
for bureaucratic power that ordinary women’s group members did not have. 
 
"Later we became very strict … we told them that if anyone … got into any of this 
then we would cancel their card and we would not give it back … If you wanted 
to complain, you could go to the [Janakpur] office … After that everyone was very 
careful (laughs)” (FGD) 
 
While such demonstrations of power were not conscious strategies on the part 
of MIRA to promote uptake of their health messages, they might have indirectly 
contributed to such uptake. This is because MIRA staff phrased its messages in 
terms of rules and regulations and these demonstrations of power made it clear 
to community members that they took their own policies very seriously when 
they enforced them. 
 
9.2.4 Small perceived size of the cash transfer 
Families widely perceived the cash transfer to have a negligible size in the larger 
scheme of things. Mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law living in households in 
the middle- to upper wealth range reported being able to make do without the 
cash transfer "I am happy whether I get this money or not" (daughter-in-law 6, 
G VDC). One poor daughter-in-law tried to politely ignore the interviewer’s 
question three times, when she asked the daughter-in-law about her feelings 
concerning the size of the cash transfer, before stating tersely that it was 
sufficient to buy fruits for a month (daughter-in-law 8, D VDC). Several 
daughters-in-law from both poorer and wealthier households also stated that 
they were actually used to handling cash the size of the transfer anyway. 
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"I used to keep rupees 500 or 1,000 all the time along with me ... My mother and 
father used to give me such amounts of money" (daughter-in-law 3, D VDC). 
 
Indeed, daughters-in-law across the wealth spectrum from the extremely poor 
to the relatively wealthy stated that the cash transfer was "nothing" (6, D VDC), 
they would "eat nothing" if its size was halved (4, D VDC) and "nothing could be 
bought" with that cash transfer (1, SI VDC). Similarly, elder sisters-in-law and 
mothers-in-law even wondered why the interviewer was asking them about 
their opinion on the size of the cash transfer “Why are you asking these things? 
You know that we should pay at least NPR 750 [a month] just to buy milk” (elder 
sister-in-law 3, G VDC). The small perceived size of the cash transfer even posed 
a challenge for women’s group facilitators, as they needed to repeatedly explain 
to participants what good the cash transfer could do, given its small size. 
 
"Those who have money, they say that NPR 750 [USD 7.3] is nothing and more 
should be added to it. But we told them that NPR 750 is not a big amount, except 
if you know how to utilize it … there is no limit to the need of money ... everyone 
has thousands and thousands of rupees, but they do not spend it on food. They 
spend it on building big houses if they have small ones or on buying fields … [But] 
even they themselves could not afford to donate NPR 750 to someone just like 
that. No. What those NPR 750 rupees can and cannot buy for one single person, 
they should be taught about that" (FGD) 
 
Consequently, families in the mid- to upper wealth range often felt they had 
little incentive to try to take the cash transfer away from the daughter-in-law or 
spend it on anything other than what was recommended. 
 
“No I do not spend her money on anything else, that amount is nothing for us … 
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9.2.5 Uptake of messages by households 
9.2.5.1 Household members motivated to invest in daughter-in-law’s nutrition 
Daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law widely reported learning that intake of the 
foods that were recommended them would provide the necessary “energy” to 
prevent disease during pregnancy and prevent “weakness” of the body. This was 
in turn reported to be important for child growth and development, as it 
prevented low birth weight and other adverse birth outcomes. 
 
"They taught us to eat those things which promote the growth of the baby and 
[prevent] low birth weight. They taught us to eat the [recommended] things so 
that the baby would get a sharp memory" (daughter-in-law 3, Kote)  
"If people do not follow [MIRA’s] advice, then the child cannot grow well even 
when her pregnancy reaches term. I have seen such occurrences. I have also seen 
stillbirths” (elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
Assessments of the risk of malnutrition likely played a role in decisions over the 
cash transfer. Multiple daughter-in-laws remarked that spending the money on 
food was the only rational course of action to take anyway, when asked how 
decisions were made concerning the cash transfer in their family. 
 
“Look! I used to spend money only on those things which increased the strength 
of my body. We were not given a big sum of money that could be spent on 
something other than food … [so] it was not useful for us to spend the cash 
transfers on anything else than food” (daughter-in-law 1, Jamal) 
 
Several daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law from both poorer and wealthier 
households also remarked that they would have to find alternative ways of 
covering the dietary needs of the pregnant women if they did not spend the cash 
transfer on food. 
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“I would have been become weak if I had not eaten the food they told me to eat 
in the women’s groups meetings … If I had spent the cash transfer on other things 
than what they recommended then from where would I get more money to eat 
food during my pregnancy?” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
Thus, daughters-in-law living in the middle to upper wealth range also received 
strong encouragement to eat, rest and spend the cash transfer on their own 
health by their own family members. 
 
"Everybody was telling me to eat food that provided energy so that after delivery 
I would not be weak" (daughter-in-law 1, Jamal)  
"[My husband] told me to tell him about every problem of mine. He was looking 
after me ... He was telling me … not do housework and also told me to take care 
what I ate” (daughter-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
9.2.5.2 Respect for daughters-in-law’s “property rights” 
At the household level, elder sisters-in-law, mothers-in-law and daughters-in-
law widely emphasized that the daughter-in-law had a personal right to the cash 
transfer. 
 
"Only she has her own right to spend it … I do not have any problem with this" 
(mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 “I did not [take her cash transfer], because I did not lust after her money” 
(mother-in-law 4, Kote) 
“I have full rights to that cash transfer, whatever I want to eat, I can eat, whether 
I want to save, I can save, I can do whatever I want” (daughter-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Mothers-in-law very frequently explained that it was important to allow the 
daughter-in-law to keep the cash transfer with herself, because diverting the 
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cash transfer to other expenditures would cause her daughter-in-law nutritional 
difficulties.  
 
“Mother-in-law: Why would I take her money as she was given the cash transfer 
to buy food for herself? 
Interviewer: You might have taken it to fulfil your household needs?  
Mother-in-law: It could be used to fulfil household needs, but it might give her 
trouble so I do not need to take her money” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law particularly insisted that the cash transfer 
had to be kept in the possession of the daughter-in-law as part of its purpose. 
Handing over the cash transfer to other family members was thus seen as similar 
in type to spending it on non-food items – both actions meant a violation of the 
purpose of the cash transfer. 
 
"Since [the cash transfer] was given to me then how could I give it to other 
people? I was given cash transfers to buy food to eat myself, I could not give it 
to others" (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku)  
“Interviewer: Why doesn’t [your daughter-in-law] give her cash transfers to 
anyone else in the family? 
Mother-in-law: As the cash transfers were given to her to spend on herself, then 
how could she give it to other people?” (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
9.2.5.3 Perceived pressure over use of cash transfers 
Given the many pressures applied to households in programme to comply with 
MIRA’s recommendations, it is perhaps natural that the daughters-in-law in our 
sample became often extremely reluctant to admit to “violating” MIRA 
guidelines. This involved either admitting to spend their cash transfer on non-
food uses or a revealing other family members’ role in seizing their cash transfer. 
For example, one daughter-in-law asked for reassurance after she had provided 
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a full list of details on how she had spent her cash transfer that her tape 
recording was truly confidential. 
 
“Daughter-in-law: Sister, can everybody listen to this recording later on? 
Interviewer: No, not at all. This recording is being taken by me. It will remain 
with me only. I will not let anybody else hear it. Even those sisters who are 
coming in this village would not be able to listen this. 
Daughter-in-law: Then who would listen to it? 
Interviewer: I would keep this recording myself. 
Daughter-in-law: What would you do with it? 
Interviewer: [detailed explanation of the purpose of the study]” (daughter-in-law 
3, Kote) 
 
Only after being reassured for a second time that the recording was truly 
confidential did she volunteer information on sharing her cash transfer with 
other family members. 
 
Several other daughters-in-law would deny being able to make their own 
decisions on the use of the cash transfer. These would state instead that MIRA 
staff decided for them what the money should be spent on. 
 
“Interviewer: Who used to take decisions regarding use of the cash transfer in 
the household? 
Daughter-in-law: The FCHV sister [women’s group facilitator] used to take 
decisions about this. 
Interviewer: Okay. But when you received the cash transfers then who used to 
take decisions regarding the use of that money?  
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Daughter-in-law: That decision was done by that Sir37 who had asked me 
whether we spend that money on food for ourselves or whether we give it to our 
family members” (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
 
When asked if they had saved the cash transfer or spent the cash transfer on 
non-food items, some daughters-in-law would try to avoid answering the 
question entirely or incredulously ask us how this was possible, when they had 
not been told to spend their cash transfer in this way. 
 
“Interviewer: Now tell me sister, were you free to spend the cash transfer on 
whatever you liked to spend it on? 
Daughter-in-law: No, how could I spend it on whatever I liked to spend it on? 
Interviewer: Why not? 
Daughter-in-law: Since it was given to me to spend exclusively on food then how 
could I spend it on other things?” (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku) 
 
And although some daughters-in-law mentioned spending the cash transfer on 
jewellery or other accessories if it was doubled in size, some daughters-in-law 
(and one mother-in-law) still replied that they would only spend it as instructed 
regardless of its size. 
 
“Interviewer: If the money was twice as much, what would it get spent on? 
Daughter-in-law: The money would get spent on those things that I would be told 
to spend them on. 
Interviewer: Who would tell you how to spend it? 
                                                          
37 “that Sir” could refer to a post-distribution monitoring team hired by Save the Children to perform home visits 
every month in 5% of household receiving material incentives. It could also refer to one of the topmost members 
of the intervention team, who occasionally visited households and asked residents about their use of the 
transfers. It could even refer to a member of the surveillance team, who also asked respondents how they had 
spent their cash transfers and who were sometimes mistaken for being part of the intervention team. 
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Daughter-in-law: For example, when these cash transfers were given to us then 
we were told to not spend money on anything else than food. Like that, if we got 
given double the amount of money then we would definitely spend the money 
on what they told us to spend it on” (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
Many mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law voiced the same readiness to 
follow the instructions of MIRA. One elder sister-in-law even seemed confused 
when prompted with the suggestion that there even existed women who did 
not spend their cash transfer on food “If they have not spent the cash transfer 
on that, then what did they spend their cash on?” (elder sister-in-law 3, Jamal)”. 
Several mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law also explained that their 
daughters-in-law had not saved any of the cash transfer as they had not been 
“told” to do so by MIRA. 
 
“[My daughter-in-law] has not saved any of the cash transfer, because she was 
not told to do so? She was given the money to spend on fruits and vegetables. If 
she had been told to save, then she might save” (mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 
The suggestion of external pressure was reinforced by the observation of FCs 
that women’s group participants were often too afraid to disclose any instances 
of “non-recommended” spending during women’s groups meetings. 
 
"Interviewer: Have you ever met women anywhere who did not spend the money 
on food? …  
FCs: They do not tell us.  (Pause) Even if they did such things, nobody would share 
it with us … They never tell us themselves" (FGD) 
 
Ample evidence existed for a “soft” fear of embarrassment and accusations of 
moral negligence in case the cash transfer was not spent as recommended 
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(Section 9.2.3). However, the presence of “hard” fear of losing access to the cash 
transfers was less evident. Most daughters-in-law tended to describe women 
who did not spend the cash transfer in accordance with MIRA guidelines as 
privileged, naughty or deprived, but not as rule-breakers. 
 
"Some women might have spent the money on jewellery or bought clothes, but I 
have not done anything like this, because I did not have enough money even to 
eat food" (daughter-in-law 3, Jamal) 
“[The facilitators] had told us that some women had spent the money on clothes, 
gold and silver, but we were told not to spend it on anything like that. They had 
told us to spend it on food” (daughter-in-law 6, Kote) 
 
However, most daughters-in-law in our sample were never asked directly what 
they thought might happen to their access to cash if they were “caught” 
spending the cash transfer on non-food items. In the last phase of data collection 
(Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.4), we directly asked daughters-in-law about this. The 
daughters-in-law generally provided answers to the effect that they would be 
questioned or told off by the women’s group facilitators, but did not explicitly 
state that they would lose access to the cash transfers. 
 
“Interviewer: If you did not spend the cash transfer on food, then what would 
the Sisters from the women’s group say to you? 
Daughter-in-law: They might say to me that since we were told to do spend the 
money on food we had to spend the money on food only. We were not given 
money to buy anything except food, so we should only buy food with that money” 
(daughter-in-law 1, Jamal) 
“Interviewer: Sister, tell me, how would you or your family be affected, if you 
didn’t spend the cash transfer on food items? 
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Daughter-in-law: If I hadn’t spent that money on food, then [the women’s group 
facilitators] might have asked me questions about why I hadn’t bought food” 
(daughter-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
It was possible that daughters-in-law felt uncomfortable voicing a fear of losing 
access to the cash transfers in interviews. Alternatively, they might have felt a 
vague, unarticulated concern that “something bad” might happen as a result of 
non-compliance with MIRA’s guidelines without knowing exactly what. FCs 
thought beneficiaries feared their family would tell the group that they did not 
spend the money on food, or they might lose the cash transfer. 
 
“Interviewer: Okay now, what do the pregnant women think, in their own view, 
would happen if they spent the cash transfer on something else other than food? 
What would they think? 
FC: The office will catch them.  
FC: They will not be given the money in another meeting … 
FC: They think that they have been told to spend that money on food, and if they 
do not do that then they might be affected and the sisters might not pay them. 
FC: They think that they have been told to spend the money on food and if 
someone from their own family went to the women’s groups and told them 
anything, they would be unsure if they could get the money for the following 
month or not” (FGD) 
 
9.2.6 Daughters-in-law’s strategies for financial agency 
9.2.6.1 Strategy 1: Being the financial guardian 
Daughters-in-laws’ agency to decide on their daily activities depended radically 
on whether they lived in a nuclear household with their husband or in a joint 
household with their in-laws (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.3). Separated daughters-in-
law were under no obligation to provide financial support to their in-laws and 
this held for the use of the cash transfer as well. For example, one mother-in-
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law explicitly stated that she never asked her daughter-in-law to hand over her 
cash transfer, as she lived separately from her “She lives alone in her house [i.e. 
separately from me] and I do not ask her to give that money to me” (mother-in-
law 5, Sahku). 
 
Further, many husbands had migrated to the Middle East or Malaysia in search 
of employment. Although it was theoretically possible that husbands could send 
them instructions on the use of the cash transfer over the phone, none of the 
separated daughters-in-law reported consulting their migrant husbands on the 
use of the cash transfer. In fact, whether husbands had migrated abroad or not, 
almost all separated daughters-in-law reported no restriction on their use of the 
cash transfer and did not seem to worry about husbands taking their cash 
transfers “I make decisions myself regarding the cash transfers” (daughter-in-
law 10, Sahku).  
 
As these daughters-in-law were effectively the financial guardian of the house, 
they openly spent the cash transfer without any restriction from the side of their 
family members38. Thus, according to our notion of agency freedom, these 
daughers-in-law exerted agency by simply spending the cash transfer as they 
liked. 
 
9.2.6.2 Strategy 2: Honouring the financial guardian 
Due to the uptake of MIRA’s messages on the use of cash transfers by local 
households, daughters-in-law found themselves in quite a different context 
compared to Chapter 8 concerning their use of the MIRA cash transfer. Their 
                                                          
38 The one daughter-in-law who was an exception to this pattern seemed to use the strategy described in Section 
9.2.6.2 instead. She initially wanted to save the cash transfer, but let her husband make spending decisions on 
the cash transfer after he insisted on spending it on food for her pregnancy. After receiving fruits from his 
purchases, she offered him some of the purchased fruit, which he refused, and the mother-in-law even blamed 
her for not eating all the fruits that her husband bought for her. Yet these fruits were, in her own words, “food 
of my choice”, her husband’s behaviour showed his “care and love” towards her and she also got her husband 
to spend part of the cash transfers on face cream and an ear-ring for herself. In addition, the daughter-in-law 
did not feel strongly about the fact that her husband executed all the purchases at home, as she felt he knew 
better how to make cheap purchases. Thus the daughter-in-law might have obtained alternative desirable goals 
with her cash transfer, even if she was not able to save it as she initially wanted (5, Sahku). 
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household members felt external pressure from both MIRA and the community 
to ensure that the cash transfer on their nutritional needs. At the same time, 
daughters-in-law stood to lose significantly in the household if they insisted on 
forcing their husband or in-laws to accept their desires for how the cash transfer 
should be spent, since this might make them seem disrespectful or disobedient. 
 
Thus, the strategy of least resistance to exert agency over the cash transfers 
seemed to become for most daughters-in-law a strategy of “giving up power in 
order to obtain power”. In this strategy, daughters-in-law offered their financial 
guardian part of the cash transfer in the hopes that their guardian would refuse. 
If the guardian did refuse to take what was offered, the daughter-in-law had 
effectively demonstrated her obedience, deference and loyalty, while still 
managing to spend the cash transfer on what she wanted it to be spent on. If 
the guardian accepted what was offered, the daughter-in-law might get a 
second chance to influence how the cash transfer was spent at the time of 
purchasing. Although this strategy obviously did not provide guarantees, on the 
whole, it was often a better option than open confrontation. 
 
In one example, a daughter-in-law insisted that she was never forced by her 
mother-in-law to give up her cash transfer, but handed over her cash transfer as 
a show of deference and respect to an elder in her family. 
 
"Nobody forced me to give money to my mother-in-law, but I decided on my own 
to give her the cash transfer … She is my elder and I do show her respect. She is 
also managing everything at home [anyway]" (daughter-in-law 8, Sahku) 
 
This had the desired effect that the mother-in-law continued to feel that she 
was making the main decisions over the cash transfer "Interviewer: Who made 
the decisions regarding the use of the cash transfers? Mother-in-law: Me myself" 
(mother-in-law 8, Sahku). As a consequence, the mother-in-law did not pay close 
attention to how the cash transfer was actually spent and in fact asked the 
daughter-in-law regularly for her preferences so she could buy whatever the 
daughter-in-law told her to buy. 
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"Mother-in-law: I would ask her what she wanted to have when I went to the 
market. And then I would buy that for her … 
Interviewer: Did the money get spent only on food or on anything else?  
Mother-in-law: I never calculated that" (mother-in-law 8, Sahku). 
 
In another example, one daughter-in-law reported that she had offered her cash 
transfer and the foods purchased with it to her in-laws, but was refused. The 
daughter-in-law subsequently mixed the cash transfers in with her own secret 
money/koseliya and spent the cash transfer on apples, pomegranates and 
Horlicks for herself. In the interview, she took care to express all choices made 
with the cash transfer as being informed by MIRA and her in-laws. 
 
"Before it was fine not to eat pomegranates and apples, but after we got this 
money, that Sister started saying that we needed to eat these things. Then 
Mummy also told me that it was necessary to eat these things" (daughter-in-law 
1, Kote) 
 
However, the net result was that she got to consume expensive fruits and dairy, 
which she would not have had access to otherwise, and which she felt were 
important to her baby’s health. 
 
“When they were not giving us cash transfers, then I would eat whatever was 
available in our home such as rice, pulses and vegetables only … [but] during 
pregnancy [pomegranates and apples] are good for the baby” (daughter-in-law 
1, Kote) 
 
In households in the middle wealth range, this behaviour was just as prevalent. 
One mother-in-law mentioned how her daughter-in-law had first asked her 
opinion on how to spend the cash transfers and replied that she should spend 
the cash transfer only on food, but could decide herself what food to buy. This 
was likely what the daughter-in-law wanted to hear, as she emphasized in her 
respective interview how “good things” like pomegranates cost a lot, and if the 
cash transfer was twice as large, she would want to spend the cash transfer on 
“delicious food” (6, Sahku). 
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Moreover, while extremely poor families faced an entirely distinct set of moral 
consequences to their actions due to the presence of family members whose 
basic nutritional needs were not met (Section 9.2.6.2), daughters-in-law from 
such families also phrased their choice to hand over the cash transfer to the 
mother-in-law in terms of acknowledging and respecting the financial 
guardianship of the mother-in-law “She is the guardian of the household and I 
must give her money" (daughter-in-law 4, Kote). 
 
This strategy might not seem to involve large amounts of agency, as daughters-
in-law still needed to obtain permission from their financial guardian and were 
barred from spending their money on items that were conspicuously unrelated 
to food, like a new mobile phone (the cheapest models were within the price 
range of the total sum of the cash transfer). However, within the optics of the 
extremely limited agency that Maithili daughters-in-law anyway had in our 
context, the ability to choose what types of food to buy with the LBW-SAT cash 
transfer, to openly direct other family members to purchase things for them and 
to discreetly save part of the transfer towards non-food uses did constitute a 
modicum of agency. For example, the experience of increasing confidence 
narrated by one daughter-in-law from a wealthier family regarding the use of 
cash in the family shows us how much these daughters-in-law felt enabled by 
their participation in the LBW-SAT programme. 
 
“When we needed to buy something, I did not use to tell anyone previously. I felt 
different then. But now I say out loud whatever I want for myself, “This money, I 
will keep and save … this, I will spend in this way”. I used to feel afraid before, 
but now that does not happen” (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
Thus, we include this strategy as a form of agency exerted by daughters-in-law 
in our context. 
 
9.2.6.3 Strategy 3: Subverting the financial guardian 
Some daughters-in-law lived in households with significant risks of financial 
neglect and exploitation during pregnancy. MIRA staff had advised daughters-
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in-law to keep their cash transfer out of concern that family members would not 
take their interests into account otherwise. Thus, strategies that relied on simply 
trusting the financial guardian to make the best decision might carry a risk of 
being exploited by financial guardians in families where daughters-in-law had 
conflictual or difficult relationships with their financial guardians. Rather than 
risk an overt confrontation, a few such daughters-in-law reported deploying 
secret and inconspicuous forms of subversion.  
 
One daughter-in-law (4, Jamal) illustrated the tensions between trust and 
distrust, overt obedience and covert subversion well. Initially, she claimed she 
was well-supported in her family and was free to spend the cash transfer 
however she liked. When asked if she shared the foods purchased, she 
vigorously defended her decision to share with other family members, which 
she described as an almost religious duty towards grace and goodwill. 
 
“Whenever anything is bought … then everybody partakes in that … God has 
given us all a mouth to eat with and one family member could not possibly eat 
some kind of special food on their own ... Either we all eat or none of us eat … 
Even if it is a small portion then we all share it between us" (daughter-in-law 4, 
Jamal)  
 
However, during the interview, the respondent was repeatedly glancing in the 
direction of her elder sister-in-law; so much so in fact that our interviewer 
commented on her behaviour.  
 
“Interviewer: Why are you feeling shy? You have said everything so well and now 
you suddenly seem shy, why is that? You are looking at your sister-in-law, she is 
making you shy, no? Is she your sister-in-law? 
Daughter-in-law: No, I am not feeling shy in front of my sister in-law. 
Interviewer: But I think you are” (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
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At the same time, the daughter-in-law was providing multiple examples of 
“other” daughters-in-law whose mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law had 
taken the cash transfer away from them. 
 
“There is a woman … she was also getting cash transfers, but she had given birth 
to a very thin girl child … I don’t visit her in her household, so I can’t say too much 
about it, but she used to say that … her sister-in-law was not buying food for her 
… but her mother-in-law and sister-in-law were spending the cash on food for 
themselves” (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
 
Near the end of the interview, when her elder sister-in-law had finally left, she 
admitted to being treated unfairly by her family. As she was forbidden to go 
outside her house, she was effectively prevented from buying things herself and, 
like almost all daughters-in-law in our sample, depended on other household 
members to purchase foods for her. However, her elder sister-in-law refused to 
buy the fruits that she requested her to buy and had instead taken her cash 
transfers and given it to the mother-in-law who shared it between the two of 
them. 
 
“(In a very low voice) Sometimes I fought with my sister-in-law. She was not 
always behaving well … Although the money had been given to me to buy fruits, 
my sister-in-law did not buy them for me … It was not possible for me to eat what 
you told me to eat. As I can’t go outside the house on my own, how could I get 
to buy and eat food of my own choice?” (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
 
When asked why she did not insist on keeping the cash transfer, she explained 
that as long as she lived in the joint household, she needed to honour the 
financial guardianship of her elders. 
 
“How was it possible for me to say no? … [My elder sister-in-law] might scold me 
… When I will live separately from them [in the future] then I can make my own 
decisions, but at present how could I argue with other family members over 
food?" (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
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However, overt obedience did not preclude covert subversion. Like many 
daughters-in-law who found covert support from their husbands (Chapter 8, 
Section 8.2.4), she turned to her husband who agreed to purchase food secretly 
for her in order to avoid overt conflict in the family. 
 
"When my husband was buying food for me secretly, then I did not share the 
fruits with any of the other family members and I also did not let anyone else 
know ...  My husband bought fruits like pomegranate secretly for me" (daughter-
in-law 4, Jamal) 
 
The example showed that relatively low-ranking daughters-in-law in the Maithili 
family hierarchy often had to “choose their battles” or pick the “least bad 
option”, which often amounted to demonstrating maximal levels of deference 
and altruism in public, while simultaneously engaging in covert tactics to 
preserve own interests. 
 
However, the use of husbands was not the only creative way, in which 
daughters-in-law gained the freedom to spend the LBW-SAT cash transfer in 
accordance with their desires in a situation of constrained mobility. The easiest 
way was to make use of travelling vendors who regularly visited households and 
sold goods door-to-door (Chapter 7, Section 7.1.3). Indeed, one daughter-in-law 
reported purchasing from them when no family members were at home. 
 
“I did not make any purchases myself, but I gave the cash transfer to other people 
to make purchases for me … [but] sometimes when nobody was at home, then I 
used to call upon visitors myself when they came to sell things in village” 
(daughter-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Another tactic seemed to be to the use of antenatal clinic appointments as 
opportunities for purchases with the cash transfer. One daughter-in-law lived 
with family members who inflicted physical violence on her during her 
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pregnancy, because she refused to hand over her cash transfer to them (Section 
9.2.6.4). The daughter-in-law explained that in order to make sure that she could 
consume her food she made a point of purchasing with the cash transfer during 
visits to the ANC clinic. 
 
“Daughter-in-law: I spent the cash transfer on food, which I ate after going 
somewhere [outside my house]. When my family members fought with me at 
home, then I only ate, after I had gone somewhere. The baby was in my womb. 
Interviewer: Where did you go? 
Daughter-in-law: To the antenatal clinic. When I went for my check-up then I 
bought something to eat” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
FCs even provided the example of a daughter-in-law who admitted to inventing 
antenatal clinic visits to her family members in order to obtain the freedom to 
purchase the types of foods she wanted to purchase with the cash transfer in 
the anonymity of Janakpur city. 
 
"One daughter-in-law shared this with me and told me not to tell this anyone. 
She told me that when she wants to eat something she tells her household 
members that she has an appointment for a check-up with the doctor and she 
comes to Janakpur, buys food to eat of her choice, and goes back (Everyone 
laughs) She told me as a woman to woman thing" (FGD) 
 
One daughter-in-law regularly used her children to obtain secret loans without 
the knowledge of other family members, including her husband (Chapter 8, 
Section 8.2.5). It should therefore not be surprising that another daughter-in-
law reported making use of her children to make purchases with the LBW-SAT 
cash transfer without the knowledge of her family. This daughter-in-law would 
ask her children to purchase things from the local shop for her while specifically 
instructing them not to reveal this to other family members. 
 
"I used to give money to children and they used to buy things [from the shop] for 
me [with the cash transfer] … I taught them not to tell this to anyone else" 
(daughter-in-law 3, Kote) 
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Finally, both a daughter-in-law and the FCs reported a practice of secretly saving 
the cash transfer in the marital trunk, while telling the mother-in-law that all of 
it had been spent. This was ironically a situation, where the daughters-in-law 
could actually exploit their subordinate status as the mother-in-law was obliged 
to fulfil their needs as part of her guardian role. 
 
“I saved NPR 2,000 [USD 20] … When I received the cash transfers, I would eat 
milk, curd, meat and fish and I would spend it, when there was no money or the 
next one had not arrived yet. [Though] I still had money from the transfers, I told 
them that it was all gone, then they would bring [me food]” (daughter-in-law 1, 
Sahku) 
 
As these examples showed, the deployment of subversive strategies allowed 
daughters-in-law to direct the cash transfer towards uses that were in direct 
opposition to their family members. As an example of daughters-in-law acting 
in accordance with their own goals and values despite external obstacles to the 
contrary, this is thus a clear case of exerting agency. 
 
9.2.6.4 Strategy 4: Confronting the financial guardian 
Only one daughter-in-law in our sample offered overt resistance to family 
members when they asked her to hand over the cash transfer. Much like another 
daughter-in-law who was effectively ostracised by her husband’s family for 
openly opposing her in-laws (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.6), the choice of this 
daughter-in-law to engage in open confrontation with her in-laws resulted in 
severe violence. It also resulted in her eventual loss of access to the cash 
transfers. 
 
Her family members first suspected her of hiding the cash transfers when they 
“discovered” her newfound ability to purchase food. 
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"Before, I did not receive any cash transfers. But after I started getting them from 
the [women’s] groups I started eating [more]. [My family members] said to each 
other “Where did she get money from? Her husband must be giving her secret 
money" (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
At first, the daughter-in-law tried to share the purchased food with other family 
members, but felt disrespected and exploited. Family members complained that 
she was wasting her time in the women’s groups and she gained relatively little 
from consuming the cash transfer as she had to share with 11 other family 
members. 
 
“There were 11 members in the family whom I shared with … They didn’t let me 
spend my cash transfer on my own … They were not respecting me. When I was 
going [to the women’s groups] they were saying “Look, she is still sitting there. 
Others have come back with money, but she is still there”” (daughter-in-law 7, 
Kote).  
 
At a certain point, her mother-in-law and her elder sister-in-law asked her to 
hand over the cash transfer itself, but the daughter-in-law refused on the 
grounds that she had personally received the cash transfer. 
 
“She told me to give her [the cash transfer], because there was no money at 
home. I didn’t give [her the money]. This was for me to spend, then how could I 
give it [to others]?” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
"I had asked her to give me money in my hand, but she did not give me any ... 
She told me that she had received that money for herself only … so she would not 
give it to anyone else" (mother-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
The situation escalated into gross physical and verbal violence between the 
daughter-in-law, her elder sister-in-law and her mother-in-law. Her husband 
blamed her for causing discord in the family and joined in the beating. Finally, 
the daughter-in-law fled to her maternal home, while she was still eligible for 
three more rounds of the cash transfer. 
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“The money made us fight … When this boy was in the womb I was doing all the 
housework. They fought with me, hit me even though I was pregnant … They 
didn’t let me eat. What if something bad had happened, as I had a baby in my 
womb? I called my brother and I went [to my maternal home]” (daughter-in-law 
7, Kote) 
 
The daughter-in-law in question reported routinely handing over her earned 
income to her sister-in-law, the financial guardian of the household, while she 
was working in a previous job as a road maintenance manager. However, in the 
case of the LBW-SAT cash transfer, curiously she refused to hand over the cash 
transfer to her financial guardian stating that the cash transfer was “for her to 
spend”. Since women’s group facilitators strongly promoted daughters-in-law’s 
physical control over the LBW-SAT cash transfer in group meetings (Section 
9.2.3), this may have reinforced the daughter-in-law’s sense of personal rights 
to the cash transfer from the women’s groups. 
 
However, this insistence on her rights to personal property may have clashed 
with the relatively large weight attached by her family on the importance of 
relying on a financial guardian. For example, in one comment the mother-in-law 
stated that she would have been happy to make purchases of food on behalf of 
her daughter-in-law using the cash transfer. This was common practice in our 
study area, as mobility constraints meant the vast majority of daughters-in-law 
relied on their mothers-in-law or their husbands to purchase with the LBW-SAT 
cash transfer. However, this daughter-in-law did not provide her mother-in-law 
the opportunity to do this. 
 
“[Other] daughters-in-law handed over the cash transfers to their mother-in-law 
to make purchases of food for their daughter in-law, but my daughter-in-law had 
made every purchase herself" (mother-in-law 7, Kote)  
 
Thus, the daughter-in-law may have caused offense to her mother-in-law and 
elder sister-in-law, not just because she denied them resources, but also 
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because she showed disrespect for their status according to traditional notions 
of hierarchy in the Maithili family. Furthermore, the mother-in-law herself 
reported being ostracised by her family after her husband died and was 
struggling with obtaining enough food for herself to stay alive. The fact that her 
daughter-in-law was spending most of the cash transfer on expensive fruits and 
cosmetics was likely to have further aggravated her. 
 
“Things like pomegranates and apples were bought for her. I had seen this … 
[and] she had also spent the cash transfers on cosmetics for herself” (mother-in-
law 7, Kote) 
 
On reflecting on the whole episode, the daughter-in-law felt that receiving the 
cash transfer certainly did not make her feel more supported or more powerful 
in the family. She reflected that the lack of change in her family environments 
could have arisen from refusing to give her financial guardian the cash transfer. 
 
"Daughter-in-law: I didn’t feel any changes [in my family environment]. No 
power, nothing ...  
Interviewer: Why do you think nothing changed? 
Daughter-in-law: I did not give my guardian money. I kept it with myself. If I had 
given money to the household then maybe, it would have been different" 
(daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
 
The daughter-in-law was clearly able to exert a limited form of agency over her 
cash transfer by spending it on pomegranates, apples and cosmetics for herself 
despite the wishes of her family members. However, the agency so exerted was 
not sustainable, as the escalating violence and conflict prevented her from 
making use of further cash transfers without risking serious physical harm to her 
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baby. Thus, while we class confrontational tactics as a form of agency, it does 
not seem to be a sustainable form of agency in our context. 
 
9.2.7 The negative case: Lack of financial agency in extremely poor 
families 
As expressed by a Maithili proverb, “two things are limitless [in the world]: land 
and the stomach”/pet ke aa khet ke koi thekaan nai hai (mother-in-law 2, 
Sahku). In extremely poor families, MIRA’s nutritional messages did not have the 
same impact on household context as they did in the less poor households, since 
family members were under great pressure to repay outstanding debts and the 
household had difficulty ensuring food security for all family members. In 
grounded theory, this constitutes a “negative case”, an exception to the overall 
pattern that shows the limits of the developed theory [341]. In such households, 
daughters-in-law emphasized that their main priority with the cash transfer was 
to cover basic needs rather than to purchase luxury goods such as clothes and 
accessories. 
 
“Only rich people spend the money on ornaments and other things, but we are 
poor people, so we do not have enough money to buy anything other than food. 
We do not even have enough money to buy food either … Some women might 
have made some kind of jewellery with the given money, or they might have 
bought clothes, but I have not done anything like that, because I did not have 
enough money to even buy food for myself” (daughter-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
Such daughters-in-law needed to carefully prioritise their own needs versus 
their children’s needs, their family members’ needs or even their fellow 
neighbours’ needs. The most urgent priority was often one’s children’s needs. 
In both poorer and wealthier families, it seemed to go without saying that 
daughters-in-law postponed their own fulfilment in order to feed their children 
and the use of the cash transfer was no exception.  
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"Since I had small children, I used to share a little of the food with my them ... 
How could I eat on my own and leave my children hungry?" (daughter-in-law 2, 
Kote) 
"Interviewer: Who ate the food bought with the money? 
Mother-in-law: Only [my daughter-in-law] and her child. A child does not 
understand things. So the food was given to it too" (mother-in-law 4, Sahku) 
 
Thus, concerns for the welfare of the whole family often trumped the need to 
respect individual property rights. Mothers-in-law complained that they already 
spent a lot of money on meals for their daughters-in-law sometimes indirectly 
indicated that they felt entitled to part of the cash transfer by virtue of their 
poverty. For example, one elder sister-in-law replied that she would spend her 
younger sister-in-law’s cash transfer on repaying loans as a matter of course, 
when asked what she would do if it was twice as large. 
 
 “[If the cash transfer was double] I would spend it on salt, oil and spices. Also 
presently, I have to borrow from others to meet our household expenses, but if I 
had my own money then I would not have to take out loans” (elder sister-in-law 
3, Kote) 
 
The same family members likely also discouraged daughters-in-law from 
thinking of themselves as entitled to spend the cash transfer exclusively on 
themselves. Many poorer daughters-in-law expressed statements to the effect 
that they felt embarrassed and awkward about asking for food. 
 
"I have never asked any of my family members [about better food for myself] … 
because she [my sister-in-law] might think that I was asking for [particularly] 
good food and that I was not a good daughter in-law. After giving it a lot of 
thought, I decided not to say anything about my wish to eat [better] food during 
my pregnancy" (daughter-in-law 3, Kote) 
 
Thus, when it came to sharing with family members, extremely poor daughters-
in-law often stated that they shared out of a sense of duty, solidarity, charity 
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and necessity. Maintaining the health of the family as a whole was important, 
as it ensured the survival of their most important sources of social support. 
 
"I had to give the cash transfer to my mother-in-law. Since we had nothing at 
home to eat, then it was my duty to give money to buy rice, salt, oil and other 
things for the kitchen ...  I had given her [the cash transfer] so that she could buy 
food for all of us in the family and I too had eaten what she bought" (daughter-
in-law 4, Kote) 
 
Furthermore, as extremely poor daughters-in-law often lived and ate together 
with other extremely poor community members, they experienced greater 
pressures than wealthier daughters-in-law to share with neighbours and 
relatives beyond the household. Daughters-in-law’s descriptions of these acts of 
sharing in these circumstances tended to reflect a sense of hospitality, empathy 
and responsibility. 
 
“When I was eating, [our relatives] used to be watching us and at that time, it 
was not good to eat on our own ... I used to cut a fruit into small pieces and share 
it with all my relatives who were present … Sister, suppose this is my house and 
over there is theirs, then all of us eat in the same place … if I was eating a variety 
of foods and their children were looking at me then what else could be done? At 
that time it was essential to give them something” (daughter-in-law 5, Kote). 
 
Such pressures were entirely absent in families in the mid- to upper wealth 
range. Tellingly, daughters-in-law in these families tended to come to other 
family members’ financial aid through the provision of small, interest-free loans 
with the cash transfer rather than direct gifting of cash. 
 
"I gave the cash transfer to mother-in-law once ... when she went Janakpur... I 
gave only NPR 400 [USD 3.9]... She wanted to take children to see a local fair … 
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[And] she gave me that money back later ... after five or six days" (daughter-in-
law 1, Sahku) 
 
Thus, it is difficult to say that daughters-in-law in extremely poor families were 
able to exert meaningful forms of agency over their cash transfer. Although they 
sometimes phrased their decision to spend the cash transfer on the welfare of 
the whole family as a form of choice, the fact some of these later admitted to 
engaging in acts of subversion (e.g. daughter-in-law 4 from Jamal in Section 
9.2.6.3) suggested that their stated preferences did not match their actual 
priorities. While such daughters-in-law could be said to engage in a minimal 
form of agency by choosing to share their cash transfer with others rather than 
endure backlash in the form of physical abuse (Section 9.2.6.4) or watch their 
family members starve, it seems more accurate to describe them as lacking any 
meaningful forms of agency over their cash transfer. 
 
9.3 Discussion 
9.3.1 Substantive findings 
Through a grounded theory study of financial agency over the cash transfers, 
multiple complex findings emerged that had not previous been reported in the 
literature on cash transfers. First, we found that conflicts between female 
household members over the control over the cash transfer were a far more 
prominent issue than competition between spouses. Second, our study showed 
the difficulty of neatly relegating issues of power to the household domain, 
while ignoring relationships of power between households and distributing 
organizations. 
 
9.3.1.1 Female-female conflicts over cash in the household 
Although FCs mentioned receiving second-hand reports on conflicts between 
husbands and wives from their group members (Section 9.2.3.2), these 
emphasized that such conflicts were rare. All conflicts over the cash transfer 
reported by daughters-in-law, elder sisters-in-law and mothers-in-law took 
place between female household members, while husbands and wives were 
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aligned in their interests on the use of the cash transfer. This contrasted with 
previous qualitative studies of the gender impacts of cash transfer programmes 
[17,345,390] which have focused on the spousal relationship. The emphasis on 
spousal relationships in previous studies may be understandable given the fact 
that the majority of previous evaluations of cash transfer programmes have 
taken place in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa [308]. In these contexts, 
extended family members may hold less power over the nuclear couple than in 
South Asia [81]. Yet even a qualitative evaluation of the impacts of a national 
cash transfer programme in Turkey did not report on the role of extended family 
members [391] despite similarly powerful roles played by mothers-in-law in 
many areas of Turkey [81,392]. 
 
The original impetus for designating women as beneficiaries of cash transfer 
programmes came from a belief that women were more likely to spend cash 
transfers on their children rather than men [393]. Thus, programme 
implementers and designers may not have felt a similar urgency in preventing 
the co-optation of cash transfers by other female family members, as these 
might have been thought to spend the cash transfer on the welfare of the family 
anyway by virtue of their “femaleness”. However, the evidence for an impact of 
recipient gender on budget allocations is mixed, with some randomized 
controlled trials finding almost no impact of varying recipient gender on 
consumption [34,386,387]. This allows for the possibility that beneficiary 
husbands might have been just as interested as their wives in promoting family 
welfare and might even have let their wives administer the received cash 
transfers to achieve this aim. 
 
Indeed, studies in several contexts have documented widespread local 
perceptions among both women and men that women are more likely manage 
money skilfully and prevent its expenditure on temptation goods compared to 
men [390,391,394]. Adato and Roopnaraine [390] also reported that husbands 
were happy to endorse women’s control over cash transfers provided in Mexico 
and Nicaragua to ensure the cash transfers were spent “responsibly”. A recent 
World Bank review also concluded that there was little evidence on a global 
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scale for cash transfers being spent on the temptation goods such as tobacco 
and alcohol [395]. 
 
In our study, we found a more prominent role played by the mother-in-law and 
the elder sister-in-law in influencing daughters-in-law’s agency over the cash 
transfers. In particular, we found that daughters-in-law in middle- to upper-
income households frequently offered their financial guardian the cash transfer, 
but were either refused or were able to closely direct their guardian’s use of the 
cash transfer subsequent to an acceptance. With our conception of agency 
(Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3), it is quite possible for both the daughter-in-law and 
the financial guardian to exert agency simultaneously in such a situation, as 
indirect freedom forms part of our notion of agency (Section 3.2.5).  
 
Even if mothers-in-law were not directly involved in determining how the cash 
transfers are spent, they would still be exerting agency as long as the use of 
these transfers aligned with their own values and goals. For example, if both the 
mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law primarily wanted the cash transfer to be 
spent on furthering the health of the unborn child, then both women’s agency 
would be enhanced by such usage of the cash transfer, irrespective of who first 
asked permission from whom. Similarly, if the mother-in-law primarily cared 
about ensuring that her own status in the family was fully respected, then her 
agency would not depend on what the cash transfer was actually spent on, only 
that her daughter-in-law had obtained proper permissions first. 
 
In extremely poor households, we found a different behaviour pattern, as 
women forewent expenditures on expensive fruits for themselves in favour of 
letting their financial guardian spend their cash transfer on staple foods for the 
whole family. In Satter’s [396] “hierarchy of food needs”, household members 
possess different types of motivation for procuring and eating food depending 
on their socioeconomic position ranging from searching for “enough food” or 
“acceptable food” to “good-tasting” or “novel” foods. Only at the top of the 
hierarchy would individuals be able to primarily concern themselves with the 
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“instrumental” uses of food such as a healthy pregnancy and birth. Although 
daughters-in-law across wealth classes indicated a strong awareness of the role 
of nutrition in promoting a healthy pregnancy, our results concerning the 
consumption behaviour of poorer and wealthier daughters-in-law indicated that 
wealthier daughters-in-law were perhaps more ready to view food in the ways 
promoted by LBW-SAT. In extremely poor households, it was difficult to view 
the daughters-in-law as exerting any meaningful form of agency over the cash 
transfer. 
 
Finally, our study showed some of the risks associated with insisting on women’s 
physical control over cash transfers. In our study, the one respondent who 
insisted on physically keeping hold of the cash transfer suffered repeated 
physical violence and ended up foregoing three more cash transfers when she 
fled to her maternal home in her last trimester. Previous qualitative studies of 
women’s use of cash transfers have also reported cases where household 
members used physical violence to extract cash transfers from beneficiary 
women [345,390]. Future researchers should make possible domestic violence 
a central research priority for any studies aiming to distribute resource transfers 
in Nepal or comparable contexts. 
 
9.3.1.2 The influence of MIRA in shaping the household context 
One of the more striking findings from this study was the fact that women’s 
agency over their cash transfer was heavily circumscribed by NGO and 
community pressures generated by MIRA’s health promotion activities. Previous 
literature on cash transfers has generally distinguished between 1) the issue of 
women’s control over cash transfers, which reflected the unequal distribution 
of power among genders in the household from 2) the design of incentive 
structures, which was a technical issue about the relative effectiveness with 
which conditional and unconditional cash transfers achieved their stated policy 
objectives. Unlike the impact of gendered power dynamics on the use of cash 
transfers, the incentive dimension has rarely been framed as an issue of power.  
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However, our study showed the difficulty of neatly relegating issues of power to 
the household domain, while ignoring relationships of power between 
households and distributing organizations. Some of the beneficiaries in our 
study open stated that nobody was in control of the cash transfer, as the 
decision about what expenditures were to be made had already been taken for 
them by MIRA. Daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law 
indicated feeling externally pressured by MIRA on their use of the cash transfer, 
as they felt widely reported obligated to spend the cash transfer according to its 
purpose of purchasing food for the pregnant daughter-in-law. In turn they 
became extremely reluctant in interviews to admit to spending the cash transfer 
on perceived non-recommended uses. 
 
The results from our study thus blurred the boundary between conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers. These blurred boundaries were intruiging. 
Economic theorists have previously discussed the presence of a “labelling” or 
“flypaper” effect [397-399] in public policy programs where the mere labelling 
of a financial transfer with an intended purpose discourages beneficiaries from 
spending the transfer on non-intended purposes, even in the absence of formal 
constraints. This effect is sometimes explained as an example of mental 
accounting where money acquired through different means are labelled with 
different purposes in order to ease the cognitive load required in keeping track 
of one’s income and expenditures [387,400]. For example, researchers have 
often noted how money found by chance on the street is more likely to be spent 
on recreational goods than an equivalent sum earned through a pay-check 
[400]. 
 
Benhassine et al. [387] conducted a randomized controlled trial comparing the 
impact of cash transfers made to households labelled with the intended purpose 
of supporting child education with cash transfers that were unlabelled, but 
conditional on children’s school attendance in Morocco. The researchers found 
that the labelled transfers performed just as well as conditional cash transfers 
in enhancing school participation. The researchers also found that parents had 
a poor understanding of the conditionalities attached to the programme, as 
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there were no apparent differences in beliefs about the conditionality of the 
cash transfer programme between the two groups. At the end of the first year 
of the programme, 48-49% of parents in both the conditional and unconditional 
arm of the programme stated that they thought the cash transfers were 
conditional on their children’s school attendance. These results suggested that 
households sometimes imputed constraints on the use of the cash transfer that 
did not exist, similarly to our results on the perceived external pressure on 
household to spend the received cash transfer in accordance with the wishes of 
MIRA. 
 
However, at the end of the second year of the programme reported by 
Benhassine et al. [387], only 10-13% of parents in both the conditional and 
unconditional arm of the programme thought the cash transfers depended on 
children’s school attendance. Such low levels of belief in the lack of 
conditionality of the cash transfer indicated that “hard” external pressure was 
unlikely to explain all intervention impacts. Instead, the researchers concluded 
that households may have interpreted the launch of the cash transfer 
programme by the Moroccan government as a positive signal about the value of 
education, as survey evidence pointed to improved beliefs about the positive 
returns to children’s education. Other researchers have similarly framed the 
non-monetary impact of cash transfer programmes on household behaviour as 
forms of “social marketing” [401] or “advertising” [307]. 
 
In our study, the exact type and amount of food purchased by beneficiaries and 
the schedule of food consumption that was followed may have been strongly 
shaped by the messages provided by the women’s group facilitators. According 
to the FCs, women’s group facilitators provided detailed guidelines to women’s 
group participants on the types of foods that ought to be consumed with the 
cash transfer and the best budgetary practices to achieve these dietary goals. In 
addition, women’s group facilitators would question women at the end of every 
women’s group meeting to check how they had spent their cash transfer and 
even conduct home visits in conjunction with staff hired by Save the Children to 
ask household members about how they spent their cash transfers. We could 
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view these concerted attempts to shape community, family and individual 
beliefs and attitudes concerning the cash transfers as forms of social marketing, 
advertising or behaviour change promotion.  
 
However, in our context, some FCs in our study seemed to go beyond merely 
advising and motivating women to enact behaviour change by actively imposing 
explicit collective conditionalities over the cash transfers. One FC told her group 
members that the cash transfer programme would be disbanded if not enough 
women attended the women’s groups, while another stated that it would be 
universally instantiated in Dhanusha and Mahottari if women followed the 
recommendations of women’s group facilitators and gave birth to babies of 
healthy weight (Section 9.2.3.1).  
 
Indeed, Gaarder [402] raised the issue of whether programme implementers in 
unconditional transfer programmes understood the implication of 
unconditionality or agreed with it and communicated it in spirit on the ground; 
the examples provided by the FCs in our focus group discussion suggested that 
this was not always the case. Qualitative studies of cash transfer programmes in 
Peru [394], Indonesia [403] and Nicaragua [390] have similarly found submissive 
relationships between recipient women and local programme officers and noted 
how programme officers sometimes “empowered themselves” to collect 
receipts from beneficiaries warning them that if they spent their transfers on 
luxury goods the government would stop the transfers. 
 
What are the implications of these findings for our concept of agency? In our 
original definition of agency, we only included immediate interpersonal barriers 
to agency (Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3). After validating and adapting our tool for 
measuring agency to the local context, we refined the concept to only include 
women’s immediate household members in the range of interpersonal contacts 
(Chapter 4). However, the results of this Chapter showed that these household 
members were in turn strongly influenced by the community context and their 
relationship with MIRA. Beneficiary women themselves might have been 
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directly constrained by MIRA, e.g. if they feared blame from the women’s group 
facilitators or FCs in case they were caught spending the cash on non-food items.   
 
One might be tempted to extend our notion of agency again to include barriers 
that lie within interpersonal relationships outside the household. However, the 
social dynamics that govern household relations are likely going to be quite 
different from the social dynamics that govern relationships with MIRA staff. 
Thus, an agency construct that subsumes both types of relations into one might 
not behave in a particularly stable manner across contexts. Although such a 
construct could be used as a normatively valued outcome in the manner of 
“overall agency freedom” in Chapter 5, a more productive approach might be to 
introduce an additional notion of agency, “agency in NGO relations”, that allow 
would allow us to talk about the interaction between “agency in household 
relations” and “agency in NGO relations”. For example, for the many daughters-
in-law who found a ready excuse for greater fruit consumption in the ordinances 
of MIRA, their agency freedom in household relations arguably increased all the 
while their agency in NGO relations decreased. This is because external barriers 
in their household environment decreased, all the while the same barriers in 
their NGO environment increased.  
 
9.3.2 Limitations 
Several important limitations must be borne in mind in interpreting our results 
on cash transfers. As explained in this study, MIRA staff frequently disseminated 
messages to the effect that beneficiary women were entitled to control their 
own cash transfers. The promotion such messages might have affected women’s 
ability to report on instances where they lost control over their cash transfer or 
where they spent the cash transfer on non-recommended items. Women might 
have tried to protect themselves from embarrassment or loss of standing with 
MIRA when they emphatically said that they had spent the cash transfer on 
pomegranates and apples or when they incredulously rejected any notion of 
spending the cash transfer on non-food items. For example, one poor daughter-
in-law tried to tell the interviewer that she managed to spend the cash transfer 
on both apples, pomegranates and staple foods, only to be contradicted by a 
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passing family member who claimed she gave birth to her child without eating 
fruits (daughter-in-law 4, Kote). 
 
Such bias is impossible to eliminate entirely. Ethnographic research of 
household dynamics as a resident in a local village [83] or in a Maithili household 
as an informal family member [22] could have partially resolved these problems. 
Family members would have found it more difficult to conceal their actual use 
of the cash transfer and they might have had less of a desire to do so anyway, 
as they learned to trust the motives and goals of the researcher. Participant 
observation might also have help uncover subtle, social dynamics concerning 
the use of the cash transfer which respondents might have found difficult to 
verbalise in linguistic form. However, such a strategy was not possible due to 
visa restrictions and conflict in the study area (Appendix L, Section L.4). 
 
Yet, it is also important to consider that while it was difficult to eliminate bias, 
women participating in the MIRA programme might have become more likely to 
reveal their genuine beliefs and opinions due the support they received from 
MIRA. In addition to the cash transfer, women received education on maternal 
and child health, opportunities for participating in social gatherings and support 
for collective action on issues relating to their own wellbeing. Rather than 
incentivising women to avoid reporting “non-compliant” usages of their cash 
transfer, such experiences may have engendered trust among women in MIRA 
as an organisation. 
 
We tried to mitigate against bias by ensuring privacy for the daughter-in-law 
through pair-wise simultaneous interviewing and by triangulating responses 
between daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law. We also 
tried to establish friendly, trusting atmospheres during interviews. The honesty 
and forthrightness with which some daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law 
complained about the small size of the cash transfer was striking. Some 
daughters-in-law openly volunteered that most or part of the cash transfer had 
been spent on make-up and some mothers-in-law equally openly lamented that 
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they “failed” as guardians for their daughters-in-law, because they had spent 
the cash transfer on general household goods instead of their daughters-in-law. 
Combined with the lucidity with which respondents shared more general details 
of their lives, this suggested that respondents were not always strongly inhibited 
by social desirability pressures. 
 
Finally, similarly to our study in Chapter 8, we did not incorporate male 
perspectives into our analysis of women’s control over LBW-SAT cash transfers. 
This might have limited our ability to study spousal dynamics from the husband’s 
perspective. In particular, it might have contributed to our understanding of why 
spousal disagreement over the use of the cash transfer was so rarely reported 
by our respondents. Second, our study focused exclusively on Hindu women 
from the Plains of Nepal and as such policy-makers should assess the 
transferability of our findings to their context if they seek to apply our results to 
other contexts. Third, our study focused only on women from the cash arm of 
the trial, so we should be careful about extrapolating our results to the impact 
of women’s groups in the absence of cash or the impact of women’s groups 
combined with food. Finally, our study did not systematically ask women about 
their experiences with domestic violence in connection with the cash transfer 
and so we cannot make any assertions about the prevalence of such incidents in 
our study area.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
Our study found that daughters-in-law exerted agency over the LBW-SAT cash 
transfer through a range of strategies including: 1) openly choosing what to 
spend the cash transfer on in separated families 2) offering the cash transfer to 
the financial guardian in the hopes of being refused 3) inconspicuously arranging 
for secret purchases through the husband or one’s children and 4) engaging in 
open confrontation with family members over the cash transfer 5) “choosing” 
to spend the cash transfer on staple foods to feed the rest of the family. The 
majority of daughters-in-law middle- to upper-income families opted for the 
first strategy where mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law either refused to 
accept the cash transfer or accepted the cash transfer and asked for suggestions 
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from the daughter-in-law as to what to buy with it anyway. Analysis of the 
relationship between households and MIRA revealed that these choices were 
made in a context where households felt under under considerable pressure 
from MIRA and their own communities to spend the cash transfer in accordance 
with recommendations. The presence of such external pressures question the 
usefulness of relegating issues of power to the household domain, while 
ignoring the considerable inequalities in power that exist outside the household. 
  




















10.1 Summary of main results 
This thesis set out to answer four main questions: 
1) To what extent can we design valid tools for measuring agency in the 
context of LBW-SAT?  
2) What is the impact of participatory women’s groups on women’s agency?  
3) What forms of agency do young, married women have over cash in their 
households in general?  
4) What forms of agency do pregnant women have over the cash transfers 
provided in LBW-SAT? 
 
The first question was analysed in Chapter 4, where we adapted and validated a 
survey tool for measuring women’s agency freedom in the local, rural Nepali 
context. Our Exploratory Factor Analysis showed a clear distinction between 
internal and external motivation regardless whether we considered agency in 
work outside the home, domestic work, health-seeking behaviour or group 
participation. Qualitative analysis of think-aloud interviewers indicated good 
overlap between respondents’ perceptions of the meaning of survey items and 
their intended meanings, although adaptations were required due to problems 
of ambiguity and redundancy when translating abstract English concepts into 
local languages. After adaptation, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis on a second 
sample of responses showed a good fit to a two-factor model. 
 
We also performed an analysis of convergent validity by comparing the scores 
of respondents across sociodemographic indicators. While scores on external 
motivation were widely consistent with accepted notions of the female life cycle 
in Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and North India, we also found that internal 
motivation was positively correlated with external motivation. This positive 
correlation pointed towards the possibility that women could be led to feel more 
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internally motivated to perform an activity through external pressure. This 
highlighted the need for qualitative work to investigate the possible meanings 
behind women’s survey answers. 
 
The second question was analysed in Chapter 5. Using our validated, adapted 
measure of agency freedom, we evaluated the impact of participatory women’s 
groups either alone or combined with food or cash transfers on pregnant 
women’s agency. We found strong evidence that women’s groups combined 
with food or cash transfers had an effect on agency (p<0.01), as well as weaker 
evidence that women’s groups alone had an impact (p<0.10). In all three cases, 
the impacts were limited to the domain of group participation alone. At the 
same time, no evidence was found for concrete changes in women’s domestic 
workload, their health-seeking patterns or their ability to make decisions on 
cash, food or their own pregnancy. 
 
 
This indicates that LBW-SAT did not have a broader multidimensional impact on 
women’s position in the family, nor did the intervention have an impact on 
agency in health behaviours alone. A major reason why such impacts failed to 
materialise may be due to a failure to sufficiently mobilise the community 
around gender and health issues. Process evaluation suggested that the final 
women’s group strategies were weak in terms of collective mobilisation and 
involved limited ownership of both women’s group members and the wider 
community. At the same time, local gender norms made it exceedingly difficult 
for young daughters-in-law to take an active role in community organising and 
public speaking. Given the central place of collective mobilisation in the theory 
of change for LBW-SAT, this likely blocked downstream change in women’s 
agency. However, the increases in women’s agency in group participation did 
indicate small, non-trivial changes to women’s lives. Such increases likely 
reflected a greater ability of women to engage with people outside of the 
household in ways that were normally forbidden by their own family members. 
This was backed up by qualitative evidence suggesting that many daughters-in-
law appreciated the intrinsic benefits of participating in women’s groups, 
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including the opportunity to gain knowledge from other women and group 
facilitators. 
 
The third question was analysed in Chapter 8.  Our grounded theory analysis 
revealed that most households operated a financial management system where 
individual family members were allowed to have small amounts of personal 
income, while the majority of household income was sent to a central person, 
the financial guardian. This person was usually a mother-in-law in the family. For 
a few daughters-in-law, this system worked well enough that they could gain 
financial agency by simply capitalising on their relationship to their mother-in-
law. For most others, strategies for gaining financial agency revolved around 
managing their relationship with their husband, particularly encouraging him to 
provide secret savings out of his own income. In a few cases, daughters-in-law 
could rely on neither their husband nor their mother-in-law and resorted to 
soliciting the support of their natal family. These daughters-in-law usually 
experienced the greatest financial hardship in our sample. A key determinant of 
whom a daughter-in-law decided to ally herself with was the incentive structure 
of the family. In particular, husbands and wives often faced shared incentives to 
enact a household separation from the wider family, since they would no longer 
have to send their income to the financial guardian after such a move. In families 
where husbands had passed away or refused to share their income with any 
family member, such an alliance was not possible. 
 
The fourth question was analysed in Chapter 9. Concerning the agency of 
daughters-in-law the household, we found strong parallels to our analysis in 
Chapter 8. Just like daughters-in-law reported engaging in secret strategies to 
accumulate their own private savings in Chapter 8, daughters-in-law also 
reported engaging in secret strategies to obtain control over their cash transfers 
in Chapter 9. Just like daughters-in-law were extremely careful to maintain an 
outward appearance of obedience and loyalty to their in-laws in the general 
case, so they were equally careful to ensure their in-laws felt respected in 
decisions on the best use of the cash transfer. Indeed, the only example of a 
daughter-in-law choosing open confrontation over the cash transfer ended in 
physical violence from her family members that forced her to give up control 
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over her cash transfer. However, while all daughters-in-law in Chapter 8 were 
deemed able to exert at least a minimum amount of agency, in Chapter 9, we 
found that daughters-in-law living in the poorest families were so constrained in 
their use of the LBW-SAT cash transfer that it was difficult to speak of them as 
exerting any kind of meaningful agency. 
 
Nonetheless, the majority of households in our sample reported a conspicuous 
absence of both overt and covert conflict over the use of the cash transfer. One 
prominent reason for this might have been the fact that household members 
faced strong social and moral pressures from MIRA and their communities to 
spend the cash transfer as recommended. These resulted from a number of 
activities that MIRA staff engaged in to promote behaviour change including 
meticulous monitoring and repeated questioning of beneficiary households.  
 
10.2 Neglected issues of empowerment 
10.2.1 Status relationships 
From the early beginnings of analytic political philosophy, philosophers have 
commented on the close relationship between the notion of “status” and 
notions of power and freedom. Berlin [177] commented in 1958, “the lack of 
freedom about which men or groups complain amounts, as often as not, to the 
lack of proper recognition … What I may seek to avoid is simply being ignored, 
patronized or despised”. Berlin went on to argue that status should be 
considered a distinct entity from freedom, because freedom was essentially 
about non-interference, whereas status involved a demand for “interference” 
from others in the form of active recognition of one’s value.  
 
However, many other philosophers disagreed with the position that status was 
distinct from freedom. Morriss [404] argued that constraints on individual action 
only mattered for their freedom insofar as these insulted or humiliated them. 
Morriss argued that individual freedom was impeded even when constraints 
were placed on them had no effective impact on their opportunities in life. For 
example, Irish people living under British colonial rule in the 19th century would 
in principle experience reduced freedom if they were barred from speaking Irish 
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by their government, even if they did not personally know how to speak the 
language. Pettit [175,176] even equated freedom with status, when he argued 
that freedom constituted a lack of institutional domination and humiliation. 
Pettit ascribed a central role for the concept of “legitimacy” and argued that 
legitimate interference in an individual’s life, such as democratically elected 
rules and policies, did not affect their freedom, while illegitimate institutions 
were freedom-reducing, even if they did not effectively interfere with people’s 
lives. 
 
For example, a Black slave living in 18th century America who happened to have 
a well-meaning master who abstained from using physical punishment and 
attended to his needs would still be unfree given his master’s institutionally 
protected right to whip and kill him if he so pleased. In particular, Pettit argued 
that it made little sense to say that a slave living under a well-meaning master 
had more freedom than a slave living under a punishing master. If the slave 
happened to run away and enter a colony of escaped slaves living under a rule-
governed democracy of their own making, the effective ability of this slave to do 
as he pleased might reduce as a result of the rules enacted by the local 
government. Again, it would not make sense to claim that the slave’s freedom 
had reduced due to leaving his master.  
 
Legitimacy-based considerations might have been desirable to include at several 
points in our thesis. First, given the widespread acceptability of the LBW-SAT 
intervention among respondents in our cash transfer study (Chapter 9), we 
could have argued that local residents considered the pressures on their usage 
of the cash transfer imposed by MIRA staff a legitimate function of their role as 
implementers of the LBW-SAT intervention. Even though locals desired greater 
flexibility in the usage of cash transfers, this was not necessarily freedom-
reducing, in the same way citizens may desire to pay less tax, but do not 
necessarily feel their freedoms are diminished by having to pay tax. Indeed, 
Skovdal et al. [405] conducted a qualitative study of a conditional child grant 
scheme in Zimbabwe where they noted that both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries strongly endorsed the existing conditionalities in the programme 
as ensuring good parenting and guardianship values were respected by the 
programme. Thus, a legitimacy-based notion of empowerment might find 
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greater compatibility between the paradigms of behaviour change promotion 
and empowerment than an agency-based notion. 
 
An emphasis on status relationships would also have enabled us to take a 
stronger normative stance on instances where daughters-in-law have to exert 
agency by appealing to the authority of other family members. For example, in 
Chapter 9, we noted that daughters-in-law often offered up their cash transfers 
to their financial guardian even though they had been told, the transfer was 
given to them specifically for their own personal use. When the guardian refused 
to take the cash transfer and gave their daughter-in-law permission to spend it 
however they wanted to, this created a situation where both parties potentially 
exerted agency at the same time (Section 9.3.1.1). However, from a status 
perspective, there is a sense of humiliation and domination in the idea that 
daughters-in-law need to ritually offer up money to their mother-in-law that 
they they have personally been given by MIRA before they can access it. 
Furthermore, while the mother-in-law has an institutionally protected right to 
take the cash transfer from the daughter-in-law any time she would like by 
virtue of local community norms, the daughter-in-law must rely on acts of 
manipulation, persuasion and ingratiation to achieve her aims. Thus, from a 
status perspective, the mother-in-law was more empowered than the daughter-
in-law concerning the use of the cash transfer. 
 
In general, status-based notion of empowerment enables critiques of accounts 
of women’s empowerment where women are claimed to nominate their 
husbands as the main decision-makers purely for show, while secretly operating 
“backstage” as the main decision-makers in the family [10].  For example, 
Silberschmidt’s [406] analysis of spousal relations led her to conclude that men 
could be “the weaker sex” in Western Kenyan families. Men were routinely 
characterized by women as “breadwinners”, “heads” of households and 
“owners” of women who could be bought and sold “just like cattle”. However, 
she felt these characterizations were in large part ritual displays of deference 
serving to furnish women with socially desirable identities in their community, 
because “Without a man, a woman has no status. Even an alcoholic husband is 
better than none” (p.251) [406]. In practice, Silberschmidt [406] stated that 
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women manipulated their husbands from behind and made their own decisions 
independently of their husbands’ opinions, but from a status-based perspective, 
women who are regularly compared to cattle and whose entire social status 
depend on being married to a man can hardly be seen as free from institutional 
domination and humiliation. 
 
Given the complexity of analysing institutional structures of recognition, 
domination or suppression, a systematic treatment of empowerment as 
legitimacy was beyond the scope of this thesis. Future research on women’s 
empowerment should consider methods for measuring and evaluating this 
notion of empowerment either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
 
10.2.2 “Freirean” notions of empowerment 
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3, we have primarily focused on a notion 
of empowerment rooted in Amartya Sen’s conception of agency to the exclusion 
of perspectives on empowerment that would align better with Paulo Freire’s 
philosophy of critical consciousness. As discussed in Chapter 5, a focus on 
community empowerment would have been more appropriate for explaining 
how LBW-SAT achieved its impacts on low birth weight. For a variety of reasons 
(Appendix A), we focused on individual empowerment as a final outcome in 
itself within this thesis based on its normative value as an intrinsic good to be 
promoted by international development agencies and activists world-wide 
(Section 3.1, Chapter 3). However, it is worth considering how researchers in the 
future might conceptualise and measure “Freirean” notions of empowerment. 
 
First, note that a “Freirean” notion of empowerment can operate at both 
societal, community and individual levels. The society and community levels 
were discussed in Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3. The individual level is needed, 
because interpreters of Freire have often described his philosophy as involving 
both individual and collective components (e.g. [117]) without acknowledging 
that individual and collective empowerment are not necessarily compatible or 
even related notions (Section 3.2.1, Chapter 3). Thus, a separate concept of 
empowerment is needed that aligns with Freire’s vision, but focuses on the 
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individual39. This notion of empowerment could see it as the process whereby 
individuals become aware of the social forces that underlie their own oppression 
(“critical awareness”) and take collective action to remedy them (“critical 
action”) [407,408]. For example, several researchers have devised individual-
level scales, where the combined expansion of critical awareness and critical 
action results in greater scores on “critical consciousness” [407,408]. 
 
However, any individual or collective measure of Freirean empowerment would 
operate with very different philosophical assumptions about empowerment 
compared to our thesis. Freire [50] heavily emphasised individual 
“understanding” of societal injustices and oppression. Thus, scales for 
measuring of critical consciousness have operated with a notion of one “correct” 
set of values arising from some transcendental, universal standards [407,408]. 
For example, Diemer et al.’s [407] critical consciousness scale explicitly scores 
individuals based on their endorsement of statements that racial and gender 
inequality exists and is unjust and that egalitarian values are appropriate. This 
fits badly with our Pragmatist conception of agency, where individuals need to 
decide on their own values and goals through a process of unpressured 
reflection and dialogue. 
 
Furthermore, a measure of Freirean empowerment would tend to value direct 
over indirect freedom. This is implicit in the Freirean notion that power cannot 
be bestowed upon a subordinate party by the dominant party, but must be 
claimed by the subordinate party directly. For example, Zacharakis-Jutz [409] 
wrote about Freirean education: 
 
                                                          
39 Feminists have also emphatically criticised communitarian notions of empowerment for naively assuming that 
individual empowerment and community empowerment mutually reinforce each other, when communities are 
often riven with conflict and power inequality (Section 3.2.6, Chapter 3). Furthermore, some of the examples of 
“community empowerment” provided by early interpreters of Freire seemed to transform communities much 
less than expand individual people’s horizons. For example, Wallerstein and Bernstein [238] illustrated their “3-
stage methodology” for empowerment using a case study from an alcohol abuse prevention programme where 
middle and high school minority students volunteered to meet residents at the local jail over the course of four 
meetings to learn about the consequences of alcohol abuse. The programme outcomes were purely individual 
(attitudes towards substance abuse, self-reported behaviour task, risk perception, ability to control their own 
lives) and the action that students were encouraged to take as part of the consciousness-raising process mostly 
aimed at improving own life circumstances (coping with loneliness and low self-esteem, handling offers of beer 
from one’s family members). 
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“A more scintillating and accurate definition of empowerment is the taking of 
power. With this slight twist of words, the empowered are no longer passive, 
but active. Empowerment is not a charitable process where power is given or 
bestowed upon powerless people. Instead, it is revolutionary, always 
antagonistic, and many times violent, since one group is taking the power that 
it was previously denied.” (p.45) 
 
The contrasts with our notion of agency which allows for indirect freedom. For 
instance, Sen’s example of choosing a medical treatment for an unconscious 
friend in a manner consistent with that person’s values and goals (Section 3.3.4) 
would presumably not fit into a Freirean conception of empowerment. Similarly, 
community participation theorists have often cite Arnstein’s [410] Ladder of 
Participation that equates greater power with greater citizen involvement in 
programme planning and design. A clear antagonistic relationship between 
“oppressors” and “the oppressed” is evident from Zacharakis-Jutz’ definition of 
empowerment, all the while, empowerment is primarily assumed to involve co-
operative relations between oppressed peoples themselves. This again differs 
from our approach to empowerment which is neutral concerning the 
relationship between different actors. 
 
Third, a Freirean measure of empowerment could in principle target either a 
backward- or forward-looking viewpoint on freedom. Giroux [117] saw 
empowerment in forward-looking terms, when he quoted Simon [411] for 
saying that literacy needed to operate as part of a “pedagogy of empowerment 
… centered within a social project aimed at the enhancement of human 
possibility” (p.372). On the other hand, health promotion researchers have 
often described the experience of being involved in enacting change as the core 
of empowerment, regardless of whether such involvement actually leads to 
concrete health outcomes. For example, Laverack and Labonte [158] described 
community empowerment as a “parallel track” to achieving programme 
outcomes where empowerment was assessed, not on the basis of realising 
health outcomes, but on the extent to which local people were involved in the 
process of achieving such outcomes. 
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Fourth, a such a measure of empowerment would need to heed Freire’s 
repeated calls to see consciousness-raising in collective, rather than individual 
terms [116]. Thus, for example, the items measuring critical action in Diemer et 
al.’s [407] scale focus entirely on participation in political action such as joining 
a party or a social movement rather than overcoming power inequalities in 
respondents’ own personal relationships. 
 
Diemer et al.’s scale [407] was not appropriate for evaluating the impact of 
participatory women’s groups, because it was developed almost entirely for use 
with urban African American youth and focused mostly on perceptions of socio-
economic inequality rather than gender inequality. At the collective level, the 
many measures of social capital [412], community mobilisation [413], or 
collective efficacy [414] that are available would be useful starting points. 
However, all of these measures focused so much on measuring the collective 
action component of community empowerment that they entirely neglected the 
critical awareness component which is crucial to any Freirean conception of 
empowerment. Thus, the development of an appropriate tool for measuring a 
Freirean notion of empowerment for use in the evaluation of participatory 
women’s groups is still an unfinished research task. 
 
10.3 Can the process of researching empowerment change 
women’s empowerment? 
As discussed in Chapter 9, power relations between different household 
members are not easily disentangled from power relations between households 
and implementing agencies. Thus, we should consider the extent to which the 
experience of being part of the LBW-SAT trial could itself impact on women’s 
empowerment in our study. The behavioural effects of an awareness that one is 
taking part in a study are explored at length in the medical literature on the 
placebo effect [415,416]. Cluster-randomised trials are ethically obligated to 
take the consent of the communities where they take place, thus it is not 
feasible to study the impact of women’s groups on women’s empowerment 
without informing women that they are part of such a study. However, in our 
context, conventional placebo effects from being aware that one is part of a 
scientific experiment are unlikely, because most local residents and even MIRA 
staff themselves saw the LBW-SAT trial primarily as a “government” programme 
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serving the maternal and child needs of local women, rather than a scientific 
experiment (see Chapter 9). 
 
Smaller changes in local women’s outlook on their own lives might still have 
been possible through their engagement with MIRA. For example, women in 
control groups might have felt that the Nepal “government” valued them 
sufficiently to actively design and implement programmes to help them and 
gained greater self-confidence as a result, which could have subtly altered family 
interactions. A rare study from Ethiopia circumvented ethical guidelines by 
including a control group of women that were not informed they were acting as 
a control group [417]. In intervention villages, randomly selected women were 
invited to watch aspirational videos; in placebo villages, randomly selected 
women were shown entertainment videos; in “pure control” villages, no-one 
was contacted by researchers until the endline data were to be collected. The 
researchers found significant increases in women’s sense of ability to control 
their own lives among women in placebo villages compared to women in the 
“pure control” villages, even among women who had not been invited to any 
video screenings and who did not know anyone who had been invited. Increases 
in a sense of control over one’s own life is potentially compatible with an 
increase in agency according to our notion of agency (Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3). 
However, the wide differences in context between Ethiopia and Nepal and the 
very different type of intervention involved makes it difficult to generalise from 
the Ethiopian study. 
 
However, at a much smaller scale, it is possible that women’s reflection over 
their own lives in the qualitative interview from our grounded theory study, 
might have slightly altered their outlook on life. Notably, one daughter-in-law 
(1, Kote) initially stated that she would never want to live separately from her 
mother-in-law and father-in-law, because she depended on them for all her 
material needs, and it would be difficult to bear the responsibility of managing 
a household on her own. After being questioned on her prospects of obtaining 
employment, she realised that her in-laws would never allow her to take a job, 
because she might become too independent-minded if that happened. When 
she reflected a second time on living together with her in-laws, she told the 
interviewer that maybe she might want to separate in the future, but she did 
not want to think about such issues at present.  Thus, the exploratory, probing 
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nature of our qualitative interviews might have altered women’s agency by 
clarifying their views on the good life and directing their actions to be more in 
line with their enduring values and interests as opposed to their apparent values 
and interests (Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3). 
 
Such changes were unlikely to have happened due to our quantitative surveys, 
as respondents almost always took limited interest in answering our survey 
questions during the many interviews, I observed over the course of my field-
work (Chapter 5). Respondents answered questions on their agency freedom 
immediately without reflection and with a tone and phrasing that suggested the 
answer was obvious rather than a source to be pondered. Indeed, given the 
entrenched power differences between different household members in our 
context (Section 2.3, Chapter 2), larger changes in women’s agency from simply 
being questioned on the motivations behind their daily actions were unlikely. 
 
10.4 Lessons for health and gender policy 
10.4.1 Lessons for the design of participatory women’s groups 
A range of lessons for future health and gender policy can be drawn from this 
thesis. Our evaluation of the impact of participatory women’s groups on agency 
freedom (Chapter 5) was important, because explicit strategies for empowering 
women are rare in maternal and child health. For example, a Lancet series on 
newborn health in 2014 listed a variety of interventions to address newborn 
mortality and morbidity from skilled birth attendance to management of 
neonatal infections [418]. Most of the interventions focused on making narrow, 
technical and clinical changes to women’s circumstances such the provision of 
nutritional supplements, the use of clean delivery kits at birth, immunisation of 
mothers during pregnancy and skin-to-skin care for newborns to prevent 
hypothermia. In contrast to such narrowly focused interventions, participatory 
women’s groups have much broader aims as they seek to address women’s 
health issues and further their empowerment at the same time. 
 
The observed impact of participatory women’s groups on agency in group 
participation suggested that women both desire greater participation in groups 
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outside the home and were enabled by the roll-out of women’s groups to realise 
such desires. The much greater participation rates in the arms dispensing 
resource transfers provided evidence that a larger number of women desiring 
to participate in groups could be enabled to do so with the addition of such 
resources. However, the lack of a multidimensional effect of participatory 
women’s groups on measures of women’s agency and the lack of intensive 
community mobilisation reported by process evaluation reports suggested that 
participatory women’s groups is not able to resolve broader gender issues 
within the household. In strongly patriarchal contexts such as the Plains of 
Nepal, where daughters-in-law are usually not allowed to speak in public, 
greater changes in their agency might only follow after long-term sustained 
engagement in groups of women that explicitly discuss how to change local 
gender norms rather than focus only on nutritional issues. 
 
Maternal and newborn health programmes invariably target young, married 
women since this sub-population is the most likely to get pregnant. Future 
policy-makers should think creatively about incorporating ways of expanding 
economic opportunities into maternal and newborn health programmes in 
South Asia.  
 
10.4.2 Lessons for the design of economic empowerment policy 
Our qualitative results for mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law from Chapter 8 
showed that general statements about “women’s economic empowerment” can 
misrepresent local women and mislead policy debates. As an example, a 
Janakpur-based non-governmental organization called “The Women’s 
Development Centre” whose explicit mission was women’s economic 
empowerment ran credit and savings groups in Sahku combined with vocational 
training, financial literacy and income-generation schemes [89]. According to 
daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law living in Sahku in our sample, the same 
household guardians that participated in the training almost unanimously 
forbade their own daughters-in-law to attend group meetings and in fact kept 
them in the dark about group activities. Ironically, these same guardians were 
being taught to become “empowered” enough to ignore propriety norms and 
unveil in public by the organization. 
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Yet, many currently unemployed daughters-in-law in our sample voiced a strong 
desire for new employment opportunities despite being forbidden to take up 
such opportunities by their families. The lack of attention to the economic 
empowerment of newly married daughters-in-law might be a missed 
opportunity. While young daughters-in-law in the middle wealth range were 
forbidden from engaging in waged work by their mothers-in-law due to concerns 
about public propriety, mothers-in-law conversely reported being too old, too 
ill or too unskilled to begin employment even if they were now in a position to 
choose themselves, “this is not my age to work” (mother-in-law 8, Sahku). The 
sociocultural constraints on “acceptable” ages for women to gain employment 
put women at a competitive disadvantage to men in the labour market and 
contributed to maintain women’s economic dependency on men. Indeed, many 
mothers-in-law reported having never taken up employment during their entire 
lifetime, although they desired to do so for non-agricultural jobs. 
 
In Nepal, the Enhanced Vocational Education and Training Project (EVENT) has 
sought to support the government of Nepal in skilling the labour force through 
short-term vocational training with a special emphasis on women, youth and 
Dalits [419]. In India the nation-wide Indian rural skills development programme 
Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (DDUGKY) targeted youth 
aged 15-35 and specifically included a 33% quota for women in an effort to 
increase job opportunities for women. The programme combined vocational 
training groups in rural communities with urban recruitment and placement 
agencies as well as migration support centres in destination cities [420,421]. 
However, no distinction was made in policy documents from both programmes 
between unmarried women, newly married daughters-in-law and mothers-in-
law and no explicit strategy was formulated to ensure that all three groups were 
included in the job opportunities that were created [419-421]. Whether or not 
adolescent unmarried women who obtained employment through programmes 
such as EVENT or DDUGKY have been able to retain their right to employment 
after marriage remains an unanswered question. 
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In conclusion, age, marital status and emic categories such as “guardianship” 
should play important roles in future policy debates and research on women’s 
economic empowerment in South Asia. While these policies should not 
uncritically accept existing social norms, neither should they exclude references 
to local social norms, as existing “women’s empowerment” policies have tended 
to do. Future policies should critically engage with existing social norms to 
enable all women across the life cycle to be included in policies targeting their 
own empowerment and experience improvements to their financial agency. 
 
10.4.3 Lessons for the design of cash transfer policy 
Our findings from Chapter 9 provided a number of lessons for future design of 
cash transfer policy. First, we found that conflicts between female household 
members over the control over the cash transfer were a far more prominent 
issue than competition between spouses. Policy-makers need to consider 
potential conflicts between family members outside of the spousal relationship 
when assessing whether beneficiaries of cash transfers will be able to exert 
agency over them. 
 
Second, it showed the considerable external pressure on households to follow 
recommendations on the cash transfers engendered by both programme staff 
and their own community. This blurs the boundary between conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers and raises a question about the extent to which the 
impacts of exisiting cash transfer programmes have been created through the 
provision of the cash, the attachment of formal conditionalities to the receipt of 
cash or the generation of “soft” pressures on households to comply with the 
stated aim of the transfer. 
 
Third, our study showed some of the risks associated with insisting on women’s 
physical control over cash transfers, as one respondent suffered physical 
violence and ended up foregoing three more cash transfers when she did so. 
Thus policy-makers should be aware of the potential negative effects of cash 
transfer programmes on women’s wellbeing associated with promoting 
women’s control over their own cash. In practical terms, this could entail 
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investing in support services for women suffering from violence in the home, 
distributing cash transfers through more discreet avenues, such as mobile-
money [345], or engaging family members and communities extensively in 
promoting family support around daughters-in-law’s use of the cash transfer. 
 
Finally, the LBW-SAT intervention put the women’s group facilitators and their 
supervisors, the facilitation coordinators, in a difficult position. In order for the 
trial to be a success, MIRA staff wanted beneficiary women to learn MIRA’s 
lessons concerning how to best spend the cash transfer and apply them in their 
own life. Yet, they also wanted beneficiary women to make their own choices 
concerning what they spent their cash transfer on. Yet, they also wanted to 
protect these women from violence and conflict with their own families. The 
complexity of negotiating these multiple, sometimes contradictory goals should 
be kept in mind by future policy-makers seeking to enhance women’s financial 
agency using cash transfers.  
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Appendix A 
Full description of contributors to the 
research in this thesis 
A.1 Overall list of contributors 
Table 20. Description of roles and responsibilities for all sections in this thesis 
Chapter(s) Task Person(s) responsible 
All Funding for the LBW-SAT trial DFID 
All Funding for this thesis MRC, CHRAT 
All Design of the LBW-SAT trial Principal Investigators 
All Enrolling women into the trial MIRA surveillance team 
All Baseline household census MIRA surveillance team 
All 
Collection of baseline socio-demographic 
characteristics of enrolled women 
MIRA surveillance team 
All 
Idea of validating a tool to measure empowerment 
and evaluate the impact of LBW-SAT 
Jolene Skordis-Worrall and 
Joanna Morrisson 
All Writing chapters Lu Gram 
All Commenting on chapters 
Jolene Skordis-Worrall and 
Joanna Morrisson 
4 Design of the validation and adaptation study Lu Gram 
4 
Translation of original survey tool from the Oxford 
Poverty and Human development Initiative into 
Nepali and Maithili 
MIRA process evaluation team 
4 Piloting first translation of original survey tool MIRA process evaluation team 
4 Recruitment of field workers MIRA senior management staff 
4 Training field workers for the calibration sample MIRA senior management staff 
4 Training field workers for the validation sample Lu Gram and Sonali Jha 
4 Supervising quantitative data collection MIRA senior management staff 
4 Quantitative data collection MIRA field workers 
4 Exploratory Factor Analysis Lu Gram 
4 Confirmatory Factory Analysis Lu Gram 
4 Validity and reliability analysis Lu Gram 
4 Training and supervising qualitative researchers Lu Gram 
4 Deciding on qualitative sampling criteria Lu Gram 
4 Conducting think-aloud interviews Neha Sharma and Kabita Sah 
4 Translating think-aloud interviews into English Neha Sharma and Kabita Sah 
4 Unstructured interviews with MIRA staff Lu Gram 
4 Conducting focus group discussion Lu Gram 
4 Framework analysis of qualitative data Lu Gram 
4 Adaptating survey tool based on analysis Lu Gram 
4 Translating adapted tool into Nepali and Maithili Neha Sharma 
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Chapter(s) Task Person(s) responsible 
5 Design of the empowerment impact study Lu Gram 
5 Power calculation for sample size Lu Gram 
5 Creating sample list of women to be visited Lu Gram 
5 Recruitment of field workers Lu Gram and MIRA senior 
management staff 
5 Training of field workers Lu Gram and Shyam Sundar 
Yadav 
5 Training of supervisors for field workers Lu Gram and Shyam Sundar 
Yadav 
5 Writing Standard Operating Procedures Lu Gram 
5 
Translating Standard Operating Procedures into 
Nepali Shyam Sundar Yadav 
5 Supervision of supervisors Lu Gram and Shyam Sundar 
Yadav 
5 Supervision of field workers Lu Gram, Shyam Sundar Yadav 
and supervisors 
5 Back-checks and quality control Lu Gram and Shyam Sundar 
Yadav 
5 Organising standardisation exercise Lu Gram and Shyam Sundar 
Yadav 
5 Data collection for main analysis Field workers 
5 Data collection for standardisation exercise Field workers 
5 Statistical analysis of data Lu Gram 
6-9 
Choosing financial agency and agency over cash 
transfers as a topic for qualitative research Lu Gram 
6-9 
Design of both studies on financial agency and 
agency over cash transfers Lu Gram 
6-9 Writing research protocols Lu Gram 
6-9 Writing topic guides Lu Gram 
6-9 Translation of topic guides into Maithili Neha Sharma 
6-9 Deciding on sampling criteria Lu Gram 
6-9 Training and supervising qualitative researchers Lu Gram 
6-9 Conducting interviews with daughters-in-law Neha Sharma 
6-9 Conducting interviews with mothers-in-law Facilitation coordinators 
6-9 
Conducting focus group discussion with facilitation 
coordinators Neha Sharma 
6-9 Translating recorded interviews into English Neha Sharma, Sweta Chaudhary 
and other translators 
6-9 Memoing and coding data Lu Gram 
6-9 Developing codes into a grounded theory Lu Gram 
6-9 Discussing and validating proposed theories 
Neha Sharma, Shyam Sundar 
Yadav, facilitation coordinators, 
Joanna Morrison 
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A.2 Study design and selection of research questions 
First, a little background information on myself. I am a Danish man of Chinese 
heritage who has lived in Britain since 2004, but also travelled extensively in 
Africa and South Asia as part of my work in Global Health since 2009. I have a 
good understanding of Nepali and Hindi/Urdu, and consequently also Maithili 
due to its closeness to Nepali, Hindi and Urdu (sufficient to follow quantitative 
and qualitative interviews conducted in Maithili with the help of a dictionary). I 
have written all of this thesis, although my thesis supervisors Jolene Skordis-
Worrall and Joanna Morrison have given me comments on drafts of my thesis. 
 
I was funded by the Child Health Research Appeal Trust (CHRAT) and the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) to conduct a PhD “Evaluating the impact of community 
based nutritional interventions on the agency and empowerment of women in 
rural Nepal”. The idea of studying women’s empowerment in the LBW-SAT trial 
was thus provided by Jolene Skordis-Worrall and Joanna Morrisson. Indeed, by 
the time, I started my PhD in September 2013, a survey tool had already been 
selected to measure to women’s empowerment, namely the tool used by the 
Oxford Poverty and Human development Initiative, which I evaluate in this 
thesis. The MIRA process evaluation team had also translated the tool into 
English and piloted it in a few qualitative interviews to check the translation 
worked reasonably well. From October to December 2013, field workers 
collected the calibration data used in Chapter 4, while I was still performing the 
literature review for my PhD. Thus, the idea behind validating the use of this tool 
for measuring the impact of LBW-SAT on women’s empowerment was already 
proposed by Jolene Skordis-Worrall and Joanna Morrisson. However, the design 
of how this tool was validated, adapted and used in practice was done by me.  
 
One important consequence of this sequence of events was the fact that it was 
difficult to argue for measuring a different notion of empowerment than the one 
targeted by this tool. Resources had already been invested in translating and 
piloting the tool on a small scale as well as collecting quantitative baseline data 
on more than 500 people by the time, I had finished my literature review. As 
argued in Section 3.3.4, Chapter 3, “Freirean” notions of empowerment differ 
considerably from Amartya Sen’s notion of agency. Since Freire’s notion of 
critical consciousness is often cited as a mediator for the impact of women’s 
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groups on health outcomes [51,54,76,302], evaluating the impact of LBW-SAT 
on a Freirean notion of empowerment would have been more useful for 
developing the theory of how women’s groups work. Given the considerable 
investment that had occurred, it was difficult to argue for scrapping the tool 
entirely and developing a new tool for a new concept within a large, multi-
million-dollar trial setting where many stakeholders were involved in deciding 
what data was or was not to be collected in the trial. 
 
At the same time, a large amount of qualitative research including Rosato’s [53] 
thesis on community empowerment in participatory women’s groups had 
already been carried out, but almost no work had taken place on agency in the 
household (Chapter 5). Thus, the greater evidence gap arguably rested with 
women’s agency at an individual level. When I arrived to do my PhD, I noticed 
that there was almost no literature on agency in the household sphere and the 
validation study (Chapter 4) also provided an empirical rationale for restricting 
our measure of agency to focus on the household anyway. In addition, a fellow 
PhD student Vikas Paudel was already tasked with studying how women’s 
groups worked in the LBW-SAT trial using ethnographic research, but 
unfortunately, Vikas died in the middle of his PhD from kidney disease. Finally, 
the LBW-SAT intervention involved both women’s groups and resource 
transfers. While Freirean empowerment was relevant for the operation of 
women’s groups, it was much less relevant for the impact of the food and cash 
transfers, as these acted at a purely individual level. On the other hand, women’s 
agency freedom could plausibly be affected by both types of intervention. 
 
As regards, the large qualitative study in the second part of this thesis, this study 
was entirely conceived of by me including both the choice of research question, 
the choice of a grounded theory approach to studying the question, and the 
specifics of executing the qualitative study itself. 
 
The funders DFID, MRC and CHRAT played no role in this PhD, except DFID 
influenced the timetables for quantitative data collection, as we needed to 
accommodate DFID’s plans for measurement of the main trial outcome, birth 
weight. 
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A.3 Own role in implementing thesis research 
For the qualitative research, I was resident in Nepal from January until March 
2014, where I supervised and discussed the collection of think-aloud data with 
qualitative researchers Neha Sharma (NSh) and Kabita Sah (KS) as well as field 
staff at MIRA. In addition, I was mostly resident in Nepal from 1st of April until 
1st of September 2015 and supervised and worked with the interviewers Nsh 
and the facilitation coordinators (FCs) during my grounded theory study of 
financial agency in the household. I personally observed a total 15 out of 22 
interviews with mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law conducted by the FCs. 
This allowed me to closely monitor FCs’ conduct during interviews and provide 
training to ensure that they adhered to our interviewing protocol in remaining 
open and respectful to participants throughout the data collection process. I 
conducted all the qualitative analyses reported in this thesis, including the 
analysis of the think-aloud interviews and the grounded theory analyses from 
Chapters 8 and 9. However, NSh, KS, the FCs and my qualitative supervisor 
Joanna Morrison had an on-going dialogue with me throughout the analysis 
process. 
 
For the quantitative research, I was resident in Nepal in May 2014 to train field 
workers for the validation study in Chapter 4 and then resided in Nepal again 
from May until September 2015 for the main impact study in Chapter 5. I was 
involved in the recruitment of field workers together with senior management 
staff at MIRA. I wrote the Standard Operating Procedures, which SSY translated 
into Nepali for me. I trained field workers and supervisors together with Shyam 
Sundar Yadav (SSY). Together with SSY we also supervised the data collection 
process and carried out back-checks and other forms of quality control. We also 
organised the standardisation exercise at the end between field workers and 
nutrition mobilisers. Finally, I carried out all the quantitative analyses in this 
thesis including the factor analyses, validity checks, and reliability checks in 
Chapter 4, as well as the impact analyses in Chapter 5.  
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Table 21. Key research staff involved in data collection for a qualitative study on financial power in the Maithili household.  
   Language proficiency     
Staff Role 
Target 
interviewees Maithili Nepali English Education 














level Fluent Bachelor's 
Collected, translated and analyzed 










level Fluent Bachelor's 
Collected, translated and analyzed 








level Basic Bachelor's 
Data collection for formative 
research in LBW-SAT as well as semi-
structured interviews for a previous 
grounded theory study in Dhanusha 








level Basic High school 
Data collection for formative 
research in LBW-SAT as well as semi-
structured interviews for a previous 
grounded theory study in Dhanusha 








level Basic High school 
Data collection for formative 
research in LBW-SAT as well as semi-
structured interviews for a previous 
grounded theory study in Dhanusha 
and Mahotarri 35-45 Married 
FC = facilitation coordinator. All interviewers were female.  
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Table 22. Research staff involved in the translation and transcription of data for a study of financial power in the Maithili household. 
  Language proficiency   
 
  
Staff Role Maithili Nepali English Education 
Previous experience with 












level Fluent Bachelor's 
Collected, translated and 
analyzed prior trial process data 









level Fluent Bachelor's 
Collected, translated and 
analyzed prior trial process data 

















level Fluent Bachelor’s 
Assistant process evaluation 
officer for MIRA where she 
collected, translated and 
analysed data for LBW-SAT  Female 36 Married 
Bhavana Translator None 
Native-
level Fluent Masters 
Previous experience as a 










Previous experience as a 
translator for MIRA Female 20-25 Single 
 
Appendix A 
Full description of contributors to the research in this thesis 
 
 
382 | P a g e  
 
A.4 Further details on qualitative researchers 
Table 21 provides an overview of the sociodemographic characteristics and prior 
qualitative research experience of the interviewers who conducted interviews 
in this study. Table 22 provides an overview of the research staff involved in the 
translation and transcription of data from the cash transfer project. 
 
For the think-aloud interviews in Chapter 4, Neha Sharma (NSh) and Kabita Sah 
(KS) conducted the interviews. For the grounded theory study in Chapters 6-9, 
NSh conducted interviews with daughters-in-law and facilitation coordinators 
(FCs) conducted interviews with mothers-in-law (or elder sisters-in-law if the 
mother-in-law was no longer alive). NSh and KS translated Maithili recordings 
into English in Chapter 4, while NSh and four other translators translated Maithili 
and Nepali recordings into English in Chapters 6-9. 
 
Both KS and NSh were female university graduates, native to Dhanusha who 
were employed by MIRA as qualitative process evaluation officers. NSh was the 
primary officer, while KS was the secondary officer. Both were proficient in 
Maithili, Nepali and English and were trained in qualitative research methods. 
Prior to this study, they had been collecting and analysing data from focus group 
discussions, semi-structured interviews and non-participant observations in the 
intervention areas as part of the process evaluation for the LBW-SAT trial. 
 
The FCs were native to Dhanusha and Mahottari and had a university or high 
school education. They were married with children, and in their mid-thirties. 
They had received training in qualitative methods, and previously conducted 
semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions as part of the formative 
research for LBW-SAT. They had also conducted semi-structured interviews for 
a previous grounded theory study on the experience of mental illness of 
pregnant women within a previous participatory women’s groups trial in our 
study area [336,338]. 
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All translators except Saurav Chaudhary (SaC) had had previous experience 
translating interviews for MIRA. All translators except Sr had achieved at least a 
university degree, while Sr had a high school education. All translators had 
native-level proficiency in Maithili and Nepali, except Bh who did not speak 
Maithili. Sweta Chaudhary (SwC) had previously worked as an officer in the 
qualitative process evaluation team in MIRA. SwC was the main translator for a 
previous study on unplanned pregnancy in our study area [422].  
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Appendix B 
Money, education and politics as 
sources of empowerment 
Women’s empowerment has often been assumed to follow from the mere fact 
of employment, political representation or formal education [151,423,424] 
including in the Millennium Development Goals [13], the Gender Development, 
and the Gender Inequality Indices [64]. This motivates a review of evidence the 
role of control over material resources, education and political mobilization. 
 
B.1 Economic empowerment 
Much empirical work argues that women’s employment [86,96], income [258] 
and access to cash [37], savings [425] or credit [210] lead to empowerment. The 
theoretical rationale for this is sometimes found in resource-dependency 
[4,129,426] or modernization theories [427], which argue that a lack of 
bargaining power arises from economic dependency and traditional attitudes to 
gender roles. These can in turn be reduced through improved control over and 
access to assets and increased integration into labour and financial markets 
[4,129,426,427]. Some studies on cash transfers, microcredit and microsavings 
do find reduced domestic violence [213,311], improved decision-making powers 
[5,37,383], self-esteem and intra-household status [37,209,428] as well as 
increased budget shares spent on “female-related” goods [4,37]. On the other 
hand, some studies of microfinance find no association [429] or even reduced 
decision-making powers [385] and increased domestic violence [212,384], while 
studies of cash transfer programmes have often failed to find an impact on 
decision-making powers [308]. Studies of cash transfers, microcredit and 
microsavings all report concerns of income appropriation by husbands using 
women as “middle-men” (sic) to increase their own financial resources 
[37,209,212,383,384]. 
 
Considerable variability in the design and evaluation of interventions 
notwithstanding [209,429], a few factors emerge repeatedly as important 
determinants of the ability of economic interventions to empower women: 
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1) Women’s contribution to the household should be recognized as valuable 
and potentially “withdraw-able”, rather than something one is naturally 
entitled to, in order to be able to serve as a threat point [268]. This 
requires a minimum basic level of empowerment to begin with. 
2) Where women’s income and labour are invested in productive assets 
controlled by other family members such as the family farm, their net 
bargaining power may weaken, as other family members reap the 
benefits of investments made with women’s income [5,211,261,385].  
3) Any increase in women’s income may be compensated for by other family 
members by reducing existing allowance transfers [5,211,261,385]. 
4) Households may also be co-operative, because absolute poverty or inter-
household inequities loom larger than intra-household inequalities in 
bargaining power. Combined with sufficient visibility and salience of the 
economic contribution of women to the household, this may translate 
into greater family status [209]. 
 
B.2 Empowerment through education 
Evidence on the effects of education paints a mixed picture. Education is often 
argued to shift women’s values away from fatalism and superstition towards a 
questioning attitude of authority [105,430] and from a dependent, communal 
identity towards an independent, personal identity [298,431]. It is argued to be 
crucial to better employment opportunities, stronger marital bargaining power, 
political participation and access to legal aid [430]. Horizontal social networks 
formed at school, improved husband-wife intimacy and greater respect from in-
laws are also argued to be some of the benefits of female education [105]. 
 
Observational evidence from the analysis of DHS data has shown a correlation 
between formal education and decision-making powers in a number of 
countries [14]. Qualitative evidence has also provided examples of cases where 
education increased the status of women in the household [105]. However, 
some quantitative studies have also found a U-shaped relationship with 
decision-making power, where decision-making power decreases for small 
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Observational evidence is largely unable to separate the causal effect of 
education on empowerment from the effect of confounding factors such as 
associative mating [432], family support and investment in daughters [433] or 
the personality characteristics of girls choosing to stay in school despite corporal 
punishment [434-436] and gender violence and sexual abuse [435,437]. Studies 
have shown that communities often see education as a means of improving the 
marriageability of girls rather than a route to economic and emotional 
independence [105,106,253]. Critics of the association between education and 
women’s empowerment have also noted how existing education systems can 
often be unconducive to critical thinking [438,439]. 
 
Quantitative studies attempting to establish a causal link via quasi-experimental 
designs have met with mixed success. One study in Indonesia that exploiting 
exogenous variation in the supply of education induced by a longer school year 
in 1978 found no impacts on female decision-making in the household [440]. 
Another evaluation of exogenous variation in the supply of schooling in Turkey 
from an increase in compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 years in 1997 found no 
impacts on gender equitable attitudes [441]. Finally an evaluation exploiting 
education reform in Sierra Leone in 2001 found increases in gender equitable 
attitudes among women, but not among men [442]. Thus, observed correlations 
between education and indicators of women’s empowerment are not 
necessarily causal in nature. 
 
Qualitative studies on non-formal/popular education connected to locally 
relevant issues more frequently report positive effects of enhanced self-
confidence, critical thinking and problem-solving skills and community 
empowerment [431,443-445]. However, even efforts to empower local women 
through popular education have been criticised for failing to teach lessons that 
are connected to local realities [106,446]. Furthermore, only few quantitative 
studies have researched the impact of non-formal education on female 
empowerment [445]. 
 
B.3 Empowerment through politics 
Women and their rights are forcefully invoked in South Asian political discourse 
by political movements across the spectrum including both the militant Maoist 
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Left in Nepal [24,447-450] and the nationalist Hindu Right in India [23,217,438]. 
Much scepticism concerns the ability of national legislation to affect the lives of 
women at the grassroots level [448], the urban, elite and state-centred nature 
of feminist movements [23,98,217] and the role of “token” women in reserved 
government seats [423,448]. However, consistent econometric evidence also 
shows female reservation leaders perform no worse than men on a range of 
indicators [451]. Female leaders have been shown to direct public resources 
towards investments related to their own gender [452,453] and psychologically 
“prime” their constituencies for electing future female leaders [454]. 
 
Only qualitative evaluations of grassroots political action on women’s 
empowerment have been carried out to our knowledge. Such studies have 
documented  political campaigns organised by women against drinking, 
gambling and domestic violence [428,449,455,456], against underage marriage 
and extramarital affairs [456] or in favour of women’s rights to communal land 
[443]. Evaluations of such campaigns often describe them as resulting in 
significant empowerment of the women who participated. However, without 
quantitative evaluation, it might be difficult to ascertain whether women 
became empowered as a result of participating in grassroots political action, or 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaire for measuring agency 
freedom in the LBW-SAT trial 
Questionnaire for Low Birth Weight South Asia Trial (LBWSAT) using 
 Internationally Comparable Indicators of Agency and Empowerment  
(Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI)) 
 
न्निरे्दशिका: 
अनतर्ाातााको समयमा महिला सक्र्दो एक्ल ैिुिपिेछ| 
परिचय हर्दिे क्रममा ििन्क्तकिण िब्र्दको प्रयोग िगिुािोला| यसको सट्टामा “सबभैनर्दा मित्र्पणुा 
लक्ष्यमा अगाडी बढ्ि सक्िे” अथर्ा “र्दबबएको ि आफ्िो निणाय गिा िसक्िे” जस्ता िब्र्दको प्रयोग 
गिुािोला|  
Instructions:  
During the course of interview, make sure that the woman is alone. 
In the introduction section please do not use word “empowerment” instead use “able to advance in 
their goal or dominated women who cannot make her own decisions”.  
निरे्दशिका : 
अनतर्ााताा  के  समयमे महिला सक्भि अस्गिे िोई | 
परिचय रे्दब बेिमें ििन्क्तकिण िब्र्दके प्रयोग िकैिब ै|एकि बर्दलामे “सबस मित्र्पणुा लक्ष्यमें आगा 
बढबला” र्ा “ र्दबल आ अपि निणाय िकैसकै छई “ जिेि िब्र्दके   प्रयोग किब ै | 
 
[intid] 
तपाई आफ्िो परिचय पत्र स्क्याि गिुािोस ् 
Scan your own id card 
आिा अपि परिचय पत्र स्क्याि करू  
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[woman_id_verify] 
रजिस्टरमा भएको मजिलाको आ.ई.डी. काडड  स््यान गननडिोस्  
Scan Woman Barcode of Register 
रजिस्टरमे रिल मजिलाके पररचय पत्र स््यान करू  
 
आफ्नो पररचय दिननिोस: 
जमरा ससं्थाल ेआमा र बच्चाको स्वास््य सनधार गनड धननषा र मिोत्तरीमा आध्ययन गि ैआएकोछ | िामी 
तपाईलाई तपाईल ेघर जभत्र र बाजिर गन ेकामको बारेमा र तपाईको घरमा जनर्डय कसरी गररन्छ भन्न ेबारेमा 
केजि प्रश्निरु सोध्न चािान्छौ| कन  ैसघंससं्थामा तपाईको सिभागीता कस्तो छ भनरे िान्न चािन्छौ| धननषा र 
मिोत्तरीमा धरैे मजिलािरु सगँ िामी जय प्रश्निरु सोजधरिकेाछौ| िाम्रो कामल ेतपाई िस्तो मजिलािरुमा 
कस्तो असर गछड  भनरे थािापाउन यसल ेसियोग गनछे| 
तपाई यो अन्तरवाडताड कन  ैपजन समयमा रोक्न सक्नन हुन्छ, उत्तर दिन नचािमेा भन्न सक्नन हुन्छ र यदि तपाई 
सिभागी हुन चािाननहुन्न भन ेयसल ेतपाईको जमरा कायडक्रम अथवा अरु कायडक्रमको पहुचमा केजि असर 
गनछैेन|  तपाईल ेभान्ननभएको कन रािरु ररपोटडमा उल्लखे भएतापजन तपाईको नाम गोप्य रिनछे|  
के तपाई सिभागी हुन सिमत हुन्ननहुन्छ? 
Introduce yourself: 
MIRA does research in Dhanusha and Mahottari to improve the health and nutrition of 
mothers and babies. We would like to ask you some questions about your work inside 
and outside the house, and about how decisions are made in your household. We 
would also like to ask you about your participation in community organisations. We are 
asking a lot of women in Dhanusha and Mahottari these questions, and this will help 
us we will find out the effect of our work on women like you.  
You can stop the interview at any time, you can refuse to answer any questions that 
you don’t want to, and if you don’t want to participate at all, this will not affect your 
access to MIRA programmes or other programmes. All the information you give us will 
be confidential. 
Do you consent to participate? 
 
आिा अपन पररचय दियौ : 
जमरा ससं्था माई  आ बच्चाके  स्वास््यम े सनधार करेके लले  धननषा आ मिोत्तररम ेकाि  करैत आईव रिल छई 
| िम सब आिासबके घर जभतर आ घर बािरके कािके बारेम े आ आिाके घर म ेजनर्डय केना लजैछयई  त ैके  
बारेम ेदकछ  प्रस्नसब पनछ चािछैीयई  | आिाके सिभाजगता कोनो सघं ससं्थाम ेकेिन ्छई त ैके बारेमा सिेो 
बनझ  चािईजछ | धननषा आ मिोत्तररके बहुत ेमजिलासबके िमसब जय प्रश्न  सब पनइछ रिल जछयई  | िमरसबके 
कािके  आिासब सनके  मजिलासब पर केिन असर करैछई सिेो बनझम ेसियोग करतईै | 
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आिा जय  बातजचत कोनो समय रोइक सकै  जछ , िवाब न ैिबेके मोनिोई त कि ैसकै जछ | यदि आिा सिभागी 
नई िोव चािजैछ तखैनो आिाके जमराके कायडक्रम आ आरो कायडक्रमके पहुचँम ेकोनो असर नकैरत ै| आिाके 
किाल बातसब ररपोटडम ेयतेईै लदेकन आिाके नाम गोप्य रितईै | 
दक आिा सिभागी िोव चाि ैजछयई ?      
 
[permission] 
अन्तवाडताडको लागी अननमती जलननिोस | 
Permission obtained for the interview 
अन्तवाडताड के  लेल अननमती जलय | 
 जलए Yes लजेलय ै  
 जलइन  No नई लजेलय ै  
 
लाग्न ेसमय ४०  िजेख  ४५  जमनटे Estimated completion time 40-45  minutes ४० स ४५ जमनट 
लाईग सकै छई  
 
मजिलाको बास्थान Addresses: मजिलाके बासस्थान 
[enrol_loctype] तपाई अजिल ेकिा ँबस्नन भएको छ?  (उत्तरअह्रन पढेर सन ाउननिोस|्) 
Whose house are you staying in at the moment? Read out the answers 
अजभ आिा कत ्रि ैजछ? (उत्तर पढू ) 
 आफ्नो घर ससनराल Own home  - husband’s (sasural) अपन घर सासनर  
 माईती   Parental home (Maiti) माय के घर  
 अन्य  Other अन्य  
 
ससनराल घर / husband’s home   ससनराल घर  
[whohoh_sasural] तपाइको ससनरालको घरमनली को हुननहुन्छ? (कृपया उत्तरिातालाई उत्तर पढेर 
नसन ाउननिोला| उत्तरिाताल ेदिएका उत्तरिरुलाई वगीकृत गननडिोस|् ) 
Who is the head of household in your sasural? (Do not read out the answers, just 
categorise the answer the respondent gives) 
आिाके ससनरालके घरमनजखया के छै? (कृपया उत्तर उत्तरिाता के नई किबई ) 
  श्रीमान Husband  श्रीमान 
  ससनरा Father-in-law  ससनर  
  सासन Mother-in-law साउस  
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  ससनराली घरको अन्य पनरुस Other man from husband's household  सासनर  घरके  अन्य  
पनरुख 
  ससनराली घरको अन्य मजिला Other woman from husband's household सासनर  घरके  अन्य 
मजिला  
 महिला आफै The woman herself  महिला अपन े 
 
माईजत  घर / Maiti’s home   नजिरा घर  
[whohoh_maiti] तपाइको माइजत को घरमनली को हुननहुन्छ? (कृपया उत्तरिातालाई उत्तर पढेर 
नसन ाउननिोला| उत्तरिाताल ेदिएका उत्तरिरुलाई वगीकृत गननडिोस|् ) 
Who is the head of household in your maiti?  (Do not read out the answers, just 
categorise the answer the respondent gives) 
आिाके नजिरा घरके घरमनजल  के छजथन ? (कृपया उत्तर उत्तरिाता के नई किबई ) 
  बनवा Father बाबन 
  आमा Mother  माय   
  माइती घरको अन्य पनरुस  Other man from maiti नजिरा घरके  अन्य  पनरुख   
  माइती घरको अन्य मजिला  Other woman from maiti नजिरा  घरके अन्य  मजिला 
  यस घरमा कोजि पजन हुननहुन्न  No body at house अइ घरम ेनई केउ छई 
 
अन्य घर / Other’s home   अन्य घर  
[whohoh_other] तपाइको अन्य घरको घरमनली को हुननहुन्छ ? (कृपया उत्तरिातालाई उत्तर पढेर 
नसन ाउननिोला| उत्तरिाताल ेदिएका उत्तरिरुलाई वगीकृत गननडिोस|् ) 
Who is the head of household in your other home?  (Do not read out the answers, just 
categorise the answer the respondent gives) 
आिाके अन्य  घरके घरमनली  के छजथन ? (कृपया उत्तर उत्तरिाता के नई किबई ) 
 श्रीमान  Husband श्रीमान  
  अन्य पनरुष  Other man   अन्य पनरुख   
  अन्य मजिला   Other woman   अन्य मजिला    
  गभडवती मजिला आफै The pregnant woman herself   गभडवती मजिला अपन े
   
[language]  अन्तरवाताड कन  भाषामा जलईएको जथयो? (अन्तरवाताडकारल ेआफै कन  भाषामा अन्तरवाताड 
जलएको िो जचन्ि लगाउनन िोस्|)  Which language was the interview conducted in? 
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(Interviewer to record this without asking respondent) अन्तरवाताड कोन भाषाम ेलजेलयई  य ? 
(अन्तरवाताडकार अपन ेकोन भाषाम ेअन्तरवाताड लने ेछई तई म ेजचन्ि लगाऊ) 
 नेपाली Nepali    मथैली Maithili   अन्य Other  
 
[ethnicity]    महिला कन  समनिायको िो? (अन्तरवाताडकारल ेआफै समनिाय छनट्याएर लखे्ननिोस|्)  
Which ethnic group does the woman belong to, hills or plains? (Interviewer to see 
which ethnicity for themselves and record this without asking)  
महिला कोन समनिाय के छजथन ? (अन्तरवाताडकार अपन ेस छनट्याक जलखन ) 
 पिाडी Pahadi     मधसेी Madeshi    अन्य Other  
 
यदि पिाडी िातिाजतको भए [caste_hills] मा िाननिोस ्
If ethnicity = pahadi go to [caste_hills] 
यदि मधसेी िातिाजतको भए [caste_plains] मा िाननिोस ् 
If ethnicity = madeshi go to [caste_plains] 
यदि अन्य भए [caste_other] मा िाननिोस ्
If ethnicity = other go to [caste_other] 
 
 
सामाजिक र आर्थडक अवस्था Socio Economic Status:  
[caste_plains] तपाई कन  िात र समनिायको िो?  
What is your caste/ethnic Group?  आिा कोन िाईत आ समनिायके जछयई ? 
 
तराई Terai:    तराई ब्रिमार् Terai Brahmin   भनजमिार Bhumihaar   
 कायस्थ Kayast   रािपनत Rajput 
 
यािव Yadav:     यािव / गोइत / मरबतैा Yadav, Marbait, Goit etc 
 
सनडी/तलेी Sudi/Teli:     
 साि Sah/ िलनवाई Haluwai/ पनव ेPurbe/ कल्वार / Kalwaar,  
 सनिी/तलेी Sudi/Teli 
 ननजनया  Nuniya 
 बाजनया  Baniya 
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 गनप्ता Gupta 
 अन्य सनडी/तलेी Other Sudi/Teli 
 
मध्य मधसेी Middle Madheshi:  
 मण्डल Mandal  (केवट Kewat / कामजत Kamati / मण्डल Mandal) 
 कोइरी  Koiri (मितो Mahato/ कोइरी ननजनया Koiri Nuniya/ कोइरी ससिं Koiri Singh/ कनशनवािा 
Kusuwaha) 
 भजेडयर / Bhediyar / बले्िार / Beldaar / अमात् Amatya / राय Raya / राउत Raut / कन मी Kurmi 
 ििाम Hajam / लोिार / Lohar / ठाकन र/ Thakur / शमाड Sharma / सोनार Sonaar 
 कन म्िाल ेKumhale / कन म्िार / Kumhar / पजण्डत Pandit 
 जबन  Bin / मलािा Malaha / मनजखया Mukhiya / सिनी Sahani / माझी (बातर) Majhi  (Baatar) 
 अन्य मधसेी Other Middle Madheshi Castes 
 
तराई िनिाती Janajati Plains:  
 थारु  Tharu   िननवार Danuwar      धाननक मण्डल Dhanuk Mandal 
 धागंर Dhangar 
 अन्य तराई िनिाती Other Plains Janajati (झगंाि Jhangad, रािबसंी Rajbanshi, गन्गाई 
Gangai,सन्थाल/सतार Santhal/Satar, जधमाल Dhimal, तािपनररया Tajpuriya, मचे े
Meche, कोच े  Koche,दकसन Kisan, मनन्ि Munda, कन स्बदिया /पथाकताड 
Kusbadiya/Patharkata, अन्य आदिबासी Unidentified Adibasi/Janajati) 
 
तराई िजलत Dalit Plains:  
 मनसिर  Musahar (सिा Sada)   चमार Chamaar    पासवान Paswan 
 तत्मा Tatma   धोबी Dhobi   डनम Dom 
 िलखोर Halkhor (Mallik)    खत्व े(मण्डल) Khatbe (Mandal) 
 अन्य तराई िजलत Other plains Dalit (Nat) 
 
 मनजस्लम Muslim   
 
 
[caste_hills]  तपाई कन  िात र समनिायको िो?  
What is your caste/ethnic Group?  आिा कोन िाईत आ समनिायके जछयई ? 
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पिाडी Hill:     पिाडी ब्रिमार् Hill Brahmin   पिाडी क्षते्री  Chhetri 
पिाडी िनिाती Janajati Hills:  
 तामांग Tamang    मगर Magar    सन नवार Sunuwar    माझी Majhi   
 िननवार Danuwar     अन्य पिाडी िनिाती Other Hills Janajati 
पिाडी िजलत Dalit Hills:  
 जबस्वकमाड Biswakarma  सने्चनरी Senchuri  
 अन्य पिाडी िजलत Other Hill Dalits  (काजम Kami, िम ैDamai,ढोली Dholi, साकी Sarki, बािी 
Badi, गाइन ेGaine) 
 
[caste_other]   तपाई कन  िात र समनिायको िो?  
What is your caste/ethnic Group?  आिा कोन िाईत आ समनिायके जछयई ? 
 अन्य Other (मरवारी Marwari, बंगाली Bangali, िनै Jain, पन्िाबी Panjabi/Sikh, अन्य 
Unidentified Others) 
 
 [religion] तपाई कन  धमड मान्नन हुन्छ?   
What is your religion?   आिा कोन धमड मानई जछयई ? 
 जिन्िन  Hindu  
 मनजस्लम  Muslim  
 बौद्ध Buddhist  
 दक्रजियन  Christian  
 अन्य Others 
 
[agepw]    महिला  को उमरे लागकेो बषडमा    
Age of the woman in running years   
महिलाके उमरे लागल बषड 
                लागकेो बषड Years                लागकेो बषड 
उत्तरिाता ल ेभनकेो उमरे सिी नलागकेो अवस्थामा फेरी खोतल्नन िोस् 
If the interviewer thinks the age is not accurate probe to work out age 
 
 [agemarried]  जबबाि हुिंा को उमरे लागकेो बषडमा    
Age of the woman in running years when she got married?  
जववाि समयके उमरे लागल बषडम े? 
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                लागकेो बषड Years in running years लागल बषड 
 
Agency and Empowerment 
 
[wrk_involve]  तलका  कायडिरु  मध्ये तपाई कस्तो काम गननड हुन्छ? Which types of work are you 
normally involved in जनचा जलखल काि सब म ेस आि  दक सब करै जछयई  ?  
 
1. घर जभत्र गररन ेकायड Indoor work (inside the home only) घर जभतर करै बाला काि (घर जभतरके 
काि मात्र) 
2. घर बाजिर गररन ेकायड Outdoor work (work outside the home, such as work in the fields, 
or work in another place) घर बािर करै बाला काि (घर बिारके काि िनेा खतेके काि, वा कोनो 
िोसर िगिमें करबला काि) 
3. िनव ैठाउँ मा गररन ेकायड both िन न िगिमें करबला काि   
 
यदि उत्तर १ आएमा EMP1 न सोध्ननस| एकै्क चोटी EMP 6 म िानन िोस|्  If anwer is option 1 do not 
ask  EMP1. Directly go to EMP 6. उत्तर १ एतई त EMP1 नई पनछन |  एके्क बरे EMP 6 म ेिाऊ |  
 
उत्तर २ वा ३ दिएमा यो प्रश्न सोध्ननिोस: सामान्यतया तपाई कन  दकजसमको बाजिर गन ेकाममा सलंग्नहुननहुन्छ 
? If answer 2 or 3, ask: which type of outdoor work are you normally involved in?  यदि 
उत्तर २ वा ३ एतई त , पनछन  : केिन रंगके बािर करे वाला काि म े आिा  साजमल िोईजछयई  ?  
 
1. िजैनक ज्यालािारी मििनरी (अरुको घरमा काम गन,े कारखानामा काम गन,े ब्यान्ड बािा बिाउन,े 
इनार खन्न,े काम साटासाट)  
Daily paid labour (Hirer worker, labour exchange, daily-waged labour, factory 
labour, band party player, tube well digger) िजैनक मििनरी (घरम े काि कर बला, 
कारखानाके मििनर, ब्यान्ड बािा बिाव वला, इनार खन वला, कािके बिलाम ेकाि) 
2. जनयजमत िाजगर  (ड्राइभर, जशक्षक, सरकारी वा गरै सरकारी िाजगर आदि )  
Regular Job (driver, teacher, factory, gov job, ngo job etc. ) नोकरीकरवला (गाडी 
चलाववला, जशक्षक, सरकारी वा गरै सरकारी नोकरीकरवला) 
3. खतेीपाती (अन्न बाजल उत्पािन)  
Farming (crop production) खतेीपाती (अन्न उप्िनेाजय)  
4. पशन पालन (िस्त ैिाना वा घास सकंलन) 
Animal husbandry (like collecting food and fodder for caddles) पशन पालन (िनेा 
िाना वा घास सकंलन) 
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5. आफ्नो उत्पादित (कृजषिन्य अन्न, तरकारी, फलफूल आदि) बचेरे.    
Selling own Crop Production (Cereal, Vegetables, fruits, etc) अपन उब्िौल अन्न, 
फल फूल बचेक  
6. आफ्नो उत्पादित िधू, ििी, घ्यन बचेरे  
Selling Milk, yoghurt or ghee from own cattle अपन घर के िनध िजि बचे क 
7. आ उत्पादित पशन, माछा, मासन बचेरे  
Selling livestock, fish or meat from own production अपन घर के माछा मासन बचे क 
8. सानो व्यापार (कपाल काट्न,े धोबी आदि) 
Service provider (small scale trade) such as hair cutter, launderer (dhobi) छोटका  व्यापार 
(केस काट वला, धोबी) 
9. सानो व्यापार (ठेला, िाट बिारमा पसल थापरे, धरैे सानो पसल आदि) 
 Small scale trade (Tela, small market stall, very small shop, tea shop) छोटका व्यापार 
(ठेला ,िाट बिार पर िोकान कैर क ,एकिम छोट िोकान) 
10. मध्यम व्यापार (सानो दकराना पसल, औषधी पसल, सानो धान जमल आदि)  
Medium Scale trade (Small Grocery, Medicine shop/ practitioner, small rice mill, 
operating a band party) मझौला व्यापार (छोट दकराना िोकानिबाइ िोकान ,छोट धान के जमल) 
11. ठूलो व्यापार (मनख्य बिारमा ठूलो पसल, ठूलो अन्न भण्डार वा जमल, उधोग आदि) 
 Large Scale Trade (Larger shop in main bazaar, big grain store or mill, factory, 
etc) बढका व्यापार (मने बिार म ेबढका िोकान ,बढका अन्न के िोकान ,या जमल) 
12. स्वरोिगार (ढक्की, पंखा आदि बनाएर बचे्न,े कपडा जसलाउन ेआदि)  
Making things for sale e.g. Bamboo baskets, fans, tailoring etc. स्वरोिगार (ढदकया ,पंखा 
यािी बचे क ,कपडा सी क) 
13.  िङ्गली सामग्रीिरु िम्मा गरेर बचे्न े– (िस्त ैमाछा, घोंगी, िाउरा, बासँ, पत्ता, साग)  
Selling things gathered from the wild (e.g. fish, snails, firewood, bamboo, leaves, sag 
etc.)  िगंली समान सब (िनेा माछ ,घोंगी ,िनाड ,बासँ ,पता ,साग) बचे क 
14. अफ्नो रर्सा/बयल वा टायर गाडा/ ठेला/ थ्रसेर/ ट्रया्टर/ पम्पसटे चलाउन े  
Riding own rickshaw/operating own ox cart/ or push along cart (Tela) अपन रर्सा/बलै 
गाडी  / टायर गाडी / ठेला    चला क 
15.  रर्सा/बयल वा टायर गाडा/ तलेा/ थ्रसेर/  ट्रया्टर/ पम्पसेट आिी भाडामा दिन े 
Renting out Rickshaw/ ox cart/ or push cart (Tela)/ Thresher/ Tractor/Pumpset etc. 
भाडा म ेरर्सा/बलै गाडी  / टायर गाडी / ठेला भाडा म े चला क  
16. र्सी बनाएर बचे्न ेMaking and selling alcohol    िारु बनाक आ बचेक  
Appendix C 
Questionnaire for measuring agency freedom in the LBW-SAT trial 
 
 
397 | P a g e  
 
17. जसमा व्यापार Border trade जसमा व्यापार क क  
18. ठेकेिार Tegdaar contractor (building, tube wells etc) ठेकेिार     
19. बैिजेसक रोिगार इजन्डया  Overseas labour India बैिजेसक रोिगार इजन्डया 
20.  बिैजेसक रोिगार अन्य Overseas labour other बैिजेसक रोिगार अन्य 
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सनचक १: जबजभन्न क्षते्रिरुको स्वतन्त्रता; काम सम्बजन्ध जनर्डय गन े
Indicator 1 - Autonomy in different domains; decision-making regarding work  
सनचक १:जबजभन्न क्षते्रसबमें स्वतन्त्रतासोततं्र; काि सम्बजन्ध जनर्डय करबाक 
 
EMP1  
उत्तरिाताल ेघर बाजिर गररन ेकायड वा िनव ैठाउँमा गररन ेकायड गछन ड भनमेा मात्र सोध्न|े ( घर बाजिर कायड शब्ि 
भन्नन भन्िा उत्तरिाताल ेभनकेो घर बाजिरको कायड प्रयोग गननड  
Answer only if the interviewee declares that she DOES outdoor work or both. (Instead 
of saying word “outdoor work”, refer to the actual outdoor work that the interviewee 
says she does)  
घर बािर के काि या िन न िगिमें करबला  काि करैजछ कित ै त मात्र पनछन  | ( घर बािरके काि कि ेस ेअच्छा 
उत्तरिाता किल घर बाजिरके काि प्रयोग करु) 
     
माजनसिरुसगँ घर बाजिर कायड गननडको पछाडी प्राय गरेर जबजभन्न खालका कारर्िरु हुन ेगिडछन | यस्ता 
खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे बनझ्नको लाजग िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु सोध्न 
चािन्छन | कन  ै कन  ै कारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ भन े कन  ै कन  ै सजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया 
तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला | उिािरर्को लाजग तपाईल े कन  ैकायड गननडहुन्छ 
दकनदक तपाईलाई त्यो कायड गनपैछड त्यिी कायड  गिाड तपाईले केिी मात्रामा घर पररवारका सिस्यिरुलाई 
खनशी बनाउन पजन गननड भएको हुन स्छ | कन  ैपजन उत्तरिरु सजि वा गलत हुन्छन भन्न ेछैन|कजतपय समयमा 
तपाईल ेमिशनस गननडहुन्छ दक जत कायड गनडको पछाडी  जबजभन्न कारर्िरु छन ्| 
People often have several reasons for doing outdoor work. I  will ask you to tell me 
whether or not these reasons are right for you. Some reasons may be right for you, 
some may not be right for you. Please answer yes or no to the question. For example, 
you might do outdoor work because you have to. At the same time, you might do it in 
part, because you want your family members to like you, or because you think it is the 
right thing to do outdoor work. There is no right or wrong answer. Often you may 
realise that you have several reasons for doing outdoor work. 
कोनो भी काि  कर के पाछा  लोक  सब के प्रायः बहुत रंग  के कारर् सब रि ैछई | ओ कारर् सब आिाके    
सजि बनझाईय दक नै    से बात सब बनझ के लेल िम सब आिा सब सई प्रस्नसब  पनछ चाि ैछी | कोनो कोनो 
कारर् सजि लाइग सकैय आिाके आ कोनो कोनो कारर् नजियो सजि लाइग सकैय | कृपया आिाके  ई कथनसब 
सजि बनझाई य दक नै से किब | उिािरर् के लेल आिा कोनो काि करै छीई  कजथलाकी आिा के ओ काि 
करि ेपतेइ  | तिीना ओ काि आिा घर पररवारके सिस्यसबके  खनस करकेलेल सेिो केने िोब सकई छई || 
अई में कोनो उतर ठीक वा गलत नै ितेई | आिाके िे बनझाइय से किब|   
 
कृपया िो या िोइन भन्नन िोला. 
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Please answer yes or no.  
कृपया ि या न ैस ेकिब | 
 
जबकल्पिरु पढ्ननिोस ( उत्तरिाताले भन्न सज्िन वा थािा छैन भन्न सके्नछन ) 
Read out the answers [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer]  






















मालनम न ै अ / 
उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
a. तपाई  यो काम गननडहुन्छ  दकनकी तपाइल ेगननड पछड | 
You do this work because you have to. 
आिा ई काि  करै जछ कजथला  दक आिाके कर परत|ै 
11 12 99 
b. तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनकी यिी गननडभएन भन े
तपाईले गाली खाननपछड | You do this work because you will 
get in trouble if you don’t.  
आिा  ई काज  करै छि कथिला  कक न ैकरब ैत आिाके गाइर 
बात सुन परत|ै 
11 12 99 
c. तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाई यो काम गनड 
चािननहुन्छ | You do this work because you want to. 
आिा ई काि करै जछ कजथला दक आिा यी काि करे चािछैी | 
11 12 99 
d. तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई घर 
पररवारका सिस्यिरुल ेयो काम गनड भन्ननहुन्छ | 
You do this work because that is what your family 
members tell you to do.  
आिा ई काि करै जछ कजथला दक आिाके घर पररवारके सिस्यसब 
ई काि कर कि ैछै | 
11 12 99 
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मालनम न ै अ / 
उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
e. घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु सिमत भए पजन वा नभए पजन 
तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनकी  तपाईको  जबचारमा यो काम गननड 
राम्रो कन रा िो | 
You do this work because you personally think it is 
the right thing to do, whether or not your family 
members agree.  
आिा ई काि करै जछ कजथला की आिाके जवचारम ेई काम करनाइँ 
जनक बात छई  चाि ेघर पररवारके सिस्यसब मान ेया न ैमान े | 
11 12 99 
f. तपाई यो काम गननड हुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई यो काम गनड 
मनपछड | 
You do this work because you like it . 
आिा ई काि करै जछ कजथला की आिाके यी काम कर मे जनक 
लगयै | 
   
h. तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनभन े यो काम गिाड घर 
पररवारका सिस्यिरु तपाई माजथ ररसाउन ेछैनन ्|    
You do this work so that your family members won’t 
get angry with you.  
आिा ई काि करै जछ कजथला  दक ई काि  करबै त आिाके घर 
पररवारके सिस्यसब आिा पर न ैजपततैई | 
11 12 99 
i. तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई घर 
पररवारका सिस्यिरुल ेमाया गरुन भन्न ेचािननहुन्छ | 
You do this work because you want your family 
members to like you.  
आिा ई काि करै जछ कजथला की घर पररवारके सिस्यसब आिाके 
मान ेस ेचाि ैजछ | 
11 12 99 
j. तपाई यो काम गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईको यो कतडब्य िो | 
You do this work because it is your duty to do it. आिा 
ई काि करै जछ कजथला की आिाके कतडब्य छै | 
11 12 99 
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मालनम न ै अ / 
उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
k. You do this work because it is personally 
important to you. 11 12 99 
 
— — — →  E M P 1 i  प जछ  E M P  1 1  मा  िा नन िो स्   
A f t e r  E M P 1 i  g o  d i r e c t l y  t o  E M P  1 1  
E M P 1 i  के  बा ि  E M P  1 1  मे  िा उ   
 
EMP6  
यदि उत्तरिाताल ेघर जभत्र काम गछन ड  भनपेछी मात्र सोध्न े|  
Answer if the interviewee declares that she does indoor work only. 
यदि उत्तरिाता घर स बािर काि  न ैकरै जछ कि त ैत मात्र ेEMP6 पनछ बै| 
    
माजनसिरुसगँ कन  ै पजन कायड नगननडको पछाडी प्राय गरेर जबजभन्न खालका कारर्िरु हुन ेगिडछन | यस्ता 
खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे बनझ्नको लाजग िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु सोध्न 
चािन्छौ| कन  ैकन  ैकारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ भन ेकन  ै कन  ैसजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया 
तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला | उिािरर्को लाजग तपाईल े कन  ैकायड गननडहुन्न  
दकनकी तपाईल ेघर बाजिर काम गन ेअवसर पाउनन हुन्न|त्यस ैगरी तपाई कन  ैकायड गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाईल े
तपाईको पररवारल ेतपाईलाई मानन  चािन्नन हुन्छ या दकनकी तपाईको जवचारम घर बाजिर काम गननड रठक 
िोइन | कन  ैपजन उत्तरिरु सजि वा गलत हुन्छन भन्न ेछैन|कजतपय समयमा तपाईल ेमिशनस गननडहुन्छ दक जत 
घर बाजिर कायड न गननडको  पछाडी  जबजभन्न कारर्िरु छन ्| 
People often have several reasons for not doing outdoor work. I will ask you to tell me 
whether these reasons are right for you. Some reasons may be right for you, some 
may not be right for you. Please answer yes or no to the question. For example, you 
might not work because you don’t have opportunity. At the same time, you might not 
work because you want your family members to like you, or because you do not think 
it is the right thing to do outdoor work. There is no right or wrong answer. Often you 
may realise that you have several reasons for not doing outdoor work.  
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कोनो भी काि  नइ कर के पाछा  लोक  सब के प्रायः बहुत रंग  के कारर् सब रि ैछई | ओ कारर् सब आिाके    
सजि बनझाईय दक नै    से बात सब बनझ के लेल िम सब आिा सब स यी  प्रस्नसब  पनछ चाि ैछी | कोनो कोनो 
कारर् सजि लाइग सकैय आिाके आ कोनो कोनो कारर् नजियो सजि लाइग सकैय | कृपया आिाके  यी  
कथनसब सजि बनझाई य दक नै से किब | उिािरर् के लेल आिा काि नै करै जछ कजथला दक आिाके अवसर 
नइ जमललै  |तजिना  आिा काि नइ करै जछ कजथलादक आिा चाि ैजछ दक आिाके पररवार आिाके मान ै या 
कैला दक घर बािर काि करनाई आिाके लेल नई रठक छै  |  आिा िे किब ओईमे सजि या गलत कनछो नइ 
िोतै | कोनो कोनो समयमे आिाके मिसनस िोतई दक घर बािर काि नइ करेके पाछन  बहुते कारर् सब िोतै| 
 
कृपया गरेर िो अथवा िोइन भन्नन िोला| 
Please answer Yes or No.  
कृपया  क क ि या न ैस ेकहु| 
 
जबकल्पिरु पढ्ननिोस ( उत्तरिाताले भन्न सज्िन वा थािा छैन भन्न सके्नछन) 
Read out the answers [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer]  


















मालनम न ै अ / 
उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
a. तपाई घर बाजिर काम गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाईल ेघर बाजिर 
काम गन ेअवसर पाउनन हुन्न| You do not work outside 
the home because you do not have the 
opportunity. 
आिा घर बािर काम न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके अवसर न ै
जमलयै| 
11 12 99 
b. तपाई घर बाजिर काम गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाईलाई सीप छैन 
| You do not work outside the home because you 
do not have the skills. 
आिा घर बािर काम न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके काम करे के 
सीप(लनइर ) न ैछै | 
11 12 99 
c. तपाई घर बाजिर काम गननड हुन्न दकनदक यदि गननड भयो भन े
तपाईल ेगाली खाननपछड | You do not work outside the 
11 12 99 
Appendix C 
Questionnaire for measuring agency freedom in the LBW-SAT trial 
 
 


















मालनम न ै अ / 
उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
home because you will get in trouble if you do. आिा  
घर बिार काि  न ैकरै जछ कजथला  दक  काि  करब ैत आिाके 
गाइर बात सन  परत|ै 
d. तपाई यो काम गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाई चािननहुन्न | You do 
not work outside the home because you do not 
want to.  
आिा घर बािर काि न ैकरै जछ कजथला  दक आिा न ैचािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
e. तपाई घर बाजिर काम गननड हुन्न दकनकी घर पररवारका 
सिस्यिरुल े  त्यसो नगनड भन्छन | You do not work 
outside the home because your family members 
tell you not to do so. 
आिा घर बािर काि न ै करै जछ कजथला दक घर पररवारके 
सिस्यसब ई न ैकर स े कि ैछै | 
11 12 99 
f. घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु  सिमत भए पजन  नभए 
पजन  तपाईको  जबचारमा  घर बाजिर  काम गनन  ठीक िैन 
त्यसैले  तपाई यो काम गनुन िुन्न | You do not work 
outside the home because you personally think it 
is the right thing to do, whether or not your family 
members agree. 
आिा घर बािर काज नैकरै छि कथिला  कक ई काज हठक न ै
िै स ेआिाके  बुझाई य चािे घर पररवारके सिस्यसब  मान े
या न ैमान े | 
11 12 99 
g. तपाई   घर बाजिर  काम गननड हुन्न  दकनकी तपाईलाई  यो 
काम मनपिनै | You do not work outside the home 
because you don’t like it. 
आिा घर बािर काम न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके जनक न ै 
लागइ य | 
11 12 99 
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मालनम न ै अ / 
उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
h. तपाई   घर बाजिर काम गननडहुन्न  दकनकी यदि तपाईल ेयो 
काम गननड भयो  भन े घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु तपाईसगँ 
ररसाउछन भनरे|  You do not work outside the home 
because your family members might get angry 
with you if you do. 
आिा घर बािर काि न ै करै जछ कजथला दक करब ै त घर 
पररवारके सिस्यसब आिा पर जपततैई | 
11 12 99 
i. तपाई   घर बाजिर काम गननड हुन्न  दकनकी घर पररवारका 
सिस्यिरुल ेतपाईलाई  माया गरोस ्भन्न ेचािन्छन  | 
You do not work outside the home because you 
want your family members to like you.  
आिा घर बािर काि न ै करै जछ कजथला दक घर पररवारके 
सिस्यसब आिाके मान ैस े चाि ैजछ | 
11 12 99 
j. तपाई घर बाजिर काम गननड हुन्न दकनकी घर जभत्र बस्नन तपाईको 
कतडब्य िो | You do not work outside the home 
because it is your duty to stay at home. 
आिा घर बािर काि न ैकरै जछ कजथलादक घर जभत्रर  रिके 
आिाके कतडब्य छै| 
11 12 99 
h. You do not work outside the home because it is 
not personally important to you. 




सबलैाई सोध्नन िोस.् Ask everyone. सबके पनछन . 
 
सनचक २ : जबजभन्न क्षते्रिरुको स्वतन्त्रता; घरायसी कायड र रेखिखेको जनर्डय बारेमा   
Indicator 2 - Autonomy in different domains; decision-making regarding household 
activities and caring   
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सनचक २ :  सब रंगके  क्षते्रसबके  स्वतन्त्रता; घरायसी काि आ िखेभालके  जनर्डय बारेम े 
 
तपाईले गने कायड वा अन्य दक्रयाकलापिरु बािकेका घरमा (एउटै भान्सा प्रयोग गन,े सगँै बस्न े) रििा गन े
जबजभन्न दक्रयाकलापिरु िस्त ै घर सफा गन,ेकपडा सफा गन,े खानकेन रािरुको दकनमले गननड पन े हुन्छ | 
बच्चािरुको स्यािार वा बनढाबनढीको स्यािार गननडपन ेहुन्छ |  यी दक्रयाकलापिरु पररवारको कन  ैएउटा व्यजिल े
गननडपने हुन्छ |  कजिलकेािी पररवारका अन्य सिस्यिरुसगँ काम बाडरे पजन गररन्छ |  
 
Besides your work or other activities, living in a household (sharing kitchen, living 
together) also involves several activities, such as cleaning the house, doing the 
laundry, or doing shopping for food. It may also involve caring for the children or the 
elders living in that household. Many times one specific member of the household 
performs these activities. Sometimes, they are divided among two or more members.   
आिाके   करै बाला काि  या िोसर कामकाि के अलावा  घर मे(ऐकेटा भानस प्रयोग करवला , सगं ेरिवला 
)   रिजैछ त बहुत रंगके  कामकािसब करई जछ  िनेा घर सफा करनाइँ, कपडा सफा करनाइँ या खाए  जपब 
के लले सर समान दकन परैत िते, तजिना  बच्च सब के िखेाभाल वा  बनढसब के िखेाभाल कर परैत ितेई |   
यी काम काि सब घर के कोनो एक गोटे के कर परै छै|कजियो काल घर के िोसर गोटेसग े सिेो जमलिनल क 
सिेो  करै  छैई |    
 
तपाईको घरमा यी कामिरु कसल ेबढी गननड हुन्छ ? 
In your household, who does each of these things most of the time? 
आिा  के घर म ेई कामसब सब स बसेी के  करै छै ? 
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खाना बनाउन े काम 




and cooking the 
main meal most 
of the time? 
आिा के घरधनरी  म े
भान्सा करै बाला 
काम सब स  बसेी के 
करै छै ?  
धेरै िसो म 
पनरै घरको 
लाजग गछन ड 
You do 
most of 







लेल  करै 
जछ 
धेरै िसो अरुिरुले गननड हुन्छ 
Someone else does most 
of it.  







1  बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िेठाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2  आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3  १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4  १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5  अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6  पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7  पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8  काम गने  Hirer worker  
काम करवला   
धेरै वा िोरै जे भए पजन  घरको 
सिस्यिरुमा बाढेर गछौ कृपया 
उल्लखे गननडिोस ्) You share more 
or less equally with other 
person or persons in your 
household (please 
specify). काि बसेी सब गोटे 
जमलिनल क करै जछ कृपया उल्लखे करु 
)  
 
1  बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
2  आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3  १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4  १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5  अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6  पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7  पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  





















न ै य/ 
उत्तर न ै
िेलकै 
2.प्राय  िसो 
घरधनरीको खान े
कन रािरु कसल ेदकनरे 
ल्याउछन ्? 
Who in the 
household 
 1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
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and brings food 
for the 
household?  
प्राय क क घरधनरीके  
खाई वाला जचि सब 
के दकन क लब ैछै?  
 
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker काम 
करवला 
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घरधनरीमा घर सफा 
गने काम 




the home most 
of the time? 
आिा के घर म े
घरधनरी  सफा करै 
बाला काम  
 सब  बसेी के करै छै 
? 
धेरै िसो म 
पनरै घरको 
लाजग गछन ड 
You do 
most of 







लेल  करै 
जछ 
धेरै िसो अरुिरुल े गननड हुन्छ 
Someone else does most 
of it.  






1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
धेरै वा िोरै जे भए पजन  घरको 
सिस्यिरुमा बाढेर गछौ कृपया 
उल्लखे गननडिोस ्) You share more 
or less equally with other 
person or persons in your 
household (please 
specify). काि बसेी सब गोटे 
जमलिनल क करै जछ कृपया उल्लखे करु 
)  
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  


























सफा गन े काम र 
लनगा धन  ेकाम कसल े
बढी  गछड? 
In your 
household, who 
cleans dishes  
and does the 
 1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
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laundry most of 
the time? 
आिा के घरधनरीम े
बतडन माि बाला 
काम आ कपडा धोए 
वाला काम सब स े 
बसेी के  करै छै ?  
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker काम 
करवला  
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घरधनरीमा घर ममडत  
काम 




repairs most of 
the time? 
आिा के घरधनरी म े
घर मरमत बाला 
काम  
 सब स बसेी के करै छै 
? 
धेरै िसो म 
पनरै घरको 
लाजग गछन ड 
You do 
most of 







लेल  करै 
जछ 
धेरै िसो अरुिरुल े गननड हुन्छ 
Someone else does most 
of it.  






1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
धेरै वा िोरै जे भए पजन  घरको 
सिस्यिरुमा बाढेर गछौ कृपया 
उल्लखे गननडिोस ्) You share more 
or less equally with other 
person or persons in your 
household (please 
specify). काि बसेी सब गोटे 
जमलिनल क करै जछ कृपया उल्लखे करु 
)  
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  



























सरंक्षर्  गन े तथा 
खचड गन/े जतन े काम 
कसल ेबढी  गछड? In 
your household, 
who does 
 1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
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looking after the 
household 
money and 
paying bills most 
of the time? आिा 
के घरधनरी म े ढौवा 
कौरी के लने िने आ 
राख बाला काम सब 
स बसेी के करै छै ? 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker काम 
करवला 
Appendix C 
Questionnaire for measuring agency freedom in the LBW-SAT trial 
 
 




समय कसल े जबताउ 
छ, प्राय कसल े
स्यािार गछड र 
जबरामी हुिा िरेचाि 




spends time with 
children, 
generally looks 
after them and 
takes care of 
them when they 
are ill most of the 
time? आिा के 
घरधनरी म ेबच्चा िोरे 
समय के जबतब ै  छै, 
प्राय के स्यािार करै 
छै आ   मन खराब बरे 
म ेरेख िखे कर बाला 
काि सब स  बसेी के  
करै छै ? 
धेरै िसो म 
पनरै घरको 
लाजग गछन ड 
You do 
most of 







लेल  करै 
जछ 
धेरै िसो अरुिरुल े गननड हुन्छ 
Someone else does most 
of it.  







1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
धेरै वा िोरै जे भए पजन  घरको 
सिस्यिरुमा बाढेर गछौ कृपया 
उल्लखे गननडिोस ्) You share more 
or less equally with other 
person or persons in your 
household (please 
specify). काि बसेी सब गोटे 
जमलिनल क करै जछ कृपया उल्लखे करु 
)  
 
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  

























जबरामी वा बनढाबनढी 




 1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
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does looking 
after elderly or ill 
person most of 
the time? 
आिा के घर बरेामी 
आ बढू परूान  सब के 
िखे बाला काम सब 
स  बसेी के  करै छै ? 
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker काम 
करवला  
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9. तपाईको घरमा 
बच्चा बच्चीलाई राम्रो 
व्यविार बारेमा 






most of the 
time? 
आिा के घरके  जधया 
पनताके  जनक बोजल 
व्यविार जसखाब 
बाला काि सब स 
बसेी के करै छै ? 
धेरै िसो म 
पनरै घरको 
लाजग गछन ड 
You do 
most of 







लेल  करै 
जछ 
धेरै िसो अरुिरुल े गननड हुन्छ 
Someone else does most 
of it.  






1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in 
law बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 
10 १० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख 
सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  
8 काम गने  Hirer worker 
काम करवला  
धेरै वा िोरै जे भए पजन  घरको 
सिस्यिरुमा बाढेर गछौ कृपया 
उल्लखे गननडिोस ्) You share more 
or less equally with other 
person or persons in your 
household (please 
specify). काि बसेी सब गोटे 
जमलिनल क करै जछ कृपया उल्लखे करु 
)  
1 बजिनी वा नन्ि वा िठेाजन वा 
िेउरानी Sister or sister in law 
बिीन आ ननिै आ  दियािजन 
2 आमा वा सासन Mother or 
mother in law माय आ   
3 १० वषड मनजनका केटी Girl  
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके   लडकी 
4 १० वषड मनजनका केटा Boy 
children under the age of 10 
१० वषड स जनचाके लडका  
5 अन्य  बच्चािरू Other 
childrenअन्य बच्चासब  
6 पररवारका पनरुष सिस्य Male 
family member घरके पनरुख सिस्य  
7 पररवारको अन्य सिस्य (िरू) 
Other family member(s) 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्यसब  

























EMP12.   
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यहर्द उत्तिर्दाताले केहि क्रक्रयाकलाप मात्र गछाि भिे, नत क्रक्रयाकलापको उनि निि फेिी  र्दोिोयााउिुिोस,् 
जसले गर्दाा उनिले बुझ्ि ेनछि क्रक िामी उिले गिेको क्रक्रयाकलापको को कािणिरु सोध्िे छौ.यहर्द उिाले 
सबै क्रक्रयाकलाप गनछाि भिे फेिी र्दोिोयााउिु परै्दि. 
If interviewee does only some activities, repeat them to her, so that she can 
understand that we will now talk about her reasons for doing those activities. If she 
does all activities, no need to repeat them. 
यहर्द उत्तिर्दाता कुछ कामकाजसब मात्र ेकिै छै त, उ कामकाज सब िुनकासब लग  फेिो   र्दोििाउ , 
जई स क्रक ओं बुझथथि क्रक अपिा सब  ओंकिा सबस ओं सब केिे कामकाज के कािण  सब पुछबै 
|यहर्द  ओं  सब कामकाज किै छै त फेिो र्दोििाब  िै पितै. 
 
People often have several reasons for doing household activities. I will ask you to tell 
me whether or not these reasons are right for you. Some reasons may be right for 
you, some may not be right for you. Please answer yes or no to the question. There 
is no right or wrong answer. Often you may realise that you have several reasons for 
doing household activities. माजनसिरुसगँ घरधनरीका दक्रयाकलाप गननडको पछाडी प्राय गरेर जबजभन्न 
खालका कारर्िरु हुन ेगिडछन | यस्ता खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे बनझ्नको लाजग 
िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु सोध्न चािन्छन | कन  ैकन  ैकारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ भन ेकन  ैकन  ै
सजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला | कन  ैपजन उत्तरिरु 
सजि वा गलत हुन्छन भन्न ेछैन|कजतपय समयमा तपाईल ेमिशनस गननडहुन्छ दक जत दक्रयाकलाप गनडको पछाडी  
जबजभन्न कारर्िरु छन ्| 
 कोनो भी कामकाि  कर के पाछा  लोक  सब के प्रायः बहुत रंग  के कारर् सब रि ैछई | ओ कारर् सब 
आिाके    सजि बनझाईय दक न ै   से बात सब बनझ के लेल िम सब आिा सब सई प्रस्नसब  पनछ चाि ैछी | कोनो 
कोनो कारर् सजि लाइग सकैय आिाके आ कोनो कोनो कारर् नजियो सजि लाइग सकैय | कृपया आिाके  ई 
कथनसब सजि बनझाई य दक नै स ेकिब | अई में कोनो उतर ठीक वा गलत न ैितेई | आिाके ि ेबनझाइय स े
किब|   
 
कृपया गरेर िो अथवा िोइन भन्नन िोला| 
Please answer Yes or No.  
कृपया  क क ि या न ैस ेकहु| 
 
जबकल्पिरु पढ्ननिोस ( उत्तरिाताले भन्न सज्िन वा थािा छैन भन्न सके्न छन)  
Read out the options [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer]  
जबकल्पसब पढू (उत्तर नैकिब वा नैबनझल अई सेिो किी सकैछई  ) 
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थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको Don’t 
know/ 
No answer मालनम 
न ैअ / उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
a. तपाई  यी दक्रयाकलापिरु गननड हुन्छ दकनकी  
तपाईलाई  यी दक्रयाकलापिरु गननड पछड | You do these 
activities because you have to. 
आिा ई कािसब   करै जछ कजथला  दक आिाके कर परै 
छई| 
11 12 99 
b. तपाई ई कामिरु  गननडहुन्छ दकनकी यिी गननडभएन भन े
तपाईले गाली खाननपछड | You do these activities 
because you will get in trouble if you don’t.  
आिा ई कािसब करै जछ कजथला दक न ैकरब ैत आिाके 
गाइर बात सन  परैछई | 
11 12 99 
c. तपाई ई कामिरु गननड हुन्छ दकनकी तपाई ई कामिरु 
गनड चािनन हुन्छ | You do these activities 
because you want to. 
आिा ई कािसब करै जछ कजथला दक ई कािसब आिा कर 
चािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
d. तपाई ई  कामिरु गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई घर 
पररवारका सिस्यिरुल ेई काम गनड भन्ननहुन्छ | 
You do these activities because that is what 
your family members tell you to do.   
आिा ई कािसब  करै जछ कजथला दक आिाके घर 
पररवारके सिस्यसब ई काि कर कि ैछै | 
11 12 99 
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थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको Don’t 
know/ 
No answer मालनम 
न ैअ / उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
e. घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु सिमत भए पजन वा नभए 
पजन तपाई ई कामिरु  गननडहुन्छ दकनकी  तपाईको  
जबचारमा ई कामिरु  गननड राम्रो कन रा िो | 
You do these activities because you 
personally think it is the right thing to do, 
whether or not your family members agree. 
आिा ई कािसब  करै जछ कजथला की आिाके जवचारम ेई 
कामसब  करनाइँ जनक बात छई  चाि े घर पररवारके 
सिस्यसब मान ैया न ै मान ै 
11 12 99 
f. तपाई ई कामिरु गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई ई कामिरु 
गनड मन पछड | You do these activities because 
you like doing them. 
आिा ई कािसब करै जछ कजथला दक ई कािसब कर 
आिाके जनक लागइ य| 
11 12 99 
g. तपाई यी कामिरु गननड हुन्छ िसल ेगिाड घर पररवारका 
सिस्यिरु  तपाईसगँ  ररसाउन ेछैनन ्| 
You do these activities so that your family 
members won’t get angry with you. 
आिा ई कािसब करै जछ कजथला दक ई काम करब ैत घर 
पररवारके सिस्यसब आिा पर न ैजपततैई | 
11 12 99 
h. तपाई ई कामिरु गननडहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई घर 
पररवारका सिस्यिरुल ेमाया गरुन भन्न ेचािननहुन्छ 
You do these activities because you want 
your family members to like you. 
आिा ई कािसब करै जछ कजथला दक घर पररवारके 
सिस्यसब आिाके मानई  स ेचाि ैजछ| 
11 12 99 
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थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको Don’t 
know/ 
No answer मालनम 
न ैअ / उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
i. तपाई ई कामिरु गननड हुन्छ दकन दक ई कामिरु गननड 
तपाईको कतडब्य िो | You do these activities 
because it is your duty to do them.  
आिा ई कामसब करै जछ कजथला दक ई कामसब करनाई 
आिाके कतडब्य छै | 
11 12 99 
You do these activities because it is 
personally important to you. 
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सनचक ३: जबजभन्न  क्षते्रिरुको स्वतन्त्रता; मनख्य घरायसी  समाग्री दकनमलेको जनर्डय गन ेसनि्भडमा  
Indicator 3 - Autonomy in different domains; decision-making regarding major 
household purchases  
 सनचक ३: सबरंगके क्षते्रसबके स्वतन्त्रता: प्रमनख घरायसी सामान दकनके जनर्डय लवेके सनि्भडमें  
 
EMP13 
िामी तपाईको घरकोलाजग गररन ेठूला खालका दकनमले गन ेकन रामा कसल ेजनर्डयिरु गछड भन्न ेबारेमा िान्न 
चािन्छौ| यस्तो दकनमलेकोलाजग ठूलो रकम लाग्छ िन  िजैनक हुन ेखचडमा समाबशे हुिनै िस्त ैघर दकन्न,े 
घरको ममडत, नया सामग्री तथा गाईबस्तन दकन्न ेिस्ता कन रािरु पछडन ्|      
Now we would like to know about who makes the decisions about the major household 
purchases in your household. These types of purchases include large amount of 
money which are not included in household regular budget, such as buying a house, 
important house repairs, buying a new appliance or buying new livestock.   
िम सब आिा  घर के लले बढ्का दकनमले के बारे म ेके जनर्डय करैय स ेबनझ चाि ैजछ. एिन दकनमले के लले 
बसेी रुपयैा खचड िछैै ि ेिजैनक खचड म ेन ैजगनाई ि ैिनेा दक घर दकनाइँ, घर के मरमत करनाइ, घर के नम्िर 
सर समान  दकन्नाइ या गाइ माल दकन्नाइ 
 
EMP13a.  
गएको १ बषडमा घरको लाजग िजैनक खचड गररन ेबिटेमा  परेको बािके ठूलो रकम पन ेखचड गननड भएको छ? 
In the last year has your household had a major household expenditure of a large 
amount of money that was not included in the normal budget? 
जबतलािा १ साल  म ेघर के िजैनक खचड बािके बसेी रुपयैा परै बाला खचड केन ेजछयई ? 
1. छ Yes ि ँ 
2. छैन No न ै→ छैन भन ेEMP14 मा िाननिोस Go to EMP14  न ैछेजल त EMP14 म ेिाउ 
 
EMP13b.  
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घरकोलाजग ठनलो रकमको खचडमा (माथीभन्नन भएको खचड िरु िस्त)ै प्राय िसो कसल ेजनर्डय गछड? Who 
usually makes decisions about making major household expenditures (like the one 
you mentioned above)? 
घर के लले बढ्का खचड (उपर किल खचडसब िनेा ) म ेप्रायः के जनर्डय करै य ? 
1. तपाई आफै You  आिा ँअपन े 
2. तपाई र तपाईको श्रीमान You and your husband आिा  आ आिा  के श्रीमान  
3. तपाई सँगै तपाईको घरको कन ै व्यजि (श्रीमानबािके) You along with someone else in your 
household (not your husband) आिा सागं ेआिाके घर पररवार गे कोनो  िोसर गोटे (श्रीमान 
छोइर क) 
4. तपाई  र तपाई सगै बस्न ेघरको पररवार  You and the whole household  आिा ँआ आिा सगं े
रिवला आिाके पररवार  
5. तपाईको श्रीमान Your husband only  आिा  के श्रीमान मात्र ै
6. सासन Mother in law साउस 
7. ससनरा Father in law  ससनर 
8. सासन ससनरा सगं ैFather in law and mother in law together ससनर र साउस िड े 
9. बनवा/आमा  father/mother बाबन/माय  
10. घर जभत्र बस्न ेपररवारको अरु सिस्यिरु Other family members living in the household  
घरम ेरिवला  पररवारके आरो कोनो सिस्यसब  
11. घर बाजिर बस्न े पररवारको अरु सिस्यिरु Other family members living outside the 
households घरम ेरिवला  पररवारके आरो कोनो सिस्यबािके  
12.  पररवारको सियािरु बािके अन्य व्यजि Other non family members पररवारके सिस्य बािके 
अन्य कोनो गोटे  
13. समाि/ सामाजिक ससं्था/ सरकार The community / social organisation /government  
समाि / सामाजिक ससं्था/ सरकार 
 
१ िजेख ४ को लाजग EMP 16  मा िाननिोस,् ५ िजेख १३ छ भन ेEMP15 मा िाननिोस   Alternatives 
1  to 4 go to EMP16, alternative 5 to 13 then go to EMP15.  १  स  ४  के लले ेEMP 16  म े
िाउ, ५ स १३ के लले to EMP15 म ेिाउ  
 
EMP15.  
यदि तपाई आफैल े चािकेो भए, तपाई यी जनर्डयिरु गन ेकन रािरुमा सिभागी हुन सक्नन हुन््यो ? 
If you wanted to, would you be able to participate in these decisions? 
यदि आिा  चािजैतऐ त, ई जनर्डय सब म ेआिा  सिभाजग भ सकै छेजलऐ  ?  
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1. स्थ ेYes  ि ँ 
2. सज्िन जथए No न ै   
 
सनचक ४: जबजभन्न  क्षते्रिरुको स्वतन्त्रता; िीबन िोजखममा नपान ेस्वास््य समस्या समाधानको जनर्डय गन े
सन्िभडमा  
Indicator 4 - Autonomy in different domains; decision-making regarding dealing with a 
non-life-threatening health problem 
 सचूक ४: सबरंगके क्षते्रसब स्वतन्त्रता: िीबन िोजखममे नईपरेवाला स्वस्थ समस्या जनर्डय लवेके सधंभडमें 
 
EMP16.  
यदि तपाईलाई साधारर् स्वास््य समस्यािरु िस्तै कडा  टाउको िनखेमा वा िातको िनखाई भएमा किा ँिानन 
हुन्छ ? Where would you go if you had simple health problems, such as a severe 
headache or a painful tooth ache?  
यदि आिाके साधारर् स्वस्थ समस्या िनेा िोर स माथ िनखनाइ या िातं िनखते ैत कत िबे ै?  
 
1. सामनिाजयक स्वास्थ सस्था (उप स्वास्थ चौकी, स्वास्थ चौकी, जिल्ला अस्पताल वा अचंल अस्पताल) 
Public sector health institution Sub-Health Post/Health Post/District/Zonal 
Hospital,  सामनिाजयक स्वास्थ सस्था (उप स्वास्थ चौकी, स्वस्थ चौकी, जिल्ला अस्पताल वा अचंल 
अस्पताल) 
2. जनजि स्वास््य केन्र, ज्लजनक, नर्सिंग िोम वा अस्पताल 
Private  medical centre,clinic, nursing home or hospital  जनजि स्वास््य केन्र, ज्लजनक, 
नर्सिंग िोम वा अस्पताल 
3. औषजध पसल Pharmacy/Medical Shop िबाई िोकान  अन्य (उल्लखेगननडिोस)् 
4. Other Specify.  अन्य _________ 
5. केजि पजन गर्िडन Don’t do anything  दकछ नई करैजछ  
99. थािा छैन/ उत्तर नआएको Don’t know/No answer मालनम न ैछै/उत्तर न ैिलेकै 
 
If answer from EMP16 is either “1,2,3 or 4”  then ask 17a 
If answer is “5” then go to 17b  
If answer is “99” then directly go to 17c. 
यदि EMP16 बाट “1,2,3 or 4”  उत्तर आउछ भन े 17a 
यदि उत्तर 5” आउछ भन े17b मा  िाननिोस  
यदि उत्तर “99” आउछ भन े 17c मा िाननिोस  
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माजनसिरुसगँ जतनीिरुको स्वास््यको  समस्या समाधान कसरी गछडन त्यसको पछाडी प्राय गरेर जबजभन्न 
खालका कारर्िरु हुन ेगिडछन | यस्ता खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे बनझ्नको लाजग 
िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु सोध्न चािन्छन | कन  ैकन  ैकारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ भन ेकन  ैकन  ै
सजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला |  
People often have several reasons for how they deal with their health problems. I will 
ask you to tell me whether or not these reasons are right for you. Some reasons may 
be right for you, some may not be right for you. Please answer yes or no to the 
question. There is no right or wrong answer. 
 लोकसबलग  ओकर सबके स्वास््यके समस्या समाधान केन्ना करै छै ओईके पाछन  बहुत ेकारर् सब िोई छै | 
ओ कारर् सब आिाके    सजि बनझाईय दक नै    से बात सब बनझ के लेल िम सब आिा सब सई प्रस्नसब  पनछ 
चाि ैछी | कोनो कोनो कारर् सजि लाइग सकैय आिाके आ कोनो कोनो कारर् नजियो सजि लाइग सकैय | 
कृपया आिाके  ई कथनसब सजि बनझाई य दक नै स ेकिब  
 
जबकल्पिरु पढ्ननिोस ( उत्तरिाताले भन्न सज्िन वा थािा छैन भन्न सके्न छन) 
Read out the answers [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer] जबकल्पसब 



































तपाई ( माजथ आएको िवाफ) गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननड हुन्छ दकनभन े
तपाइल ेयो गननडपछड |  
You (insert response from above) because you have to. 
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ) िाके अप्पन समस्या सबके समाधान करै जछ कजथलाकी 
आिाके कर परै छै | 
11 12 99 
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तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ)  गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननड हुन्छ दकनकी 
यदि (समस्या समाधान )गननड भएन भन ेतपाइल ेगाजल खानन पछड|  
You (insert response from above) the way you do because you 
will get in trouble if you don’t. 
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ) िाके अप्पन समस्या सबके समाधान करै जछ कजथलादक 
यदि न ैकरब ैत आिाके गारर बात सन  परत ै| 
11 12 99 
c.  
तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ) गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननड हुन्छ दकनकी 
तपाई आफ्नो समस्या समाधान गनड चािननहुन्छ| 
You (insert response from above) the way you do because you 
want to. 
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ) िाके अप्पन समस्यासब समाधान करै जछ कजथला दक 
आिा ई समस्या सब समाधान कर चािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
d. 
तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ) गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननड हुन्छ दकनकी 
तपाईको घर पररवारको सिस्यिरुल ेई समस्या समाधान गनड भन्नन हुन्छ |  
You (insert response from above) the way you do because that is 
what your family members tell you to do.   
आिा (उपर आल िवाफ )  समस्या सब के समाधान कैर लबे ैकजथला  दक आिाके 
घर पररवारके सिस्यसब    ई समस्या समाधान  कर कि ैछै |  
11 12 99 
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घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु सिमत भए पजन वा नभए पजन तपाईको जवचारमा (माजथ 
आएको िवाफ) गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननड राम्रो कन रा िो त्यसैले तपाई 
ई समस्यािरु समाधान गननड हुन्छ | 
You (insert response from above) the way you do because you 
personally think it is the right thing to do, whether or not your 
family members agree. 
आिाके जबचारम े(उपर आयल िवाफ)म ेिाके अप्पन समस्याके समाधान करनाई  
जनक बात छै चाि ेघर पररवारके सिस्य मान ेया न ैमान े| 
11 12 99 
f. 
तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ) गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननडहुन्छ दकनकी 
तपाईलाई अरु उपाय भन्िा यसरी गनड राम्रो लाग्छ | 
You (insert response from above) the way you do because you 
like doing it more than other alternatives. 
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ )म ेिाके अप्पन समस्या सबके समाधान करैजछ कजथला 
दक आिाके आरो उपाय स जय करम ेबदढया लग ै य | 
11 12 99 
g. 
तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ)गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननडहुन्छ िसल ेगिाड 
घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु तपाईसँग ररसाउन ेछैनन |  
You (insert response from above) the way you do so that your 
family members won’t get angry with you  
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ ) िाके अप्पन समस्या सब समाधान करै जछ कजथला दक 
तब घर पररवारके सिस्य सब आिा पर न ैजपततैई | 
11 12 99 
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तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ) गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननडहुन्छ दकनकी 
घर पररवारका सिस्यिरुले तपाईलाई माया गरोस भने्न चािननहुन्छ | 
You (insert response from above) the way you do because you 
want your family members to like you. 
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ) िाके अप्पन समस्या सब समाधान करै जछ कजथला दक 
घर पररवारके सिस्यसब आिाके मान ैस ेचािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
i. 
 तपाई (माजथ आएको िवाफ)गएर आफ्नो समस्यािरु समाधान गननडहुन्छ दकनभन े
यी समस्या समाधान गननड तपाईको कतडब्य िो | 
You (insert response from above) the way you do because it is 
your duty to do that 
आिा (उपर आयल िवाफ)िाके ई समस्या सब के समाधान करै जछ कजथला दक ई 
आिाके कतडब्य छै | 
11 12 99 
j. You (insert response from above) the way you do because it is 
personally important to you. 
11 12 99 
 
- - - > Go to EMP17c 
 
EMP17b. 
माजनसिरुसगँ जतनीिरुको साधारर् स्वास््य  समस्यािरुको लागी केजि पजन न गननडको  पछाडी प्राय गरेर 
जबजभन्न खालका कारर्िरु हुन ेगिडछन | यस्ता खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे 
बनझ्नको लाजग िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु सोध्न चािन्छन | कन  ैकन  ैकारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ 
भन ेकन  ैकन  ैसजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला |  
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People often have several reasons for why they don’t do anything when they have 
simple health problems. I will ask you to tell me whether or not these reasons are right 
for you. Some reasons may be right for you, some may not be right for you. Please 
answer yes or no to the question. There is no right or wrong answer.  
 लोकसबलग  ओकर सबके साधारर् स्वास््य समस्या समाधान नई करेके पाछन  बहुत रंगके  कारर् सब िोई 
छै | ओ कारर् सब आिाके    सजि बनझाईय दक नै    से बात सब बनझ के लेल िम सब आिा सब स यी  प्रस्नसब  
पनछ चाि ैछी | कोनो कोनो कारर् सजि लाइग सकैय आिाके आ कोनो कोनो कारर् सजि नजियो लाइग सकैय 
| कृपया आिाके  ई कथनसब सजि बनझाई य दक नै स ेकिब | 
 
जबकल्पिरु पढ्ननिोस ( उत्तरिाताले भन्न सज्िन वा थािा छैन भन्न सके्न छन) 
Read out the answers [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer] जबकल्पसब 

































 a.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनभन ेतपाईसगँ अरु जवकल्प छैन | 
 You don't do anything because you have no other option.  
आिा  कथन  नकैरै जछ  कजथला  दक आिा लग कोनो जवकल्प न ैछई | 
11 12 99 
b.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनकी यदि तपाईल ेकेजि गननड भयो भन ेगाजल खानन 
पछड | 
You don’t do anything because you will get in trouble if you 
do. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक यदि करब ैत गाईर बात सन  परत ै|  
11 12 99 
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c.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाई केजि पजन गनड चािनन हुन्न | 
You don’t do anything because you don’t want to do anything. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिा कथन न ैकर चािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
d.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाईको घर पररवारको सिस्यल ेकेजि पजन 
न गनड भन्छन| 
You don’t do anything because that is what your family 
members tell you to do. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके घर पररवारके सिस्यसब कथन न ैकर 
कि ैछै |  
11 12 99 
e.  
घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु सिमत भए पजन वा नभए पजन तपाईको जवचारमा 
केजि न गननड न ैरठक िो त्यसलै ेतपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न | 
You don’t do anything because you personally think it is the 
right thing to do whether or not your family members agree. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके जवचारम ेकथन न ैकरनाई रठक छै चाि े
घर पररवारके सिस्य मान ेया न ैमान े| 
11 12 99 
f.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनदक तपाईलाई केजि पजन गनड मन परिनै | 
You don’t do anything because you don’t like doing anything.  
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके कथन करेम ेजनक न ैलगयै | 
11 12 99 
g.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न िसल े गिाड घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु तपाईसगँ 
ररसाउन ेछैनन | 
You don’t do anything so that your family members won’t get 
angry with you. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक  घर पररवारके सद्सस्यसब आिा पर न ैजपततैई 
| 
11 12 99 
h.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनकी तपाईको घर पररवारको सिस्यिरुल े
तपाईलाई मन पराउन भन्न ेचािनन हुन्छ|  
You don’t do anything because you want your family 
members to like you. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके घर पररवारके सिस्यसब आिाके मान े
स ेचािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
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i.  
तपाई केजि पजन गननड हुन्न दकनकी यो तपाईको कतडब्य िो| 
You don’t do anything because it is your duty to stay at home. 
आिा कथन न ैकरै जछ कजथला दक आिाके कतडब्य छै घरम ेरिकेे |  
11 12 99 
j. You don’t do anything because it is not personally important 
to you. 
11 12 99 
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EMP17c.  
सबलैाई सोध्नन िोस.् Ask everyone. सबके पनछन . 
 
घरमा खानकेन राको  बारेमा प्राय: िसो कसल े जनर्डय गछड? के पकाउन े ,कजत पकाउन े र पररवारको सब ै
सिस्यलाई कजत  दिन े भन्न ेजनर्डय कसल ेगछड? 
Who usually makes decisions about food in your household? Who decides what to 
cook, how much to cook and how much to serve each household member? 
घरम े खाना बनाब के लले प्राय: के जनर्डय लइ छई  ? अई म ेके खाना बनते ै, कत ेबनते ैआ पररवारके सब 
सिस्य के कत ेिवेके लले जनर्डय  के करै छई |  
1.  तपाई आफै You  आिा ँअपन े 
2. तपाई र तपाईको श्रीमान You and your husband आिा  आ आिा  के श्रीमान  
3. तपाई सगँ ैतपाईको घरको कन  ैव्यजि (श्रीमानबािके) You along with someone else in your 
household (not your husband) आिा सगं े आिाके घर पररवार के कोनो  िोसर गोटे (श्रीमान 
छोइर क) 
4. तपाई  र तपाई सग ैबस्ने घरको पररवार  You and the whole household  आिा ँआ आिा सगं े
रिवला आिाके पररवार  
5. तपाईको श्रीमान Your husband only  आिा  के श्रीमान मात्र े 
6. सासन Mother in law साउस 
7. ससनरा Father in law ससनर 
8. सासन ससनरा सगं ैFather in law and mother in law together ससनर आ  साउस सगं े
9. बनवा/आमा Father/mother बाबन/माय  
10. घर जभत्र बस्न ेपररवारको अरु सिस्यिरु Other family members living in the household  
घरम ेरिवला  पररवारके आरो कोनो सिस्यसब  
11. घर बाजिर बस्न े पररवारको अरु सिस्यिरु Other family members living outside the 
households घरम ेबािर रिवला पररवारके आरो कोनो सिस्यसब 
12. पररवारको सियािरु बािके अन्य व्यजि Other non family members पररवारके सिस्य बािके 
अन्य कोनो गोटे  
 
१ िजेख ४ को लाजग EMP 18 मा िाननिोस ्, ५  िजेख १२  को लागी EMP17d मा िाननिोस ्Alternatives 
1  to 4 go to EMP18, Alternatives 5 to 12  go to EMP17d 
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यदि तपाई आफन ल ेचािकेो भए, तपाई यी जनर्डयिरु गन ेकन रािरुमा सिभागी हुन सक् हुन््यो ? 
If you wanted to, would you be able to participate in these decisions? 
EMP17d. यदि आिा  चाि ैजतय ै त, ई जनर्डय सब म ेआिा  सिभाजग भ सकै छेजलऐ  ?  
1. स्थ ेYes  ि ँ 
2. सज्िन जथए No न ै   
 
सचूक ५: मान्छेको िीवन पररवतडनका पाटोिरु (व्यजिगत तिबाट)   
Indicator 5 - Changing aspects in one’s life [Individual Level]  
 सचूक ५:जिवन  पररवतडन के सम्भाजवत उपायसब (व्यजिगत तिस)े   
 
EMP18.  
म तपाईको िीवन पररवतडनका पाटोिरुको सम्भावनाको बारेमा सोध्न चािन्छन   यो तपाईको व्यजिगत कायड 
वा सामनजिक कायडबाट पजन  प्राप्त भएको हुनसके्न छ  के तपाईल ेअजिल ेतपाईको िीवनमा कन  ैपजन कन रािरु 
पररवतडन गनड चािननहुन्छ? 
I would like to ask you now about the possibility of changing aspects of your life. This 
can be achieved either by your own individual actions or through the actions of a 
group. Would you like to change anything in your life at this point in time? 
िम आिा  के जिवन  पररवतडन(बिलवला ) िोबवला  उपाय सब के बारे म ेबनझ चाि ैजछ| ि ेआिा के  व्यजिगत 
काि वा सामजूिक  काि स प्राप्त भले भसकई  य | दक आिा  अजभ अपना जिबन म ेकोनो पररबतडन (बिलब) 
कर चाि ैजछ ? 
1. चािन्छन  Yes चाि ैजछ 
2. चािन्न No  न ैचाि ैजछ  EMP21a मा िाननिोस ्Go to EMP21a  EMP21a म ेिाउ  




यो समयमा, तपाईको िीवनमा सब ैभन्िा बदढ के पररवतडन गनड चािननहुन्छ  
At this point in time, what would you most like to change in your life?  




तपाईको िीवनमा हुन ेकन  ैपररवतडनमा कसको योगिान सबभैन्िा  मित्वपरू्ड हुन्छ िस्तो लाग्छ  
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 कृपया योगिानको आधारमा तलका उत्तरिरुलाई श्ररे्ीमा (जतन वटा सम्म) राख्ननिोस ्िस्मा एकको सब ैभन्िा 
बडी योगिान हुनछे  
Who do you think will contribute most to any change in your own life? Please rank in 
the order (up to 3) of contribution with one being the most significant contributor 
आिा  के जिबन के कोनो पररबतडन (बिलाब)  करम ेकेकर मद्दत  मित्वपूर्ड िते ैस ेबनझाई य ? कृपया मद्दत 
के आधारम ेजनच्चा के उत्तरसब के श्ररे्ी म े(जतनटा तईक ) रखब ैिईम ेएकटा के सब स बसेी मद्दत ितेई |  
1. तपाई आफै You आिा  के  अपन े 
2. Your husband  
3. Your in-laws  
4. Your natal family  
5. तपाईको समनिाय Your community आिा  के समाि के  
6. स्थानीय सरकार The local government स्थानीय सरकार के  
7. केन्रीय सरकार The central government केन्र सरकार के  
8. गरै सरकारी सघं ससं्था NGO/CBO गरै सरकारी सघं ससं्था 
9. अरु कन  ै भए उल्लखे गननडिोस ् Other: (please specify) आउर कोनो िोसर छै त जलखन 
.............................................  
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सचूक ६: मान्छेको िीवन पररवतडनका पाटोिरु (समनि तिबाट)   
Indicator 6 - Changing aspects in one’s life [Group Level]  
सचूक६:जिवन  पररवतडन के सम्भाजवत उपायसब (समनि तिस)े   
 
EMP21a.  
के तपाई कन  ैसमिू, ससं्था, सिंाल, गठबन्धन आदिमा स्वयम्सवेी रुपमा सिभागी हुनन हुन्छ?  
Do you participate in any group, organisation, network, association, etc.? 
दक आिा  कोनो समनि, ससं्था, सिंाल, गठबन्धन आदि मे स्वयम्सवेी रुपम ेसिभागी जछ ? 
1. छन  Yes जछ 
2. छनईन No नइ जछ  EMP28 मा िाननिोस ्Go to EMP28  यदि न ैत EMP28 म ेिाउ  
 
EMP 21b. 
तपाई कस्तो खालको ससं्था सगँ सम्बजन्धत हुननहुन्छ?  
What kind of organisations do you belong to?  
आिा केिन  ससं्थास  सम्बजन्धत जछ ? 
 
 आर्थडक गजतजबजधसगँ सम्बजन्धत (खतेीपाती, माछापालन, व्यापार, उत्पािनआदि) Relates to your 
main economic activity (for example, farming, fishing, trade, manufacturing, etc)? 
आम्िानी स सम्बजन्धत (खतेीपाती, माछापालन, व्यापार, उत्पािन, आदि) 
 बचत तथा सिकारी ससं्थासगँ सम्बजन्धत That deals with finance, credit or savings बचत आ 
सिकारी स सम्बजन्धत  
 स्वास्थसगँ सम्बजन्धत That deals with health issues सवास्थ स सम्बजन्धत  
 जशक्षासगँ सम्बजन्धत That deals with education issues जशक्षा स सम्बजन्धत  
 रािनीजतक समनि/सगँठनसगँ सम्बजन्धत Any political groups or associations  रािनीजतक 
समनि/सगँठन स सम्बजन्धत  
 धार्मडक समनि/सगँठनसगँ सम्बजन्धत Religious groups or associations धार्मडक समनि/सगँठन स 
सम्बजन्धत  
 अन्य िनिातीसगँ सम्बजन्धत Any ethnic groups or associations अन्य िनिाती स  सम्बजन्धत  
 अरु कन  ै समनि (उल्लखेगननडिोस)् Other groups or associations आउर कोनो समनि (जलखन 
_________)? 
 99.   थािा छैन/उत्तर नआएको Don’t know/No answer मालनम न ैअइछ/उत्तर न ैिलेकै  
 
EMP22. 
तपाई सलंग्न भएको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड समनि कन  िो?  
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What is the most important group or association that you belong to 
आिा  सिभागी िोब बाला सब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि कोन अइछ ? 
 
1. आर्थडक गजतजबजधसगँ सम्बजन्धत (खतेीपाती, माछापालन, व्यापार, उत्पािनआदि) 
Relates to your main economic activity (for example, farming, fishing, trade, 
manufacturing, etc)? 
आम्िानी स सम्बजन्धत (खतेीपाती, माछापालन, व्यापार, उत्पािन, आदि) 
2. बचत तथा सिकारी ससं्थासगँ सम्बजन्धत 
That deals with finance, credit or savings 
बचत आ सिकारी स सम्बजन्धत  
3. स्वास्थसगँ सम्बजन्धत That deals with health issues? सवास्थ स सम्बजन्धत  
4. जशक्षासगँ सम्बजन्धत  
That deals with education issues? जशक्षा स सम्बजन्धत  
5. रािनीजतक समनि/सगँठनसगँ सम्बजन्धत  
Any political groups or associations?  रािनीजतक समनि/सगँठन स सम्बजन्धत  
6. धार्मडक समनि/सगँठनसगँ सम्बजन्धत  
Religious groups or associations? धार्मडक समनि/सगँठन स सम्बजन्धत  
7. अन्त िनिातीसगँ सम्बजन्धत 
Any ethnic groups or associations?अन्य  िनिाती स  सम्बजन्धत  
8. अरु कन  ैसमनि (उल्लखेगननडिोस)्  
Other groups or associations आउर कोनो समनि (जलखन _________)? 
99.   थािा छैन/उत्तर नआएको Don’t know / No answer मालनम न ैअइछ/उत्तर न ैिलेकै  
 
EMP25. तपाई समूिमा कजत्तको सदक्रय हुनन हुन्छ? How active are you in the group? आिा  समनि 
मे कते सदक्रय जछ ? 
 
1. म मनख्य अगनवा (अथवा अगनवािरू मध्य ेएक) अथवा कायाडलय भूजमका भएको  I am the  leader 
(or one of the leaders)or have an official role िम प्रमनख अगनवा(वा अगनवा सब मेस एक )  
जछ  
2. सदक्रय सिस्य Active member सदक्रय सिस्य   
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यदि उत्तरिाताले उ समनिमा सलंग्न ‘छन ’ भनमेा मात्र सोध्ननिोस ्|  
Answer only if the interviewee declares that she participates in a group. 
यदि उत्तरिाता समनि म ेसिभागी अइछ त मात्र ेपनछन    
 
माजनसिरुसगँ समनिमा सिभागी हुननको पछाडी प्राय गरेर जबजभन्न खालका कारर्िरु हुन े गिडछन | म 
तपाईलाई [उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ EMP 22 मा उल्लेख गननड भएको मनख्य समनिको नाम  भन्ननिोस ] मा दकन 
सिभाजग हुन ेबारे कारर्िरू दिन चािन्छन  . यस्ता खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे 
बनझ्नको लाजग िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु सोध्न चािन्छन | कन  ैकन  ैकारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ 
भन ेकन  ैकन  ैसजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला |  
People often have several reasons for participating in a group. I am going to give 
several reasons why you might participate in [insert the most important group 
mentioned above in EMP22]. Please tell  me whether or not these reasons are right 
for you. Some reasons may be right for you, some may not be right for you. Please 
answer yes or no to the question.. There is no right or wrong answer.  
कोनो भी समनि सबमे सिभागी िोई के पाछा  लोक  सब के प्रायः बहुत रंग  के कारर् सब रि ैछई | िम आिा  
के (EMP22 ि ेसमनि के नाम किल ेछालीय ै) कजथला  सिभागी िोई जछ स ेकारर् सब कि ैजछ .|कृपया, यी  
कारर् सब आिा  के लले कत ेसच छै स ेकहु | आब िम आिाके यी जवजभन्न कारर् किवेाला कथनसब सजि छै 
दक न ैस ेपनछ चािजैछ| कृपया ि या न ैकिब | 
 
जबकल्पिरू पढ्ननिोस [उत्तरिातालाई थािा छैन/ उत्तर छैन भन्न अननमजत दिननिोला] 
Read out the options [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer] जबकल्पसब 





















नआएको   
Don’t know / 
No answer 
मालनम न ै य/उत्तर 
नई  िलेकै 
a.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनकी तपाइल ेसिभागी हुननपछड | 
You participate because you have to. 
आिा सिभागी िोइ  जछ कजथला दक आिाके  सिभागी िोव परत ै| 
11 12 99 
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नआएको   
Don’t know / 
No answer 
मालनम न ै य/उत्तर 
नई  िलेकै 
b. 
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनदक यदि हुननभएन भन ेतपाईल ेगाली 
खानन पनछे | 
You participate because you will get in trouble if you 
don’t. 
आिा सिभागी िोइ जछ कजथला दक आिा न ैिबे ैत गाइर बात सन  
परत|ै 
11 12 99 
c.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकन दक तपाई सिभागी हुन चािनन हुन्छ | 
You participate because you want to participate.  
आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक आिा सिभागी िोव चािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
d.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनकी घर पररवारको सिस्यिरुल े
तपाईलाई सिभागी हुन भन्छन | 
You participate because that is what your family 
members tell you to do. 
आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक घर पररवारके सिस्यसब आिाके 
सिभागी िोईला कि ैछै | 
11 12 99 
e.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनकी घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु सिमत 
भए पजन वा नभए पजन तपाईको  जबचारमा यो राम्रो कन रा िो भन्न े
लाग्छ | 
You participate because you personally think it is the 
right thing to do, whether or not your family members 
agree. 
आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक आिाके जवचारम ेई जनक बात 
छै चाि ेघर पररवारके  सिस्य मान ैया न ैमान ै| 
11 12 99 
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नआएको   
Don’t know / 
No answer 
मालनम न ै य/उत्तर 
नई  िलेकै 
f.   
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनकी तपाईलाई मन पछड | 
You participate because you like it. 
आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक आिाके जनक लगयै | 
11 12 99 
g.  
म तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ िसल ेगिाड घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु 
तपाईसगँ ररसाउन ेछैनन | 
You participate so that your family members won’t get 
angry with you. आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक अई स ेघर 
पररवारके सिस्य सब आिा पर न ैजपततैई | 
11 12 99 
h.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनकी घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु 
तपाईलाई माया गरुन भन्न ेचािनन हुन्छ | 
You participate because you want your family 
members to like you.  
आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक घर पररवारके सिस्य सब 
आिाके  मान ै स ेचािजैछ | 
11 12 99 
i.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्छ दकनकी यो (सिभागी हुनन) तपाईको कतडब्य 
िो | 
You participate because it is your duty to participate. 
आिा सिभागी िोई जछ कजथला दक ई (सिभागी िोनाई) आिाके 
कतडब्य छै | 
11 12 99 
j. You participate because it is personally important to 
you. 
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EMP27 
यदि उत्तरिाताले उ समनिमा सलंग्न ‘छन ’ भनमेा मात्र सोध्ननिोस ्|  
Answer only if the interviewee declares that she participates in a group. 




































य/उत्तर नई  
िलेकै 
a.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू ]  मा, एकिनट भएर व्यजिगत इच्छालाई त्याग गन े
कन रािरुमा सिमजत गन े काममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन 
भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in agreeing to decisions that 
require giving up personal interests?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क अपन इच्छा के छोइर क सिमजत 
करे म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
1 2 3 4 99 
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य/उत्तर नई  
िलेकै 
b.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर तनावमा परेको बलेा एक 
अकाडलाई सियोग गन े काममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन 
भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in supporting each other in 
times of stress?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क तनाव के समय म ेएक िोसर के 
सियोग करे म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
1 2 3 4 99 
c.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर समनिल ेमित्वपरू्ड जनर्डयिरु गन े
बलेामा कन  छान्ने भन्नेमा सियोग गन े (उिािरर्को 
लाजग , नया अगनवाको छनोट गननड )  काममा कजत्तको 
सिभागी हुनन भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in figuring out what choices 
to make when the group faces important 
decisions (for example, chosing a new 
leader)?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क समनि के कोनो मित्वपनर्ड जनर्डय कर 
बरेम ेकोन ्चन ब ै  तईम ेसियोग करवला  (िनेा नया ँ
अगनवाके  छनोट केनाई ) काि म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  
छजल | 
1 2 3 4 99 
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य/उत्तर नई  
िलेकै 
d.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर समनिको समस्या समाधान गन े
काममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in resolving conflicts in the 
group?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क समनि के  समस्या के समाधान करे 
म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
1 2 3 4 99 
e.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर एक अकाडमा जबश्वासको मािोल 
बनाउन े| 
 काममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in building trust in each 
other? 
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क एक िोसर म े जवश्वासके मािोल 
बनाबमे ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
1 2 3 4 99 
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य/उत्तर नई  
िलेकै 
f.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर एक अकाडको व्यजिगत 
इच्छालाई सम्मान गन े काममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन 
भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in building respect for each 
other’s particular interests?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क एक िोसर के इच्छा के सम्मान करे 
म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
1 2 3 4 99 
g.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर साझा स्रोतिरुको राम्रो 
सिनपयोग गन ेकाममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in making good use of 
common resources?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क सजझया सरसमान के जनक स 
सिनपयोग करे म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
1 2 3 4 99 
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य/उत्तर नई  
िलेकै 
h.  
[उत्तरिाताल ेमाजथ उल्लखे गरेको सब ैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड 
समिू] मा, एकिनट भएर समनिका सिस्यिरुलाई आफ्नो 
जिम्मवेार बाडंफांड गन ेकाममा कजत्तको सिभागी हुनन 
भएको छ? 
In (the most important group) how well do 
you participate in get the members of the 
group to share responsibilities?    
(उत्तरिाता उपर किन ेसब स मित्वपरू्ड समनि) म ेएक 
िोसर स जमलिनल क समनि के सिस्य सब के अपन अपन 
जिमबेारी बाट फाट करे म ेकत ेके सिभागी  भले  छजल| 
 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
— — — →  कृ प या  E M P  2 9  मा  िा नन िो स्   
P l e a s e  G O  T O  E M P  2 9  कृ प या  E M P 2 9 मे  िा ऊ  ? ?   
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EMP28  
यदि उत्तरिाताले उ समनिमा सलंग्न छैन भनमेा मात्र तलका प्रश्निरु सोध्ननिोस:् 
Answer only if the interviewee declares that she DOES NOT participate in any group 
यदि उत्तरिाता समनि म ेसिभागी न ैअइछ त मात्र ेपनछन ; 
 
माजनसिरुसगँ कन  ैपजन समनिमा सिभागी न ्हुननको पछाडी प्राय गरेर जबजभन्न खालका कारर्िरु हुन ेगिडछन 
| यस्ता खालका कारर्िरु तपाईलाई सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे बनझ्नको लाजग िामी तपाईलाई जत कारर्िरु 
सोध्न चािन्छौ| कन  ैकन  ैकारर् तपाईलाई सजि लाग्न पजन स्छ भन ेकन  ैकन  ैसजि न लाग्न जन स्छ |कृपया 
तपाईलाई ई कथन िरु सजि लाग्छ दक नाई भनरे भन्ननिोला | कन  ैपजन उत्तरिरु सजि वा गलत हुन्छन भन्न े
छैन| 
 People often have several reasons for not participating in any group. I will ask you to 
tell me whether these reasons are right for you. Some reasons may be right for you, 
some may not be right for you. Please answer yes or no to the question. There is no 
right or wrong answer.  
कोनो भी समनिसबमे सिभागी नइ िोई के पाछा  लोक  सब के प्रायः बहुत रंग  के कारर् सब रि ैछई | ओ 
कारर् सब आिाके    सजि बनझाईय दक नै    से बात सब बनझ के लेल िम सब आिा सब सई प्रस्नसब  पनछ चाि ै
छी | कोनो कोनो कारर् सजि लाइग सकैय आिाके आ कोनो कोनो कारर् नजियो सजि लाइग सकैय | कृपया 
आिाके  ई कथनसब सजि बनझाई य दक नै से किब | आिा िे किब ओईमे सजि या गलत कनछो नइ िोतै |  
 
जबकल्पिरू पढ्ननिोस ्[उत्तरिातालाई थािा छैन/ उत्तर छैन भन्न अननमजत दिननिोला] 
Read out the options [Allow the respondent to say I don’t know/no answer]  

















थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको 
Don’t know / No 
answer 
मालनम न ैय/उत्तर जन 
िलेकै 
a.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्न दकनकी तपाई सिभागी हुन सक्नन  हुन्न. 
उिािरर्िरु: पाररवाररक रोकटोक, समयको अभाव, जबरामी 
You don’t participate because you can’t. Example: 
family restriction, limited time, illness 
11 12 99 
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थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको 
Don’t know / No 
answer 
मालनम न ैय/उत्तर जन 
िलेकै 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोंई जछ कजथला  दक आिा सिभागी न ैभसकै 
जछ| िनेा पररवाररक रोकाबट , समयके अभाब , जबमारी | 
b.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्न दकनकी यदि सिभागी हुनन भयो भन े
तपाईल ेगाजल खानन पनछे | 
You don’t participate because you will get in trouble 
if you do. 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोंई जछ कजथला दक सिभागी िबे ैत आिाके 
गईर बात सन  पतईै| 
11 12 99 
c. 
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्न दकनकी तपाई चािननहुन्न | 
You don’t participate because you don’t want to. 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोंई जछ कजथला दक आिा न ैचाि ैजछय ै| 
11 12 99 
d.  
तपाई सिभागी हुनन हुन्न दकनकी घर पररवारका सिस्यिरुल े
तपाईलाई सिभागी नहुन भन्न ेगछडन | 
You don’t participate because your family members 
tell you not to.  
आिा सिभागी न ैिोंई जछ कजथला  दक घर पररवारके सिस्यसब    
आिाके सिभागी न ैिोईला कि ैछै | 
11 12 99 
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थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको 
Don’t know / No 
answer 
मालनम न ैय/उत्तर जन 
िलेकै 
e.  
तपाई  सिभागी हुननहुन्न  दकनकी घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु  
सिमत भए पजन वा नभए पजन तपाईको  जबचारमा सिभागी हुनन 
राम्रो कन रा िोइन | 
You don’t participate because you personally think 
it is the right thing to do, whether or not your family 
members agree. 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोंई जछ कजथला  दक आिाके जवचारम ेसिभागी 
िनेाई जनक बात न ैि ैचाि ेघर पररवारके सिस्य सब मान ैया न ै
मान ै| 
11 12 99 
f.  
तपाई सिभागी हुनन हुन्न दकनकी तपाईलाई सिभागी हुन मन 
पर््िनै | 
You don’t participate because you don’t like 
participating. 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोई जछ कजथला दक आिाके सिभागी िोएम े
जनक न ैलगयै | 
11 12 99 
g.  
तपाई सिभागी हुननहुन्न िसल े गिाड घर पररवारका सिस्यिरु 
तपाईसगँ ररसाउन ेछैनन | 
You don’t participate so that your family members 
won’t get angry with you. 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोई जछ कजथला दक घर पररवारके सिस्य सब 
आिा पर न ैजपततैई | 
11 12 99 
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थािा छैन/ उत्तर 
नदिएको 
Don’t know / No 
answer 
मालनम न ैय/उत्तर जन 
िलेकै 
h.  
तपाई सिभागी िुनिुुन्न ककनकी घर पररवारका सदस्यिरुले 
तपाईलाई माया गरुन भन्ने चािनिुुन्ि | 
You don’t participate because you want your family 
members to like you. आिा सिभागी नई िोई छि कथिला 
कक घर पररवारके सदस्यसब आिाके मान ैस ेचािैछि | 
11 12 99 
i.  
तपाई सिभागी िुनुिुन्न ककनकी घरमा बस्न ुतपाईको कतनब्य 
िो |  
You don’t participate because it is your duty to stay 
at home. 
आिा सिभागी न ैिोई छि कथिला कक आिाके कतनब्य िै घरम े
रिके | 
11 12 99 
j. You don’t participate because it is not personally 
important to you. 
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सनचक ८- सशजिकरर् बनझाई मनल्याकंन  गनड "जसडीको जचत्र"  
Indicator 8 - A ‘ladder question’ assessing perceptions of empowerment  




















Now we would like you to think about the women in your community. Think about a 
woman who you would think of as being able to advance personally important goals. 
How would you describe her? What would she do, how would she behave, how 
would you know that she was someone who could advance personally important 
goals? 
Now, think about a woman who is dominated and can’t make her own decisions. 
How you would describe her? What would she do? How would she behave, how 
जनिजेशका: 
• कृपय प्रश्नावलीमा उल्लखे भएका शब्ििरु अथवा मजिलालाई प्रश्न सोध्िा उसल ेभनकेो शब्ििरु मात्र 
प्रयोग गननडिोला| 
• मजिलाल े प्रश्न बनिकेो छ भन्न े  जवश्वास गननडिोस,् उिािंरुल े प्रश्न नबनझकेो िखेाएमा मात्र  प्रश्न 
बनझाउननिोला|  
• उत्तर भन्न  समय दिननिोला| 
• उिािँरुल ेदिएको उत्तर नबनझमेा, पन ः एक पटक  जनजित गननडिोस,् उनीिरुल ेदिएको उत्तरमा जवश्वास 
गननडिोला, धरैे पटक  सम्झाउन ेप्रयास नगननडिोला 
Instructions: 
• Please, use the words on the question or the words that women say when asking 
the question. 
• Need to trust in women that they understand, only explain when they express 
that they don’t understand. 
• Give them time to answer 
• If you answered and don’t understand, only reconfirm once, trust their answers, 
don’t try to convince them otherwise. 
जनिजेशका: 
• कृपया  प्रश्नावलीमें  उल्लेख भेल शब्िसब वा मजिलाके प्रश्न पूछ बेरमे ओं किने शब्िके मात्र  प्रयोग 
करबै  | 
• मजिला  प्रश्न बनझने छई से जवश्वास करू , प्रश्न नै  बनझने िखेेतई त मात्र प्रश्न बनझा िबेई | 
• उत्तर किके समय िबेई | 
• हुकंार सबके उत्तर नैबनझ्बै त पन  ऐक बेर   जनजित करू,  हुकंारसबके उत्तरमें  जवश्वास करू , बेसीबरे  
सम्झाबके  कोजससनै करबै |   
 
EMP29.  अब आफ्नो समनिायको मजिलािरुको बारेमा सोच्ननिोस्|  
 
तपाईको जबचारमा तपाईको समनिायमा  भएको मजिला िो आफ्नो सबैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड लक्ष्यमा अगाडी बढ्न 
स्छ उसको  बारेमा सोच्ननिोस्| तपाई उसलाई कसरी ब्याख्या गननडहुन्छ ? उसले के गछड, उसको व्यविार 
कस्तो छ, र तपाईले कसरी उ  आफ्नो सबैभन्िा मित्वपनर्ड लक्ष्यमा अगाडी बढेको  थािा पाउनन हुन्छ? 
 
अब तपाइको जबचारमा तपाईको समनिायमा  रिकेो िजबएको र आफ्नो जनर्डय गनड नसके्न  मजिलाको बारेमा 
सोच्ननिोस्| तपाई उसलाई कसरी ब्याख्या गननडहुन्छ ? उसले के गछड, उसको व्यविार कस्तो छ, र तपाईले कसरी 
उ  आफ्नो जनर्डय गनड नसकेको थािा पाउनन हुन्छ? 
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would you know that she was was someone who could not make her own 
decisions?  
१० खुडक्रकला भएको शसडीको थचत्र रे्दखाउििुोस,् जसको पहिलो खुड्क्रकला /ति मा थथथचएका ि आफ्िो 
निणाय गिा िसक्िे (माथी उल्लेख भएको थथथचएको महिला)  महिलािरु उशभएका छि ्भिे सबभनर्दा 
माथथल्लो खुडक्रकलोमा (र्दसौ खुड्क्रकला/ तिमा), आफ्िो लक्ष्यअिसुाि अगाडी बढेका क्षमतार्ाि (माथी 
उल्लेख भएको  सबभैनर्दा मित्र्पणुा लक्ष्यमा अगाडी बढ्ि सक्िे महिला) महिलािरु  उशभएका छि ् ? 
कृपया तलको तालीका मा , उत्तरमा आएको खुद्ककलाको अकं लेख्नुिोस,् सब भन्दा मछुन १  (थिथचएको 
महिला ) र सब भन्दा माथि १० ( सबभैन्दा मित्वपरु्न लक्ष्यमा अगाडी बढ्न सक्ि) | 
 
Now, show the picture of ten step ladder, where on the bottom, the first step, stand 
people who are dominated and can’t make her own decisions (mention the 
dominated women described above), and on the highest step, the tenth step, stand 
those with the most ability to advance personally important goals (mention the 
women who can advance personally important goals as described above.  Please 
write in the table below the number rung that she says. One is at the bottom 
(dominated) and 10 is at the top (can advance personnaly in important decisions). 
 
\आब अपना समािके के मजिला सबके बारेमे सोंचन | अिाँके जवचारमे  समािके  एकटा मजिला ि ेअपन 
सबस मित्वपनर्ड लक्ष्य दिसन अगाडी बैढ़ सकैय ओकरा बारेमे सोंचन |अिाँ ओकरा बारेमे कोना वर्डन  कैरजछ 
? ओ कथी करै छजथन ं, हुन्कर  व्यविार केिन छई  , आ ओं  अपन मित्वपूर्ड लक्ष्य दिस  आगू   बैढ़ रिल 
छजथन  से बूइझ सकै जछ ? 
आब अिाँ के जवचार मे आिाके समािके  एकटा मजिला िे चौतफी रुपस िबल छै या अपन जनर्डय अपन े
नैक सकैय ओकरा बारे मे सोंचन | अिाँ ओकरा बारे मे कोना  वर्डन करबै  ?  ओ कथी करै छजथनं , हुन्कर  
व्यविार केिन छई आ  अपन  जनर्डय  नै कर सकै छई  से  आिा कोना बनझबई |   
१० खाडी बाला सीरिी के जचत्र िखेाउ , िैके पहुल्का खाडी मे समाि मे द्सब्याल िे अपन जनर्डय अपने स 
नै कसकै बाला (उपर उल्लेख भेल िबल मजिला  ) मजिलासब  अईछ आ सब स उपरका (१० मा खाडी/ति)  
मे अपन उिशे्य/लक्ष्य अननसार  बहुत आगन  पहुचल क्षमतावान ( उपर उल्लेख भेल सबस मित्वपूर्ड लक्ष्यमें 
आगन बढ् सकवला मजिला  )  मजिला   सब अईछ कृपया जनच्चा के ताजलकामें  ,उत्तरमें  आयल सीढ़ीके  अंक 
जलखन सब स जनच्चा १ (िबल मजिला ) आ  सब स उपर १० (सबस   मित्वपनर्ड लक्ष्यमें आगन  बढ् सकबला 
|    
 
EMP29a तपाई आि कन  तिमा हुननहुन्छ? On which step are you today? आई के दिन मे आिा  
के कोन खाडी म ेजछ ? 
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EMP29b तपाईको जछमेकीिरू आि कन  तिमा हुननहुन्छ? On which step are most of your 
neighbours today? आिा  के परोसी सब आई के दिन मे कोन खाडी मे आइछ?  
EMP 29c अबको ५ वषडमा तपाई कन  तिमा हुननहुन्छ िोला? On which step will you be in five 




EMP29_a EMP29_b EMP29_c 
   
 
[presentint] अन्तवाडताडको समयमा को को उपजथत हुननहुन्थो?  
Who was present at the interview?  
अन्तवाडताडके समयमे के के उपजथत छजल्खन ? 
 महिला Woman herself महिला  
 सासन Mother-in-law   सउस        
 ससनरा Father-in-law  ससनर  
 श्रीमान Husband श्रीमान    
 ससनराली घरको अन्य मजिला Other women from husband's household   ससनरके  अन्य 
मजिला         
 बनबा Father  बाबू                                              
 आमा Mother   माय  
 माइतीका अन्य मजिला Other women from the parental household निीरा के अन्य मजिला        
 मजिला जछमेदक वा साथी Female neighbour /friend मजिलाके परोसी  वा साथी         
 पनरुस जछमेदक Male neighbour पनरुख परोसी            
 अन्य Other अन्य  
 
 
आमा समिू Women’s Group 
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[attdwardm] के तपाई वडा भलेामा िानन भयो ििा ँनवाजबबाजित मजिला र गभडवती मजिलािरुलाई आमा 
समिूमा भाग जलनको लाजग बोलाईएको  जथयो? Did you attend the ward meeting, where 
pregnant mothers and newly married woman were invited to attend women’s group?  
दक आिा वडा भलेाम ेगले जछयई ित नया ँजववाजित मजिला आ गभडवती मजिलासबके माय स्मनह्म ेभाग लबे 
के लले बिने ेरि ै? 
  जथए Yes ि  
 जथएन Noनई  
  पररवारका अन्य सिस्य गएका जथए Other family members went पररवारके अन्य सिस्य 
गले रि ै 
 
 
[wgheard] के तपाईलजेमराको सियोगमा सचंाजलत मजिला स्वास््य स्वयम सजेवका र पोषर् पररचाजलका 
भएको आमा समनिको बारेमा सनन्नन भएको छ?Have you ever heard of women's groups operated 
with MIRA's assistance? 
के आिा जमरा के सियोग स सचंाजलत मजिला स्वास््य स्वयम सजेवका आ  पोषर् पररचाजलका रिल माय 
समनि के बारेम ेसनन्न ेछजलय ै? 
 छ Yes ि  छैन No नई    
[wgattdmira]तपाईल ेवा पररवारको अन्य सिस्य आमा समनिको बठैकमा िाननभएको छ?Have you or 
your family member attended any women's group meeting? आिा या पररवार के अन्य सिस्य 
माय समनि के बठैक म ेगले जछयई ? 
 छ जमरा द्वारा सियोग गररन े आमा समिू Yes, MIRA assisted Women’s group go to 
[wgattnby] ि जमरा द्वारा सियोग केन ेमाय समनि म े 
छ अरु ससं्था द्वारा सियोग गररन ेआमा समिू Yes, some other organisation assisted 
women’s group [homevisit] मा िाननिोसskip to [homevisit]. ि अन्य ससं्था द्वारा सियोग 
केन ेमाय समनि म े
 छैन No  नई  
 
[noattdwhy] आमा समनिमा निान ेकारर् के िो ? What is the reason behind not attending 
women’s group? मया समनि के बठैक म ेनई िाइके कारर् कजथ छइ  ? 
गभडवास्थाको बारेमा कन रा गनड लाि लाग्छ Too shy  गभडवास्थाके बारेम ेबात करम ेलाि लग ै
छई  
श्रीमानल ेअननमजत दिननभएन Not allowed by Husband श्रीमान अननमजत नई िलेकै  
सासनआमाल ेअननमजत दिननभएन Not allowed by mother in law साउस अननमजत न ैिलेकै  
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 पररवारको अन्य सिस्यल ेअननमजत दिननभएन Not allowed by other family members 
पररवारके अन्य सिस्य अननमजत नई िलेकै  
 घरको कामल ेव्यस्त भएरToo busy with household chores घरके कामम ेव्यस्त भलेा स   
 इच्छा नभएर Not interested इच्छा नई भलेाके चल्त े 
मलाई सब ैकन रा थािा भएर I know all about it िमरा बात नई पत्ता छल ै 
 
[wgattdby] जथयो भन,े कसल ेभाग जलनन भएको जथयो? If yes, who attended the meeting? यदि 
छजल्खन त , के भाग लने ेछजल्खन ? 
 गभडवती मजिला आफै Woman herself गभडवजत मजिला अपन े 
सासनलेMother-in-law साउस  
श्रीमान Husband श्रीमान 
पररवारको अन्य सिस्यल ेother family member पररवार के अन्य सिस्य  
थािा छैन Don't know मालनम नई  
[wgattdtimes] कजत पल्ट तपाई या तपाईको पररवारको सिस्यल ेभाग जलननभयो ? How many times 
have you and other family members attended the meeting? कत ेबरे आिा आ आिाके पररवार 
के सिस्य भाग लने ेछजथन ? (0-50, 99 = don't know) 
[pwtimes]गभडवती मजिला आफै PW herself गभडवजत मजिला अपन े _____  _____ 
[sasutimes]सासनलMेother-in-law साउस _____  _____ 
[husbandtimes]  श्रीमानल ेHusband श्रीमान 




[hv_nm] के तपाईलाई जमराको सियोग द्वारा सचंाजलत पोषर् पररचाजलका भटे्न आउननभएको जथयो?Has 
nutrition mobiliser assisted by MIRA come to visit you? दक आिा के  जमरा के सियोग सचंाजलत 
पोषर् पररचाजलका भटे कर आयल रिजथन  ? 
जथयो Yes ि   जथएन No  नई  
 
[hv_purpnm] आउननभयो भन,े के कामको लाजग?If yes, for what purpose? आयल रिजथन त , कोन 
कािके लले ? 
आमा समिूमा भाग जलनInvitation to women’s group माय समनिम ेभाग लबेके लले  
परामशडको लाजग Counselling सर सल्लाि िबेके लले   
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जपठो दिनको लाजग Food transfer आटा िबेके लले 
पसैा दिनको लाजग Cash transfer पसैा िबेके लले 
 
[hv_timesnm] पोषर् पररचाजलका कजत पटक आउनन भयो?How often did the NM home visit 
you? पोषर् पररचाजलका कत ेबरे आयल रिजथन ? 
_____ पटक, पजिलो जतन मजिनामा Times in first trimester बरे , पजिल जतन मजिनाम े 
_____पटक, िोस्रो जतन मजिनामा Times in second trimester बरे , िोसर जतन मजिनामे 
_____पटक, तसे्रो जतन मजिनामा Times in third trimester बरे , तसेर जतन मजिनामे 
 
 
[hv_fchv]तपाईलाई गभडवास्थामा मजिला स्वास््य स्वयसंजेवकाल े भटे्न आउनन भएको जथयो?Has the 
female community Health volunteer (FCHV) from the MIRA assisted group come to 
visit you? आिा के गभडवास्था म ेमजिला स्वास््य स्वयसंजेवका भटे कर आयल रि जथन ? 
जथयो Yes ि जथएन No  नई  
 
[hv_purpfchv] आउननभयो भन,े के कामको लाजग?If yes, for what purpose? आयल रि जथन त कोन 
कािके लले ? 
 आईरन चक्की बाड्नDistribute iron tablets आईरन चक्की बाट  
 सामान्य स्वास््य परामसड दिन   General health counselling सामान्य स्वास््य बारे सर 
सल्लाि िबे  
 पोषर्को बारेमा परामशड Counseling on nutrition पोषर्के  बारेम े सर सल्लाि िबे  
 
 आमा समनिमाजनम्तो दिनको लाजग Invitation to women’s group माय समनिम ेआब के लले 
बिाब   
 अन्य Other अन्य  
 
 
जशक्षा / Educational status:  
 
[att_school] तपाई कजिले स्कनल िानन भएको छ ? Have you ever attend the school ? 
आिा कजियो स्कनल गेल जछय ै? 
  छ Yes  जछयई  
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 छैन No नई जछयई  
 
[edulevel]    तपाईल ेकजत सम्म पढ्नन भएको छ?  
What is the highest grade that you studied to?   
आिा कत ेपढन ेजछयई ? 
 कक्षा Class Number   कक्षा मा तलको  
अवस्थामा 0 लखे्नन िोस ् १. उत्तरिाताल े केजि पजन नपढेको अवस्थामा २. उत्तरिाताल े उिनड वा  
ससं्कृत मात्र पढेको छ भन े (अनौपचाररक रुपमा)/ ३.प्रौढ जशक्षा पढेको छ भन े| तर यदि उिनड वा  
ससं्कृत पढे पजन स्कनल/कलिेमा कन  ैति सम्म पनगकेो छ भन ेमाजथ कक्षा लखे्नन िोस ्| 
Record 0 in class number if i) the respondent has not studied at all ii) the 
respondent only studied Urdu, Sanskrit or non-formal/ adult  education/ but no 
other formal schooling iii) literacy classes.  However if a person has studied 
formal Sanskrit or Urdu at a school and got some certificate and moved up 
classes then record their class no. 
 जनच्चाके अवस्थाम े0 जलखन , १. उत्तरिाता दकचछो नई पढ्न ेिोई त २. उत्तरिाता उिनड या   ससं्कृत 
मात्र ेपढ्न ेिोई त(अनौपचाररक रूपम)े/ ३.प्रौढ जशक्षा पढ्न ेिोई त  लदेकन उिनड या   ससं्कृत पढ्ला 
के बाि स्कनल/कलिेम ेकोन ति तईक पहु चल छई स ेकक्षा उपर जलखन  
 
[read]   तपाई यो वा्य पढ्न सक्नन  हुन्छ? Can you read the above statement?  आिा यी वा्य 
पईढ सकै जछयई ? 
छोरा र छोरी सामान हुन ्िनबलैाई स्कूल पठाउन पछड  Sentence provided in Nepali, Hindi and 
Maithili according to the language the woman has been schooled in and speaks most 
frequently. बटेा आ बेटी समान छई िन नके स्कूल पठाब पर तई  
 पढ्न नसके्न  Cannot read पईढ नई सकै छयई  
 गािो सगं पढ्न े Reads with difficulty  मनजस्कल स पईढ सकै छयई     
 सजिल ैपढ्न सके्न  Reads easily     आसनी स पईढ सकै छयई     
 
[husbanystudy] 
तपाईको श्रीमानले पढ्नन भएको छ ? Has your husband studied?  
दक आिाके  श्रीमान पढने छजथन  ? 
  छ Yes  छ्थीन   
 छैन No नई छ्थीन   
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(येिी छैन भने anyone5yed मा िाननिोस) 
(If No then go to anyone5yed) 
(येिी नइछ जथन त anyone5yed मा िाउ) 
 
[husbedulevel] 
छ भने  कजत सम्म पढ्नन भएको छ ? What is the highest grade that your husband studied to? 
छई त कते तईक पढने छजथन ? 
कक्षा Class Number   कक्षा मा तलको  
 
[anyone5yed] 
तपाइको घरधनरीको १२ वषड भन्िा माथीको कन ै सिस्यले ५ वषड सम्म स्कूल पढ्नन भएको छ ? 
Has any member of the household, who is older than 12 years, completed 5 years of 
schooling? आिाके  घरधनरीके  १२ वषड स बेसी के कोनो सिस्य ५ वषड तईक स्कूल पढने  छजथन  ? 
  छ Yes  छजथन 
 छैन No नई छजथन 
 
[anychildenrol] 
तपाईको घरमा   ६ लागेको वषड िखेी १६ लागेको वषड सम्मका  बच्चािरू  स्कनलमा भरना भएका छन ? 
Thinking now about all the children in your household aged 6-16 running years, are 
they all enrolled in school? 
आिाके घरमे  ६ लागल वषड स १६ लागल वषड तईके  बच्चासब  स्कनलमें भनाड भेल छई ?   
  छ  Yes ि  
  छैन  No नई  
 यो उमेरको बच्चा छैन No children in the age group in the household घरमे अई उमेरके 
बच्चा नई छई   
 
[school_absent] 
तपाईको घरमा गएको वषडमा   ६ लागेको वषड िखेी १६ लागेको वषड सम्मका  कन ै  बच्चािरूल ेएक मजिना 
वा त्यों भन्िा बढ़ी लगातार   स्कनल छन टाएका जथए (छन ट्टी बािके)  ?  
Have children aged 6-16 running years in the household where you are staying at the 
moment not attended school for one month or more at a stretch during term time in 
the last 12 months?   
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आिाके घरमे बीतल एक सालमें   ६ लागल वषड स १६ लागल वषड तईके कोनो  बच्चासब एक मजिना या 
ओंईस बेसी दिन स्कनल छोड़ने छलई (छन ट्टी बािके)?   
  छ  Yes ि  
  छैन  No नई  
 
PREGNANCY 
[pregnant]    के तपाई अजिल ेगवडवती हुननहुन्छ? Are you currently pregnant? दक आिा अजभ 
गवडवती जछयई ? 
  छ  Yes ि  
  छैन  No नई  
 
[prev_preg] 
के तपाई पजिल ेगभडवती हुनन भएको जथयो , छोटो समयको लागी भए पजन वा बच्चा िन्मे लगतै मरेको भए 
पजन ? Have you ever been pregnant before, even if it only lasted a short time or the 
baby subsequently died? दक आिा पजिले गभडवती भेल छजलयै , छोट समय के लेल िोई या बच्चा िन्मै 
ते मरल सिेो भसकै छइ ? 
  जथए  Yes छजलयै  
  जथइन   No नई छजल  
(येिी जथइन आएमा sc_familysize मा िाननिोस) 
(If No then go to sc_familysize) 
(येिी नै छजल sc_familysize मा िाउ) 
 
तपाइले अजिलेसम्म कजत वटा बच्चालाई िन्म दिनन भएको छ ? How many children have you given 
birth to? आिा अजभ तक कै गो बच्चाके िन्म िनेे जछयई?  
 ??Limitation needed 
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के तपाईको कन ै छोरी जबबाजित जछन ? Are any of your daughters married? दक आिाके कोनो बेटी 
जबबाजित छजथन? 
िो   Yes ि  
िोइन   Noनै   
 
के तपाईको कन  ैज्वाई तपाईसँग बस्नन हुन्छ? Are any of your sons-in-law living with you? दक दक 
आिाके कोनो िमाई आिा सगं ेअई घर मे  रिई छजथन? 
िो   Yesि  
िोइन   No नै  
 
के तपाईको कन ै छोरा जबबाजित हुननहुन्छ ? Are any of your sons married? दक आिाके कोनो बेटा 
जबबाजित छै ? 
िो  Yes ि 
िोइन  Noनै   
 
के तपाईको कन ै बनिारी तपाई सँग बस्नन हुन्छ? Are any of your daughters-in-law living with you? 
दक आिाके कोनो पनतहु आिा िोरे रि ैछै ? 
िो  Yesि   
िोइन   Noनै   
  
तपाइको घर पररवारमा कजिल ेकन  ैबच्चाको मतृ्यन भएको छ? Have you ever experienced the death 
of a child? आिाके घर पररवारम ेकजियो कोनो बच्चाके मतृ्यन भले  छै? 
  Yes / छ / छै  
  No /छैन/ नइ छै  
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[sc_familysize] 
तपाई अजिले बजसरिनन भएको घरमा श्रीमान सजित कजत िना पररवारका सिस्य हुननहुन्छ ? How many 
members are there along with your husband in the household where you are currently 





[migrlab_husb]  के तपाईको श्रीमान िाल ैनपेाल भन्िा बाजिर रोिगारमा काम गरररिनन भएको छ?  
Is your husband currently working outside Nepal?  
आिा के श्रीमान आई काईलम ेनपेाल स बािर  कामकाि करिल  छजथन ? 
  छ Yes  छजथन 
 छैन No नई छजथन 
यदि छैन भन े[mnths0food] मा िानन िोस ्
If no go to [mnths0food]    
यदि नई छजथन त mnths0food म ेिाऊ 
 
[migrwhere_husb]   यदि श्रीमान िाननभएको छ किा ँभन ेिाननभएको छ? If your husband has 
migrated where is your husband living? यदि श्रीमान बािर छजथन त कत गले छजथन ? 
  भारत India  भारत 
  अरब मनलकूिरु Arab Countries (िस्त ैकतार, िनबई, वोमान, साउिी, कन वते, इराक, , बिराइन, 
िोडडन आदि ) including Qatar, Dubai, Oman, Saudi, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan etc) 
अरब िशेसब  
   मलजेसया Malaysia मलजेसया 
  अन्य िशे Other Country  अन्य िशे 
[migrother_husb] अन्य िशे उल्लखे गननडिोस ् _______________________ 
Specify other country  अन्य िशे उल्लखे करू  
अन्य िशे उल्लखे करु   
 
[remittance_pwgets]  तपाइको श्रीमान जविशे िानन भएपजछ तपाइल ेखचडको लागी कजिल ैश्रीमान वाट 
पसैा प्राप्त गननड भएको छ? Since your husband went abroad have you yourself received any 
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money to spend? आिा के श्रीमान जविशे गलेाके बाि आिाके  खचडके लले श्रीमान स पसैा प्राप्त भले 
छलयै ?   
  छ Yes  छलयै  
 छैन No नई छलयै  
 
[mnths0food]   गएको १२ मजिनामा कन  ैमजिना तपाईको पररवारको आवश्यकता अननसार खाना नपनग्न े
अवस्था जथयो? Over the last 12 months, were there any months in which you did not 
have enough food to meet your family’s needs?  
जबतालािा १२ मजिनाम ेकोनो मजिना यिाकेँ घर पररवारके आबश्यकता बमोजिम खाना /अन्न न ैपनगल के 
अवस्था   ऐल छल? 
  जथयो Yes   छल         जथएन No नई छल 
 
यो प्रश्निरु घरधनरीको  मनजखया या मजिलको गार्िडयन पजन सोध्न सदकन छ  
घरधनरीको  सामान /सम्पजत  
QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE ASKED OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD OR GUARDIANS 
OF THE WOMAN (household) 
Household assets / property 
यो प्रश्नसब  घरधनरीके  मनजखया या मजिलके  गार्िडयन के सिेो पनछ सकै जछयई   




तपाई अजिले बसेको घरधनरीमा, खाना पकाउनको लागी मात्र धेरै िसो कन  इन्धन प्रयोग गननड हुन्छ? 
Which fuels do you use for cooking - list all the fuels you tend to use? 
आिा अखन िई घरमे जछयई ओंई घरमे खाना बनाब के लेल मात्र कोन इन्धन प्रयोग करै जछयई ? 
 िाउरा र िाउराको भनस  Firewood and Sawdust िनाड या िनाडके  भनसा  
  गनइठा  Dried cow dung (goitha) गोइठा   
 पराल, धानको भनस, रिररको डाठ, झारपात  आदि  Straw /Agricultural crop residues / Other 
plant products पनवर, धानके भूसा ,रिरीके िाठ ,झारपात इत्यादि  
 ग्यास  Gas ग्यास  
 कोइला  Charcoal  कोइला  
 मट्टीतेल  Kerosene  मट्टीतेल  
 गोबर ग्यास  Biogas (gober gas)   गोबर ग्यास  
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 जबधनत  Electricity  जबधनत  
 कागि/ढड्डा  Paper/ card   कागि/कन ट  
 प्लाजस्टक  Plastic प्लाजस्टक  
 प्थर कोइला  Coal (Mined)  प्थर कोइला  
 अन्य  Other अन्य  
 घरमा खाना नपकाउने  No food cooked at home  घरमे खाना नई बनबई छई   
 
[walls]  तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरको पखाडल मनख्यतया के ल ेबनकेो छ? What are the walls of the 
house where you are staying at the moment mainly made of?  आिा अखन िई घरम ेजछयई 
स ेघरके िवेाल कजथस बनल छई ? 
 जसमने्ट र इँटा    Cement and bricks जसमने्ट आ  इँटा     
  माटो र इट्टा Mud and bricks माइट आ   इट्टा 
 माटो र ढनङ्गा    Mud and Stone माइट आ  पत्थर   
  काठको पटािा Planks of wood   काठके  पटािा 
 खर पराल       Grass / Straw Thatch खर पतार  
  क्र्कट पाता Metal sheets क्र्कट पाता 
 जसमने्ट र टाट Cement and woven stems or bamboo (tat)  टाट        
  माटो र टाट Mud and woven stems or bamboo (tat)  टाट        
 अन्य Other अन्य  
 
[roof]  तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरको छाना मनख्यतया  के ल ेबनकेो छ?  (अवलोकनको आधारमा सजि उत्तर  
लखे्ननिोस) What is the roof of the house where you are staying at the moment mainly 
made of? (observe and tick the correct response) आिा अखन िई घरम ेजछयई स ेघरके छत  
कजथस बनल छई ? (अवलोकनके आधारम ेसजि उत्तर जलखन|) 
 Cement  जसमेन्ट   जसमने्ट 
 एलबसे्टर छाना  Asbestos sheets एलबसे्टर के छत  
 खपडा Traditional tiles (Khapadaa)  खपड़ा  
 टायल Tiles  टायल 
 िस्ताको छाना Metal sheets चिरा के छत  
 फन सको छाना  Grass / straw thatch फन स के छत 
 अन्य Other  अन्य  
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[floor]  तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरको भनइँ मनख्यतया के  ल ेबनकेो छ? What is the floor of the house 
where you are staying at the moment mainly made of?  आिा अखन िई घरम ेजछयई स ेघरके 
िजमन  कजथस बनल छई ? 
 माटो / माटो र गोबर वा बालनवा Dirt / dirt with dung or sand माइट  वा  माइट या गोबर वा बाऊल    
 Cement जसमेन्ट    
 Other   अन्य anya  
  
[rooms]    तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरमा िम्मा कजत वटा सनत्न ेकोठा छन्? (यदि भान्छा कोठा पजन सनत्नलाई 
प्रयोग हुन्छ भन ेगन्नन िोला| गाई बस्तन  र बाजिरी घर नगन्नन िोला|) 
How many rooms in this household are used for sleeping? (Count kitchen if the family 
sleep there but do not count cow shed or out houses) 
आिा अखन िई घरम ेजछयई ओंइ घरम े्याटा सनतवला कोठली छई ?(भानस घर में सतूई छई त सिेो 
लबेई लदेकन थईर नई लबेई ) 
सनत्न ेकोठा   sleeping rooms 
  
[access_elec]  तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरमा जबिनली छ दक छैन? यदि जबिनली छ तर एक मजिना भन्िा 
बढी िजेख पसैा नजतरेको कारर् काटीएको छ भन ेछैनमा जचन्ि लगाउननिोस|  
Do you have electricity in the house where you are staying at the moment? If the 
electricity has been cut for more than one month because the family cannot pay for it 
(not because the electricity supply is broken) record no. 
आिा अखन िई घरम ेजछयई ओंइ घरम ेजबिली  छई दक नई छई ? यदि जबिली छई लदेकन एक स 
बसेी स पसैा नई बनझलेाके कारर् जबिली कटल छई त नई छई म ेजचन्ि लगाऊ ?   
  जबिनली को छ  Yes from a paid-for line   जबिनली के छई    
 छ तर हुक्कं्कग Yes from hooking  छई  लदेकन हुक्कं्कग          
 छ तर सोलार  Yes from solar panel  छई लदेकन  सोलार             
 छैन No नई छई 
 
[assets]    तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरमा तलका मध्य कन  कन  बस्तनिरु छन?् (जलस्टमा भएका समान बारेमा  
पालपैालो  सोध्ननिोस|्  जलस्टमा नभएको समानको बारेमा नसोध्ननिोस|्) 
What things do you have in the house where you are staying at the moment?  (Ask 
about each asset in turn. Do not ask about assets not included on this list.)  आिा अखन 
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िई घरमे जछयई ओंइ घरमे कजथ कजथ  समानसब  छई ? (जलस्टम ेभले समानके बारेम ेबरेाबरेी पनछन | जलस्टम े
न ैभले समानके बारेम ेन ैपनछन |) 
 रेजडयो Radio रेजडयो 
 सािा टेजलजभिन Black and White TV सािा टेजलजभिन 
 रजङ्गन टेजलजभिन Colour TV रजङ्गन टेजलजभिन 
 साइकल Bicycle साइकल 
 बयल/टायर गाडा Ox Cart बयल/टायर गाडी  
 मोटरसाइकल Motorcycle मोटरसाइकल 
 ट्रया्टर Tractor ट्रया्टर 
 बस/ ट्रक/ िीप/ कार/ टेम्पो Bus/truck/jeep/car/tempo   बस/ ट्रक/ िीप/ कार/ टेम्पो 
 थ्रसेर Thresher थ्रसेर 
 पम्पसटे Pump Set पम्पसेट 
 जसलाई मजेसन Sewing Machine जसलाई मजेसन  
 मोबाइल Mobile phone   मोबाइल 
 ्यामरा Camera ्यामरा             
क्रिज Fridge क्रिज             
कम्प्यनटर /ल््बटप Computer / laptop कम्प्यनटर /ल््बटप          
 माजथका मध्य ेकेजि पजन छैन None of those listed    उपरमसे कोनो नइ छई  
  
[mwater_source] 
तपाईको घरको लागी खानेपानीको मनख्य श्रोत के िो? What is the main drinking source of your 
household? आिा अखन िई घरमे जछयई ओंइ घरके खानेपानीके  मनख्य श्रोत कजथ   छई ? 
 आफ्नै घरमा धारा भएको  Piped in to dwelling अपने घर जभतरमे रिल धारा   
 आगनमा धारा भएको  Piped to yard/plot आँगनमे रिल धारा   
 सावडिजनक  वा जछमेदक को धारा  Public tap/standpipe सावडिजनक  वा परोजस के  धारा  
 आफ्नै घर जभत्रको चापाकल  Tubewell (handpump) in your own home  अपने घर जभतरमे रिल 
चापाकल 
 आगनमा भएको वा घर नजिकैको चापाकल  Tubewell (handpump) in your yard / near the 
house आँगनमे रिल चापाकल या घर लग के चापाकल  
 जछमेकीको चापाकल  Public tubewell (handpump)  परोजस के  चापाकल  
 डीप बोररंग  Deep borehole  डीप बोररंग  
 सनरजक्षत इनार  Protected well   सनरजक्षत इनार  
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 असनरजक्षत इनार  Unprotected well   असनरजक्षत इनार  
 बोतल वा िारको पानी  Bottle or jar बोतल या िार के पाइन   
 अन्य (िस्तै मनिानको पजन ,ट्यांकरबाट ल्याएको पजन ) Other (such as spring, water tanker, or 
other) अन्य (िेन : मनिान के पाइन, ट्यांकर स ल्याल पाइन ) 
 
[waterfar] 
तपाई अजिले बसेको घरवाट खानेपानी जलएर आउनको लागी तपाइलाई कजत समय लाग्छ ?(जमनेटमा 
लेखननिोस) From the house where you are staying at the moment how long does it take 
to go there, get water and come back? (write in minutes) 
आिा अखन िई घरमे जछयई ओंइ घर स पाइन लक आबमे कते समय लगइय  ?  (जमनेट मे जलखन) 
 
 
[toilet]  तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरधनररका सिस्यल ेमनख्यतया कस्तो प्रकारको शौचालयको प्रयोग गननड हुन्छ?  
What kind of toilet do your household members in the house where you are staying at 
the moment use? आिा अखन िई घरम े जछयई ओंइ घरके घरधनरीके सिस्यसब मनख्य रुपस केिन 
रंग(प्रकार)के शौचालयके प्रयोग करै जछयई   ?            
 झाडी/खोला/मैिान Bushes/Stream/ Open Areas झाडी/नदि/खनल्ला ठाउ   
 खाल्ड ेचपी Pit Toilet  खाल्ड ेचपी  
 प्यान Pan Toilet   प्यान 
 फ्लस वा कमोड  Flush or European Toilet  फ्लस या कमोड    
 अन्य चपी Other अन्य शौचालय 
 
[ownland]   के तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरको  आफ्न ैखजेत योग्य िजमन छ?  
Does the household here have their own agricultural land? आिा अखन िई घरम े जछयई ओंइ 
घरम े कत ेखजेत योग्य िजमन छई   ? 
 ि Yes  छई  िैन No नई छई 
यदि छैन भन,े [sharecropper] मा िानन िोस ्
If no go to [sharecropper] 
 
[share_land_know]  तपाई अहिले बसेको घिधिुीले  जग्गा बटैया हर्दएको छ? Of the total land 
where you are living at the moment, does the household give to sharecroppers to 
farm? 
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आिा अखन िई घरम े जछयई ओंइ घरम ेिोसरके िजमन बटैया लने ेछई   ? 
 ि Yes  छई  िैन No नई छई 
 
[sharecropper] के तपाई अजिल ेबसकेो घरधनररल ेअरुको िग्गा बटैया गननड हुन्छ?  
Does the household farm any land that belongs to someone else on a sharecropping 
agreement? आिा अखन िई घरम े जछयई ओंइ घरम ेिोसरके िजमन बटैया लने ेछई   ? 
 ि Yes छई      िैन No नइ छई 
 
[serespondent]   सामाजिक र आर्थडक   सम्बजन्ध प्रस्नािरुको मनख्य उत्तरिाता को हुननहुन््यो? 
Who was the main respondent for the socio-economic questions above?  
सामाजिक आ आर्थडक सम्बजन्ध प्रस्नसबम ेमनख्य उत्तरिाता के छलखीन? 
महिला आफै Woman herself  
सासन Mother-in-law   सउस  
ससनरा Father-in-law ससनर  
श्रीमान Husband श्रीमान  
ससनराली घरको अन्य मजिला Other women from husband's household  ससनरके  अन्य 
मजिला  
बनबा Father  बाब ू 
आमा Mother   माय  
माइतीका अन्य मजिला Other women from the parental household  निीरा के अन्य मजिला  
मजिला जछमदेक वा साथी Female neighbour /friend मजिलाके परोसी  वा साथी  
पनरुस जछमदेक Male neighbour पनरुख परोसी   
अन्य Other अन्य  
 
तपाईको समयको लाजग धन्यवाि | GPSओन गननडिोस र खनल्ला ठाउँमा  िाननिोस  ििा  आकास खनल्ला 
िोस  | 
 
THANK THE FAMILY FOR THEIR TIME 
ENSURE THE GPS IS TURNED ON AND FIND A PLACE NEARBY WITH A CLEAR 
VIEW TO THE SKY TO TAKE THE GPS 
आिाके समय के लेल धन्यवाि | GPS ओन करु आ खनल्ला ठाउँ मे िाऊ ित स आकास खनल्ला िोइ | 
[gpsnumber] 
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जि जप एस नम्बर  
GPS waypoint number 
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Appendix D 
Mathematical details on exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis 
D.1 Introduction 
This Appendix will provide additional mathematical details on the operation of 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We will 
exclusively focus on how Mplus carries out EFA and CFA to arrive at the factor 
loadings and factor scores, we use in Chapter 4. Multiple approaches to EFA and 
CFA are currently available and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide 
an overview of all these many approaches. Most of the detail in this Appendix 
will be derived from the Mplus Technical Appendix [457] and Bartholomew, 
Knott and Moustaki’s comprehensive book on factor analysis [289].  
 
EFA an CFA are fundamentally concerned with statistical inference on the value 
of “latent variables”. Latent variables are unobserved outcomes of probability 
distributions, which affect the behaviour of observed outcomes in turn. These 
are ubiquitous in social science research, where many unobserved quantitites 
such as business confidence, quality of life, conservative political attitudes or 
general intelligence cannot be directly observed, but need to be inferred from 
observable behaviours such as answers to an array of survey indicators or test-
scores from a problem-solving quiz. Researchers often proxy latent variables 
with a summary measure such as the mean of individual items’ Likert scale 
scores. However, this assumes that the fixed scoring scheme adopted by 
researchers accurately represents the value of the underlying latent variable. 
EFA and CFA apply statistical inference to test such assumptions. 
 
D.2 EFA with continuous outcomes 
In our own analysis (Chapter 4), we modelled outcomes are ordered, categorical 
outcomes on a 4-point Likert scale. Before considering such a case, we first 
introduce the simpler version of EFA, where we use continuous outcome 
variables. In this model, Mplus operates with the following specification: 
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Here, 𝒚𝒊 represents a vector of observable dependent variables for a particular 
respondent, such as their answers to all the questions on agency in domestic 
work. 𝝂 represents a vector of intercept parameters, while 𝜺𝒊 are identical, 
independently distributed multivariable normal error terms with mean 0 and 
diagonal covariance matrix V. Each diagonal entry in the matrix V corresponds 
to the variance of a particular questionnaire item. 𝜼𝒊 represents a vector of 
factor scores, one score for each factor in the factor analysis, while 𝚲 represents 
a matrix of factor loadings. 𝜼𝒊 is assumed to be independent of 𝜺𝒊. Thus, 
conditional on 𝜼𝒊, different items are assumed to be independent. 
 
Assuming p questionnaire items, m factors and n respondents in our sample, the 
size of V is p × p and 𝚲 has size m × p. V needs to provide a variance for every 
questionnaire item, while 𝚲 needs to provide a factor loading for each indicator 
variable and each factor. For example, for an exploratory factor analysis with 
two factors and 10 indicator variables, V is a 10 × 10 matrix, 𝜼𝒊 is a vector of size 
two, and 𝚲 is a 10 × 2 matrix, which provides 10 error terms, 2 factor scores, 10 
factor loadings for the first factor, and 10 factor loadings for the second factor. 
Note that the number of factors need to be pre-specified by the user.  
 
𝜼𝒊 is a latent variable, thus it is itself a random variable. In our analysis in Chaper 
4, all latent variables are continuous. Mplus models these as multivariable 
normal variables with mean α and covariance matrix Θ. By varying the values of 
α and Θ, we are varying our assumptions about the mean values of the 
underlying factors and their correlations with each other. 
 
Since both 𝚲 and 𝜼𝒊 are unobserved there is no way to empirically distinguish 𝜼𝒊 
from any invertible linear transformation of 𝜼𝒊, say 𝜼′𝒊 = 𝑨𝜼𝒊. This is because 
we can always compensate for such a transformation with a corresponding 
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inverse transformation of the factor loadings, say 𝚲′ =  𝚲𝑨−𝟏. Combining the 
two changes leaves the probability distribution of 𝒚𝒊 unchanged since  
 
𝚲′𝜼′𝒊 = 𝚲𝑨
−𝟏𝑨𝜼𝒊 = 𝚲𝜼𝒊 
 
Partly this is because unobservable variables have no natural scale. We have no 
natural way of making sense of the difference between ten units of agency 
freedom and one unit of agency freedom and no natural absolute zero to anchor 
our values of agency freedom in. Partly, this is because there is no natural way 
in which two unobservable variables are supposed to divide up the variance in 
outcomes between them. A priori two factors are indistinguishable since we 
have not estimated their factor loadings or their factor scores yet. Thus, we 
should aim to identify factor scores and factor loadings that are interpretable 
rather than settle for any set of scores and loadings that fit the data. 
 
Table 23. Two equivalent sets of factor loadings 
 Set 1 Set 2 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
You do these activities because you like it 1.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 
You do these activities because you want to 1.0 0.0 3.0 1.1 
You do these activities because they are 
personally important to you 1.0 0.0 3.0 0.2 
You do these activities so that others won't 
get angry with you 0.0 1.0 2.1 0.2 
You do these activities because you will get 
into trouble otherwise 0.0 1.0 1.2 0.2 
 
For example, the sets of factor loadings in Table 23 are linear transformations of 
one another and thus indistinguishable empirically. While the first set of factor 
loadings clearly separates internal from external motivation, the second set is 
much more difficult to interpret. This is partly because the second set contains 
many “cross-loadings”, i.e. questionnaire items that load on both factors. When 
all the indicator items are loading a little bit on all the factors as in Set 2, it is 
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much harder to tell what is unique about each factor than if the factor loadings 
are clearly separated as in Set 1. 
 
In practice, a full EFA is accomplished in three steps: 
1. Constrain 𝚲, α and Θ sufficiently to make the model identified 
2. Estimate the model parameters using statistical inference 
3. Apply a number of invertible transformations 𝑨 to the factor scores (with 
𝑨−𝟏 applied to factor loadings) until the most interpretable loadings arise 
 
Step 1 is carried out in Mplus by constraining α = 0, Θ = 𝐈 and 𝚲 to be such that 
𝚲𝑻𝐕−𝟏𝚲 is a diagonal matrix with no two diagonal elements having equal value 
and all diagonal elements being arranged in ascending order [458]. It so happens 
that these three constraints jointly make the model identified and result in a 
neat, closed expression for the model likelihood [289]. This allows for maximum 
likelihood estimation in Step 2 using an expectation-maximisation algorithm 
where we alternate between estimating 𝚲 and V conditional on preliminary 
values for the other two parameters. The maximum likelihood estimator for 𝝂 
comes out to be simply the grand mean of all our outcome vectors 𝒚𝒊. Details of 
this procedure can be found in Bartholomew, Knott and Moustaki’s book [289]. 
 
Once, we have obtained a well-fitting set of parameter values, we now apply 
invertible transformations to our factor scores and factor loadings which leave 
their likelihood value intact, but change our interpretation of them. These linear 
transformations are often called “rotations”, because simply shifting the factor 
scores by a constant or scaling the factor scores by a constant does not alter our 
interpretation of the factor scores – latent variables do not have a natural scale. 
Thus, one of the more substantial type of linear transformations to apply to our 
data are rotations. However, this is not the only type of linear transformation, 
we might apply that change our interpretation. Other transformations, e.g. the 
shear, may also constitute useful transformations. In the language of factor 
analysis, such transformations have come to be known as “oblique rotations”, 
even though they are not actually rotations.  
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The particular type of “oblique rotation”, we have employed in Chapter 4, is 
called the geomin rotation. Given a set of factor loadings 𝚲, it seeks to find the 
linear transformation 𝑨 that minimises the value of 𝑓(𝑨−1𝚲) where 𝑓 calculated 
the sum of the row geometric means of the squared entries in its input matrix 
[459]. In other words, 𝑓 is defined as follows: 
 
 











ε should be chosen as a small value, such as 0.01, to reduce the number of local 
minima produced by this function. The function 𝑓 is meant to capture the 
interpretability of a particular factor structure with low scores indicating greater 
interpretability and higher scores indicating lower interpretability. In particular, 
it favours factor structures with as few cross-loadings, i.e. indicator items 
loading on multiple factors, as possible. 
 
D.3 EFA with categorical outcomes 
In case of categorical outcomes, Mplus follows similar procedures to the case 
with continuous outcomes. The underlying probability model is still the same as 
in equation D.1. We have reproduced it below for ease of reading. 
 




𝜼𝒊 is multivariable normal with mean α and covariance matrix Θ, and the 𝜺𝒊 are 
identical, independently distributed multivariable normal terms with mean 0 
and diagonal covariance matrix V. As before, we assume p questionnaire items, 
m factors and n respondents in our sample.   
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However, 𝒚𝒊 no longer refers to the observed outcome. Rather, we refer to the 
new observed values as 𝒛𝒊. These are related to 𝒚𝒊 as follows: 
 




for categories 𝑐 = 0,1,2, … 𝐶 − 1, 𝜏𝑗,0 = −∞ and 𝜏𝑗,𝐶 = ∞, where C+1 is the 
total number of categories. In other words, 𝝉𝒋 operates as a vector of thresholds 
for questionnaire item j so that the 𝑦𝑖𝑗  values need to exceed 𝜏𝑗,𝑐  in order for 
𝑧𝑖𝑗  to attain the next categorical value. In the context of our survey tool, 𝑦𝑖𝑗  may 
reflect the underlying response strength to a particular survey question while 
𝑧𝑖,𝑗 reflects the actual answer given on the 4-point Likert scale. This is similar to 
probit and tobit models in conventional regression statistics. 
 
Conducting the EFA with categorical outcomes requires the following steps: 
1. Constrain 𝝂, 𝚲, α and Θ sufficiently to make the model identified 
2. Estimate thresholds for 𝑦𝑖𝑗  𝝉𝒋 using univariate probit regression on each 
questionnaire item in isolation from the 𝒛𝒊 vector 
3. Estimate pairwise polychoric correlations for the 𝑦𝑖𝑗  with bivariate probit 
regression on pairs of questionnaire items from the 𝒛𝒊 vector 
4. Estimate factor loadings using weighted least squares with the polychoric 
correlation matrix 
5. Apply a number of invertible transformations 𝑨 to the factor scores (with 
𝑨−𝟏 applied to factor loadings) until the most interpretable loadings arise 
 
In Step 1, we constrain α = 0 and Θ = 𝐈. We also set the means of 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝝂, to 0 and 
the variances of 𝑦𝑖𝑗  to 1 because changes in 𝝂 are interchangeable with location 
shifts to the threshold values 𝝉, while changes in the variances of 𝑦𝑖𝑗  are 
interchangeable with scale shifts to 𝝉. In other words, we can always add and 
multiply 𝝉 by two scalars to compensate for any changes in the means and 
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varianaces of 𝑦𝑖𝑗 . As with the continuous case, 𝚲
𝑻𝐕−𝟏𝚲 is also restricted to be a 
diagonal matrix with no two diagonal elements having equal value and all 
diagonal elements being arranged in ascending order [458] to allow the initial 
unrotated factor solution to be identified. 
 
Unfortunately, the resulting likelihood expression is not a simple, analytical 
expression, unlike the continuous case, but rather a long series of multiple 
integrals that grows too rapidly in computing cost to be practically useful. Rather 
than perform maximum likelihood estimation directly on the joint probability 
distribution, Mplus applies weighted least squares, means and variance adjusted 
estimation (WLSMV). 
 
This involves estimating the thresholds 𝝉 using a univariate probit regression on 
each questionnaire item j in isolation (Step 2). This involves fitting the p models 
using maximum likelihood with the following specification: 
 
 𝑦′𝑖𝑗 = 𝜀′𝑖𝑗  (D.5) 
 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑐 iff 𝜏𝑗,𝑐 < 𝑦′𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜏𝑗,𝑐+1 (D.6) 
 
Here, 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 is the observed response and the 𝜀′𝑖𝑗  are independently distributed 
normal error terms with distinct variances for each j. Each instantiation of a 
value of j between 1 and p corresponds to a single model. We refer to the final 
estimated thresholds as ?̂?.  
 
These ?̂? are not “full information” maximum likelihood estimates, since we are 
ignoring the information inherent in the correlation between different 
questionnaire items [460]. However, the difference between thresholds 
obtained incorporating information from correlations between all the 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 and 
the thresholds obtained using their marginal distribution is often negligible in 
empirical applications [289,461]. 
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Next, Mplus estimates all pairwise correlations between questionnaire items 
(Step 3). This involves fitting p(p-1)/2 models for each possible pairing of 
questionnaire items k and l, say, using the same specification as in D.5 and D.6, 
but now allowing for correlations between error terms between the particular 
two questionnaire items investigated. As explained earlier, we can assume 
without loss of generality, the variances of the 𝑦𝑖𝑗  are 1, thus the correlations 
between questionnaire items, 𝜌𝑘𝑙  say, are also simultaneously covariances. The 
𝜌𝑘𝑙  are conventially called “polychoric correlations” in the statistical literature 
as they are correlations of a continuous latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗  underlying a discrete, 
observed variable 𝑧𝑖,𝑗. 
 
Although maximum likelihood estimation is used, this method does not use all 
available information, because it ignores the full joint distribution of 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 in 
estimating the 𝜌𝑘𝑙. We refer to the estimated correlation matrix as ?̂? = (?̂?𝑘𝑙). 
Again, the differences between the correlations obtained through this method 
and the correlations obtained using complete information are often negligible 
in practice [289,461]. 
 
Next, Mplus uses weighted least squares estimation to calculate a set of factor 
loadings (Step 4). The involves minimising a weighted squared distance between 
the estimated thresholds and correlations, ?̂? and ?̂?, and the predicted 
thresholds and correlations as a function of 𝝉, 𝚲, and V, i.e. minimising: 
 









Since the predicted threshold parameters do not depend on 𝚲 and V, we can 
simply set 𝝉 = ?̂?, and focus on estimating 𝚲 and V. The weights are estimated 
using a complex formula involving the estimated correlations ?̂?𝑘𝑙. For further 
details, see Muthén’s paper on this issue [462]. 
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Finally, in Step 5, we rotate the factor loadings to obtain the most interpretable 
set of loadings. In our analysis in Chapter 4, we used the geomin method to 
search the space of possible factor loadings. As we have already obtained an 
initial set of factor loadings, this step is identical to the procedure for the 
continuous case. 
 
D.4 Choosing the number of factors 
One of the most important choices in EFA is the number of factors to include in 
one’s model structure. As mentioned in Section D.2, this number is pre-specified 
by the user rather than generated automatically by the data. The number of 
factors to include is usually assessed in two ways: 1) Run a number of EFAs with 
varying number of factors and choose the factor model with the least number 
of factors which has an acceptable model fit according to standard fit indices 2) 
Run an EFA with a large number of factors and inspect the resultant scree plot. 
 
In Section D.6, we will discuss the mathematical details of standard fit indices. 
In this section, we will discuss the interpretation of the scree plot. First, recall in 
the continuous case, the model specification is as follows: 
 
 𝒚𝒊 = 𝝂 + 𝚲𝜼𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
 
(D.7) 
where the 𝜺𝒊 are identical, independently distributed multivariable normal error 
terms with mean 0 and diagonal covariance matrix V. 𝜼𝒊 is assumed to be 
independent of 𝜺𝒊. 𝜼𝒊 is a latent multivariable normal variable with mean α and 
covariance matrix Θ. In EFA, we usually restrict α = 0 and Θ = 𝐈. That makes the 
overall distribution of 𝒚𝒊 multivariate normal with the following properties: 
 
 𝔼𝒚𝒊 = 𝔼(𝝂 + 𝚲𝜼𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊) =  𝔼𝝂 + 𝔼(𝚲𝜼𝒊) + 𝔼𝜺𝒊 = 𝝂 + 𝟎 + 𝟎 = 𝝂 (D.8) 
 𝕍𝒚𝒊 = 𝕍(𝝂 + 𝚲𝜼𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊)  = 𝟎 + 𝕍(𝚲𝜼𝒊) + 𝕍𝜺𝒊 = 𝚲𝚲
𝑻 + 𝐕 (D.9) 
 𝔼[(𝒚𝒊 − 𝝂)𝜼𝒊
𝑻] = 𝔼[𝔼[(𝒚𝒊 − 𝝂)𝜼𝒊
𝑻|𝜼𝒊]] 
                              = 𝔼[𝔼[(𝒚𝒊 − 𝝂)|𝜼𝒊]𝜼𝒊
𝑻] 
                   = 𝔼[𝚲𝜼𝒊𝜼𝒊
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Thus, the factor loadings in a continuous EFA can be interpreted as covariances 
between individual questionnaire items and underlying factor scores. At the 
same time, the variance of respondent scores on a single questionnaire item j, 
when expanded in full, becomes: 
 
 







Thus, the total variance of respondent scores on questionnaire item j can be 
decomposed into a component arising from the factor scores ∑ 𝜆𝒋𝒌
2𝑚
𝑘=1  and a 
component containing the residual variance of yij, namely 𝑣jj. The former is 
called the communality of item j and corresponds to the variance explained by 
the factor structure. In EFA, we also define the eigenvalue40 of a particular factor 
k to be the total amount of variance explained by that factor, i.e. ∑ 𝜆𝒋𝒌
2𝑝
𝑗=1 . The 
scree plot method consists of plotting the eigenvalues of the factors in an EFA 
and culling the factors with low eigenvalues, as these factors are in any case 
explaining little variance in the data.  
 
However, note our derivation of equation D.10 only simplified to 𝚲, because we 
assumed the variance of our factor structure was the identity matrix. Under 
oblique rotations of the factor structure, this no longer holds. Similarly, in the 
categorical case, the mean and covariance of our observed values 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 do simplify 
to straightforward formulae involving the factor loadings. Thus, we should be 
careful in relying too much on the scree plot to choose a model, since we used 
geomin rotation and our outcome was categorical in our case. Rather, we see 
the eigenvalues as approximate values for the amount of variance explained by 
a particular factor. Similarly, we use the factor loadings as suggestive values for 
the level of influence, a particular questionnaire item has on factor scores for a 
particular factor, as is current practice [289]. 
                                                          
40 It should be noted that the term eigenvalue originated in Principal Component Analysis, where the analogous 
quantity is a true eigenvalue in the conventional sense in linear algebra (i.e. solutions to the equation Ax = 𝝀x). 
However, the term crept in and stuck within factor analysis, even though the quantity it denotes has no direct 
connection to its conventional linear algebra sense. 
Appendix D 
Mathematical details on exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
 
 
475 | P a g e  
 
 
D.5 CFA with categorical outcomes 
While EFA seeks to reveal the underlying structure in an exploratory, inductive 
fashion, CFA seeks to verify pre-existing theory rather than generate new 
theory. Typically, EFA and CFA are used jointly by generating new hypothetical 
factor structures by running EFA on a calibration dataset and then confirming 
these factor structures on a separate validation dataset using CFA. 
 
In terms of modelling and parameter estimation, CFA initially proceeds along the 
same lines as EFA. Thus, the underlying specification for CFA is the same as for 
EFA. For ease of reading, we have reproduced it below: 
 
 𝒚𝒊 = 𝝂 + 𝚲𝜼𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 (D.12) 
 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑐 iff 𝜏𝑗,𝑐 < 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜏𝑗,𝑐+1 (D.13) 
 
𝜼𝒊 is multivariable normal with mean α and covariance matrix Θ, and the 𝜺𝒊 are 
identical, independently distributed multivariable normal terms with mean 0 
and diagonal covariance matrix V. The relationship between 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑦𝑖𝑗  holds 
for categories 𝑐 = 0,1,2, … 𝐶 − 1, 𝜏𝑗,0 = −∞ and 𝜏𝑗,𝐶 = ∞, where C+1 is the 
total number of categories.  
 
In EFA, we restrict the range of values for our parameters primarily for the sake 
of computational convenience, since we will anyway rotate the factor solution 
that is obtained until we arrive at the most interpretable representation. In CFA, 
our purpose is to confirm or refute a pre-specified factor structure. Thus, in CFA, 
we are not only guided by the need to make our statistical model fully identified, 
but also by the need to test a pre-specified factor structure when placing 
constraints on our parameter values. 
 
The factor structure that we tested in Chapter 4 was one that separated internal 
motivation from external motivation in each of the domains of work outside the 
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home, domestic work, health-seeking and group participation. We tested this 
factor structure in our CFA by constraining α = 0, 𝝂 = 0, and the variances of 𝑦𝑖𝑗  
to 1. In terms of Θ, we constrained the variances of all factors to be 1, but 
allowed for the two factors to be correlated with each other. In terms of 𝚲, we 
constrained all loadings pertaining to internal motivation to be zero in our first 
factor, and all loadings pertaining to external motivation to be zero in our second 
factor. This provided an identified statistical model. 
 
After placing appropriate constraints on the parameter space, the estimation 
procedure follows the same steps (Steps 2-4) as in EFA. However, at the end of 
the process, no rotation is applied, since the goal of CFA is to assess model fit. 
 
D.6 Model fit statistics 
We use four fit statistics in Chapter 4, namely Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 
and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR).  
 
First, the RMSEA provides an indication of the distance between the likelihood 
of observing our existing model and the likelihood of an ideal, saturated model. 
It is calculated as follows: 
 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 = √max [−








Here 𝝌2(?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?) refers to the likelihood ratio test statistic obtained from 
comparing our current factor model with a saturated model evaluated at the 
fitted values. d refers to the degrees of freedom and n is the sample size.  
 
In the continuous case, the saturated model is a multivariate normal model with 
free covariances between any of the p questionnaire items and free means for 
each item as well. Thus, there are p(p+1)/2+p parameters in the saturated 
model. The number of free parameters in the hypothesised factor model 
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depend on the model specification in CFA. In EFA, we have p loadings for each 
of m factors, p variances for the error term, m(m-1)/2 parameters after applying 
enough restrictions on the factor structure to make the model identified [463]. 
Thus, d is calculated as p(p+1)/2+p-pm-p-m(m-1)/2. In the categorical case, the 
saturated model is a model with free covariances and free thresholds. The 
degrees of freedom are adjusted based on the weights in the weighting matrix 
used for fitting our weighted least squares estimates. 
 
The SRMSR provides an indication of the average difference between the 
predicted and observed correlations between difference questionnaire items in 
our data. It is calculated as follows: 
 
 

















Where the 𝑠𝑘𝑙  denote sample covariances between different questionnaire 
items and ?̂?𝑘𝑙  denote the predicted covariances according to our estimated 
factor loadings and residual variances.  
 
Both the RMSEA and SRMSR are “error-of-approximation” indices [464] 
designed to assess the degree to which models had an adequate fit to the data 
rather than a perfect this. They were proposed as alternatives to the 𝝌2-test 
based on the likelihood ratio test statistic itself, since this test rejects almost all 
models, when sample sizes become large enough, because it assesses perfect fit 
rather than adequate fit. Instead, both RMSEA and SRMSR do not tend towards 
model rejection as sample sizes increase, when models function as adequate 
approximations. For both indices, a good fit is indicated by a value less than 0.06, 
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The CLI and TLI are two further fit indices designed to provide an indication of 
the extent to which our model adequately fits the data. While, the RMSEA 
compares the fit of our model to a “best possible model”, i.e. the saturated 
model, and the SRMSR do not compare the fit of our model to any other specific 
model, CLI and TLI compare the fit of our to “the worst possible model”.  These 





2 /𝑑𝐵 − 𝝌𝐻𝑜
2 /𝑑𝐻0
𝝌𝐵





𝐶𝐿𝐼 = 1 −
max(𝝌𝐻𝑜
2 − 𝑑𝐻0 , 0)
max(𝝌𝐵





2 denotes the likelihood ratio statistic comparing our hypothesised 
factor model to a saturated model with associated degrees of freedom 𝑑𝐻0 . 𝝌𝐵
2  
is the likelihood ratio statistic comparing a baseline factor model with a 
saturated model and with associated degrees of freedom 𝑑𝐵. The saturated 
model is specified in the same manner as for our calculation of RMSEA. The 
baseline model is a model where all questionnaire items are uncorrelated, but 
have free variances and means (or thresholds in the categorical case). For the 
CFI and TLI a good fit is indicated by a value greater than 0.95, an adequate fit 
by a greater than 0.90 and a poor fit by a value less than 0.90 [289]. 
 
D.7 Computing factor scores 
Mplus calculates factor scores using Empirical Bayes estimation. First, the 
posterior distribution for the factor scores 𝜼𝒊 conditional on the observed values 
𝒛𝒊 is proportional to the product of the prior distribution of 𝜼𝒊 and its likelihood: 
 
 𝑔(𝜼𝒊|𝒛𝒊) ∝ 𝜓(𝜼𝒊)𝑓(𝒛𝒊|𝜼𝒊) (D.17) 
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Given estimated values for all our parameters (i.e. ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, and ?̂?), we can 
obtain maximum a posteriori estimates for 𝜼𝒊 by searching for values of 𝜼𝒊 that 
maximise 𝜓(𝜼𝒊)𝑓(𝒛𝒊|𝜼𝒊). Since the 𝜼𝒊 are assumed to follow a multivariate 
normal distribution with mean 𝜶 and variance 𝚯, 𝜓(𝜼𝒊) is simply a multivariate 
normal density function. Furthermore, since different questionnaire items are 
assumed to be independent conditional on the value of factor scores, we have: 
 
 






That is, the joint density function factors into separate density functions for each 
questionnaire item j. These density functions are given by: 
 
 











Φ is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution. 
Thus, the probability of observing outcome 𝑧𝑖𝑗  is simply the probability of the 
underlying normally distributed variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗  lying between the thresholds for the 
observed outcome and the outcome one step higher up.  
 
Using these formulae, Mplus plus in the estimated values  ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?, and ?̂? 
for their parameter equivalents and calculates the values of 𝜼𝒊 that maximise: 
 
 






for each individual i separately. The maximisation itself is carried out using quasi-
Newton Raphson iteration. 
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D.8 Example Mplus code 
While the mathematical details behind Mplus may be complex, the code for 
Mplus is considerably simpler. In this section, we provide two example pieces of 
code used with minor modifications throughout Chapter 4. First, we show the 
code used to carry out an EFA: 
 
Data: 
    File is Baseline EMP.dat; 
Variable: 
    Names are 
     emp1_a emp1_b emp1_c emp1_d emp1_e emp1_f 
     emp1_g emp1_h emp1_i emp1_j emp1_k emp1_l emp1_m  




emp1_b emp1_c emp1_d emp1_g emp1_j emp1_k emp1_m 




emp1_b emp1_c emp1_d emp1_g emp1_j emp1_k emp1_m 
emp1_a emp1_e emp1_f emp1_h emp1_i emp1_l; 
 
ANALYSIS: 
    TYPE is EFA (1 4);              
    ESTIMATOR IS wlsmv; 
     
The Data: command instructs Mplus to read data from the file “Baseline 
EMP.dat”. The Variable: command informs Mplus how the numbers in the 
input file should be labelled and what values count as indicators of missing data 
(in this case -9999). The USEVARIABLES command tells Mplus which variables 
will form part of the actual analysis and the the CATEGORICAL command tells 
Mplus that these variables are categorical rather than continuous. Finally, the 
ANALYSIS command instructs Mplus in doing an EFA trying out between 1 and 
4 factors and using WLSMV as its estimation method.  
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Next, we show the code used to carry out a CFA: 
 
Data: 
    File is Baseline EMP.dat; 
Variable: 
    Names are 
      wg_barcode emp1_a emp1_b emp1_c emp1_d emp1_e emp1_f 
     emp1_g emp1_h emp1_i emp1_j emp1_k emp1_l emp1_m  
    Missing are all (-9999); 
 




emp1_b emp1_c emp1_d emp1_g emp1_j emp1_k emp1_m 




emp1_b emp1_c emp1_d emp1_g emp1_j emp1_k emp1_m 
emp1_a emp1_e emp1_f emp1_h emp1_i emp1_l; 
 
ANALYSIS: 
    ESTIMATOR IS wlsmv; 
 
MODEL:              
    wfactor1 by emp1_b* emp1_d emp1_g emp1_h;                   
    wfactor2 by emp1_c* emp1_e emp1_f emp1_i; 
 
    [wfactor1@0]; 
    wfactor1@1; 
    [wfactor2@0]; 
    wfactor2@1;      
 
    wfactor1 with wfactor2; 
 
SAVEDATA: 
    file is baselinescores.dat; 
    save = fscores; 
 
 
In this case, we are loading the variable wg_barcode and using it as an identifier 
for the respondents in our sample. In our dataset, wg_barcode refers to the ID 
signature that every woman was assigned at enrolment into our study. Since we 
are no longer carrying out EFA, we do not specify EFA in the ANALYSIS section. 
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However, we now include a MODEL section to specify the structure of the factor 
model we are operating with. In particular, this includes having two factors, 
wfactor1 and wfactor2 loading on pre-assigned indicator variables emp1_b to 
emp1_i. The * after emp1_b and emp1_c instructs Mplus that it should let these 
factor loadings be freely estimated rather than fixed as 1, as is the default in 
CFA. The following four lines instructs Mplus to treat the factors as having mean 
zero (𝜶 = 𝟎) and unit variances (i.e. 𝚯 has 1’s on its diagonal). The line wfactor1 
with wfactor2 instructs Mplus that the two factors may be correlated with 
each other (i.e. 𝚯 has a free parameter on the off-diagonal). Finally, the lines 
after SAVEDATA instruct Mplus in explicitly saving the Empirical Bayes estimates 
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Appendix E 
Standard Operating Procedures for data 
collection of empowerment data 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
VDC – Village Development Committee 
MIRA – Mother Infant Research Activities 
LBW-SAT – Low Birth Weight in South Asia Trial 
WE – Ward Enumerator  
DC – Data Collector 
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E.1 What this manual contains 
 
This manual is a reference document for all field procedures associated with the 
empowerment study in LBW-SAT. 
The manual is divided into six chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 forms an introduction to this manual 
Chapter 2 describes the work conducted in the empowerment study and the 
organisational structure of staff employed 
Chapter 3 provides an organizational overview of the study team and job 
descriptions of all field workers involved in the study. 
Chapter 4 provides a general description of fieldwork routines including how 
work is organised and how field workers should conduct themselves in the field. 
Chapter 5 describes the supervision procedures including observation 
schedules, supervisor checklists and good supervisory practices. 
Chapter 6 describes the questionnaire itself in great detail along with 
clarifications of any ambiguity in wording or issues regarding administration of 
the questionnaire. 
 
We hope you find this manual useful. 
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E.2 Introduction to the empowerment study in LBW-SAT 
 
2.1 Background 
Globally, 9 million children and 300,000 pregnant women die every year, 99% of 
them in developing countries.Low birth weight underlies 60-80% of all deaths in 
children under one years old in developing countries. All the major risk 
factorsfor low birth weight are also major causes of illness and death in mothers 
during pregnancy. 
 
MIRA in collaboration with UCL is conducting a major study in the Terai region 
of Nepal on preventing low birth weight called LBW-SAT. Through preventing 
low birth weight MIRA aims to reduce the rate of death in children and mothers 
in Nepal and inform governments of developing countries across the world on 
how to achieve similar reductions in their own settings. 
 
MIRA has previously conducted multiple similar studies using participatory 
women’s groups across Nepal. All of these studies aimed to change the 
behaviour of women and men in their communities to better support mothers 
during pregnancy. The projects dramatically succeeded at behaviour change by 
reducing the rate of death in women and children by almost a third. 
 
However, it remains unclear why these projects succeeded, where similar 
behaviour change projects in the past failed. Without a convincing theory of 
change governments and international agencies remain sceptical of the results. 
Researchers at UCL and MIRA now believe that an important component of the 
behaviour change strategy of women’s groups is “empowerment”. 
 
As a result, this study was commissioned to evaluate and measure the degree of 
change in women’s empowerment induced by the LBW-SAT trial. 
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2.2 What is “empowerment”? 
“Empowerment” is a multi-faceted phenomenon that reflects aspects of choice, 
options, freedom, power and status. An empowered woman is actively involved 
in major decisions pertaining to her own life and is able to act in accordance with 
her own conception of the good. In contrast a disempowered woman is 
powerless to carry out actions on her own and is either explicitly or implicitly 
forced to follow the orders of other people. 
 
It is easy to see how empowerment plays a role in behaviour change. An 
empowered woman is unrestrained in her ability to take action to improve her 
own and her child’s health. A disempowered woman may be prohibited such 
action by other people even at the cost of her own and her child’s health. 
 
2.3 Project objectives 
The primary aim of this study is to determine if provision of any of the 
community interventions operated by LBW-SAT has an impact on women’s 
empowerment amongst pregnant women residing in the area. 
 
2.4 Field plan 
The study will perform household visits to 1440 women in trial VDCs in 
Dhanusha and Mahottari during their third trimester of pregnancy and ask them 
questions about their empowerment status. We will have field staff visiting the 
household and asking household members for information and perhaps asking 
people on the road for directions, but we hope to keep any disturbance in the 
community to a bare minimum. The data collection will take place between 1st 
of June and 1st of September 2015.  
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E.3 Team organization 
 
3.1 Management structure 
The figure above outlines the management structure of the LBW-SAT 
empowerment study team. The UCL Principal Investigator and UCL supervisors 
provide technical advice to the UCL Technical Lead, while the MIRA officer 
provide managerial support to the UCL Technical Lead. The Senior Supervisor 
reports directly to the UCL Technical Lead and supervises three supervisors in 
turn. The supervisors supervise four Data Collectors each in turn. 
3.2 Job descriptions 
Data Collector (DC) 
• Getting training and achieving competency handling empowerment 
forms including handling of mobile handsets 
• Routine data collection according to the needs of the LBW-SAT study 
• Mobilizing ward enumerators to locate women 
• Routine reporting to supervisors 
• Attending training whenever needed related to the empowerment study 
• Attending weekly team meetings 
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• Support and providing assistance to supervisors as and when necessary 
Supervisor 
• Getting training and achieving competency in the empowerment forms 
including handling mobile handsets 
• Providing necessary support, supervision and training to DCs 
• Monitoring the weekly/fortnightly progress of the field workers 
• Observing interviews from DCs 
• Checking on the quality of the data through spot checks and back check 
• Trouble-shooting in the field  
• Organising and attending weekly orientation meetings  
• Attending training whenever needed related to the empowerment study  




• Attaining an in-depth understanding of the purpose and content of the 
empowerment study 
• On-going monitoring, supervision and support of empowerment team 
o Coordination and communication with supervisors and DCs 
listening to issues both over the phone and in the field 
o Checking on the quality of the data through spot checks, back check 
and review of data collected with Technical Lead 
• Liaising with Logistics Officer ensuring appropriate transport including 
vehicles and drivers are available for the whole empowerment team as 
and when needed 
 
• Organising, attending and supporting weekly team meetings  
• Problem solving in the field  
• Direct visits to respondents’ families to clarify field queries and check the 
work of the empowerment team 
• One-to-one discussions with DCs and supervisors 
• Group discussions during weekly team meetings 
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• Support and providing assistance to technical lead as and when necessary
  
o Bi-weekly meetings with technical lead regarding the state of data 
collection when possible and bi-weekly Skype calls if technical lead 
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E.4: General Field Work Procedures 
4.1 General notes 
All field work is expected to adhere to the standards in this document. If 
problems arise in the field, this manual should always be the first resort of field 
staff. It is crucial that field staff request a change to this manual first before 
making any change to actual operations in the field. 
 
4.2 Work flow 
Field work in the empowerment study consists solely of home visits to 
participants enrolled in LBW-SAT. The participants are all pregnant women and 
the visits are scheduled in advance according to a pre-produced listing detailing 
the women who are due to be visited each week. DCs are expected to arrive in 
the field at 10am in the morning and work until 5pm in the evening.  DCs work 
five days a week in the field and gather on Sundays in the MIRA office for a 
weekly orientation meeting. 
 
4.3 Preparing for work in the morning 
Every morning before leaving for the field, the DC needs to inform their 
supervisor of their planned activities for the day over the phone including any 
changes to their existing plans. Before leaving for the field the DC must ensure 
that: 
• The carrier bag is with him/her 
• The phone is fully charged 
• 3G data roaming is turned off (turned on only for data transmission) 
• The pen and field diary is in the bag 
• The list of women to visit is in the bag 
• The GPS is turned on the phone 
• For supervisors:  
o If they have a motorbike, never forget blue book and license 
 
4.4 Locating women 
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Upon arriving in the ward, DCs must consult with WEs in order to locate women. 
Upon finding a woman in her own household, the DC should greet them and 
introduce themselves. The DC must then confirm the woman’s own and her 
husband’s name to ensure they have identified the correct woman. Before the 
interview begins, the DC must also scan the ID card of the respondent. If the 
woman has lost her ID card, the DC should scan the barcode from the WE 
register instead and double-check that he has found the correct woman. This 
ensures that the DC has identified the appropriate woman. 
 
If the woman is not at home, the DC must enquire about her whereabouts.  
• If the woman is temporarily away from the house, the DC should make an 
appointment to return and come back later that day. The DC should keep 
coming back during the week and try to get hold of the woman. 
• If the woman has moved to a separate village, the DC must submit a 
report to her supervisorwho will confirm the move at a later date.  
• If the woman has moved within the same village, the DC must go to the 
new location to enquire about the woman there instead. 
• If the woman withdraws her consent, the DC should politely try to figure 
out why. If it is simply because she is too busy, the DC should try to 
arrange for a more convenient time to come back and re-do the interview. 
If it is a more serious reason, the DC should give them an opportunity to 
discuss it. If they still refuse, the DC should thank them for having allowed 
her to visit them, ask them if they are happy to have a senior supervisor 
visit them and leave. If the woman decides to join the study at a later time, 
the DC should allow her to be interviewed. 
 
4.5 Performing the interview 
After introductions and small talk, the DC should ensure that the respondent 
and the DC is seated appropriately. This includes a private space with as few 
bystanders as possible where the DC can make eye contact with the respondent. 
If there are many bystanders, the DC may explain that on-lookers need to leave 
in order that the interview can be carried out in peace and quiet.  
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During the interview, the DC must respect the following guidelines: 
• Each interview is a new source of information, so the DC must at all times 
seem interested in the interview process.  By saying things like "I see" or 
"yes", the DC indicates to the respondent that the response has been 
heard, and that it is interesting.  An interview must not be mechanical. 
 
• If the respondent does not understand a question or misinterprets it, the 
DC should repeat the question as it is written. If a question is poorly 
understood, this difficulty should be reported to the supervisor. During 
training, we will discuss simpler wordingprovide guidelines. Questions 
should not be reworded before discussion during training.    
 
• If the response is not clear, it should not be rephrased on the form in the 
DC own words. Instead, the DC should probe by repeating the 
respondent's response. The probe should be in such a manner that the 
respondent comes up with the relevant answer by themselves. 
 
• The DC should never give examples unless explicitly stated in the 
question. And if the question states examples, the DC should only provide 
the examples given in the question and refrain from making his/her own 
examples. 
 
• The DC must make every effort to be neutral throughout the interview 
process.The respondent must not think that their response is right or 
wrong by the expression on the DC face or by their tone of voice.  The DC 
must not show approval or disapproval at the respondent's replies.   
 
• If the respondent asks the DC for his/her opinion, the respondent should 
be told politely that the DC opinion is irrelevant to the study, and that it 
would save time if they continued with the interview. 
 
• A DC should never indicate through his/her manner that he/she doubts 
the ability or knowledge of the respondent. Any differences between the 
DC and respondent in terms of literacy and background should not affect 
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the interview process. The DC should always behave and speak in a way 
that puts the respondent at ease. 
 
• If the respondent appears to give answers without understanding the 
questions, the DC should try to check whether or not the respondent 
understands the question using methods provided during training. The 
interviewer should not make a judgment on the ability of the respondent 
independently of the procedures provided during training. 
 
• If the respondent appears  to be providing answers without thinking 
about the questions, the DC should try to draw their attention to the 
questions being asked. The DC should not simply continue to ask 
questions, but wait and ensure the respondent is fully attentive towards 
the interviewer before moving on. 
 
• If the respondent resorts to the reply "I don't know," seems bored, or 
refuses to answer the question, the DC must try to get them interested in 
the conversation and then repeat the question. The DC must try to get a 
response to that question at least one or two times before accepting it as 
the final response. 
 
• The interview process should not be hurried.The FW must allow enough 
time after reading each question for the respondent to think and 
formulate the response.  If the respondent feels hurried, she may give 
inaccurate answers or respond with "don't know." 
 
4.6 Ending the interview 
At the end of the interview, the DC should thank the respondent for their time 
and take a GPS coordinate of the location where the interview took place. The 
DC should wait until the GPS coordinate has an accuracy of 8m or less until 
accepting the coordinate. If the GPS takes a long time to settle on a coordinate, 
the DC should check: 
• That the GPS is turned on 
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• That there is a direct line of sight to the sky, i.e. no obstructing roof 
material or trees 
• That the DC has waited at least 10 minutes for the coordinate to settle 
Note that the GPS does not depend on 
• Network phone signal 
• Weather conditions 
If it is impossible to find a place nearby the interview location with a direct line 
of sight to the sky, the field worker should take a picture of the surrounding area. 
The DC should then report the incident to their supervisor, explaining the exact 
area and sending them the picture so the supervisor can check for themselves 
the GPS signal at a later date. 
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E.5: Field Work Support and Supervision 
5.1 The role of supervisors 
The supervisors are an essential part of the fieldwork team. Their main purpose 
is to ensure that high standards for data collection are maintained by helping 
DCs to improve their work. This is mainly achieved through supervisory visits to 
each DC. Supervisors also form the link between the DC and the MIRA office, 
and are the avenue through which any problems or suggestions should be fed.  
One supervisor will be assigned to a group of DCs who they work with. 
 
Specifically, the role of supervisors is to: 
• Provide DCs with support in their day to day activities 
• Observe DCs at work in order to monitor their performance 
• Pass any queries from the DCs to the MIRA office 
• Feedback any decisions taken at the MIRA office to the DCs 
• Identify issues that DCs find difficult and/or were not covered in training. 
These should be documented and discussed with the MIRA office. Based 
on feedback from the MIRA office, supervisors should provide support to 
the DCs to resolve these issues. This will allow DCs to respond to new 
situations. 
• Conduct home visits when a DC is absent for more than two days 
• Provide DCs with support so that they can improve on their existing 
practice and maintain high standards of data collection 
 
It is very important that both supervisors and DCs see the supervisory visits as 
an opportunity to improve upon practice, rather than as a tool for “policing” or 
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5.2 Supervisory Visits 
 
The best way to see whether a DC is performing well is to watch the DC perform 
their job. This should be followed by a discussion of the supervisor’s assessment, 
based on the observations and past performance.  This is also the time to discuss 
any important areas in which the DC can improve before the next visit. The 
supervisor fills out an observation checklist form on the phone during the 
interview containing items such as how the DC is asking specific questions, how 
the DC responded to questions asked by the women or other points about how 
the DC generally interacted with the women. 
 
A discussion should happen after the DC has completed the particular visit and 
should take place outside the home. The supervisor should notinterrupt the 
home visit unless a serious error is being committed, but should note their 
observations and the issues they want to discuss in their notebook during the 
home visit. The feedback meeting afterwards is also a time when the DC may 
want to discuss other problems relating to their work which may not necessarily 
have arisen during the visit. It is important that the DC and the supervisor reach 
agreement on any problems identified and the solutions proposed. Remember 
that it may be necessary to continue to the next visit to observe if the suggested 
solution can be implemented. 
 
There are three different types of supervisory visits, each of which takes place 




For this visit the supervisor visits a household at the same time as a fieldworker, 
having made an appointment with the DC. There will be a schedule for these 
visits. On any given day the supervisor will know the group of households the DC 
is visiting, and so will make an appointment to meet the DC near a particular 
household at a specified time. The fieldworker is required to wait for the 
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supervisor to join him/her at the appointed time before continuing with their 
visit.   
Random unscheduled visit 
The random unscheduled visit is not by appointment.  In this case, the supervisor 
decides whom they want to visit, and will look for the DC in the area they are 
working in that day. Because these visits are unannounced, they provide an 
opportunity to pick up any “bad” practices that may have cropped up in the 
course of fieldwork. The supervisor may base his/her decision on who to visit on 
problems previously identified by the supervisor, from issues arising out of the 
weekly fieldwork meetings, or from problems notified by the MIRA office.   
 
However, the DC should not necessarily assume that they are doing something 
wrong if their supervisor pays an unscheduled visit.  They must continue their 
work as normal.  It is possible that their supervisor was in their neighbourhood 
for something else and just decided to see how they were doing. 
 
Check visit 
In a check visit, the supervisor makes a visit to the household on his/her own 
without the DC present.  This visit may be performed for several reasons, to: 
a) Obtain information from the household members on whether a reported 
visit (by the DC) was indeed made, for example if the DC reports a woman 
as temporarily away 
b) Find out about the DC conduct during the visit 
c) Discuss any concerns of women participating in the trial 
d) Verify notifications that have been reported by the DC 
e) Conduct a random blind re-interview 
In a blind re-interview, the supervisor conducts a repeat interview similar to one 
previously made by the DC.  The answers obtained from this interview are 
compared to the forms previously returned by the DC.  This would be from the 
same respondent as the original interview and would usually be as close in time 
to the original interview as possible. A random sample of women will be selected 
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for re-interviews on a weekly basis, and will be selected such that each 
fieldworker area is covered over a period of time. 
 
5.3 Other duties of supervisors 
Supervisors have other important office-based duties apart from the field visits 
and direct support to the DC.  These include: 
• Providing weekly work-plan sheets to DCs during the weekly meetings 
• Collecting filled work-plan sheets during the weekly meetings 
• Check weekly work-plan sheets to ensure they have been correctly filled 
out 
• Resolving queries that are returned from the MIRA office, including 
returning queries to the field for correction 
• Act as a channel through which DC concerns related to finance, human 
resources and administration can be fed through to the MIRA office 
 
5.4 Weekly Field Team Meetings 
Once a week, all DCs will come to the MIRA office in order to hand in their weekly 
work-plan sheet.  Meetings with the DCs, supervisors and senior supervisor will 
be held, where DCs will make reports of their activities in the field, and report 
any problems which they have experienced. These problems will be fed by the 
senior supervisor to the Technical Lead. The problems reported by the DCs will 
form the basis for decisions on re-training. For example, if a particular problem 
is observed consistently for the whole or part of the group, re-training on this 
issue may occur for all DCs.  Any decisions made by the Technical Lead will be 
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E.6 The Empowerment Measurement Tool 
6.1 Overview 
The tool is roughly broken into three parts. 1) An easy background section 
introducing the questionnaire. 2) The empowerment section proper 3) A more 
difficult background section, which can be asked of another household member 
if necessary. This is because the empowerment section is the main focus of the 
questionnaire and we want to prevent respondents from getting tired during 
the interview. 
 
For the empowerment section proper, there are four long sections measuring 
empowerment in the areas of work, household chores, health-seeking and 
group participation. Each “long” section is prefaced with a framing question 
requiring the respondent to think about her situation in the specific area under 
investigation. Afterwards, the respondent is asked a series of questions on her 
own subjective experience of empowerment in that area. Each question in this 
series refers back specifically to the answer given to the framing question. 
 
For example, in the work section, the respondent is asked about whether she 
works outdoors or only indoors and if so what type of work. Then she is asked 
what the motivations behind her chosen work are. If the respondent sells milk 
from her own cattle, e.g., we will ask why she does that. Whether she specifically 
sells milk from her own cattle because she wants to, because she likes it, 
because she is forced to, etc. 
 
If the woman does not perform a task such as outdoor work, seeking treatment 
or participating in groups, then she is asked her motivation for not doing it. For 
example if a woman does not work outdoors, she is asked why she does not 
work outdoors.  
 
There are also two short decision-making questions about decision-making 
regarding expensive purchases and food in the household. There is also a 
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question inquiring into the respondents’ sense of control over her life. Women 
who are members of groups are additionally asked questions regarding social 
cohesion, conflict resolution, organizational capacity and leadership of the 
groups they are members of. 
 
Finally, there is a question on overall experience of empowerment, the “ladder 
question”. After being primed to think through examples of empowered and 
disempowered women from her community, she is shown a picture of a ladder 
with ten steps and asked to place herself on it. She is also asked to place her 
neighbours and her future self in ten years on the same ladder. The ladder 
question is the last question of the questionnaire. 
 
6.2 Motivation types 
Key to answering the long sections on empowerment in specific domains are 
different motivation types that we ask respondents to answer. It is important 
for DCs to understand what the different motivation types refer to. If the 
respondent does not understand a motivation type at first, the DC should simply 
repeat the question verbatim and see if the respondent understands. It is crucial 
that the first two attempts at asking these questions, the DC sticks strictly to the 
wording indicated on the questionnaire. If the respondent still does not 
understand, the DC should use the standardized back-up explanation furnished 
in the table below. 
Motivation Back-up explanation 
Because you have 
to 
The respondent is forced to perform the task by the 
circumstances in which the respondent lives including 
coercion by other people, insufficient economic means or 
internal compulsion. The most general of all. 
Because you want 
to 
Respondent wants, desires or wishes to perform the task 
herself. It is important that the respondent personally 
feels she wants, desires or wishes to perform the task and 
she is not just reporting what is socially desirable. 
Because you will 
get into trouble 
otherwise 
Respondent fears scolding by other family members if she 
violates their expectations of her. This motivation is 
usually easy for respondents to understand. 
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Because that is 
what your family 
members tell you 
to do 
Respondent is told by her family members to perform the 
task and the respondent does not feel she is in a position 
to refuse their request. 
Because you 
personally think it 
is the right thing 
to do whether or 
not family 
members agree 
Respondent has a personal belief that what she does is 
right. She holds this even if her family members disagree 
with her and think her task is not the right thing to do. It 
is important for this statement that the respondent 
reports her own personal belief and not just what is 
socially desirable. 
Because you like it Respondent feels a sense of enjoyment or small pleasure 
in the task that she performs. 
So that your 
family members 
won’t get angry 
with you 
Respondent fears a strongly negative emotional reaction 
of her family members if she does not comply with their 
expectations. This motivation is usually easily understood 
by the respondents. 
Because you want 
your family 
members to like 
you 
Respondent wants to please her family members. The 
respondent feels pressured by family members to act 
according to what makes them think of her more highly. 
This restricts her own personal choices in turn. 
Because it is your 
duty to do it 
Respondent feels she needs to act according to her 
concept of duty. The respondent feels pressured to fulfil 
people’s expectations that she will follow her duty. 
Because it is 
personally 
important to you 
Respondent feels the task is personally relevant to her, 
has a personal impact on her or is personally necessary for 
her. She feels personally involved in the task. It is the 
opposite of considering the task trivial. 
 
Frequently, the respondent does not give a single “Yes/No” answer or even if 
they do, this answer may be ambiguous. If the respondent does not give an 
unambiguous “Yes/No” answer or the respondent has difficulty in deciding upon 
a single “Yes/No” answer, then DCs must help guide the respondent towards a 
“Yes”/”No” answer.  
 
A particularly frequent scenario is one where the respondent may have no 
problem understanding the questions and provide answers, yet have serious 
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difficulty with deciding whether or not their response to the question boils down 
to a “Yes” or a “No” answer. For example, a respondent may answer a question 
such as “You do not work outside the home, because you do not want to” with 
“I want to work outside, but I have a small child at home so I can’t leave the 
house” which is a perfectly valid answer. Yet, the same respondent may be 
unable to tell the field worker if this answers constitutes an “Agree”/”Yes” 
answer or a “Disagree”/”No” answer. In such cases, it is advisable for the DC to 
perform some interpretation themselves with regards to the respondent answer 
rather than force the respondent to fit their answer into a “Yes”/”No” box. This 
saves both interviewer and respondent time, prevents respondents from getting 
tired and irritated and also avoids respondent anxiety amongst respondents 
thinking they are being supervised or monitored in some way and need to supply 
the “correct” answer.  
 
The following matrix is meant as a guide to which field workers on how they can 
arrive at an answer in such scenarios: 


























The matrix is meant to illustrate that there are roughly two types of questions 
in the questionnaire – questions that ask about family pressure and questions 
that ask about personal freedom. If the respondent provides an answer that 
conveys a sense of family pressure from the rest of the family and the question 
asks about family pressure, then the correct answer is “Yes”/”Agree” (option 
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11). Similarly, if the respondent provides an answer that conveys a sense of 
personal freedom and the question also asks about personal freedom. However, 
if the answer the respondent provides does not match the question itself, then 
they should tick “No”/”Disagree” (option 12). 
 
One caveat: The respondent’s answer must be linked in domain type to the 
particular domain being asked about. For example, if the question pertains to 
outdoor work, then the answer must also be related to outdoor work in order 
to obtain a “Yes”/”Agree” (option 11). I.e. if the question is “You work outside 
the home because it is personally important to you”, then the answer should 
also relate to outdoor work, e.g. “Yes, the work outside is personally important 
to me.” If the answer does not clearly specify the domain, e.g. “I do whatever I 
am told to do by my guardian” or is linked to a different domain e.g. “I do all this 
household cleaning work, because it is important for my house to be clean”, 
then the DC needs to probe the respondent until they give an answer that 
reflects the domain in question.  
 
Incredibly special care must be taken in the case of the negatively worded 
domains, e.g. “You do not work outside the home, because you will get into 
trouble if you do”. Here, the answer may contain positive wording “Well, I want 
to work outside the home”, negative wording “I don’t think my family would be 
happy if I worked outside the home” or a mixture of both “No, my family wants 
me to work outside the home, but I don’t want to”. The classification matrix still 
applies (we are still matching family pressure with family pressure and personal 
freedom with personal freedom), but the matching process needs more care 
and attention. 
 
Two questions fall into neither category: Questions regarding doing things 
because you “have to” and questions regarding doing this because it is your 
“duty”. Both questions could pertain to both internal and external aspects of 
motivation and hence do not cleanly fall into either category. These questions 
will have to be managed on a more ad hoc basis by the field workers. 
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The classification for the remaining questions runs as follows: 
Questions that ask about family pressure Questions that ask about personal freedom 
You do this work because you will get into trouble 
if you don’t 
You do this work because you want to 
You do not work outside the home because you 
will get into trouble if you do 
You do not work outside the home because you 
do not want to 
You seek health care the way you do because you 
will get into trouble if you don’t 
You seek health care the way you do because 
you want to 
You participate because you will get into trouble if 
you don’t 
You participate because you want to 
You do this work because that is what your family 
members tell you to do 
You do this work because you personally think it 
is the right thing to do whether or not your 
family members agree or not 
You do not work outside the home because your 
family members tell you not to do so 
You do not work outside the home because you 
personally think it is the right thing to do 
whether or not your family members agree 
You seek health care the way you do because that 
is what your family members tell you to do 
You seek health care the way you do because 
you personally think it is the right thing to do 
whether or not your family members agree or 
not 
You participate because that is what your family 
members tell you to do 
You participate because you personally think it is 
the right thing to do whether or not your family 
members agree or not 
You do not work outside the home because your 
family members might get angry with you if you do 
You do not work outside the home because you 
do not like it 
You do this work so that your family members 
won’t get angry with you 
You do this work because you like it 
You seek health care the way you do so that your 
family members won’t get angry with you 
You seek health care the way you do because 
you like it better than other alternatives 
You participate so that your family members 
won’t get angry with you 
You participate because you like it 
You do not work outside the home because you 
want your family members to like you 
You do not work outside the home because it is 
not important to you 
You do this work because you want your family 
members to like you 
You do this work because it is personally 
important to you 
You seek health care the way you do because you 
want your family members to like you 
You seek health care the way you do because it 
is personally important to you 
You participate because you want your family 
members to like you 
You participate because it is personally 
important to you 
 
And the classification of answers is exemplified by the following snippets: 
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Answers reflecting family pressure Answers reflecting personal freedom 
If I don’t do it my mother-in-law will get angry 
with me 
My mother-in-law loves me no matter what I do 
My family tells me to do it this way Nobody tells me to do anything 
I am afraid of my family members I don’t care what other people say or think 
Nobody gets angry with me because I do as I am 
told 
Nobody gets angry with me because they love 
me so much 
Nobody scolds me because I do everything they 
tell me to do 
Nobody scolds me because they want me to be 
happy 
If my family does not like what I do then I will be 
in trouble 
If my family does not like what I do then I can 
still persuade them 
I cannot do it because I am not allowed to do it I do not do it because I am not interested in it 
I have to do it because I am forced to do it I do it because I want to do it and I like doing it 
I have to obey my guardian My family lets me do whatever I want to do 
I have to do what I am told to do I have to do what is important to me 
I do not do it even though I want to do it I do not do it because I don’t enjoy doing it 
How can I do it if my mother-in-law tells me not 
to do it? 
I make my own decisions about this matter 
I do it because I don’t want to be punished I do it because I want to learn new things 
I do it because my family puts pressure on me I do it because I love my family very much 
I cannot do it, even though I’d love to do it I cannot do it, because I dislike doing it 
I cannot do it, even though it is important to me I cannot do it, because it is not important and I 
don’t have time to do it 
I cannot do it, even though I’m very interested in 
it 
I cannot do it, because it is boring 
 
6.3 Decision-making questions 
There are two decision-making questions. One concerns the ability of the 
respondent to make decisions regarding large purchases. The other concerns 
the ability of the respondent to make decisions about food in the household. 
EMP14.  
घरकोलाजग ठनलो रकमको खचडमा (माथीभन्नन भएको खचड िरु िस्त)ै प्राय िसो कसल ेजनर्डय गछड? Who 
usually makes decisions about making major household expenditures (like the one 
you mentioned above)? 
घर के लले बढ्का खचड (उपर किल खचडसब िनेा ) म ेप्रायः के जनर्डय करै य ? 
 
१ िजेख ४ कोलाजग EMP 16 मािाननिोस,् ५ िजेख १३ छ भन ेEMP15 मा िाननिोस   Alternatives 1  
to 4 go to EMP16,alternative 5 to 13 then go to EMP15.१ स ४  के लले ेEMP 16  म ेिाउ, 
५ स १३ के लले to EMP15 म ेिाउ  
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यदि तपाई आफैल े चािकेो भए, तपाई यी जनर्डयिरु गन ेकन रािरुमा सिभागी हुन सक्नन हुन््यो ? 
If you wanted to, would you be able to participate in these decisions? 
यदि आिा  चािजैतऐ त, ई जनर्डय सब म ेआिा  सिभाजग भ सकै छेजलऐ  ? 
1. स्थYेes  ि ँ 
2. सज्िन जथएNo न ै   
 
EMP17c.  
घरमा खानकेन राको  बारेमा प्राय: िसो कसल े जनर्डय गछड? के पकाउन े ,कजत पकाउन े र पररवारको सब ै
सिस्यलाई कजत  दिन े भन्न ेजनर्डय कसल ेगछड? 
Who usually makes decisions about food in your household? Who decides whatto 
cook, how much to cook and how much to serve each household member? 
घरम ेखाना बनाब के लले प्राय:के जनर्डय लइ छई  ? अई म ेके खाना बनते ै, कत ेबनते ैआ पररवारके सब 
सिस्य के कत ेिवेके लले जनर्डय  के करै छई |  
 
EMP17d.  
यदि तपाई आफन ल ेचािकेो भए, तपाई यी जनर्डयिरु गन ेकन रािरुमा सिभागी हुन सक् हुन््यो ? 
If you wanted to, would you be able to participate in these decisions? 
EMP17d. यदिआिाचािजैतयतै, ईजनर्डयसबमआेिासिभाजगभसकैछेजलऐ?  
1. स्थYेes  ि ँ 
2. सज्िन जथएNo न ै   
 
If the respondent has difficulties with the question, the interviewer should ask 
the respondent to give an overall assessment of who normally makes the final 
decision the majority of the time.The interviewer should not start giving her own 
examples regarding decision-making. For the question regarding major 
purchases, the interviewer should refer back to the previous framing question 
regarding any major expenditures that have been made in the past year. 
 
After asking the respondent who makes the decision, the interviewer asks the 
respondent if she could participate in the decision if she wanted to. This refers 
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to whether she can make suggestions or influence the final decision if she 
wanted to. 
 
6.4 Ladder question 
For this question, the DC must first explain in depth an overall concept of 
empowerment in the community. A pre-amble asks the respondent first to think 
about a woman who is able to advance personally important goals in her 
community. It is important that the DC encourages the respondent to describe 
the woman in question without explicitly naming the woman as this may cause 
some friction in the household. Next, it asks the respondent to think about 
women who are dominated and unable to make their own decisions. Again, the 
DC asks the respondent to describe the woman in question without naming her 
explicitly. 
 
The process of describing the two types of women is important in order to 
confirm that the respondent fully understands what is being asked of her. It also 
encourages the respondent to fully think through her own situation before 
giving a response. The process should not be rushed and the woman should have 
plenty of time to answer. 
 
After letting the woman think about the two types of women in the community, 
the DC should pull out the picture of the ladder. The DC should first ensure that 
the woman understands this is a picture of a ladder. Then explain to her that the 
bottom rungs contains a woman who is the least able to make her own decisions 
and the top a woman who is the most able to make her own decisions. Make 
sure the respondent understands this before moving on to the next step. 
 
At the next step, the woman is asked to place herself on the ladder, now and in 
the future. She is also asked to place her neighbours on the ladder. It is very 
important at this point that the DC trusts the response of the woman and does 
not pass judgement about whether the placement is appropriate or not. 
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Addendum 05.07.2015: We made two changes to the ladder question. First, we 
asked DCs to avoid numbering the steps on the ladder. This is because number 
one is commonly considered to represent the “best” person and so it is 
confusing for respondents to have explained to them that the most 
disempowered and least capable woman is at number one. Second, we asked 
DCs always to hold the ladder picture vertically, get the respondents to count 
the steps with their fingers and the get the respondents to point at the ladder 
to indicate their answer with their fingers. This component is important, 
because respondents may count from the top instead of from the bottom and 
give misleading answers as a result. 
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Appendix F. Exploring interviewer 
effects in the LBW-SAT study 
 
F.1 Comparing adjusted and unadjusted results 
This appendix provides an analysis of the impacts of adjusting for interviewer 
identity in our analysis of intervention impact on women’s agency in Chapter 5. 
We will first compare the adjusted and unadjusted results. Then, we will discuss 
mechanisms that could give rise to such interviewer effects. Then, we will 
discuss evidence that the hypothesised mechanisms are indeed in action. Then, 
we will discuss simulation results on how results might change if we adjusted for 
interviewer identity. 
 
Table 24 on the next page shows the analysis of the primary outcome, overall 
agency freedom, without interviewer effects. Table 25 repeats Table 11 from 
Chapter 5 by showing the same outcomes with controls for interviewer effects. 
Comparing the two tables, the adjustment moderately increased the effect of 
the women’s group only arm (from 0.08 to 0.13 SD), while simultaneously 
substantially decreasing the standard error (from 0.15 to 0.08). This resulted in 
the impact of the women’s group only arm on overall agency becoming 
significant at the 10% level. While the impact of the women’s group and cash 
transfer arm did not change much, the impact of the women’s group and food 
arm changed dramatically from no impact (0.00 SD, SE 0.13) to a moderate 
impact (0.24, 0.05) after the adjustment. 
 
In terms of the estimates for control variables, these were largely unchanged. 
However, we did see somewhat reduced associations with agency freedom 
among women whose mothers-in-law had died, women whose husbands had 
migrated to India and somewhat strengthened associations with early marriage 
and spousal age differences. However, it should be noted that the addition of 
interviewer dummies explained substantial variation, as the R2-value increased 
from 18% to 29% (not shown in the table).  
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Table 24. Main trial effect without adjusting for interviewer dummies 
 Impact on overall agency freedom  
 
Mean effect 
size in SDs  
Mean effect 
size in SDs 
Treatment allocation  Head of household  
Control - Not the woman herself - 
Women's groups only 0.08 (0.15) The woman herself 0.65*** (0.11) 
Women's groups and cash 0.35*** (0.13) Joint/separated family  
Women's groups and food 0.00 (0.13) Joint family - 
Maternal education  Separated from mother-in-law 0.32*** (0.09) 
No education - Mother-in-law is no more 0.16** (0.08) 
1-5 years -0.06 (0.10) Husband migrant status  
6-8 years -0.09 (0.10) Not migrated abroad - 
9-10 years 0.16* (0.09) Migrated to India -0.24*** (0.07) 
11-13 years 0.50** (0.22) Migrated to Arab countries 0.04 (0.07) 
Socioeconomic status  Migrated elsewhere -0.21* (0.11) 
Wealth index 0.01 (0.03) Current residence  
Wealth index squared 0.00 (0.02) Husband's home - 
Caste/religion/ethnicity  Parental home 0.20 (0.19) 
Dalit - Age of marriage  
Muslim -0.13 (0.12) 18+ years - 
Janajati -0.17 (0.13) <10 years 0.24 (0.28) 
Middle Madhesi -0.04 (0.10) 10-14 years 0.21** (0.08) 
Yadav -0.03 (0.12) 15-17 years 0.12 (0.07) 
Sudi/Teli -0.12 (0.13) 
Age difference between 
husband and wife  
Brahmin/Chettri 0.04 (0.21) Wife same age or older - 
Age of woman  Husband 1-5 years older 0.16 (0.19) 
<20 years - Husband 6+ years older 0.29 (0.18) 
20-24 years 0.13* (0.07) 
Educational difference 
between husband and wife  
25-29 years 0.44*** (0.11) Same level of education - 
30-34 years 0.48*** (0.13) Wife more educated 0.20* (0.10) 
35-39 years 0.93*** (0.21) 
Husband 1-5 years' more 
educated 0.05 (0.06) 
40+ years 1.45*** (0.29) 
Husband 6+ years more 
educated 0.01 (0.06) 
 
Mean effects presented with robust standard errors in brackets. Effect sizes have been 
standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. Additional controls (not shown): 
number of sons alive (p=0.79), number of previous pregnancies and number of previous 
pregnancies squared (p=0.096). 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 25. Main trial effect adjusting for interviewer dummies 
 Impact on overall agency freedom  
 
Mean effect 
size in SDs  
Mean effect 
size in SDs 
Treatment allocation  Head of household  
Control - Not the woman herself - 
Women's groups only 0.13* (0.08) The woman herself 0.65*** (0.10) 
Women's groups and cash 0.38*** (0.08) Joint/separated family  
Women's groups and food 0.24*** (0.05) Joint family - 
Maternal education  Separated from mother-in-law 0.29*** (0.09) 
No education - Mother-in-law is no more 0.10 (0.07) 
1-5 years -0.08 (0.09) Husband migrant status  
6-8 years -0.07 (0.10) Not migrated abroad - 
9-10 years 0.14* (0.08) Migrated to India -0.10* (0.06) 
11-13 years 0.46** (0.22) Migrated to Arab countries 0.02 (0.06) 
Socioeconomic status  Migrated elsewhere -0.13 (0.11) 
Wealth index -0.02 (0.03) Current residence  
Wealth index squared 0.00 (0.02) Husband's home - 
Caste/religion/ethnicity  Parental home 0.25 (0.17) 
Dalit - Age of marriage  
Muslim 0.03 (0.10) 18+ years - 
Janajati -0.06 (0.12) <10 years 0.37* (0.22) 
Middle Madhesi -0.02 (0.10) 10-14 years 0.17* (0.09) 
Yadav 0.11 (0.10) 15-17 years 0.04 (0.08) 
Sudi/Teli 0.02 (0.12) 
Age difference between 
husband and wife  
Brahmin/Chettri 0.13 (0.20) Wife same age or older - 
Age of woman  Husband 1-5 years older 0.26 (0.20) 
<20 years - Husband 6+ years older 0.34* (0.20) 
20-24 years 0.12* (0.07) 
Educational difference 
between husband and wife  
25-29 years 0.43*** (0.10) Same level of education - 
30-34 years 0.49*** (0.11) Wife more educated 0.15 (0.10) 
35-39 years 0.96*** (0.19) 
Husband 1-5 years' more 
educated 0.02 (0.06) 
40+ years 1.27*** (0.25) 
Husband 6+ years more 
educated 0.00 (0.06) 
 
Mean effects presented with robust standard errors in brackets. Effect sizes have been 
standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. The controls that are not shown are: 
number of sons alive (p=0.73), number of previous pregnancies and number of previous 
pregnancies squared (p=0.12), interviewer dummies (joint p<0.001). 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%  
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Table 26 shows the disaggregated analysis of agency freedom in each domain 
without interviewer effects. Table 27 repeats the Table 12 from Chapter 5 by 
showing the disaggregated analysis with interviewer effects. We see that the 
adjustment mainly changed the coefficients on the impact of women’s groups 
and food through reductions in the estimated impact on overall external 
motivation (1.89 to 0.71 points), while the estimated impact on overall internal 
motivation remained the same (1.89 to 1.69 points). The amount of variance 
explained increased from 19% to 36% for external motivation and from 22% to 
27% for internal motivation. 
 
Breaking down overall external motivation by domain, we see that the reduction 
in estimated impact on overall external motivation was not confined to any 
particular domain. In fact, we see reduced coefficients for impacts on external 
motivation in all four domains (0.22 to 0.01 in work outside the home, 0.34 to 
0.10 in household chores, 0.55 to 0.14 in health-seeking, and 0.80 to 0.44 in 
group participation). Concerning the coefficients for internal motivation, these 
reduced in magnitude in both cash and food arms, but less consistently than the 
coefficients for external motivation.  
 
Table 28 shows impact estimates on measures of decision-making power. With 
or without adjustment for interviewer dummies, no evidence for impact was 
found, but the adjusted point estimates were more positive overall.  
 
All together, if it was indeed the case that the identified interviewer effects were 
true effects, our comparative analyses suggest the following: un-adjusted 
results over-estimate women’s external pressure in the women’s group and 
food arm; un-adjusted results also under-estimate women’s decision-making 
power in the intervention arms of the trial. Such results could have come about 
if the interviewers who were allocated work in the intervention arms of the trial, 
were biased towards measuring lower levels of agency than interviewers with 
larger workloads in the control arm of the trial. We explore this possibility in the 
next section. 
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Mean effects with robust standard errors provided in brackets. The same controls are applied 
as in Table 24, i.e. interviewer dummies are excluded. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%  
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Mean effects with robust standard errors provided in brackets. The same controls are applied 
as in Table 24, i.e. interviewer dummies are included. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 28. Impact of LBW-SAT on measures of household decision-making power with and 








Including interviewer dummies    
Control - - - 
Women's groups only 0.07 (0.21) 0.32 (0.23) -0.06 (0.21) 
Women's groups and cash -0.09 (0.21) 0.18 (0.18) -0.09 (0.18) 
Women's groups and food -0.08 (0.19) 0.25 (0.21) -0.13 (0.21) 
    
Excluding interviewer dummies    
Control - -  
Women's groups only 0.02 (0.25) 0.07 (0.33) -0.39 (0.33) 
Women's groups and cash 0.16 (0.23) 0.05 (0.27) -0.05 (0.29) 
Women's groups and food -0.15 (0.25) -0.09 (0.30) -0.32 (0.28) 
 
Effect sizes in log odds ratios with robust standard errors provided in brackets. Apart from the 
interviewer dummies, the same controls are applied as in Table 24. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
 







and food Control Total 
FC1 10 49 13 35 107 
FC2 29 28 19 37 113 
FC3 31 0 48 13 92 
FC4 31 60 19 0 110 
FC5 31 0 41 44 116 
FC6 18 43 20 18 99 
FC7 25 43 12 34 114 
FC8 7 71 45 0 123 
FC9 9 80 28 0 117 
FC10 4 59 41 2 106 
FC11 0 0 73 37 110 
FC12 62 11 15 14 102 
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F.2 Explaining the origin of interviewer effects 
Table 20 shows the total number of interviews conducted by each field worker 
across trial arms. As shown by the table, half of the interviewers worked in all 
four arms of the trial, while the other half worked in three out of four arms. As 
mentioned in Section 5.2.1, Chapter 5, I had allocated the interviewers for this 
study across study areas primarily according to logistical concerns. This was 
because cost and administrative concerns limited the timeframe of our data 
collection drive to two and a half months to visit and potentially interview 1930 
women with only 12 field workers. Randomising respondents to interviewers 
would potentially entail interviewers having to travel more than 8 hours on a 
motorbike in order to reach a single interviewee. This was clearly not feasible, 
as the same interviewers would need another 8 hours to travel home again. In 
general, it is the norm in work on randomised controlled field trials to allocate 
field workers to respondents primarily based on logistical concerns. 
 
One unavoidable result of such an allocation scheme was the high likelihood of 
systematic differences in measurement bias across trial arms created by 
different interviewing styles among interviewers for reasons purely connected 
to chance alone. This is because interviewer identity is correlated with trial arm 
allocation by design, thus any random differences in interviewer bias would also 
translate into systematic differences in outcome scores between trial arms.  
Figure 21. Measurement bias of field workers relative to FC8 in measuring overall agency 
 
Figure 21 shows the coefficients for the interviewer effects in the regression for 
our main outcome analysis (Table 25). The interviewer effects are assessed 
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shown by the figure, these effects are relatively evenly distributed with no single 
interviewer sticking out as an outlier. This suggests a random process for 
allocating field workers to a specific measurement bias. Since a Shapiro-Wilk test 
did not reject a null hypothesis of normally distributed interviewer effects 
(p=0.33), we can model this using a normal distribution with mean and standard 
deviation equal to the ones observed for our regression coefficients in Figure 21. 
Thus, we might alter equation (1) in Section 5.2.2.3 to read: 
 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖 + 𝑫𝒖𝒊 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑖
12
𝑗=1
+ 𝜖𝑖 (F.1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the dependent variable, 𝛼 is an intercept, the xji are dummy variables 
for residence in the three intervention arms of the trial, 𝛽𝑗 are their mean 
effects, and 𝑫𝒖𝒊 represents the control variables as before. However, now each 
field worker has a normally distributed field worker effect 𝛿𝑗 that affects the 
outcome 𝑌𝑖 through a dummy variable indicating the field worker who carried 
out the interview 𝑓𝑗𝑖. Given estimated values for the interviewer effects, ?̂?𝑗, we 
can calculate the average bias in our estimated intervention effects for a single 
intervention arm k, say, as the quantity: 
 
 
𝜍𝑘 = ∑ ∑ 𝛿?̂?𝑓𝑗𝑖
12
𝑗=1










where 𝑥0𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating respondent i living in the control arm. 
Thus, 𝜍𝑘 subtracts the average value of ?̂?𝑗 in the control arm from the average 
value of ?̂?𝑗 in intervention arm k. The estimated coefficients from Figure 21 yield 
average biases -0.04 SD for the women’s group only arm, -0.03 for the women’s 
group and cash arm, +0.23 SD for the women’s group and food arm. 
 
We can investigate the plausibility of such systematic differences in bias from 
trial arms arising from a purely random process by simulating normally 
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distributed interviewer effects. We will use the same mean (0.04) and standard 
deviation (0.40) as observed in Figure 21 and the same allocation of field 
workers to trial arms as in Table 29. The code is provided in Section F.3. 
 
Figure 22 shows the distribution of 𝜍𝑘 resulting from such an experiment. 
Although the mean expected bias for all three measurement effects was close 
to zero, we see that a large proportion of the probability mass was distributed 
in areas outside of the region [-0.1, 0.1]. In fact, the probability of observing bias 
of magnitude of 0.2 or greater was 11% for the women’s group only arm, 21% 
for the women’s group and cash arm, and 10% for the women’s group and food 
arm, and 31% for any of the three arms. Thus, we should not be too surprised 
to see interviewer effects arising from random chance alone. 
 
Figure 22. Simulation results of measurement bias in the intervention arms of LBW-SAT due to 
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F.3 Correlating standardisation data with main data 
Since we conducted a standardisation exercise with these same interviewers at 
the end of the data collection period in August 2015, we can assess whether or 
not the bias shown in this exercise correlated with the bias estimated using our 
main sample. As described in Section 5.2.1, we asked 12 nutrition mobilisers to 
act as respondents for all 12 interviewers. After one interviewer called in sick, 
we rotated 11 interviewers among 12 respondents four times to estimate inter-
rater variability when holding the identity of the respondent constant. 
 




Figure 23 plots the regression coefficients for interviewer effects obtained from 
the main impact analysis shown in Figure 21 against the regression coefficients 
for interviewer effects obtained using a linear regression on the standardisation 
dataset. For the latter dataset, we used a model with random effects for each 
nutrition mobiliser and fixed effects for interviewers. We also standardised the 
agency score using the same mean and standard deviation as was observed in 
the main dataset. Caution must be taken with this data, since each interviewer 
only interviewed four women in total, thus the outlying observation for one of 
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clearly shows that almost all interviewers with a positive bias in the 
standardisation dataset, also had a positive bias in the main dataset, while all 
interviewers with a negative bias in the standardisation dataset also had a 
negative bias in the main dataset. The Spearman correlation between the two 
sets of coefficients is 0.81 which indicated a high degree of correlation. Given 
the fact that the nutrition mobilisers were entirely unrelated women to the 
women interviewed in our main dataset, the high degree of correlation provided 
good evidence that interviewer effects reflected permanent, fixed differences 
between interviewers, such as their interviewing styles. 
 
F.4 Impact of adjusting for interviewer effects 
A question arises as to whether adjusting for interviewer identity could 
successfully control for these biasing effects. In particular, given the fact that our 
interviewers did not all work in both intervention and control areas, a natural 
concern might be that adjustment for interviewer identity resulted in problems 
with multicolinearity. We can also use simulation to check this by simulating a 
combination of interviewer and intervention effects using parameter values 
obtained from our data, and then examining the effect of adjusting for 
interviewer identity on the resultant coefficients (The code is provided in F.3).  
 
Figure 24 shows the simulation results. The red vertical line indicates the true 
intervention effect, the blue kernel density indicates the estimated intervention 
effect without adjustment and the red kernel density the estimated intervention 
effect with adjustment for interviewer effects. In all three cases, the adjusted 
version outperformed the unadjusted version in getting closer to the true 
coefficient value in distribution, while the means of the adjusted and the 
unadjusted distributions stayed the same. This suggested that multicollinearity 
was not a problem. 
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In conclusion, we have shown that the adjustment for interviewer effects in our 
results changed the estimated impact of women’s groups and food on women’s 
overall agency freedom substantially. This was primarily due to lower agency 
scores being measured by field workers who had larger portions of work 
assigned to the women’s group and food arm of the trial, likely due to 
differences in interviewing styles between different field workers. Since we had 
assigned field workers to intervention arms based primarily on logistical 
concerns, this was to some extent unavoidable. Simulation results suggested we 
had a 31% chance of observing up to 0.2 SD average bias in one of the trial arms 
relative to control. Correlating data from our standardisation exercise with our 
main data suggested the individual biases of interviewers could be detected in 
the standardisation exercise. Simulation results further suggested that the 
adjusted regression coefficients were closer to the true coefficients in 
distribution than the unadjusted coefficients ones, while there was no indication 
of problems with multicolinearity. Thus, on balance, the results suggested it was 
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F.6 Simulation code 
This Stata code simulates and calculates average interviewer biases per arm 
that would arise from pure chance alone, 𝜍𝑘, using the allocation of field 
workers to trial arms in our original dataset and the mean and variance of 
scores among interviewers observed in the original dataset: 
 
keep interviewer allocation 
sort interviewer 
 
set seed 1 
set matsize 10000 
mat A = [-1,-1,-1] 
forval i=1/1000 { 
 preserve 
 
 gen r = rnormal(0.04, 0.40) 
 egen pickone = tag(interviewer) 
 by interviewer: egen interviewer_effect = total(r*pickone) 
 
 quietly regress interviewer_effect ib4.allocation 
 mat eb = e(b) 




mat list A 
 
 
The following Stata code simulates and calculates regression coefficients for 
the effect of the LBW-SAT intervention with and without further adjustment 
for interviewer effects: 
 
keep interviewer allocation 
sort interviewer 
 
set seed 1 
set matsize 10000 
mat A = [-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1] 
forval i=1/1000 { 
 preserve 
   
 gen outcome = rnormal(0,1) 
 quietly replace outcome = outcome + 0.13 if allocation==1 
 quietly replace outcome = outcome + 0.38 if allocation==2 
 quietly replace outcome = outcome + 0.24 if allocation==3 
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 egen pickone = tag(interviewer) 
 gen r = rnormal(0.04, 0.40) 
 by interviewer: egen interviewer_effect = total(r*pickone) 
  
 quietly replace outcome = outcome + interviewer_effect 
  
 quietly regress outcome ib4.allocation 
 mat eb = e(b)  
 mat C = [eb[1,1], eb[1,2], eb[1,3]] 
  
 quietly regress outcome ib4.allocation i.interviewer 
 mat eb = e(b)  
 mat C = C, [eb[1,1], eb[1,2], eb[1,3]] 




mat list A 
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Appendix G. Guidance for interviewers 
and consent forms for qualitative study 
G.1 Guidance for interviewing daughters-in-law and mothers-
in-law 
• Arrive on time with your recording equipment, interview guide and notebooks.  
• Be psychologically prepared to conduct the interview. 
• Try to find as private as possible a space where you and the respondent can be alone 
for the interview with a minimum amount of third-party observers 
• Have a package of sweets ready in case the children are distracting 
• Have a set of bangles ready to give to the respondent after the end of the interview  
• If this is the first interview, obtain informed consent 
• Conduct the interview itself 
o Follow the flow of the conversation 
o Stick to the topics in the topic guide, namely 
▪ Household management of cash 
▪ Use of the cash transfers 
▪ Empowerment in general 
o In general, avoid asking questions in the topic guide, if the woman has already 
answered them when responding to an earlier question 
o Ask follow-up questions and probe in order to learn as much as possible 
o Record the interview, where possible, otherwise take notes 
o Observe and document participants’ behaviours and their environment, in 
particular interactions with any third-party observers 
o If you make an observation, make sure to record at which point in the 
interview, this observation was made 
• Thank the respondent and end the interview on time (within an hour). Let them listen 
to the recording afterwards for as long as they like. 
• If this is the first interview, notify them that you will return later during her pregnancy 
for a follow-up interview 
• Expand your notes on your observations of this respondent and the environment as 
soon as you get home. Ensure all observations have been annotated with notes 
indicating where in the interview, they were made. During transcription, insert your 
observation notes into the transcript at the appropriate time points. 
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G.2 Consent form for daughters-in-law 
गुणात्मक डीजाइि  
Consent form for pregnant women receiving cash transfers in LBW-SAT सिमनत पत्र गभार्ती 
महिला सबके लाथग जे सब कम तौल बच्चा अध्ययिके पैसा वर्तिण कायाक्रमसे पैसा प्राप्त 
किै छै  
Information and purpose. I come from MIRA, which is an organization that researches the 
health of women and children in Nepal.Currently, I am studying how cash is handled in the 
household in Ghodghas. I ask you to participate in this interview, because I am very interested 
in how household members use the cash transfers received from MIRA. 
जानकारी आ उद्देश्य: िम शमिा संस्थासे आइलनछ, जे माय आ बच्चाके स्र्ास्थ सम्बन्नध 
अिुसनधाि किै छै. र्तामािमे िम पढाई कििल नछ क्रक घोड़घास गा.वर्.समे पैसा केिाके 
उपयोग िोइछई .िम आिाके अई अनतर्ााताामे सिभागी िोए के लाथग पुछ चािैनछ कैला क्रक िम 
बिुतै इचचकु नछ यी जािेला क्रक शमिा से जे पैसा शमलै छै से घिपरिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब केिाके 
प्रयोग किै छै.  
यी शमिाके लाथग मित्र्पुणा छै. वर्षेस क के, आिा, यी शमिा के पैसा वर्तिण कायाक्रमम े
गभार्ती महिलाके भूशमकाके बािेमे बुझमे मर्दत क सकै नछयै. एिा क के िम सब भबबस्यम े
येिि कायाक्रम बिार्े सकर्ै जई से क्रक आिाके समुर्दाईके लाभ िोतै .  
आिाके सिभाथगता : 
आिाके सिभाथगता यै अध्ययिमे एक घण्टाके अनतर्ााताा िोइत. आिाके गर्ाार्ास्थाके पछाडीके 
चिनमे जखनि आिाके समय सुवर्धाजिक िोइत ्िम आिासे फेरु अनतर्ााताा शलय चािब. आिाके 
कोिो प्रस्िमे असुवर्धा िोइत त आिा प्रस्ि छोइड सकै नछ या कोिो समयमे िमिा कैि सकै 
नछ अगि आिा अनतर्ााताा िोक चािैनछया यै अध्ययिमे सिभागी िै िोए चािैनछ त.  
 
This is important for MIRA. Particularly, you can really help us understand pregnant women’s 
role in the MIRA cash transfer programme. By doing this, we can design future programmes 
in the area that benefit your community. 
Your participation. Your participation in this study will be an hour-long interview. I may also 
like to interview you again at a time that is convenient for youat a later stage of your 
pregnancy. You may pass on any question that you find uncomfortable and at any time you 
may tell me you would like to stop the interview and your participation in the study.  
Appendix G. Guidance for interviewers and consent forms for qualitative study 
 
 
527 | P a g e  
 
Please note that your responseswill not affect receipt of the cash transfers in any way. They 
will also not affect your ability to participate in the women’s groups.Neither will your decision 
to participate in this interview affect your cash transfers or your participation in women’s 
groups. 
कृपया कके ध्यािमे िाख ुक्रक आिाके प्रनतक्रक्रयासे पैसा बबताििमे कोिो प्रभार् िै पित ै. अईस े
आिाके आमा समुिमे सिभागी िोयेके छमतामे सिो िै प्रभार् पितै. अई अनतर्ााताामे आिाके  
सिभागी िोयेके निणायसे सेिो पैसा बबतिणमे कोिो प्रभार् िै पितै .  
 
Confidentiality. Your name and identifying information will not be associated with any part 
of the written report of the research. All of your information and responses will be kept 
confidential. [Is that ok?] 
गोप्यता 
आिाके िाम आ पहिचाि हर्दयेर्ाला जािकािीसब यै अिुसनधिके शलखखत हटपोटके कोिो भी 
भागमे िै िाखल जायत. आिाके सब जािकािी आ प्रनतक्रक्रया गोप्य िाखल जायत. [ हिक छै?]  
We would like to remember all the things you say as they are very important, so we would 
like to record the interview. [Is that ok?] 
आिा जते शभ बात किबै से बिुते मित्र्पुणा छै आ िम सब यार्द िाखे चािर्ै तै के लाथग िम 
सब इ अनतर्ााताा िेकोडा कि चािबै. [ हिक छै ] 
[If she does not want to be recorded]If you feel uncomfortable with recording, we can take 
notes on paper instead. Your name will not be recorded on paper or on the tape. 
[अगि महिला िेकोडा किे हर्दए िै चािै छथथि त ] अगि आिा िेकोडा किेसे असिज मिसुस किै 
नछ त, िमसब र्ोई के सट्टामे कागजमे शलख सकै नछ. आिाके िाम कागज या िेकोिडिमे िै 
शलखल जाइत.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns please let us know. 
अगि आिाके कोिो प्रस्ि या न्जज्ञासा छै त कृपया कके िामिा सबके किु. 
 
Take oral consent and get woman to acknowledge that she has heard and understood the 
above information and is aware that she can discontinue her participation in the study at any 
time. 
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G.3 Consent form for mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law 
Consent form for mothers-in-law of pregnant women receiving cash transfers in LBW-SAT 
सिमनत पत्र उ गभार्ती महिलाके सासु सबके लाथग जे सब कम तौल बच्चा अध्ययिके पैसा 
वर्तिण कायाक्रमसे पैसा प्राप्त किै छै  
Information and purpose. I come from MIRA, which is an organization that researches the 
health of women and children in Nepal. Currently, I am studying how cash is handled in the 
household. I ask you to participate in this interview, because I am very interested in how 
household members use the cash transfers received from MIRA. 
 िानकारी आ उद्दशे्य: िम जमरा संस्थासे आइलजछ, िे माय आ बच्चाके स्वास्थ सम्बजन्ध अननसन्धान करै छै. 
वतडमानमे िम पढाई करिल जछ दक पैसा केनाके उपयोग िोइछई .िम आिाके अई अन्तवाडताडमे सिभागी िोए 
के लाजग पनछ चािजैछ कैला दक िम बहुतै इचचनक जछ यी िानेला दक जमरा से ि ेपैसा जमलै छै से घरपररवारके 
सिस्यसब केनाके प्रयोग करै छै.  
यी जमराके लाजग मित्वपनर्ड छै. जवषेस क के, आिा, यी जमरा के पैसा जवतरर् कायडक्रममे मजिलाके भूजमकाके 
बारेमे बनझमे मित क सकै जछयै. एना क के िम सब भजबस्यमे येिन कायडक्रम बनाव ेसकवै िई से दक आिाके 
समनिाईके लाभ िोत ै.  
आिाके सिभाजगता : 
आिाके सिभाजगता यै अध्ययनमे एक घण्टाके अन्तवाडताड िोइत. आिाके कोनो प्रस्नमे असनजवधा िोइत त आिा 
प्रस्न छोइड सकै जछ या कोनो समयमे िमरा कैि सकै जछ अगर आिा अन्तवाडताड रोक चािैजछया यै अध्ययनमे 
सिभागी न ैिोए चािजैछ त.  
This is important for MIRA. Particularly, you can really help us understand women’s role in 
the MIRA cash transfer programme. By doing this, we can design future programmes in the 
area that benefit your community. 
Your participation. Your participation in this study will be an hour-long interview. You may 
pass on any question that you find uncomfortable and at any time you may tell me you would 
like to stop the interview and your participation in the study.  
Please note that your responses will not affect receipt of the cash transfers in any way. They 
will also not affect your ability to participate in the women’s groups. Neither will your decision 
to participate in this interview affect the cash transfers or your participation in women’s 
groups. 
कृपया कके ध्यानमे राखन दक आिाके प्रजतदक्रयासे पैसा जबतारनमे कोनो प्रभाव नै परत ै. अईसे आिाके आमा 
समनिमे सिभागी िोयेके छमतामे सिो नै प्रभाव परतै. अई अन्तवाडताडमे आिाके  सिभागी िोयेके जनर्डयस े
सेिो पैसा जबतरर्मे कोनो प्रभाव नै परतै .  
 
Confidentiality. Your name and identifying information will not be associated with any part 
of the written report of the research. All of your information and responses will be kept 
confidential. [Is that ok?] 
गोप्यता 
आिाके नाम आ पजिचान दियेवाला िानकारीसब यै अननसन्धनके जलजखत रटपोटके कोनो भी भागमे नै राखल 
िायत. आिाके सब िानकारी आ प्रजतदक्रया गोप्य राखल िायत. [ रठक छै?]  
We would like to remember all the things you say as they are very important, so we would 
like to record the interview. [Is that ok?] 
आिा ित ेजभ बात किबै से बहुते मित्वपनर्ड छै आ िम सब याि राखे चािव ैतै के लाजग िम सब इ अन्तवाडताड 
रेकोडड कर चािबै. [ रठक छै ] 
Appendix G. Guidance for interviewers and consent forms for qualitative study 
 
 
529 | P a g e  
 
[If she does not want to be recorded]If you feel uncomfortable with recording, we can take 
notes on paper instead. Your name will not be recorded on paper or on the tape. 
[अगर मजिला रेकोडड करे दिए नै चाि ैछजथन त ] अगर आिा रेकोडड करेसे असिि मिसनस करै जछ त, िमसब 
वोई के सट्टामे कागिमे जलख सकै जछ. आिाके नाम कागि या रेकोरडरमे नै जलखल िाइत.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns please let us know. 
अगर आिाके कोनो प्रस्न या जिज्ञासा छै त कृपया कके िामरा सबके कहु. 
 
Take oral consent and get woman to acknowledge that she has heard and understood the 
above information and is aware that she can discontinue her participation in the study at any 
time. 
 
G.4 Consent form for facilitation coordinators 
Consent form for key informants from the intervention team in MIRA 
Information and purpose. I come from MIRA, which as you know is an organization that 
researches the health of women and children in Nepal. Currently, I am studying how women 
in the community are receiving our cash transfers. I ask you to participate in this interview, 
because I am very interested your experiences with the cash transfers in MIRA. 
This is important for MIRA. By doing this, we can design future programmes in the area that 
benefit our community and make better use of our government resources. 
Your participation. Your participation in this study will be an hour-long interview. You may 
pass on any question that you find uncomfortable and at any time you may tell me you would 
like to stop the interview and your participation in the study.  
Please note that your responses will not affect your job or standing within MIRA in any way. 
We are collecting this information for research purposes only. We are not evaluating your job 
performance and none of this information will reach your supervisors or anybody associated 
with MIRA except me and the qualitative research team. Neither will your decision to 
participate in this interview affect your job or your standing within MIRA in any way. 
Confidentiality. Your name and identifying information will not be associated with any part 
of the written report of the research. All of your information and responses will be kept 
confidential. [Is that ok?] 
गोप्यता 
आिाके िाम आ पहिचाि हर्दयेर्ाला जािकािीसब यै अिुसनधिके शलखखत हटपोटके कोिो भी 
भागमे िै िाखल जायत. आिाके सब जािकािी आ प्रनतक्रक्रया गोप्य िाखल जायत. [ हिक छै?]  
We would like to remember all the things you say as they are very important, so we would 
like to record the interview. [Is that ok?] 
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आिा जते शभ बात किबै से बिुते मित्र्पुणा छै आ िम सब यार्द िाखे चािर्ै तै के लाथग िम 
सब इ अनतर्ााताा िेकोडा कि चािबै. [ हिक छै ] 
[If she does not want to be recorded]If you feel uncomfortable with recording, we can take 
notes on paper instead. Your name will not be recorded on paper or on the tape. 
[अगि महिला िेकोडा किे हर्दए िै चािै छथथि त ] अगि आिा िेकोडा किेसे असिज मिसुस किै 
नछ त, िमसब र्ोई के सट्टामे कागजमे शलख सकै नछ. आिाके िाम कागज या िेकोिडिमे िै 
शलखल जाइत.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns please let us know. 
अगि आिाके कोिो प्रस्ि या न्जज्ञासा छै त कृपया कके िामिा सबके किु. 
 
Take oral consent and get woman to acknowledge that she has heard and understood the 
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Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
This Appendix details the topic guides used in interviews with daughters-in-law, 
mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law. Unfortunately, the fully translated 
copies of the topic guides in Maithili are not available, but the original English 
wording is available in full. 
 
H.1 Topic guides for daughters-in-law 
H.1.1 Topic guide for daughters-in-law, Phase 1 
माय समुिमे सिभागी िोयर्ाला महिलासबके लाथग वर्षय पुन्स्तका.                                                           
1) Basic information आधार 
What is your age? आिाके उमि कते छै? 
What is your religion? आिाके धमा कोि छै? 
What is your caste? आिाके जानत कोि छै? 
Madheshi/Bahadi?  मधेसी/ पिाडी ? 
What is your educational level? आिाके िैक्षक्षक स्ति कते छै? 
[Make an assessment of socio-economic status] 
Are you staying in your maiti or your sasural?क्रक आिा अप्पि माइनतमे ििैनछ क्रक ससुिालमे ? 
How many months pregnant are you? कते महििाके गभार्ती नछ आिा? 
How long ago did you get married? 
How many times have you visited the women’s groups? आिा कत ेबेि आमा समुिके बैिकम े
गेल नछ? 
 
Please tell me who lives in your household. कृपया क के िाम्रा किु क्रक आिाके घिमे के सब 
ििै छै? 
[Sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law]( बेटासब, 
बेटीसब , जमायसब, पुतिुसब, साउससब , ससुिसब ) 
 
Do you have any members of your family that are currently living abroad? क्रक आिाके 
परिर्ािके कोिो सर्दस्य वर्रे्दि ििै छै र्तामािमे ? 
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[If yes] Please tell me who lives abroad. अगि िँ, त, कृपया िाम्रा बताउ क्रक के ििैछै वर्रे्दि?  
 
2) Household management of finances 
I am now going to ask you questions about what you do with money in the household. This 
involves questions on personal income, credit and savings. It is important for us to know this 
information to us understand how best to help your community move forward economically. 
आब, आिाके घिमे पैसाके व्यर्स्थापि सामानयतया केिाके िोइछै तै सम्बन्नध प्रस्ि सब पुछ 
चािैनछ? आब िम आिासे पुछे जाइनछ क्रक आिाके घिमे पैसाके कथथ सब किै छै? आइम े
आिाके व्यन्क्तगत आय, ऋण आ बचतके बािेम ेप्रस्िसब छै. यी जािकािी िम्रासबके लेल 
मित्र्पुणा छै कैला क्रक आिाके समुर्दायके आथथाक रुपसे केिा के आगाडी बढायल जाय से बुझमेे 
िमिा सबके मर्दत कितै .  
 
Income आय 
First I am going to ask you questions regarding the income that comes to your family. Can you 
tell me about all the people who earn an income in your family? 
सर्ाप्रथम िम आिाके पुछ जा ििलनछ क्रक आिाके घिमे आय किाँसे अर्ई छै? क्रक आिा कईि 
सकैनछ आिाके घिके उ सर्दस्यसब के बािेमे जे पैसा कमाइ छै? 
• Who earns an income in your family?आिाके परिर्ािमे के पैसा कमाइछै? 
• [For each earner, talk through with the mother the details of the income earned: How 
the income is earned, how often  it comes to the family and if it is main income or 
supplement] 
• [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Does anyone send remittances from 
abroad?कोइ गोटा वर्रे्दिसे िेशमट्यानस भेजै छै? 
• [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Who receives the remittances that 
are sent?िेशमट्यानस जे भेजै छै से के लईछै? 
• Do you have a family business? [If yes, what is it and who works on it doing what] क्रक 
आिाके पारिर्ारिक व्यापाि छै? [ अगि ि, कथथ छै आ के किै छै कथथकेव्यापाि कितै 
से ?  
• Who receives the income that is earned?जे पैसा आय आजाि िोइछै से के लई छै ? 
• [If multiple earners] Do the different earners make each their own decisions regarding 
the use of the money they earn or do they pool the money together and make a joint 
decision? [अगि बिुते गोटा कमायर्ाला छै तब ]  उ सब अपि कमायल पैसाके केिाके 
उपयोग किर्ै, तै सम्बन्नध अपिे निणाय किै छै क्रक एके जगि पैसा िाइख क संयुक्त 
निणाय किै छै? 
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• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she have a way of 
getting money? [ घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्य सब जे पैसा िै कमाय छै ] क्रक उिका पैसा 
पार्ेके कोिो उपाय छै? 
• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she receive allowances 
from [income earners]? [ घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्य सब जे अप्िेसे पैसा ि ैकमाय छै ] 
क्रक कमायर्ाला लोक उिका सबके खचाा रै्द छै ?  
• [If yes] What are the allowances for? अगि िँ, त कथथलाथग खचाा रै्द छै? 
 
Do you earn an income yourself [This includes government allowance]? क्रक आिा अप्िेसे पैसा 
कमाय नछ? 
[If woman earns her own income][ अगि महिला अप्िेसे पैसा कमाय छै त ] 
• How do you feel about earning an income yourself? [आहा अपने से पसैा कमायछि त आहा 
केहन महसुस होइय ? 
• What do you do with the income you earn? [ अगि ि ] आिा जे पैसा कमाय नछ तै 
से कथथ किै नछयै? 
• Do you hand over your income to your family members? [ अगि ि ] क्रक आिा अपि 
आय घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसबके र्द रै्द नछयै? 
[If woman does not earn her own income] [अगि महिला अप्िेसे पैसा िै कमाय छै त ? 
• Do you have a way of getting money? क्रक आिाके कोिो क्रकशसमसे पैसा भेटैछै? 
• Do you receive allowances from [income earners]? [If yes, what is it for]? क्रक 
कमायर्ाला लोकसबसे आिाके खचाा भेटैय ? [ अगि ि, कथथ के लाथग ] 
• Would you like to earn an income yourself? क्रक आिा अप्िेसे पैसा कमाय चािैनछयै ? 
• Why do you not earn an income yourself? [अगि ि]ै आिा कैलाथग ि ैअपिे स ेपैसा 
कमायनछ? 
• What would happen if you earned an income yourself [अगि िै] कथथ िोत ैअगि आिा 
अपिेसे पैसा कमैनतयै त? 
• Have you ever earned an income yourself? [If yes, how did you earn your income] 
[अगि िै] क्रक आिा कहियो अपिेसे पैसा कमैिे नछयई? [ अगि ि, त केिाके पैसा 




Now I would like to ask you about savings in the household. Savings can be kept either in cash 
or as assets. Does anybody in your household keep their own savings?आब िम आिासे आिाके 
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घि के बचतके बािेमे पुछ चािैनछ ? बचत क्रक पैसाके रुपमे िाखल जाइछै या सामािके रुपमे.क्रक 
आिाके घिमे कोइ गोटा अपिेसे बचत किै छथथि? 
[If yes, for each household member that keeps own savings] [ अगि ि, ििेक घि परिर्ािके 
सर्दस्यसब जे अप्िेसे बचत किै छथथि]  
• How doeshe/she keep their savings? उ केिाके बचत किै छाथथि? 
• What is he/she saving money for?कथथ के लाथग उ पैसा बचत किै छै?  
• Hashe/she previously had to spend money from his/her savings?क्रक उिकापहिले 
कहियो अप्पि बचतमेसेपैसा खचा किे पिल छलैय? [If yes, on what] [ अगि ि ] 
कथथमे? 
[If money is physically stored in the household] Who keeps the money in the household? घरमे 
पसैा के रखिैै?  
[If money is physically stored in the household] How is the money kept in the household? घरमे 
पसैा केनाके राखलजायिै? 
  
[If woman does not save money herself]Have you ever wanted to save your own money? [ 
अगि महिला अपिेसे बचत िै किै छै ] क्रक आिा कहियो अपिेसे पैसा बचत किे चािशलयै ? 
[If woman does not save money herself]Are you allowed to keep your own savings? [ अगि 
महिला अपिेसे पैसा बचत िै किै छै ] क्रक आिाके अप्पि बचत पैसा अपिे पास िाखेके 
अिुमनत छै? 
•  [If yes] Why do you not keep your own savings? [ अगि ि ] आिा कै लाथग िै अप्पि 
बचत अपिे पास िखनैछयै ? 
• [If no] Why are you not allowed to keep your own savings?[ अगि िै ] आिाके अप्पि 
बचत पैसा अपिे पास िाखेके अिुमनत कैला िै छै? 
• [If no] What would happen if you kept your own savings?[ अगि िै ] कथथ िोतै अगि 
आिा अप्पि बचत अपिे पास िखबै? 
 
[If woman receives an allowance] How do you feel about receiving the allowance? 
How would you feel if your family members withheld your allowance? 




Now I am going to ask you regarding any credit that your family possesses. Can you tell me 
about anybody in your family that take out loans?आब िम आिासे आिाके परिर्ािके कोिो 
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ऋण िै क्रक तै संम्बनधी पुछ जाििल नछ. क्रक आिा िमिा बतासकै नछ क्रक आिाके परिर्ािमे 
कोइ ऋण/ कजाा लेिे छै ? 
• Where do they get their loans from?उिका सबके ऋण किासे शमलै छै? 
• When do they take out loans?उ सब ऋण कथथ लाथग लई छै ? 
• Why do they take out loans? उ सब कैलाथग ऋण लाई छै ? 
 
Does anyone lend to others in the household? क्रक घि परिर्ािके कोइ गोटा र्दोसि लोक के 
उधािी रै्द छै? 
• Who do they lend to? केकिा रै्द छै उधािी? 
• When do they lend out money? उ सब कहिया रै्द छै उधािी? 
• Why do they lend out money? कै लाथग पैसा रै्द छै उधािी? 
  
Are you allowed to borrow your own money? क्रक आिाके अिुमनत िै क्रक आिा केकिो से 
अपिेसे उधाि ल सकी ? 
• [If yes] Have you ever borrowed your own money? [ अगि ि] क्रक आिा कहियो अपिेसे 
उधाि लेिे नछयइ? 
• [If no] Have you ever wanted to borrow money for something? [ अगि िै ] क्रक आिा 
कहियो कोिो समािके लागी पैसा उधि शलय चािशलयै ?   
• [If no] Why are you not allowed to borrow your own money? [ अगि ि ै] कै लाथग 
आिाके अपिेसे पैसा शलय अिुमनत िै छै? 
• [If no] What would happen if you borrowed your own money? [ अगििै ] कथथ िोतै 
अगि आिा अपि ेसे पैसा उधाि शलतीयै त ? 
 
Group participation समनिम ेसिभाजगता 
 
Does anybody in your family participate in groups related to financial matters (credit, savings, 
income, financial education)? क्रक आिाके परिर्ािमेसे कोइ गोटा पैसा सम्बन्नध ( जेिाक्रक ऋण, 
बचत, आय , वर्त्तीय शिक्षा ( पैसा सम्बन्नध शिक्षा हर्दयेर्ाला) समुिमे सिभागी िोइछै ?  
• [If yes] Can you tell me what the group does? [ अगि ि] क्रक आिा िमिा बता सकैनछ 
क्रक उ समुि कथथ किै छै ? 
• [If credit] How does the group provide your family with credit? [ अगि ऋण हर्दयेर्ाला 
समुि छै त ] उ समुि आिाके परिर्ािके केिाके/ किाँसे ऋण रै्द छै? 
• [If savings] How does the group help you save money? [ अगि बचत किेर्ाला समुि छै 
त ] उ समुि आिाके पैसा बचत किेमे केिाके सियोग किै छै? 
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• [If income] What type of work do you do in the group? [ अगि आय आजाि किेर्ाला 
समुि छै त ] आिा, समिुमे केिि क्रकशसमके काम किै नछयै? 
• [If financial education] What do they teach you about? [ अगि वर्त्तीय शिक्षा सम्बन्नध 
समुि छै त] उ सब कथथ शसखबै छै आिाके? 
• [if she does not participate in any groups] Why not? [ अगि महिला समुिमे सिभागी 
िै िोइ छै त] कथथलाथग िै सिभागी िोइनछ?  
 
Purchases 
Now I would like to ask you about purchases in the household. Who makes purchases in the 
household? 
• [If woman herself is involved] Do you go outside the household to make purchases? 
• [If yes] Have you always been able to go outside the household and make purchases? 
[If no] Why did it change? 
• [If woman does not go outside] Why do you not go outside to make purchases? 
• [If woman does not go outside] Have you ever make your own purchases? [If yes] Why 
did it change? 
• [If woman does not go outside] Are you able to ask other family members to buy things 
for you? 
• [If yes] Do you know the prices of goods in the area? 
• [If yes] How do you learn about the prices of goods in the area? 
 
Management व्यवस्िापन  
Now I would like to ask you about the management of money in the household. Who manages 
the money generally in the household?आब िम आिाके पुछ चािब क्रक आिाके घिमे पैसाके 
व्यर्स्थापि केिाके िोइछै?सामानयतया घिमे पैसाके व्यर्स्थापि के किै छै? 
• Do [mention decision-makers] consult other people in such decisions?क्रक उ (जे निणाय 
लै छै) पैसा सम्बन्नध निणाय शलए बेिमे आिो लोकसे सेिो पुछई छै? 
• Do other people ever disagree with [mention decision-makers]’s decisions? क्रक र्दोसि 
लोकसब  उिकि निणायसेकहियो असिमत िोइ छै? 
• Do other people ever make their own suggestions regarding money in the 
household?क्रक र्दोसि लोक कहियो सल्लाि सुझाब रै्द छै क्रक घिमे पैसाके बािेमे केिाके 
निणाय कैल जतै  ?  
• [If multiple decision-makers] How do [decision-makers] come to an agreement on 
decisions regarding money in the household?[अगि एक से बेसी निणायकताा सब छै त] 
उ निणायकताा सब घिमे  पैसा सम्बन्नध निणायमे केिाके सम्झौता किै छै? 
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If you wanted more money in the household to be spent on something you cared about would 
you be able to raise the issue?अगि आिा चािनतयै क्रक घिमे कोिो येिि थचजमे पैसा बेसी खचा 
िो जे आिा वर्चाि किै नछयै, त आिा इ मुद्र्दा उिाबे सकै छशलय? 
• [If yes] Did you ever influence what the money in the household was spent on? What 
was the situation? What was the outcome?[ अगि ि ] कृपया आिा िमिासे र्ोय 
समयके बािेमे बात क सकै नछ जखिी आिाके प्रभार्से घिमे पैसा खचा काइल गेल ? 
केिि अर्स्था छलैय? िनतजा कथथ भेलै? 
• [If no] Have you ever been consulted on a decision made in the household?[अगि िै ] 
क्रक घिमे भेल निणाय बािेमे आिाके कहियो पुछल गेल छै ? 
o [If yes] Have you ever disagreed with the decision? [If yes, please give an 
example] [ अगि ि] आिा कहियो असिमनत भेली र्ोय निणायसे? 
• [If no] How do you feel about not being involved in money matters in the household? 
[अगि िै ]  आिा जखिी घिके पैसा सम्बन्नध वर्षयमे संलग्ि िै िोइ नछ त आिाके 
केिा मिसुस िोइय ? 
• [If she answers with shyness] Why are you shy about it?[ अगि महिला लजाके जर्ाब 
रै्द छै ] आिा कथथलाथग लजाईनछ अई वर्षयमे ? 
• [If she answers it is not good to be involved] Why is this not a good thing? [ अगि 
महिला जर्ार् रै्द छै क्रक र्ोयमे संलग्ि िोिाई बहढया िै िोइ छै ]  इ कै लाथग बहढया 
बात िै िोइ छै ? 
• [If she answers good women do not do this] Why do good women not do this?[ अगि 
महिला किै छै क्रक बहढया महिला एिा िै किैछै ] कैलाथग बहढया महिला एिा िै किै 
छै? 
 
Are you able to make decisions regarding the cash transfer that you receive? क्रक आिा उ 
पैसासे  निणाय कसकै नछयै जे आिाके पैसा वर्तिण माफा त शमलैय ? 
• [If yes] Can you give me an example of a decision you have made regarding your 
cash transfer? [ अगि ि ] क्रक, आिा अप्पि प्राप्त पैसासे निणाय कैिे एगो उर्दाििण 
र्द सकै नछयै? 
• [If no] Who makes decisions regarding the cash transfer that you receive? [अगि िै 
] पैसा वर्तिण माफा त जे पैसा आिाके शमलैय तेकि निणाय के लै छै? 
• [If no] Do you make any of your own decisions regarding the cash transfer that you 
receive? [ अगि िै ] क्रक आिा कोिो भी निणाय लै नछ उ पैसासे जे आिाके पैसा 
वर्तिण माफा त प्राप्त िोइय ? 
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• [If no] Would you like to make any decisions yourself regarding the transfer? 
Why/why not? [ अगि िै ] क्रक आिा इ पैसा सम्बन्नध कोिो निणाय अपिेसे शलय 
चािर्ई? 
 
3) Cash transfers पैसा स्िानान्तरर् 
I am now going to ask you some questions about the cash transfers that you receive. This is 
important information to us that will help us design cash transfer programmes in the future 
that can better benefit pregnant women in need in your community. 
आब िम आिाके पैसा वर्तिणसे जे पैसा भेटैय त ैवर्षयमे कुछ प्रस्ि सब पुछे जाििल नछ. 
इ िमिा सबके लाथग मित्र्पुणा जािकािी छै जे िमिा सबके भवर्ष्यके लाथग पैसा स्थािानतिण 
कायाक्रम बिार्ेमे मर्दत कितै जाईसे क्रक आिाके समुर्दायके जरुितमनर्द महिला सबके फाइर्दा 
िोतै. 
 
Receiving the cash transfer at home – FOR WOMEN RECEIVING CASH AT HOME ONLY 
महिलासब जे पैसा ववतरर् घरेमे पवै िै : 
 
How did you hear about the cash transfers? 
आिा पैसा वर्तिणके बािेमे केिाके सुिाशलयै? 
Why do you receive your cash transfers at home instead of at the women’s groups? 
आिा कैलाथग पैसा घिेमे लेशलयै आमा समुिमे शलएके सट्टामे? 
 
Please tell me about the last time the nutrition mobiliser visited you. 
कृपया कके किु क्रक पोसि परिचालक आिासे अन्नतम बेि कहिया भेटे आइल छलैय? 
• What happened during the last visit? 
• कथथ भेलै अन्नतम भ्रमणमे? कथथ भेलई तब? 
• Were you alone when the NM visited or were your family members also there? 
• क्रक आिा अकेले छशलय जखनि पोसि परिचालक भ्रमण किे आइल छलैय क्रक आिाके 
घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्य सब सेिो छलखखि?  
• Did you receive the cash transfer yourself or did other family members take it? 
• क्रक आिा पैसा वर्तिण अपिे लेलीय क्रक परिर्ािके र्दोसि सर्दस्य सब लेलखखि? 
• Has the NM ever visited at a time when you were not home? 
• क्रक पोसि परिचालक कहियो आिासे भेटे आइल छलखखि जखिी आिा घिमे िै 
छशलय? 
• [If yes] What happened then? 
• [ अगि ि  ] कथथ भेलै तब? 
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• Have you ever handed over the money you receive from the NM to other family 
members? क्रक आिा कहियो आिाके पोसि परिचालकसे जे पैसा शमलल से परिर्ािके 
र्दोसि सर्दस्यके रे्दिे नछयै?  
• [If does not hand over] Do you hand over the money that you receive on a later day? 
[ अगि िै रै्द छै त ] क्रक आिा उ पैसा परिर्ािके लोकके र्दोसि हर्दि र्द रै्द नछयै ? 
• [If she hands over on any day] Who do you hand over your money to? [ अगि महिला 
कोिो हर्दि र्द रै्द छै त ] आिा उ पैसा केकिा र्द रै्द नछयै?  
• Do you hand over all of the money or only a portion of it? क्रक आिा पुिा पैसा र्द रै्द 
नछयै क्रक कुछ भाग मात्र ैरै्द नछयै? 
• Where is the money you receive money kept? पैसा किा िखाएछई? 
• Do you have access to the money? क्रक आिाके र्ोए पैसा पि पिुच छै? 
• [If the woman makes her own decisions regarding the money] Do you like making 
decisions regarding the money yourself?[ अगि महिला अप्िेसे निणाय किै छै पैसाके 




Going, getting the cash transfers and taking the money home – FOR WOMEN ATTENDING 
WOMEN’S GROUPS MEETINGS ONLY 
महिलासब जे आमा समुिके बैठकसे पैसा प्राप्त करै िथिन: 
 
 
Going, getting the cash transfers and taking the money homeजजाईजा 
Please tell me about how you ended up going to the women’s groups to get cash transfers. 
• How did you hear about the cash transfers? पैसा वर्तिणके बािेमे आिा केिाके 
सुिशलयै? 
• Who decided that you would be going to the WGs to get cash transfers? आिा आमा 
*समुिमे पैसा शलए जबै से के निणाय कैलकै ? 
• Do you come to WG meetings alone or with someone else? आमा समुिके बैिकम े
आिा अकेले अर्ई नछयइ क्रक केकिो जोिे अर्ै नछयइ ? 
• Do you receive the cash transfer yourself or do your family members take it?क्रक 
आिा पैसा वर्तािणसे पैसा अपिे लै नछयै क्रक आिाके घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब लै छै 
? 
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• Have you ever been unable to come to a WG meeting? क्रक आिा कहियो आमा समुि के 
र्ैिक मे आर्े मे असमथा छशलय?[If yes, what was the reason] [ अगि ि] कथथ कािण 
छलै ? 
• [If yes] What happened then? [ अगि ि ] कथथ भेलै तब ? 
• Have you ever had someone else come to a WG meeting and receive the cash 
transfer on your behalf?आिाके खानति कोइ र्दोसि गोटा आमा समुह्के बैिकमे 
आइर्के पैसा वर्तिण माफा त पैसा प्राप्त कैिे छै ? 
 
Talk me through what happens with the money you receive from MIRA starting with getting 
the cash at the women’s groups. 
शमिासे जे पैसा शमलैय तेकिा कथथ किै नछयै तै वर्सयमे िमिासे बात करु? आमा समुिम े
से जे पैसा शमलैय, तेकिा बार्द कथथ किै नछयै से किु . 
• When you come home from a WG meeting after having received the cash transfer 
what do you do with the cash transfer next? जखनि आिा आमा समुिके बैिकमे स े
पैसा ल के घिे अर्ै नछयै, उ पैसाके आिा तेकिा बार्द कथथ किै नछयै ? 
• Has anyone told you to hand over the money you receive?कोइ आिाके कििे छै उ 
पैसा केकिो र्दहर्दयेला? 
• Do you hand over your cash transfer to anybody else when you come home with 
the transfer? जखिी आिा पैसा लके घिे अर्ैनछयै त आिा उ पैसा केकिो र्दरै्द नछयै 
? 
• [If does not hand over] Do you hand over the money that you receive on a later day? 
[अगि पैसा केकिो िै रै्द छै ] क्रक आिाके जे पैसा शमलैय से र्ार्दमे केकिो र्द रै्द नछयै? 
• [If she hands over on any day] Who do you hand over your money to? [ अगि महिला 
कोिो हर्दिमे, र्द रै्द छै पैसा केकिो ] आिा केकिा पैसा र्द रै्द नछयै? 
• [If she hands over on any day] Do you hand over all of the money or only a portion 
of it? [  
• अगि महिला कोिो हर्दिमे, र्द रै्द छै पैसा केकिो ] क्रक आिा पुिे (सब )पैसा र्द रै्द नछयै 
क्रक कें का भाग मात्र ैरै्द नछयै ? 
• Where is the money kept? पैसा किा िखाएछई? 
• Do you have access to the money? क्रक आिाके र्ोए पैसा पि पिुच छै? 
• [If the woman makes her own decisions regarding the money] Do you like making 
decisions regarding the money yourself?[ अगि महिला अप्िेसे निणाय किै छै पैसाके 
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Control over money in  case it is handed over पसैामे छनयन्रर्  
[If hands over money to other family members] How you feel about handing over the money 
to [mention the family members]? [ अगि महिला परिर्ािके र्दोसि सर्दस्यसब के पैसा रै्द छै 
] आिा पहिले किशल क्रक सामानयता आिा पैसा .[परिर्ािके सर्दस्यके ] आिाके केिि मिसुस 
िोइय जखिी आिा परिर्ािके र्दोसि सर्दस्यके पैसा रै्द नछ?  
• Were you told to hand over the money by someone or did you decide to do it 
yourself? क्रक आिाके कोइ कििे छल पैसा हर्दयेला क्रक आिा अपिेसे निणाय कैिे 
छशलय? 
• Why do you hand over the money? Why do you not keep it yourself? कैलाथग आिा  
र्दोसि के पैसा रे्दलीयै? कैलाथग िै आिा पैसा अपिे पास (जोड े) िखशलयै ? 
• [If she answers with shyness] Why are you shy about keeping the money yourself? 
[ अगि महिला लजाके जर्ाब रै्द छै ] आिा कैलाथग लजाईनछ पैसा अपिे पास िाखेला? 
Is this what you would like to happen after you receive the transfer?क्रक आिाके पैसा  
शमललाके बार्द एनिैएते िोए से चािै छशलय ? 
• What would happen if you kept the money yourself? कथथ िोतै अगि आिा पैसा 
अपिे पास िैखनतयै ? 
 
Use of cash transfer पैसा ववतरर्के प्रयोग  
How do you feel about the cash transfer? पैसा वर्तिण सम्बन्नध आिा कथथ मिसुस किै 
नछ ? 
• Have you handled such amounts of money previously in your life? क्रक आिा र्ोत े
पैसा अपि न्जर्ािमे पहिले कहियो िखिे छशलय? 
• [If yes] How did you receive the money? [ अगि ि ] आिाके केिाके पैसा शमलल?                                                                                                                                                
• [If yes] What did you do with the money? [ अगि ि ] आिा पैसाके कथथ कैशल?                
• To your family, is the cash transfer a big or a small sum of money? आिाके जे पैसा 
शमलैय से आिाके परिर्ािके लाथग बेसी पैसा छै क्रक कम? 
 
How do purchases with the cash transfer get made? आिाके जे पैसा शमलैय तै से खरिर्दािी 
केिा के िोइछै? 
• Who makes purchases with the money that you receive yourself? [ अगि महिला 
अपिेसे खरिर्दािी िै किै छै ] आिाके जे पैसा शमलैय तै से के खरिर्दािी किै छै? 
• Do you evermake purchases with the money that you receive yourself? क्रक आिा 
र्ोई पैसासे कहियो खिीर्दरि किै नछयै?                                                                                                                        
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• [If does not make purchases herself] Do you hand over all of your money or do you 
hand over only enough to make the purchase? [ अगि महिला अपिेसे खरिर्दािी िै 
किै छै ] क्रक आिा उ सब पैसा र्द रै्द नछयै क्रक र्ोतबे रै्द नछयै जते मे खरिर्दािी िोतै? 
• [If does not make purchases herself] Why did you not make the purchases yourself? 
[ अगि महिला अपिेसे खरिर्दािी िै किै छै ] आिा कैलाथग िै अपिेसे खरिर्दािी किै 
नछयै? 
• [If she says no, because I do not leave the house] Would you like to leave the house? 
[ अगि महिला िै कितई कथथला क्रक िम घि छोएड क बाििा िै जाइनछ ] 
• [If she says no, because I am shy] Would you want to leave the house if your family 
supported you in this? [ अगि महिला कितई िै, कथथला क्रक िमिा लाज लगैय]   
• [If she says no, because of my reputation] Would you want to leave the house if 
your community supported you in this? [ अगि महिला कितई ि,ै प्रनतष्िाके कािण 
] 
• [If she makes purchases herself] Do you like making purchases yourself or do you 
prefer other people making purchases for you? [ अगि महिला अप्िेसे खरिर्दािी किै 
छै त ] क्रक आिाके अपिे खरिर्दािी किेमे निमि लगैय क्रक कोइ र्दोसि गोटा क रै्द छै 
से निमि लगैय ? 
 
[If does not hand over] How do you feel about keeping the money yourself? [ अगि पैसा िै 
रै्द छै ] आिाके केिि मिसुस िोइय पैसा अपिे पास िख ैनछयै त?   
• Did you need to seek permission to keep the money yourself or could you make the 
decision on your own?  पैसा अपिे पास िाखेला क्रक आिाके केकिो अिुमनत के खोन्ज 
किे पिैय क्रक आिा अपिेसे निणाय ल सकै नछयै? 
• How does your family feel about you keeping the money yourself? आिाके परिर्ािके 
केिि मिसुस िोइय जखिी आिा पैसा अपिे पास िख ैनछयै ?  
 
What are you told by the FCHV/nutrition mobiliser to spend the money on?आिाके 
स्र्यम्सेवर्का आ पोसि परिचालक कथथमे पैसा खचा किेला कििे छल? 
As a mother you know best what you need. What does the money actually get spent on? 
एगो मायके रुपमे आिा जिै नछ क्रक आिाके कथथ जरुरि छै. र्ास्तर्मे पैसा कथथमे खचा िोइ 
छै? 
आिाके जे पैसा शमलैय से कथथ मे खचा िोइय? 
• Did the money get spent on food? [What kind of food, if yes] क्रक पैसा खािामे खचा 
िोइ छै? [ अगि ि, कोि क्रकशसमके खािा ] 
• Did the money get spent on medicines? क्रक पैसा र्दबाईमे खचा िोइछै ? 
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• Did the money get spent on cigarettes, alcohol or betel-leaf? क्रक पैसा चिुोट, िक्सी 
आ पाि खायेमे खचा िोइछै? 
Did the money get spent on soap or other household products? क्रक पैसा साबुि या  
घिकेलाथग कोिो र्दोसि सामािमे खचा िोइछै? 
• Did the money get spent on accessories such as bangles or rings? क्रक पैसा समाि 
जेिाकी चडुी आ औिीमे खचा िोइछै? 
• Did the money get spent on the family business? [What kind of family business, if 
yes] क्रक पैसा पारिर्ारिक व्यापािमे खचा िोइ छै? [ अगि ि, केिि क्रकशसमके व्यापाि 
] 
• Did the money get saved? [How much, if yes] क्रक पैसा बचत िोइ छै? [ अगि ि, 
कते पैसा ] 
• Did the money get used to pay off loans? [How much, if yes] क्रक पैसा ऋण नतिेम े
प्रयोग िोइ छै? [ अगि ि, कते ] 
• Did the money get spent on anything else? [What, if yes] क्रक पैसा आिो कोिो र्दोसि 
थचजमे खचा िोइछई? [ अगि ि, कथथ मे ] 
If the money was twice as much, what would it get spent on? अगि पैसा जते रे्दल जाइ छै 
र्ोएसे र्दोब्बि िैितै, त पसैा कथथमे खचा िोइतै? 
If the money was only half as much, what would it get spent on? अगि पैसा आधा मात्रै 
िैितै, त कथथमे खचा िोइतै? 
 
4) Empowerment शसक्क्तकरर् 
In this final section, we would like to know more about your role and status in the family. This 
is important information for us, because we can design much better programmes for your 
community, if we understand the relationships that different family members have with each 
other. 
अई अन्नतम खण्डमे, िम सब आिाके घिम ेआिाके भूशमका आ न्स्थनत बािे जािे चािैनछ. इ 
िमिा सबके लाथग मित्र्पुणा जािकािी छै कथथला क्रक जखिी िमसब बुझ ेसकर्ई/ बुझर्इ क्रक 
आिाके घिमे वर्शभनि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब बीच केिि  सम्बनध छै िम सब आिाके समुर्दायके 
लाथग आिो बहढया कायाक्रम निमाणा क सकै नछयै. 
 
General empowerment सामान्य सामान्य सामान 
 
First I am going to ask you to tell me about yourself a little. Would you describe yourself as an 
active, capable, aware, educated woman who is a leader in the community? Or would you 
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describe yourself as less aware, less educated, less engaged in social, political work and less 
able to speak up for your rights? 
 सर्ाप्रथम िम आिासे पुछे चािैनछ क्रक आिा अपिा बािेमे िमिा कुछो किु .  क्रक आिा अपि े
आपके सक्रक्रय, योग्य, सचते, शिक्षक्षत महिला जे समुर्दायके अगुर्ा छै कैिके व्याख्या क 
सकैनछयै? क्रक आिा अपिे आपके कम सचते, कम शिक्षक्षत, सामान्जक, िाजिीनतक कायामे कम 
संलग्ि आ अपि अथधकािके लाथग बोल कम योग्य, कैि के व्याख्या किर्ई? 
 
Social support सामाक्जक समिन   
 
Now I am going to ask you about what you usually do during those times when there are 
problems. आब िम आिासे पुछे जाइनछ क्रक आिा कथथ किै नछ जखिी आिाके कोिो समस्या 
पिैय. 
During times when you have many private worries and fears what do you usually do? 
• Do you seek help from anyone? क्रक आिा केकिोसे मर्दत लै नछयै? 
• [If yes] Who do you approach? केकिा किै नछ मर्दत किेला? 
• [If yes] How does that person help you? [ अगि ि ] उ आर्दमी आिाके केिाके मर्दत किै 
छै? 
• [If yes and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a time 
when you sought help? [ अगि ि आ महिला अनतर्ाातााकािके साथ अकेले छै त ] क्रक आिा 
िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै? 
• [If no] Why not? [अगि पतुिु केकिोसे मर्दत िै लै छै त ] कथथलाथग िै? 
 
 
During times when you have trouble with family disputes what do you usually do? आिा कथथ 
किै नछ जखिी कोिो पारिर्ारिक झगडासे आिाके समस्या िोइय? 
Do you seek help from anyone? ?क्रक आिा केकिोसे मर्दत लै नछयै? 
• [If yes] Who do you approach? केकिा किै नछ मर्दत किेला? 
• [If yes] How does that person help you? [ अगि ि ] उ आर्दमी आिाके केिाके मर्दत किै 
छै? 
• [If yes and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a time 
when you sought help? [ अगि ि आ महिला अनतर्ाातााकािके साथ अकेले छै त ] क्रक आिा 
िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै? 
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि पुतिु केकिोसे मर्दत िै लै छै त ] कथथलाथग िै? 
 
Leadership नतेतृ्व  
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Are you able to convince others in your household to do things differently? [All matters in the 
household. For example, household chores, jobs, financial matters, child care, cooking, health 
care] क्रक आिा अपि घि परिर्ािके लोक सबके कुछ अलग किेके लाथग मिा सकै नछयै? [ 
जेिाकी घिेके काम, िोकिी, पैसा सम्बन्नध बात, बच्चाके िेख रे्दख, खािा पकार्ेमे, स्र्स्थ 
सुधािे मे]s 
What kind of things are you able to convince others to do differently? केिि क्रकशसमके कामके 
लाथग आिा र्दोसि लोकके मिार्ेमे योग्य नछयै? 
What kind of things are you not able to convince others to do differently? केिि क्रकशसमके 
कामके लाथग आिा घिके र्दोसि लोकके मिार्ेमे योग्य िै नछयै?  
o Have you ever expressed your feelings when you didn’t agree with something in your 
household?क्रक आिा कहियो अपि भार्िा व्यक्त कैिे नछयै जखनि आिा घिके कोिो 
निणायसे असिमत छशलय? 
o If you wanted to convince others in your household to do things differently how would 
you go about it?अगि आिा घिके र्दोसि लोकसबके कुछ अलग किे के लाथग वर्श्र्स्त 
किे चािनतयै त आिा केिा के कैिनतयै ? 
o Can you give me an example of a time where you convinced others in your household 
to do things differently?क्रक आिा िमिा एगो कोिो समयके उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै 
जखनि आिा कुछ अलग किे के लेल अपि घिके सर्दस्यकेवर्श्र्स्त किैिे छशलय ? 
o Do household members come to you for advice about how to move forward? If yes, 
please give an example.क्रक घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब केिाके अगाडी बढबै तै वर्षयम े
आिासे सल्लाि शलए अर्ैछै ? 
 
Power, authority and status छनर्नय करेके िमता, शक्क्त, आ क्स्िछत 
 
Now I am going to ask you about authority, power and status in your family. आब िम आिास े
पुछे जाििल नछ आिाके परिर्ािमे आिाके निणाय किेके िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत कथथ छै. 
 
In your family, who has the most authority, power and status? आिाके परिर्ािमे केकिा सबसे 
बेसी निणाय किे के िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत छै? 
Can you give me an example of how that person has the most authority, power and status? 
क्रक आिा िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछ क्रक उ महिला/ पुरुस के केिा के सबसे बेसी निणाय 
किेके िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत छै? 
 
In your family, who has the least authority, power and status [among adults]? आिाके 
परिर्ािमे केकिा [ बडक लोक सबमे ] सबसे कम निणाय किेके िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत छै? 
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Can you give me an example of how that person has the least authority, power and status? 
क्रक आिा िमिाएगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै क्रक केिा के उिका सबसे कम निणाय किेके िन्क्त 
आन्स्थनत छै? 
 
Freedom and legitimacy स्वतन्रता आ वैधता 
 
Now I would like to ask you about your level of satisfaction with the way things are done in 
your family. आब िम आिासे पुछ चािब क्रक जई तरिकासे आिाके घिमे सब थचज िोइ छै 
र्ोईमे आिा कते के सनतुस्ट ििैनछयै ? 
  
Changes in empowerment शसक्क्तकरर्मे बदलाव 
 
Finally, we would like you to reflect on your life before and after you received the cash 
transfers. In your household, what, if anything, has changed after you started receiving the 
cash transfers? 
अन्नतम्मे िम सब चािब क्रक आिा अपि ेआपके पैसा वर्तििसे पहिले आ बार्दमे रे्दखु. आिाके 
घिमे क्रक कोिो एिि थचज िै जे आिाके पैसा शमलला के बार्द बरै्दल गेलैय ? 
o Has the amount of support you receive from your family changed since you started 
receiving the cash transfer?आिाके परिर्ािसे जे समथाि शमलै छलैय तै मे कोिो बर्दलार् 
भेलैय जहियासे आिाके पैसा शमले लागल? 
o [If yes] Please give an example of how it has changed. [ अगि ि ] कृपया िमिा 
एगो उर्दाििण र्द ुक्रक केिा के बरै्दल गेलैय ? 
o [If yes] Why do you think it has changed? [ अगि ि ]  आिाके वर्चािम ेकै 
लागी बरै्दल गेलैय ? 
o [If no] Why do you think it has not changed? [ अगि िै ] आिाके वर्चािम ेकै 
लाथग िै बर्दल लैय ? 
o Has your ability to follow your own heart changed since you started receiving the cash 
transfer?[For example, better able to choose what to do with your time, better able 
to make decisions]पैसा शमल ला के बार्द क्रक आिाकेअपिमिके पालि 
किेकेछमताबरै्दलगेलैय ? [ उर्दाििणके लाथग, आिाके अपि समयमे आिाके जे मि 
िोइय से किे सकै नछयै, अपि निणाय अपिे ल सकै नछयै ] 
o [If yes] Please give an example of how it has changed. [ अगि ि ] कृपया क 
के किु क्रक केिा के बरै्दल गेलैय ? 
o [If yes] Why do you think it has changed? [ अगि ि ] आिाके वर्चािमे कै लाथग 
बरै्दल गेलैय? 
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o [If no] Why do you think it has not changed? [ अगि िै ] आिाके वर्चािम े
कैलाथग िै बर्दललैय ? 
o Has your authority, power and status changed since you started receiving the cash 
transfer? क्रक आिाके निणाय किेके छमता, िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत बार्दलल छै जहियासे 
आिाके पैसा शमले लागल ? 
o [If yes] Please give an example of how it has changed. [ अगि ि ] कृपया एगो 
उर्दाििण र्द ुक्रक केिाके बरै्दल गेल छै ? 
o [If yes] Why do you think it has changed? [ अगि ि ] आिाके वर्चािमे कथथ 
लाथग बरै्दल गेल छै? 
o [If no] Why do you think it has not changed? [ अगि िै ] आिाके वर्चािम े
कथथलागी िै बर्दलल छै?  
 
Thank the woman for her participation and patience and give her a choice of bangles as a 
reward for participating. 
 
H.1.2 Topic guide for daughters-in-law, Phase 2 
माय समुिमे सिभागी िोयर्ाला महिलासबके लाथग वर्षय पुन्स्तका.                                                           
Basic information आधार 
What is your age? आिाके उमि कते छै? 
What is your religion? आिाके धमा कोि छै? 
What is your caste? आिाके जानत कोि छै? 
Madheshi/Bahadi?मधेसी/ पिाडी ? 
What is your educational level? आिाके िैक्षक्षक स्ति कते छै? 
[Make an assessment of socio-economic status] 
Are you staying in your maiti or your sasural?क्रक आिा अप्पि माइनतमे ििैनछ क्रक ससुिालमे ? 
How many months pregnant are you? कते महििाके गभार्ती नछ आिा? 
[If she has delivered already] How old is the child? 
How long ago did you get married? 
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Please tell me who lives in your household. कृपया क के िाम्रा किु क्रक आिाके घिमे के सब 
ििै छै? 
[Sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law]( बेटासब, 
बेटीसब , जमायसब, पुतिुसब, साउससब , ससुिसब ) 
 
Do you have any members of your family that are currently living abroad? क्रक आिाके 
परिर्ािके कोिो सर्दस्य वर्रे्दि ििै छै र्तामािमे ? 
[If yes] Please tell me who lives abroad. अगि िँ, त, कृपया िाम्रा बताउ क्रक के ििैछै वर्रे्दि?  
 
Income आय 
First I am going to ask you questions regarding the income that comes to your family. Can you 
tell me about all the people who earn an income in your family? 
सर्ाप्रथम िम आिाके पुछ जा ििलनछ क्रक आिाके घिमे आय किाँसे अर्ई छै? क्रक आिा कईि 
सकैनछ आिाके घिके उ सर्दस्यसब के बािेमे जे पैसा कमाइ छै? 
• Who earns an income in your family?आिाके परिर्ािमे के पैसा कमाइछै? 
• [For each earner, talk through with the mother the details of the income earned: How 
the income is earned, how often it comes to the family, if it is main income or 
supplement and the amount of income earned] 
• [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Does anyone send remittances from 
abroad?कोइ गोटा वर्रे्दिसे िेशमट्यानस भेजै छै? 
• [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Who receives the remittances that 
are sent?िेशमट्यानस जे भेजै छै से के लईछै? 
• Do you have a family business? [If yes, what is it and who works on it doing what] क्रक 
आिाके पारिर्ारिक व्यापाि छै? [ अगि ि, कथथ छै आ के किै छै कथथकेव्यापाि कितै 
से ?  
• Who receives the income that is earned?जे पैसा आय आजाि िोइछै से के लई छै ? 
• [If multiple earners] Do the different earners make each their own decisions regarding 
the use of the money they earn or do they pool the money together and make a joint 
decision? [अगि बिुते गोटा कमायर्ाला छै तब ]  उ सब अपि कमायल पैसाके केिाके 
उपयोग किर्ै, तै सम्बन्नध अपिे निणाय किै छै क्रक एके जगि पैसा िाइख क संयुक्त 
निणाय किै छै? 
• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she have a way of 
getting money? [ घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्य सब जे पैसा िै कमाय छै ] क्रक उिका पैसा 
पार्ेके कोिो उपाय छै? 
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• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she receive allowances 
from [income earners]? [ घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्य सब जे अप्िेसे पैसा ि ैकमाय छै ] 
क्रक कमायर्ाला लोक उिका सबके खचाा रै्द छै ?  
• [If yes] What are the allowances for? अगि िँ, त कथथलाथग खचाा रै्द छै? 
 
LIVED EXPERIENCE OF POVERTY/WEALTH AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE/INDEPENDENCE 
Now please tell me about your family’s economic situation. How would you describe your 
household? (Probe: Wealthy, poor, secure, insecure, well-off, struggling for survival; also 
probe why) 
• How do you feel about your own economic situation? (Probe: Secure, insecure, well-
off, struggling for survival, worries, fears, joys; also probe why) 
• [If the woman is pregnant] Has your pregnancy affected your economic situation in 
any way? [If yes, how] 
• [If the woman has children] What role do the children play for your economic 
situation? [Ask for expenses] 
• [If the economic situation is bad] How do you manage to make ends meet? 
Do you depend on your family members economically or could you make a living without 
them? 
[If dependent]: 
• Please describe how you are economically dependent. 
• How do you feel about being economically dependent? 
• Do you think your ability to make decisions at home would be different if you were 
economically independent? [If yes, how; if no, why not] 
• Do you think your ability to make decisions about money at home would be different 
if you were economically independent? [If yes, how; if no, give an example of what 
would stay the same] 
• Has your ability to sustain yourself economically changed in your life? [If yes, how, 
what impact did it have] 
• What would change in your life if you were economically independent? 
 [If independent]: 
• Can you please elaborate on that [how you could make a living on your own]? 
• Do you think your ability to make decisions at home would be different if you were 
economically dependent? [If yes, how; if no, why not] 
• Do you think your ability to make decisions about money at home would be different 
if you were economically dependent? [If yes, how; if no, give an example of what 
would stay the same] 
Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
 
550 | P a g e  
 
• What would change in your life if you were economically dependent? 
• Has your ability to sustain yourself economically changed in your life? [If yes, how, 
what impact did it have] 
ACCEPTABILITY OF SAVINGS AND LOANS AND KOSELIYA/SHARING 
Now I would like to ask you about savings in the household. Savings can be kept either in cash 
or as assets. Does anybody in your household keep their own savings? आब िम आिासे आिाके 
घि के बचतके बािेमे पुछ चािैनछ. बचत क्रक पैसाके रुपमे िाखल जाइछै या सामािके रुपमे.क्रक 
आिाके घिमे कोइ गोटा अपिेसे बचत किै छथथि? 
[If yes, for each household member that keeps own savings, talk through how they keep their 
savings, how much it is and when they last spent it]  
 
Do you keep your own savings (bachat)? 
• [If yes] How much? 
• [If yes] How do you keep your own savings? 
• [If yes] How does your family feel about you having your own savings? 
• [If yes] Has anyone ever said anything about you having your own savings? 
• [If no] Why not? 
Do you consider it a good thing or a bad thing if daughters-in-law have their own savings? 
[Why, why not] 
• What would you think if you heard of another daughter-in-law who had a lot of 
savings?  
• What if the daughter-in-law had more than her husband or her mother-in-law?  
• Is it a good thing or a bad thing if a daughter-in-law has no savings of her own? 
Are there situations where you would need to share your savings with other family members? 
[Clarify we are talking about giving out money for free, not giving out loans. If yes, which 
situations are these; if no, why not] 
• Have you ever had to share large amounts of your own savings with other family 
members in the past? 
o [If yes] Please describe the situation [including how much was involved]. 
o [If yes] How did you feel about it when it happened? (Probe: Sad, happy, 
concerned, annoyed, tension, no tension etc.) 
o [If yes] Did you want to share with the rest of the family? [Why, why not] 
o [If yes] Did you feel it was fair to share with the rest of the family? [Why, why 
not] 
o [If no] Why not? 
o [If no] Have you ever shared small amounts of your own savings? [If yes, when, 
how did you feel, did you feel it was fair] 
Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
 
551 | P a g e  
 
• Have you ever given out loans to other family members? 
o [If yes] Please describe the situation [including how much was involved]. 
o [If yes] Did you take interest on the loan given out? [If yes, how much] 
o [If yes] Did you feel it was a fair decision to lend to the rest of the family? [Why, 
why not] 
o [If no] Why not? 
• Have you ever been required to contribute to a large purchase for another family 
member using your own savings?  
o [If yes] What was the situation [including how much did it cost]? 
o [If yes] How did you feel about contributing? (Probe: Happy, sad, indifferent, 
frustrated, generous, worried, etc.] 
o [If yes] Was it fair? [If yes, is giving less unfair then; if no, why not] 
o [If no] Why not? 
• Have you ever refused to contribute money to another family member in any way 
(either through cash, loans or purchases)? [If yes, what was the situation; if no, why 
not] 
Do other family members share their savings with you? [Clarify we are talking about giving 
money for free, not giving out loans.]  
[If yes]: 
• Which family members have shared their savings with you? 
• In which situations have they shared their savings with you? 
• Do you feel they ought to share their savings with you? [Why, why not] 
• How much do they share with you? 
• In your situation, do you consider that a fair amount to share with you? [If yes, would 
sharing more be unfair then; if no, why is it unfair] 
[If no]: 
• Why do you think they do not share their savings with you? 
• Are there situations where they would be required to share their savings with you? [If 
yes, what situations] 
• How do you feel about them not sharing their savings with you? [Probe: Indifferent, 
hurt, content, concerned, etc.] 
• Do you feel it is fair they do not share their savings with you? [Probe: Ought they share 
their savings?] 
Are you able to ask for money from your other family members if you need to?  
• [If yes] Who would you ask? 
• [If yes] What have you asked them for in the past? 
• [If yes] How much was it? 
Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
 
552 | P a g e  
 
• [If no] Why not? 
• Have your other family members contributed to a purchase that was for you? [If yes, 
what, when, how much did it cost; if no, why not] 
• Have other family members ever refused to contribute money to something you asked 
for (either through cash, loans or purchases)? [If yes, what was the situation; if no, 
why not] 
Do you have any recurring expenses you need to pay to other family members? [If yes, what] 
Do your other family members have any recurring expenses they need to pay you? [If yes, 
what] 
Do you know what koseliya means? [If yes, please describe] 
Do you keep your own koseliya? 
• [If yes] How much? 
• [If yes] How do you keep your own koseliya? 
• [If yes] Have you told all your other family members about your koseliya? 
o [If no] Who have you told? 
o [If no] Why have you not told all of them? 
o [If no] What would happen if they discovered your koseliya? Do you worry 
about that? 
• [If yes] Why do you feel it is necessary to keep koseliya? 
• [If no] Why not? 
• [If no] Do you keep any money hidden from other family members? 
Do you keep balance accounts of how much you have spent on other family members and 
how much they have spent on you? [If yes, how; if no, do you not worry about unfairness] 
Do you feel you get a fair share of money and items in this family? [Why, why not] (Probe: 
Money, items, property, land) 
CASH TRANSFER 
Now I would like to ask you questions regarding the cash transfer from MIRA. 
In your household, who makes decisions regarding the cash transfer you receive? 
Where is the cash transfer kept? 
What does the cash transfer get spent on? 
• [If food, for each item; if more than three items, only ask about “top three”] 
o Where did you purchase the item from? 
o How much did you buy? 
o How much did it cost? 
o How often did you purchase it? 
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o Did you share any of it with other family members? [If yes, how do you decide 
how much to share, when] 
• [If other item or savings, loans, investments – how much was it] 
Have you purchased any food from your other savings?  
[If yes] How does it compare to the food bought from your cash transfer? 
[If yes] Please talk me through what you have purchased. 
• [For each item; if more than three items, only ask about “top three”] 
o Where did you purchase the item from? 
o How much did you buy? 
o How much did it cost? 
o How often did you purchase it? 
o Did you share any of it with other family members? [If yes, how do you decide 
how much to share, when] 
Have you eaten any other food other than the food that was purchased from your own 
money? [If yes] Please talk me through what you have eaten and how much it cost. [If no] 
Why not? 
Have you previously been pregnant? 
• [If yes] How does the food eaten in this pregnancy compare to your previous 
pregnancies? (Probe: How has it been different?) 
o [If yes] Do you feel the differences are significant to you? [Why, why not] 
o [If no] Can you give an example of what has remained the same? 
o [If no] Why not? 
Do you feel the cash has made a difference to what you can eat?  
• [If yes] What differences has it made? (Probe: Anything else?) 
• [If yes] Why do you think [mention differences above] have happened? 
• [If yes] Do you feel the differences are significant? [Why, why not] 
• [If no] Why not? 
Are you free to spend the cash transfer on whatever you like? 
• Can you refuse if your other family members ask you for money from your cash 
transfer? 
• Are you free to spend the cash transfer differently from what they talk about in the 
women’s groups? 
o [If yes] Have you wanted to spend it on anything different? [If yes, what] 
o [If yes] Have you spent it on anything different? [If yes, what] 
o [If no] What would happen if you spend the cash transfer differently from what 
they talk about in the women’s groups? 
How many cash transfers did you receive? 
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[If she is no longer receiving transfers] How did you feel after the cash transfers ended? 
(Probe: Sad, happy, etc.) 
• Are you planning to get pregnant again in the future? 
• [If yes] How do you feel about your next pregnancy right now? 
FAMILY SEPARATION AND DEGREES OF SEPARATION  
I would now like to ask you some questions about your family circumstances. 
Do you currently live together with your mother-in-law? 
If she lives on her own and is separated from her mother-in-law 
Please can you tell me the story of how you became separated from your mother-in-law. 
(Probe, this should be conversational: What was the context? When did it happen? How did 
it start? Why did it happen? What happened when the separation took place? How did you 
split up the property when the separation happened? How did she feel during the separation? 
How does she feel now about it after it has finished? How did the separation turn out in the 
end?) 
How has the separation affected your relationship to the family members who no longer live 
with you? 
• How has it changed how you behave towards each other? 
o Do you still have the same responsibilities towards each other? 
o Has it changed how they treat you? 
o Has it changed the allocation of household chores in your family? 
• How has the separation changed how you feel about them? 
• How has the separation changed what decisions you can make in the family? [If no 
change, what has remained the same] 
• Do you still have a guardian? [If yes, who, what do they do that makes them a 
guardian] 
How has the separation affected your relationship to your husband? 
• How has it changed how you behave towards each other? 
o Do you still have the same responsibilities towards each other? 
o Has it changed how they treat you? 
o Has it changed the allocation of household chores in your family? 
• Has it changed how you feel about each other? 
• Has it changed how your husband treats you? 
How has the separation affected how your share money in the family? 
• Has it changed how you make decisions about money in the family? [If yes, what; if 
no, what has remained the same] 
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• [If the husband is alive and earns money] Has it changed who receives the income that 
is earned by your husband? [If yes, how] 
• [If there are brothers-in-law who earn money] Has it changed who receives the income 
that is earned by your brothers-in-law? [If yes, how] 
• Has it changed who makes purchases in the family? [If yes, how; if no, how are 
purchases made] 
• Has it changed which purchases get made? [If yes, how] 
If she lives together with her mother-in-law 
Please can you tell me a bit about your own life since you got married? (Probe: When did you 
get married? How did you get married? Who decided who you should marry? How did you 
feel when you got married? What was life like after you had just married? What were the 
biggest worries or fears after you married? What were the biggest joys? How did your life 
change in the years passing after you were married? What are your current biggest worries 
or fears? What are your biggest joys?) 
Can you tell me about your relationship to your mother-in-law? (Probe: What do you enjoy 
about living with your mother-in-law? What do you find difficult about living with her? Are 
there any expectations from your mother-in-law with regards to you? Do you expect anything 
from her? How do you feel about your relationship to your mother-in-law? Has this 
relationship changed in the years since you got married?) 
[Only ask this question if alone with the respondent and nobody else is around] Do you expect 
to continue living with your mother-in-law for the future? 
• [If yes] Do you worry about separating from your mother-in-law in the future? [Why, 
why not] 
• [If yes] Do you want to separate from your mother-in-law in the future? [Why, why 
not] 
• [If no] When do you expect to stop living with your mother-in-law? (Probe: Please 
describe) 
• [If no] How do you feel about separating from your mother-in-law in the future? 
(Probe: Happy, calm, anxious, stressed, relieved, worried, etc.) 
• Would you be able to keep all your savings and other belongings if you separated from 
your mother-in-law? [Why, why not] 
COMMUNITY SUPPORT 
Changing the subject a little, I will now ask you about what you usually do during those times 
when there are problems in your personal life. आब िम आिासे पुछे जाइनछ क्रक आिा कथथ 
किै नछ जखिी आिाके कोिो समस्या पिैय. 
During times when you have many private worries and fears what do you usually do? 
• Do you seek help from anyone? क्रक आिा केकिोसे मर्दत लै नछयै? 
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• [If yes] Who do you approach? केकिा किै नछ मर्दत किेला? 
• [If yes] How does that person help you? [ अगि ि ] उ आर्दमी आिाके केिाके मर्दत किै 
छै? 
• [If yes and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a time 
when you sought help? [ अगि ि आ महिला अनतर्ाातााकािके साथ अकेले छै त ] क्रक आिा 
िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै? 
• [If no] Why not? [अगि पतुिु केकिोसे मर्दत िै लै छै त ] कथथलाथग िै? 
 
 
During times when you have trouble with family disputes what do you usually do? आिा कथथ 
किै नछ जखिी कोिो पारिर्ारिक झगडासे आिाके समस्या िोइय? 
Do you seek help from anyone? क्रक आिा केकिोसे मर्दत लै नछयै? 
• [If yes] Who do you approach? केकिा किै नछ मर्दत किेला? 
• [If yes] How does that person help you? [ अगि ि ] उ आर्दमी आिाके केिाके मर्दत किै 
छै? 
• [If yes and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a time 
when you sought help? [ अगि ि आ महिला अनतर्ाातााकािके साथ अकेले छै त ] क्रक आिा 
िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै? 
• [If no and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a 
time when you had a dispute? 
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि पुतिु केकिोसे मर्दत िै लै छै त ] कथथलाथग िै? 
 
Apart from your husband or your mother-in-law, is there anybody you can approach when 
you have worries or fears? 
• Do you have any friends outside of your house that you visit? 
o [If yes] Please describe the friends that you visit? (Probe: Where do you know 
them from? What are they like as people? What do you like about seeing 
them?) 
o [If yes] Would they support you if you had worries and fears? [If yes, how] 
o [If yes] Would they be able to help you with family disputes? [If yes, how] 
• Do you have any friends outside of your house that visit you [apart from the ones 
mentioned already in the previous question]? 
o [If yes] Please describe those friends (Probe: Where do you know them from? 
What are they like as people? What do you like about seeing them?) 
o  [If yes] Would they support you if you had worries and fears? [If yes, how] 
o [If yes] Would they be able to help you with family disputes? [If yes, how] 
• [If no friends outside of house] 
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o How do you feel about not having friends outside of your house? (Probe: 
Indifferent, content, lonely, sad, insecure, secure) 
o Would you want to have friends outside of your house? [Why, why not] 
o What are the challenges you face in making friends outside of the house? 
o Why do you not have any friends outside of the house? (Probe: Is she not 
allowed? How does she feel about not being allowed to make friends outside 
the house?) 
HONOR 
Finally, I would like to know more about honor/ijjat in your community. Please can you explain 
to me what role honor plays in your life? (Probe: Why is it important for you personally? How 
does honor affect your life personally? Is your honor related to your other family members’ 
honor? Do you active try to achieve honor in your life? Do you worry about losing honor in 
your life?) 
As you know, in our community, a woman’s behavior often reflects her honor. Can you explain 
this in more detail for us? (Probe: What are some traits of women who behave with honor? 
What are some traits of dishonorable women? Are there actions that are more honorable 
than other actions? Are there actions that are more dishonorable than other actions? How 
does the community react to dishonorable women? How does it react to honorable ones?) 
Think of a woman that you know very well. This could be someone in your family or someone 
from your community. You do not need to tell us who it is (but you may if you wish). How 
would you assess whether or not she is an honorable woman? Does she do anything that is 
particularly honorable or dishonorable? Please describe all aspects of her that reflects on her 
honor. 
In the following situations, please tell us if there is a potential for someone’s honor to be 
damaged or enhanced: 
• A woman going outside her house 
• A woman earning her own money 
• A woman making purchases outside her house 
• A woman keeping her own savings 
THANK THE WOMAN FOR HER TIME AND END THE INTERVIEW 
H.1.3 Topic guide for daughters-in-law, Phase 3 
मायसमुिमे सिभागी िोयर्ाला महिला सबके लाथग वर्षय पुन्स्तका. 
Topic guide with women receiving cash 
 
Ask about her family situation: is she in her maithi or sasural? Was her husband and other 
family members in the home, have they been in the home during her pregnancy (are they 
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migrant labourers), who does she share the house with, which daughter in law is she - the 
youngest daughter in law, is it her first pregnancy, has she had antenatal checkups. 
 
First of all we would like to ask you about your pregnancy 
How does your family feel about you being pregnant? 
To what extent are you treated differently because you are pregnant? 
How does your family take care of you while you are pregnant? 
How do you feel about being pregnant? 
 (What differences do you notice between this pregnancy and previous pregnancies? Why?) 
How much do you move around outside the house normally (for shopping/taking children to 
school/visiting neighbours/looking after animals etc)?  
How has this changed since you have been pregnant? 
 
Now we would like to ask you about MIRA meetings 
How did you find out about MIRA group meetings? 
How often do you go to MIRA group meetings? 
What affects your ability to go to meetings? What helps (enables) you to go to meetings?  
What role did the cash transfer play in enabling you to go to groups? 
What makes it more difficult for you to go to meetings? 
Describe the times when you have not been able to go to meetings. Why were you not able 
to go? 
 
What do you like most about the meetings? 
What do you least like about the meetings? 
What is the main purpose of the meetings? 
How has going to the meeting affected you? (How has going to the meeting made you feel or 
behave?) 
Who usually goes with you to the meetings? To what extent do they participate in the 
meeting? 
How do you think going to the meeting has affected them (the accompanying person)? (How 
has going to the meeting made them feel or behave?) 
 
Recently, what have you been discussing in the meetings? 
(probe for strategy formation – home visit, group members do agriculture meeting, learning 
from other group members re kitchen garden, meeting with men, rally, mother in law 
meeting, daughter in law meeting) 
How have you participated in the planning and implementation of the strategies? 
Which activity of the women’s group have you enjoyed the most? 
 
Now we would like to talk to you about the cash transfer that you receive. 
How do you usually receive the cash? 
How do you prefer to receive the cash? Why? 
Tell us about a time when you have received cash at home. (Why did you receive it at home? 
What happened? Who came to give you the cash? What did they say? Whom did they talk 
to?) 
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When you receive cash at the women’s group meetings, what happens? (do you keep the 
cash, or give to someone else – why do you give to someone else? ) 
If you keep the transfer, why do you not give it to someone else? 
 
What are the advantages (good things) about receiving the cash at the women’s group 
meetings? 
What are the disadvantages (bad things) about receiving cash at the women’s group 
meetings? 
How do you think receiving cash at the meetings affects your ability to spend the cash on 
what you want to? 
How do you think receiving cash at the meetings affects your ability to keep the cash and do 
what you want with it? 
 
Now we would like to ask you about the spending of the cash 
What advice have you received about how the cash should be spent? 
How useful was that advice?  
How much were you able to follow this advice? 
What made it difficult to follow the advice? 
We have heard that it is difficult to make the transfer last over the whole month. Can you tell 
us how you have managed? 
Throughout your pregnancy, how has your spending of the cash changed? Why? 
 
How easy is it to keep the money yourself and spend it? 
To what extent do you have to consult with other family members about spending the cash? 
 
We have heard that daughters in law like you cannot always move outside the home. How do 
you manage to spend the cash transfer?  
(If she asks others to spend it, how easy is it to ask for change back from the money? How 
often do you ask others to buy things, or do they know to buy you things regularly?)  
How easy is it for you to ask others to buy things for you? What makes it easy? What makes 
it more difficult? 
(To what extent do they buy you what you ask for?) 
How do other family members decide what to buy for you if you don’t tell them regularly? 
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How easy is it for you to keep track of how the money is spent? How easy is it for you to know 




Sometimes you might want to spend the cash on something other than food, to what extent 
can you spend it on what you want to? 
 
In what circumstances do you lend or give some of your cash to other family members? 
(why don’t they ask you for a loan/money?) 
It must be difficult to keep the food that you buy with the transfer only for yourself. How do 
you manage? To what extent do you share the food you buy? 
 
Generally, how easy is it to follow the advice of MIRA? To what extent are you able to follow 
the advice? What makes it easier to follow advice? What makes it difficult to follow advice? 
 
How do MIRA check that you have spent the cash according to their advice? 
How would you or your family be affected if you didn’t spend the cash on food? 
We have observed that the NM or FCHV asks you how you spent the cash at every meeting. 
How do you feel about this?  
How do you think that other people (ie not MIRA staff) would react if it was known you hadn’t 
spent the money on what was recommended? 
How would the honour/reputation of the family be affected? 
 
We want to explore your opinions about how the cash might improve the health of your 
baby. 
 
We have heard that giving cash to pregnant women will improve the health of their baby 
because there is community (outside) pressure to spend the cash transfer on fruit and milk, 
and then people feel ashamed if they spend it on anything else. 
To what extent do you think this is true? 
How is this community pressure created? 
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Some people think that giving a pregnant woman cash, helps to remind the family that 
pregnant women need good nutrition for the health of their baby. 
To what extent do you think this is true? Why? 
(Compared to other pregnancies, how aware is your family about good nutrition in 
pregnancy? Why) 
 
Some people think that giving a pregnant woman cash helps to remind her family that 
pregnancy is an important time to take care of a woman? 
To what extent do you think this is true for you? Why? 
(compared to other pregnancies, how aware is your family about the need to take care of you 
especially?) 
- probe about antenatal care and rest 
 
Some people think that the women’s group is effective in reducing the number of low birth 
weight babies, by increasing the knowledge of family members of pregnant women? 
To what extent do you think this is true? 
Why? 
What does your family know about what you should eat, and how you should eat during 
pregnancy? 
Who has the most knowledge in your family about good nutrition in pregnancy? Why/how? 
How does your family ensure that you have good nutrition in your pregnancy? 
How easy is it for you to maintain good nutrition during pregnancy? What affects the quantity 
and type of food that you eat? 
 
Finally we would like to explore how the cash transfer and going to the women’s group has 
affected you more broadly. 
 
Since you started going to the women’s groups and receiving cash, what changes have you 
noticed in how your family members were treating you? What were the good changes? What 
were the bad changes? 
 
What changes have you noticed in your ability to make decisions about money in the family? 
How did the cash transfer play a role in this, if at all? 
 
What changes have you noticed in your ability to advance your own goals and move ahead in 
life more generally? 
 
H.2 Topic guides for mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law 
H.2.1 Topic guide for mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law, Phase 1 
Basic information आधार 
What is your age? आिाके उमर कते छै? 
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What is your religion? आिाके धमड कोन छै? 
What is your caste? आिाके िाजत कोन छै? 
Madheshi/Bahadi? मधेसी/ पिाडी ? 
What is your educational level? आिाके शैजक्षक स्तर कते छै? 
[Make an assessment of socio-economic status] 
Are you staying in your maiti or your sasural? दक आिा अप्पन माइजतमे रिजैछ दक ससनरालमे? 
 
Please tell me who lives in your household. कृपया क के िाम्रा कहु दक आिाके घरमे के सब रि ैछै? 
[Sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law]( बेटासब, 
बेटीसब , िमायसब, पनतहुसब, साउससब , ससनरसब ) 
 
Do you have any members of your family that are currently living abroad? दक आिाके पररवारके 
कोनो सिस्य जविशे रि ैछै वतडमानमे? 
[If yes] Please tell me who lives abroad. अगर ि,ँ त, कृपया िाम्रा बताउ दक के रिछैै जविशे?  
 
Household management of finances घरम ेपसैाके व्यवसथापन  
I am now going to ask you questions about how money is usually managed in your household. 
This involves questions on personal income, credit and savings. It is important for us to know 
this information to us understand how best to help your community move forward 
economically. 
आब, आिाके घरमे पैसाके व्यवस्थापन सामान्यतया केनाके िोइछै त ैसम्बजन्ध प्रस्न सब पनछ चािजैछ? आइमे 
आिाके व्यजिगत आय, ऋर् आ बचतके बारेमे प्रस्नसब छै. यी िानकारी िम्रासबके लेल मित्वपनर्ड छै कैला 
दक आिाके समनिायके आर्थडक रुपसे केना के आगाडी बढायल िाय से बनझेमे िमरा सबके मित करत ै.   
 
Income आय  
First I am going to ask you questions regarding the income that comes to your family. Can you 
tell me about all the people who earn an income in your family? 
सवडप्रथम िम आिाके पनछ िा रिलजछ दक आिाके घरमे आय किाँसे अवई छै? दक आिा कईि सकैजछ आिाके 
घरके उ सिस्यसब के बारेमे िे पैसा कमाइ छै? 
• Who earns an income in your family? आिाके पररवारमे के पैसा कमाइछै? 
• [For each earner, talk through with the mother the details of the income earned: How 
the income is earned, how often  it comes to the family and if it is main income or 
supplement] [ िरेक कमायवाला आिमीके बारेमे साउससे पनछन ; दक पैसा केन कमाय छै? पैसा 
पररवारमे केनाके अवै छै? दक इ आम्िनी मनख्य स्रोत छै दक पूरक मात्रै छै?  
•  [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Does anyone send remittances 
from abroad? कोइ गोटा जविशेसे रेजमट्यान्स भेिै छै? 
• [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Who receives the remittances that 
are sent? रेजमट्यान्स िे भिेै छै से के लईछै? 
• Do you have a family business? [If yes, what is it and who works on it doing what] दक 
आिाके पाररवाररक व्यापार छै? [ अगर ि, कजथ छै आ के करै छै ?] 
• Who receives the income that is earned? िे पैसा आय आिडन िोइछै से के लई छै ? 
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• [If multiple earners] Do the different earners make each their own decisions regarding 
the use of the money they earn or do they pool the money together and make a joint 
decision? [अगर बहुते गोटा कमायवाला छै तब ]  उ सब अपन कमायल पैसाके केनाके उपयोग 
करवै, त ैसम्बजन्ध अपने जनर्डय करै छै दक एके िगि पैसा राइख क संयनि जनर्डय करै छै? 
• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she have a way of 
getting money? [ घर पररवारके सिस्य सब ि ेपैसा न ैकमाय छै ] दक उनका पैसा पावेके कोनो 
उपाय छै? 
• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she receive allowances 
from [income earners]? [ घर पररवारके सिस्य सब िे पैसा नै कमाय छै ] दक उनका सबके  खचाड 
भेटै छै ?  
• [If yes] What are the allowances for? अगर ि,ँ त कजथलाजग भत्ता भेटै छै? 
 
Do you earn an income yourself? दक आिा अपे्नसे पैसा कमाय जछयै ? 
[If woman earns her own income] [ अगर मजिला अपे्नसे पैसा कमाय छै त ] 
• How do you feel about earning an income yourself? [अगर ि]ँ आिा अपनेस ेपैसा कमाय जछ 
ता आिाके केिन मिसनस िोइय ? 
• What do you do with the income you earn? [ अगर ि ] आिा िे पैसा कमाय जछ त ैस ेकजथ 
करै जछ? 
• Do you hand over your income to your family members? [ अगर ि ] दक आिा अपन आय 
घर पररवारके सिस्यसबके ि ैजछयै? [If yes, explore why] [ अगर ि , कजथलाजग ?] 
• [If no] Do you like having your own income? [ अगर नै, दक आिाके जनमन लगैय िखनी आिाके 
अपन आमिानी रियै?] 
[If woman does not earn her own income] [अगर मजिला अपनेसे न ैकमाय छै त ] 
• Do you have a way of getting money? दक आिाके कोनो दकजसमसे पैसा भेटैछै? 
• Do you receive an allowance? [If yes, how] दक आिा अपन खचाड पवैजछयै?  
• [If yes] What is the allowance for? [अगर ि ] कजथलाजग खचाड भेटैय? 
• Would you like to earn an income yourself? दक आिा अपे्नसे पैसा कमाय चािजैछयै ? 
• Why do you not earn an income yourself? [ अगर नै] आिा कै लाजग न ैअपनेसे पैसा कमाय 
जछ? 
• What would happen if you earned an income yourself [अगर नै] कजथ िोत ैअगर आिा 
अपनेसे पैसा कमायब त? 
• Have you ever earned an income yourself? [If yes, how did you earn your income] 
[अगर नै] दक आिा कजियो अपनेसे पैसा कमैने जछयई? [ अगर ि, त केनाके पैसा कमैन ेजछयै? ]   
 
Savings बचत  
Now I would like to ask you about savings in the household. Savings can be kept either in cash 
or as assets. Does anybody in your household keep their own savings? आब िम आिाके घर के 
बचतके बारेमे पनछ चािजैछ ? दक आिाके घरमे कोइ गोटा बचत अपना पास रखैछै? 
[If yes, for each household member that keeps own savings] 
• How does he/she keep their savings? उ केना के बचत रखैछै/ करैछई ? 
• What is he/she saving money for? कजथ के लाजग उ पैसा बचत करै छै?  
Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
 
564 | P a g e  
 
• Has he/she previously had to spend money from his/her savings? दक उनका पजिले कजियो 
अप्पन बचतमेसे पैसा खचड करे परल छलैय? [If yes, on what] [ अगर ि ] कजथमे? 
• [If money is physically stored in the household] Who keeps the money in the 
household? घरमे पैसा के रखैछै?  
• [If money is physically stored in the household] How is the money kept in the 
household? घरमे  पैसा केनाके राखल िायछै? 
  
[If woman does not save money herself] Have you ever wanted to save your own money? [ 
अगर नै ] दक आिा कजियो अप्पन पैसा बचत करे चािजलयै ? 
[If woman does not save money herself] Are you allowed to keep your own savings? [ अगर नै 
] दक आिाके अप्पन बचत पसैा अपने पास राखेके अननमजत छै? 
•  [If yes] Why do you not keep your own savings? [ अगर ि ] आिा कै लाजग नै अप्पन बचत 
अपने पास रखैजछयै ? 
• [If no] Why are you not allowed to keep your own savings? [ अगर नै ] आिाके अप्पन बचत 
पैसा अपने पास राखेके अननमजत कैला नै छै? 
• [If no] What would happen if you kept your own savings? [ अगर न ै] कजथ िोतै अगर आिा 
अप्पन बचत अपने पास रखबै? 
 
Credit ऋर्  
Now I am going to ask you regarding any credit that your family possesses. Can you tell me 
about anybody in your family that take out loans? आब िम आिासे आिाके पररवारके कोनो ऋर् ि ै
दक तै संम्बन्धी पनछ ि रिल जछ? दक आिा िम्रा बतासकै जछ दक आिाके पररवारमे कोइ ऋर् लई छै ? 
• Where do they get their loans from? उनका सबके ऋर् किासे जमलै छै? 
• When do they take out loans? उ सब ऋर् कजिया लई छै ? 
• Why do they take out loans? उ सब कै लाजग ऋर् लाई छै ? 
 
Does anyone lend to others in the household?  दक घर पररवारमे से कोइ गोटा िोसर लोक के उधारी 
ि ैछै? 
• Who do they lend to? केकरा ि ैछै उधारी? 
• When do they lend out money? उ सब कजिया ि ैछै उधारी? 
• Why do they lend out money? कै लाजग पैसा ि ैछै उधारी? 
  
Have you ever borrowed your own money? [ अगर ि] दक आिा कजियो अपनेसे उधार लेने जछयइ? 
• [If yes] What did you borrow money for? [ अगर ि ] कजथके लाजग उधार लेजलय ै? 
• [If no] Have you ever wanted to borrow money for something? [ अगर नै ] दक आिा 
कजियो कोनो समानके लागी पैसा उधर जलय चािजलयै ?   
• [If no] Why are you not allowed to borrow your own money? [ अगर नै ] कै लाजग आिाके 
अपनेसे पैसा जलय अननमजत न ैछै? 
• [If no] What would happen if you borrowed your own money? [ अगर न ै] कजथ िोतै अगर 
आिा अपनेसे पैसा उधर लेवै त? 
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Group participation समनिम ेसिभाजगता  
 
Does anybody in your family participate in groups related to financial matters (credit, savings, 
income, financial education)? दक आिाके पररवारमेसे कोइ गोटा पैसा सम्बजन्ध ( िेनादक ऋर्, बचत, 
आय , वर्त्तीय शिक्षा ( पैसा सम्बन्नध शिक्षा हर्दयेर्ाला) समनिमे सिभागी िोइछै ?  
• [If yes] Can you tell me what the group does? [ अगर ि] दक आिा िमरा बता सकैजछ दक उ 
समनि कजथ करै छै ? 
• [If credit] How does the group provide your family with credit? [ अगर ऋर् दियेवाला 
समनि छै त ] उ समनि आिाके पररवारके केनाके/ किाँस ेऋर् ि ैछै? 
• [If savings] How does the group help you save money? [ अगर बचत करेवाला समनि छै त ] 
उ समनि आिाके पैसा बचत करेमे केनाके सियोग करै छै? 
• [If income] What type of work do you do in the group? [ अगर आय आिडन करेवाला समनि 
छै त ] आिा, समनिमे केिन दकजसमके काम करै जछयै? 
• [If financial education] What do they teach you about? [ अगर वर्त्तीय शिक्षा सम्बन्नध 
समुि छै त] उ सब कथथ शसखबै छै आिाके? 
• [if no] Why not? [ अगर मजिला समनिमे सिभागी नै िोइ छै त] कजथलाजग नै सिभागी िोइजछ?  
 
Management व्यवस्थापन  
Now I would like to ask you about the management of money in the household. Who manages 
the money generally in the household? आब िम आिाके पनछ चािब दक आिाके घरमे पैसाके व्यवस्थापन 
केनाके िोइछै? सामान्यतया घरमे पैसाके व्यवस्थापन के करै छै? 
Are you involved in decisions about money in the household? दक घरमे पैसाके बारेमे आिा जनर्डय 
करै जछयै?  
[If the mother-in-law is involved in decisions]  [ अगर साउस जनर्डय लै छै त ] 
• Were you always involved in decisions about money in the household? दक आिा पजिले भी 
घरमे पैसाके जनर्डय ल ैछजलय? 
• [If no] When did it change? [ अगर न]ै इ कजिया पररवतडन भेलै? आिा कजिया से पैसाके जनर्डय 
करे लगजलयै ? 
• [If no] Why did it change? [ अगर नै] एिन पररवतडन कजथलाजग भेलै? 
• Do you need to consult other people in such decisions? दक आिा कजियो जनर्डय करे बेरम े
घरके िोसर लोकस ेसल्लाि जलएके िरुरर परै छै ? [If yes, give an example] [ अगर ि, एगो उिािरर् 
िन  ] 
• Do other people ever disagree with your decisions? दक िोसर लोक कजियो आिाके जनर्डयस े 
असिमत िोइछई? [If yes, give an example] [ अगर ि, एगो उिािरर् िन  ] 
• Do other people ever make their own suggestions regarding money in the household? 
दक िोसर लोक सब कजियो पैसाके बारेमे सल्लाि सनझाब ि ैछै दक घरमे पैसाके बारेमे केनाके जनर्डय 
कैल ितै  ? [If yes, give an example] [ अगर ि, एगो उिािरर् िन  ] 
• [If multiple decision-makers] How do you come to an agreement on decisions regarding 
money in the household with [mention other decision-makers]? [अगर एक स े बेसी 
जनर्डयकताड सब छै त] घरमे  पैसा सम्बजन्ध जनर्डयमे आिा केनाके सम्झौता करै जछयै ? 
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[If the mother-in-law is not involved in decisions] 
• Do [mention decision-makers] need to consult other people in such decisions? दक उ (ि े
जनर्डय लै छै) पैसा सम्बजन्ध जनर्डय जलए बेरमे आरो लोकसे सेिो पनछेके िरुरर परै छै? [If yes, give an 
example] [ अगर ि, एगो उिािरर् िन  ] 
• Do other people ever disagree with [mention decision-makers]’s decisions? दक िोसर 
लोकसब  उनकर जनर्डयस ेकजियो असिमत िोइ छै? [If yes, give an example] [ अगर ि, एगो 
उिािरर् िन  ] 
• Do other people ever make their own suggestions regarding money in the household? 
दक िोसर लोक सब  कजियो सल्लाि सनझाब ि ैछै दक घरमे पैसाके बारेमे केनाके जनर्डय कैल ितै  ? [If 
yes, give an example] [ अगर ि, एगो उिािरर् िन  ] 
• [If multiple decision-makers] How do [decision-makers] come to an agreement on 
decisions regarding money in the household? [अगर एक से बेसी जनर्डयकताड सब छै त] उ 
जनर्डयकताड सब घरमे  पैसा सम्बजन्ध जनर्डयमे केनाके सम्झौता करै छै? 
 
Market transactions बिारके लनेिने  
Now I would like to know more about how purchases are made in this household. Who makes 
purchases for this household? [Explore reasons why some make purchases, while others do 
not make any purchases] अई घरके लाजग के खररिारी करै छै? [ कजथ कारर् छै दक कोइ गोटा खररिारी 
करै छै आ आरो गोटा नै करै छै?]  
 
Where does your family go to make purchases? आिाके पररवार खररिारी करे किा ँिाइछै?  
• Who makes purchases from the local market? स्थानीय विारमे से के खररिारी/ दकनमेल 
करै छै? 
• What do you buy from the local market? आिा कजथ दकनै जछयै स्थानीय विारमे से ? 
• Does anyone make purchases directly from other people’s households? [If yes] Who? 
दक कोइ गोटा जसधे िोसरके घरसे खररिारी करै छै? 
• [If yes] What do you buy from other people’s households? [ अगर ि] िोसरके घरसे आिा 
कजथ दकनै जछयै? 
• Do visitors come to your house directly and sell you things? दक बािरसे कोइ आिाके घरमे 
समान बेचे अवैछै ? 
• [If yes] Who are the visitors? [ अगर ि ] उ बेचे वाला सब के छै? 
• [If yes] What do they sell you? [ अगर ि ] उ आिाके कजथ बेचै छै? 
• [If yes] How frequently do they come? [ अगर ि ] उ सब कत ेिल्िी  ( कत ेदिनमे) समान बेच े
अ वै छै? 
• Does anyone make purchases from local shops? [If yes] Who? दक कोइ गोटा स्थानीय 
िोकानसे खररिारी करै छै? 
• [If yes] What do you buy from local shops? [ अगर ि ] आिा कजथ दकनै जछयै स्थानीय 
िोकानसे? 
• Does anyone make purchases from other villages? [If yes] Who? दक कोइ गोटा िोसर 
गाउँसे खररिारी करै छै? 
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• [If yes] What do you buy from other villages? [ अगर ि ] आिा कजथ दकनै जछयै िोसर गाउँ 
से? 
• Does anyone make purchases from Janakpur? [If yes] Who? दक कोइ गोटा िनकपनरस े
खररिारी करै छै? [ अगर ि ] के? 
• [If yes] What do you buy from Janakpur? [ अगर ि] आिा कजथ दकनै जछयै िनकपनरसे? 
• Any other places where you make purchases? आरो कोन िगि आिा खररिारी करै जछयै? 
 
[If mother-in-law makes purchases herself] [ अगर साउस अपनेसे खररिारी/ दकनमेल  करै छै त ] 
• Of the above places, where do you go to make purchases yourself? अई िगि सबमे से, 
आिा अपनेसे कत िाइजछ खररिारी करे? 
• Why do you like going to these places? कैलागी आिाके अजि िगिसबमे िायेमे जनमन लगैय?  
• Are there places you don’t go yourself but instead send someone else instead? दक एिन 
कोनो िगि छै ित आिा कजियो नै िाइजछ खररिारी करे , बजल्क कोइ िोसर गोटाके पठवै जछयै ? 
• [If yes] Why not these places? [ अगर ि ]  कैला नै िाइजछ अई िगि सबमे ? 
• Have you always been able to leave the house and make purchases yourself? दक आिा 
सब दिनसे/ पजिलिी स ेघरस ेबािर िाके  अपनेसे खररिारी करै जछयै? 
• [If no] When did you start being able to make purchases yourself? [ अगर नै ] आिा 
अपनेसे खररिारी करेके कजिया सनरु कैजल ? 
 
[If mother-in-law does not make purchases herself] [ अगर साउस अपनेसे खररिारी न ैकरै छै त ] 
• Why do you not make any purchases yourself? आिा कजथ लाजग नै अपे्नसे खररिारी करै 
जछयै? 
• What would happen if you made purchases yourself? कजथ िोतै अगर आिा अपे्नसे खररिारी 
कैरजतयै त ? 
• [If prestige is the answer] If the community supported you in going to the market and 
making purchases, would you want to make purchases yourself? [ अगर िबाब “ 
पररवारके इज्जतके चलते” छै त ] अगर समनिाय आिाके विार िाय दियेला आ खररिारी करेला 
समथडन करतै त दक आिा अपनेसे खररिारी करे चािबै? 
 
1) Cash transfers 
 
[WHEN DAUGHTERS-IN-LAW RECEIVE THE CASH TRANSFER AT HOME] [ िखनी पनतहुसब घर 
भटेस ेपसैा ल ैछै ] 
 
How did you hear about the cash transfers? 
आिा पैसा जवतरर्के बारेमे केनाके सन ाजलय?ै 
Why did your daughter-in-law receive the cash transfers at home instead of at the women’s 
groups? 
आिाके पनतहु आमा समनिस ेपैसा जलएके सट्टामे घर भेटसे कजथलाजग पैसा प्राप्त कैलजखन? 
 
Please tell me about the last time the nutrition mobiliser visited your house. 
कृपया कके कहु दक पोसन पररचालक आिासे अजन्तम बेर कजिया भेटे आइल छलैय. 
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• Were you present during the last visit? दक आिा घरमे छजलय तखनी? 
• What happened during the last visit? 
• कजथ भेलै अजन्तम भ्रमर्मे? कजथ भेलई तब? 
• Who received the cash transfer from the NM? पोसन पररचालाकिे पैसा िलेकै से के लेलकै? 
• Has the NM ever visited at a time when your daughter-in-law was not at home?दक 
पोसन पररचालक कजियो आिाके घर आइल छलजखन िखनी आिाके पनतहु घरमे नै छलजखन?  
• [If yes] What happened then? [ अगर ि ] कजथ भेल ैतब? 
 
WHEN DAUGHTERS-IN-LAW GO TO THE WOMEN’S GROUPS TO RECEIVE CASH TRANSFERS 
िखजन पनतहुसब आमा समनिके बठैकम ेपसैा जलए िाइछै  
 
Please tell me about how you ended up going to the women’s groups to get cash transfers. 
कृपया कके कहु दक आिा पैसा जलए आमा समनिके बैठकमे केनाके िाय लगजलय ? 
• How did you hear about the cash transfers? पैसा जवतरर्के बारेमे आिा केनाके सन जलयै? 
• Who decided that your daughter-in-law would be going to the WGs to get cash 
transfers? के जनर्डय करै जछ दक आिाके पनतहु आमा समनिके बैठकमे पैसा जलए ित?ै 
• Does she come to WG meetings alone or with someone else? दक उ आमा समनिके 
बैठकमे अकेले अवै छै दक केकरो िोड ेअवैई छै? 
• Do she receive the cash transfer yourself or do other family members take it? 
दक उ पैसा अपे्नसे लै छै दक पररवारके िोसर सिस्य लै छै? 
• Have she ever been unable to come to a WG meeting? [If yes, what was the 
reason, what happened] दक उ कजियो आमा समनिके बैठकमे आवेमे असमथड छलजखन? 
 
Control over the cash transfer पैसाम ेछनयन्रर्  
• Have your daughter-in-law ever handed over the received cash transfer to other 
family members either after receiving it or on a later day? क्रक आिाके पतुिुके जे पैसा 
भेटैय से घि अईबते घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब रै्द छै क्रक बार्दमे र्दोसि हर्दि रै्द छै?   
• [If she hands over] Who does your daughter-in-law hand over her money to? [ अगि 
महिला पैसा रै्द छै त ] आिाके पुतिु केकिा रै्द छै पैसा?  
• [If she hands over] Why does she hand over her cash transfer to someone else? [ अगि 
महिला रै्द छै त] उ पैसा र्दोसि गोटाके कैलाथग रै्द छथथि?  
• Where is the money from the cash transfer kept? पैसा किा िखाएछई? 
• Who makes decisions regarding the use of the cash transfer? क्रक आिा निणाय किै नछ उ  
पैसास ेजे आिाके आमा समुिसे भेटैय? 
• Do you think your daughter-in-law has handled such amounts of money before? 
आिाके वर्चािमे क्रक आिाके पुतिु र्ोत ेपैसा (रु७५०) पहिले कहियो िखिे छल?ै   
 
Purchases with the cash transfer 
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As a mother-in-law you know best what your own family needs. What does the money 
actually get spent on? एगो साउसके रुपमे आिा जि ैनछ क्रक आिाके कथथ जरुरि छै. र्ास्तर्मे पैसा 
कथथम ेखचा िोइ छै? आिाके जे पैसा शमलैय से कथथ मे खचा िोइय? 
• Did the money get spent on food? [What kind of food, if yes] क्रक पैसा खािामे खचा 
िोइ छै? [ अगि ि, कोि क्रकशसमके खािा ] 
• Did the money get spent on medicines? क्रक पैसा र्दबाईमे खचा िोइछै ? 
• Did the money get spent on cigarettes, alcohol or betel-leaf? क्रक पैसा चिुोट, िक्सी आ 
पाि खायेमे खचा िोइछै? 
Did the money get spent on soap or other household products? क्रक पैसा साबुि या  
घिकेलाथग कोिो र्दोसि सामािमे खचा िोइछै? 
• Did the money get spent on anything else? [What, if yes] क्रक पैसा आिो कोिो र्दोसि 
थचजम ेखचा िोइछई? [ अगि ि, कथथ म े] 
If the money was twice as much, what would it get spent on? अगि पैसा जते रे्दल जाइ छै 
र्ोएस ेर्दोब्बि िैितै, त पैसा कथथमे खचा िोइतै? 
If the money was only half as much, what would it get spent on? अगि पैसा आधा मात्र ैिैितै, 
त कथथम ेखचा िोइतै? 
 
2) Relationship with daughter-in-law पुतिुस ेसम्बन्ध   
 
Now we would like to know more about your relationship to your daughter-in-law. This is 
important for us so we can help both mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law move forward 
together in the future. 
आब आिा किु क्रक आिाके केिि सम्बनध िै आिाके पुतिुसे 
 
 
Please tell me about your relationship to your daughter-in-law. What is she like as a 
daughter-in-law? आब आिा किु क्रक आिाके केिि सम्बनध िै आिाके पुतिुसे.आिाके उ 
(पुतिु) केिि लगै छथथि?  
• Do you enjoy living together with your daughter-in-law? क्रक आिाके अपि पुतिु जोड े
ििेमे बहढया लगैय? 
• [If yes] What do you like about your daughter-in-law? [ अगि ि ] आिाके अपि 
पुतािुके बािेमे कथथ निमि लगैय? 
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o [If she mentions respect] How does your daughter-in-law show her respect 
for you? [ अगि साउस कितई, आर्दि किै छै ] आिाके पुतिु केिाके आर्दि 
किै छै आिाके? 
o [If she mentions service] Which services does your daughter-in-law provide 
you with? [ अगि साउस कितई, सेर्ा किै छै ] आिाके पुतिु केिि सेर्ा किै 
छै आिाके?  
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि साउस कितई, पुतिु जोड ेििेमे बहढया िै लगैय] कथथलाथग 
बहढया िै लगैय? 
• Is there anything that your daughter-in-law still needs to learn? क्रक एिि कथ ुछै 
जे आिाके पुतिुके अखनियो शसखेके बाक्रक छै?  
 
Do you ever ask your daughter-in-law for advice when making decisions? क्रक आिा कहियो 
अपि पुतिुसे सल्लाि लै नछयै निणाय शलए बेिमे?  
• [If yes] Can you give me an example? [ अगि ि ] क्रक आिा िमिा कोिो उर्दाििण र्द सकै 
नछयै? 
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि ि]ै कथथलागी िै? 
• [For each of the following decisions get the mother-in-law to explain if she would 
consult her daughter-in-law. If yes, please give an example, if no, why not.] [ िीचा 
शलखल ििेक काममे क्रक साउस अपि पुतिुसे सल्लाि ल ैछै /  अगि ि, एगो उर्दाििण र्द/ु 
अगि िै, कैलागी िै?  ]   
o Allocation of work in the household? घिके काम किे बेिमे?  
o Health care for the daughter-in-law? पुतिुके स्र्ास्थके बािेमे?  
o Major purchases in the household? घिके मुख्य खरिर्दािी किे बेिमे ? 
o Employment for your daughter-in-law? पुतिुके काम/ िोकिी किे हर्दएके 
बािेमे? 
o Education for your daughter-in-law? पुतिुके पढ़ार्ेके बािेमे? 
 
Have you ever disagreed with your daughter-in-law over an issue? क्रक आिा कहियो कोिो 
वर्षयमे अपि पुतािुसे असिमत छशलय ? 
• [If yes] What was the issue? [ अगि ि ] कोि वर्षयमे ? 
• [If yes] How did you handle the disagreement? [ अगि ि ] कथथ कैशलयै असिमनत 
भेलै तब? 
• [If yes] How did it end? [ अगि ि ] केिाके बातके शमलै शलयै तब ? 
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• [If no] Would your daughter-in-law tell you if she disagreed with you? [ अगि िै ] 
क्रक आिाके पुतिु आिाके कितई जखिी उ आिासे असिमत िोतै? 
o [If no] Why not? [ अगि साउस अपि पुतिुसे असिमत िै भेल छै त ] 
कथथलागी िै ? 
 
Do you ever allow your daughter-in-law to leave the house? क्रक आिा कहियो अपि पुतिुके 
घिसे बािि जायके अिुमनत रै्द नछयै?  
•  [If yes] Would you allow your daughter-in-law to leave the house unaccompanied? 
[Why/Why not?] [ अगि ि ] क्रक आिा अपि पुतिुके घिस ेबािि अकेले जायके अिुमनत 
रे्दर्ै? [ कैला/ कैला िै ]  
• [If no] Why do you not allow your daughter-in-law to leave the house? [ अगि िै ] 
आिा कैलागी ि ैअपि पतुिुके घिसे बािि जाएके अिमुनत रे्दर्ै?  
• [If the answer is prestige] If the community supported you letting your daughter-in-
law leave, would you allow her to leave the house? [ अगि जर्ार्” इज्जतके चलते “ 
िोतै त ] अगि आिाके समरु्दाय आिाके पुतािुके बािि जाए हर्दयेला समथाि कितै त आिा 
उिका घिसे बािि जाय रे्दर्?ै 
• [If the answer is prestige] If your son supported you letting your daughter-in-law 
leave, would you allow her to leave the house? [ अगि जबाब, घिके इज्जतके चलते 
छै त ] अगि आिाके बेटा आिाके पुतिुके बािि जाय हर्दएके लाथग अिुमनत रै्द छै त 
आिा उिका जायके अिुमनत रे्दर्ै? 
•  [If yes] In what situations do you think it is appropriate for your daughter-in-law to 
leave the house? [ अगि ि ] कोि अर्ास्थाम,े आिाके वर्चािमे, आिाके पुतिुके घिसे बािि 
जायेके लाथग उपयुक्त छै? 
• [Probe regarding waged work, family business, education, purchases, health care, 
women’s groups and her maiti as appropriate] [ पुछु : मजर्दिुीके लाथग? पारिर्ारिक 
व्यापािके लाथग? पढाईके लाथग, खरिर्दािीके लाथग, स्र्ास्थ स्यािािके लाथग, आमा समूि 
जायके लाथग या माइनत जायेके लाथग ?] 
 
Do you allow your daughter-in-law to earn an income? क्रक आिा अपि पुतिुके पैसा कमायके 
अिुमनत रे्दर्ै?  
• [If yes] Is she currently earning an income? [ अगि ि] क्रक उ अखिी पैसा कमाय छै? 
• [If yes] How does she earn her income? [ अगि ि ] केिाके पैसा कमाय छै? 
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• [If yes] Does your daughter-in-law keep her income with herself or does she give it 
to somebody else? [ अगि ि ] क्रक आिाके पतुिु पैसा अपिे पास िखछैै क्रक कोइ र्दोसि 
गोटाके रै्द छै?  
• What types of income-earning work would be appropriate for your daughter-in-
law? [Why/why not?] केिि क्रकशसमके आय आजाि िोएर्ाला काम आिाके पतुिुके लाथग 
उपयुक्त छै?  
• [If the mother-in-law answers that her daughter-in-law does not go out] Would you 
allow her to earn an income if she worked from home? [ अगि साउस जबाब रे्दतै क्रक 
उनकि पुतिु बािि ि ैजाइछै ] क्रक आिा उिका पैसा कमायके अिुमनत रे्दर्ै अगि उ घिेसे काम 
कथथाि त ?  
• [If the answer is prestige] If the community supported you letting your daughter-in-
law earn an income, would you allow her to do so? [ अगि जर्ार् “इज्जत के कािण” 
छै त] गा समुर्दाय आिाके पुतिुके पैसा कमायला समथाि कितै त आिा उिका पसैा कमाय 
रे्दर्ै? 
• [If the answer is prestige] If your son supported you in letting your daughter-in-law 
earn an income, would you allow her to do so? अगि आिाके बेटा आिाके पुतिुके 
बािि जाय हर्दएके लाथग अिुमनत रै्द छै त आिा उिका जायके अिुमनत रे्दर्ै?    
 
Do you allow your daughter-in-law to have her own savings? क्रक आिा अपि पुतिुके अप्िेसे 
बचत किेके लाथग अिुमनत रै्द नछयै? 
• [If yes] Does your daughter-in-law have a means of getting savings? [If yes, what is 
it] [ अगि ि ] क्रक आिाके पुतिुके बचत किे के लाथग पैसा प्राप्त किेके उपाय छै ? 
[ अगि ि, कथथ छै?   
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि पुतिुके पैसा बचत किेके अिुमनत िै छै त ] कथथलाथग 
अिुमनत िै छै? 
 
Do you allow your daughter-in-law to take out her own loans? क्रक आिा पुतिुके अप्िेसे कजाा 
शलएके अिुमनत रै्द नछयै?  
• [If yes[ Does your daughter-in-law have a means of taking out loans? [If yes, what is 
it] [ अगि ि ] क्रक आिाके पुतिुके कजाा शलएके उपाय छै? [ अगि ि ] केिाके लै छै 
?  
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि पुतिुके कजााशलएके अिुमनत िै छै त ] कथथलाथग अिुमनत 
िै छै? 
 
3) Empowerment शसक्क्तकरर् 
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In this final section, we would like to know more about your role and status in the family. This 
is important information for us, because we can design much better programmes for your 
community, if we understand the relationships that different family members have with each 
other. 
अई अन्नतम खण्डमे, िम सब आिाके घिमे आिाके भूशमका आ न्स्थनत बािे जािे चािैनछ. इ िमिा 
सबके लाथग मित्र्पुणा जािकािी छै कथथला क्रक जखिी िमसब बुझ ेसकर्ई/ बुझर्इ क्रक आिाके घिम े
वर्शभनि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब बीच केिि  सम्बनध छै िम सब आिाके समुर्दायके लाथग आिो बहढया 
कायाक्रम निमाणा क सकै नछयै.    
 
General empowerment सामान्य शसक्क्तकारर्  
First I am going to ask you to tell me about yourself a little. Would you describe yourself as an 
active, capable, aware, educated woman who is a leader in the community? Or would you 
describe yourself as less aware, less educated, less engaged in social, political work and less 
able to speak up for your rights? 
  
सर्ाप्रथम िम आिास ेपुछे चािैनछ क्रक आिा अपिा बािेमे िमिा कुछो किु .  क्रक आिा अपिे आपके 
सक्रक्रय, योग्य, सचते, शिक्षक्षत महिला जे समुर्दायके अगुर्ा छै कैिके व्याख्या क सकैनछयै? क्रक आिा 
अपिे आपके कम सचते, कम शिक्षक्षत, सामान्जक, िाजिीनतक कायामे कम संलग्ि आ अपि 
अथधकािके लाथग बोल कम योग्य, कैि के व्याख्या किर्ई? 
 
Social support सामाक्जक समिन   
Now I am going to ask you about what you usually do during those times when there are 
problems.  आब िम आिासे पुछे जाइनछ क्रक आिा कथथ किै नछ जखिी आिाके कोिो समस्या 
पिैय. 
 
During times when you have many private worries and fears what do you usually do? आिा 
कथथ किै नछ जखिी आिाके अपि व्यन्क्तगत बिुत क्रकशसमके निजी थचनता या डि ििैय?  
• Do you seek help from anyone? क्रक आिा केकिोसे मर्दत लै नछ? 
• [If yes] Who do you approach? [ अगि ि ] केकिा किै नछ मर्दत किेला? 
• [If yes] How does that person help you? [ अगि ि ] उ आर्दमी आिाके केिाके मर्दत 
किै छै? 
• [If yes and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a time 
when you sought help? [ अगि ि आ महिला अनतर्ाातााकािके साथ अकेले छै त ] क्रक 
आिा िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्दसकै नछयै? 
• [If woman does not seek help] Why not? [अगि साउस कितई केकिोसे मर्दत िै लै नछ 
] कथथलागी मर्दत िै लै नछ? 
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During times when you have trouble with family disputes what do you usually do? आिा कथथ 
किै नछ जखिी कोिो पारिर्ारिक झगडासे आिाके समस्या िोइय? 
• Do you seek help from anyone? क्रक आिा केकिोसे मर्दत लै नछयै? 
• [If yes] Who do you approach? [ अगि ि ] केकिा किै नछ मर्दत किेला? 
• [If yes] How does that person help you? [ अगि ि ] उ आर्दमी आिाके केिाके मर्दत 
कि छै? 
• [If yes and woman is alone with interviewer] Can you give me an example of a time 
when you sought help? [ अगि ि आ महिला अनतर्ाातााकािके साथ अकेले छै त ] क्रक 
आिा िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्दसकै नछयै? 
• [If no] Why not? [ अगि साउस केकिोसे मर्दत िै लै छै त ] कथथलाथग िै?  
Leadership नतेतृ्व  
 
Are you able to convince others in your household to do things differently? [All matters in the 
household. For example, household chores, jobs, financial matters, child care, cooking, health 
care] क्रक आिा अपि घि परिर्ािके लोक सबके कुछ अलग किेके लाथग मिा सकै नछयै? 
What kind of things are you able to convince others to do differently? केिि क्रकशसमके कामके 
लाथग आिा र्दोसि लोकके मिार्ेमे योग्य नछयै? 
What kind of things are you not able to convince others to do differently? केिि क्रकशसमके 
कामके लाथग आिा घिके र्दोसि लोकके मिार्ेमे योग्य ि ैनछयै?  
o Have you ever expressed your feelings when you didn’t agree with something in your 
household? क्रक आिा कहियो अपि भार्िा व्यक्त कैिे नछयै जखनि आिा घिके कोिो 
निणायसे असिमत छशलय? 
o If you wanted to convince others in your household to do things differently how would 
you go about it? अगि आिा घिके र्दोसि लोकसबके कुछ अलग किे के लाथग वर्श्र्स्त किे 
चािनतयै त आिा केिा के कैिनतयै ? 
o Can you give me an example of a time where you convinced others in your household 
to do things differently? क्रक आिा िमिा एगो कोिो समयके उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै जखनि 
आिा कुछ अलग किे के लेल अपि घिके सर्दस्यके वर्श्र्स्त किैिे छशलय ? 
o Do household members come to you for advice about how to move forward? If yes, 
please give an example. क्रक घि परिर्ािके सर्दस्यसब केिाके अगाडी बढबै तै वर्षयमे आिासे 
सल्लाि शलए अर्ैछै ? 
 
Power, authority and status छनर्नय करेके िमता, शक्क्त, आ क्स्िछत 
Now I am going to ask you about authority, power and status in your family. आब िम आिासे 
पुछे जाििल नछ आिाके परिर्ािमे आिाके निणाय किेके िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत कथथ छै. 
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In your family, who has the most authority, power and status? आिाके परिर्ािमे केकिा सबसे 
बेसी निणाय किे के िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत छै?   
Can you give me an example of how that person has the most authority, power and status? 
क्रक आिा िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछ क्रक उ महिला/ पुरुस के केिा के सबस ेबेसी निणाय किेके िन्क्त 
आ न्स्थनत छै? 
 
In your family, who has the least authority, power and status [among adults]? आिाके परिर्ािम े
केकिा [ बडक लोक सबमे ] सबसे कम निणाय किेके िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत छै? 
Can you give me an example of how that person has the least authority, power and status? 
क्रक आिा िमिा एगो उर्दाििण र्द सकै नछयै क्रक केिा के उिका सबस ेकम निणाय किेके िन्क्त आ न्स्थनत 
छै? 
 
Freedom and legitimacy स्वतन्रता आ वैधता 
Finally I would like to ask you about your level of satisfaction with the way things are done in 
your family. अन्नतम्मे िम आिासे पुछ चािब क्रक जई तरिकासे आिाके घिमे सब थचज िोइ छै र्ोईमे 
आिा कते के सनतुस्ट ििैनछयै ?  
 
Thank the woman for her participation and patience and give her a choice of bangles as a 
reward for participating. 
 
H.2.2 Topic guide for mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law, Phase 2 
Basic information आधार 
What is your age? आिाके उमर कते छै? 
What is your religion? आिाके धमड कोन छै? 
What is your caste? आिाके िाजत कोन छै? 
Madheshi/Bahadi? मधेसी/ पिाडी ? 
What is your educational level? आिाके शैजक्षक स्तर कते छै? 
[Make an assessment of socio-economic status] 
Are you staying in your maiti or your sasural? दक आिा अप्पन माइजतमे रिजैछ दक ससनरालमे? 
 
Please tell me who lives in your household. कृपया क के िाम्रा कहु दक आिाके घरमे के सब रि ैछै? 
[Sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law]( बेटासब, 
बेटीसब , िमायसब, पनतहुसब, साउससब , ससनरसब ) 
 
Do you have any members of your family that are currently living abroad? दक आिाके पररवारके 
कोनो सिस्य जविशे रि ैछै वतडमानमे? 
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[If yes] Please tell me who lives abroad. अगर ि,ँ त, कृपया िाम्रा बताउ दक के रिछैै जविशे?  
 
Household management of finances घरम ेपसैाके व्यवसथापन  
I am now going to ask you questions about how money is usually managed in your household. 
This involves questions on personal income, credit and savings. It is important for us to know 
this information to us understand how best to help your community move forward 
economically. 
आब, आिाके घरमे पैसाके व्यवस्थापन सामान्यतया केनाके िोइछै त ैसम्बजन्ध प्रस्न सब पनछ चािजैछ? आइमे 
आिाके व्यजिगत आय, ऋर् आ बचतके बारेमे प्रस्नसब छै. यी िानकारी िम्रासबके लेल मित्वपनर्ड छै कैला 
दक आिाके समनिायके आर्थडक रुपसे केना के आगाडी बढायल िाय से बनझेमे िमरा सबके मित करत ै.   
 
Income आय  
First I am going to ask you questions regarding the income that comes to your family. Can you 
tell me about all the people who earn an income in your family? 
सवडप्रथम िम आिाके पनछ िा रिलजछ दक आिाके घरमे आय किाँसे अवई छै? दक आिा कईि सकैजछ आिाके 
घरके उ सिस्यसब के बारेमे िे पैसा कमाइ छै? 
• Who earns an income in your family? आिाके पररवारमे के पैसा कमाइछै? 
• [For each earner, talk through with the mother the details of the income earned: How 
the income is earned, how often  it comes to the family and if it is main income or 
supplement and how much it is] [ िरेक कमायवाला आिमीके बारेमे साउसस ेपनछन ; दक पैसा 
केन कमाय छै? पैसा पररवारमे केनाके अवै छै? दक इ आम्िनी मनख्य स्रोत छै दक पूरक मात्रै छै?  
•  [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Does anyone send remittances 
from abroad? कोइ गोटा जविशेसे रेजमट्यान्स भेिै छै? 
• [If remittances have not already been mentioned] Who receives the remittances that 
are sent? रेजमट्यान्स िे भिेै छै से के लईछै? 
• Do you have a family business? [If yes, what is it and who works on it doing what] दक 
आिाके पाररवाररक व्यापार छै? [ अगर ि, कजथ छै आ के करै छै ?] 
• Who receives the income that is earned? िे पैसा आय आिडन िोइछै से के लई छै ? 
• [If multiple earners] Do the different earners make each their own decisions regarding 
the use of the money they earn or do they pool the money together and make a joint 
decision? [अगर बहुते गोटा कमायवाला छै तब ]  उ सब अपन कमायल पैसाके केनाके उपयोग 
करवै, त ैसम्बजन्ध अपने जनर्डय करै छै दक एके िगि पैसा राइख क संयनि जनर्डय करै छै? 
 
Do you earn an income yourself? दक आिा अपे्नसे पैसा कमाय जछयै ? 
[If woman earns her own income] [ अगर मजिला अपे्नसे पैसा कमाय छै त ] 
• How do you feel about earning an income yourself? [अगर ि]ँ आिा अपनेस ेपैसा कमाय जछ 
ता आिाके केिन मिसनस िोइय ? 
• What do you do with the income you earn? [ अगर ि ] आिा िे पैसा कमाय जछ त ैस ेकजथ 
करै जछ? 
• Do you hand over your income to your family members? [ अगर ि ] दक आिा अपन आय 
घर पररवारके सिस्यसबके ि ैजछयै? [If yes, explore why] [ अगर ि , कजथलाजग ?] 
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• [If no] Do you like having your own income? [ अगर नै, दक आिाके जनमन लगैय िखनी आिाके 
अपन आमिानी रियै?] 
[If woman does not earn her own income] [अगर मजिला अपनेसे न ैकमाय छै त ] 
• Would you like to earn an income yourself? दक आिा अपे्नसे पैसा कमाय चािजैछयै ? 
• Why do you not earn an income yourself? [ अगर नै] आिा कै लाजग न ैअपनेसे पैसा कमाय 
जछ? 
• What would happen if you earned an income yourself [अगर नै] कजथ िोत ैअगर आिा 
अपनेसे पैसा कमायब त? 
• Have you ever earned an income yourself? [If yes, how did you earn your income] 
[अगर नै] दक आिा कजियो अपनेसे पैसा कमैने जछयई? [ अगर ि, त केनाके पैसा कमैन ेजछयै? ]   
 
Sharing income in the family 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about how income is shared in your family. 
[For each of the household members who do not earn an income]: 
• Does he/she have a way of getting money? [ घर पररवारके सिस्य सब िे पैसा नै कमाय छै 
] दक उनका पैसा पावेके कोनो उपाय छै? 
• [For household members who do not earn an income] Does he/she receive allowances 
from [income earners]? [ घर पररवारके सिस्य सब िे पैसा नै कमाय छै ] दक उनका सबके  खचाड 
भेटै छै ?  
• [If yes] What are the allowances for? अगर ि,ँ त कजथलाजग भत्ता भेटै छै? 
• [If yes] Do you feel he/she ought to get the allowance? [Please explain] 
• [If yes] Do you feel he/she should get a bigger allowance? [Please explain] 
• [If yes] Do you feel he/she gets bigger allowances than he/she deserves? [Please 
explain] 
• [If no] Do you feel he/she ought to get an allowance? [Please explain] 
 
Apart from income-generating work, do you have a way of getting money yourself? दक आिाके 
कोनो दकजसमसे पैसा भेटैछै? [If yes, how] 
• Do you receive an allowance? [If yes, how] दक आिा अपन खचाड पवैजछयै?  
• [If yes] What is the allowance for? [अगर ि ] कजथलाजग खचाड भेटैय? 
• [If yes] Why do you think your family members give you an allowance? 
• [If yes] How do you feel about getting an allowance? 
• [If yes] Are you able to spend our allowance on personal items? 
• [If yes] Do you feel the allowance is your right? [Please explain in depth] 
•  [If no] Do you feel having an allowance is your right? [Please explain in depth] 
o  [If yes] Who do you feel they ought to give you an allowance? 
 
Sharing savings in the family 
Now I would like to ask you about how savings are shared in your family. Savings can be kept 
either in cash or as assets. Does anybody in your household keep their own savings? आब िम 
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आिासे आिाके घि के बचतके बािेमे पुछ चािैनछ. बचत क्रक पैसाके रुपमे िाखल जाइछै या 
सामािके रुपमे.क्रक आिाके घिमे कोइ गोटा अपिेसे बचत किै छथथि? 
[If yes, for each household member that keeps own savings, talk through how they keep their 
savings, how much it is and when they last spent it]  
 
Do you keep your own savings (bachat)? 
• [If yes] How much? 
• [If yes] How do you keep your own savings? 
 
Are there situations where you would need to share your savings with other family members? 
[Clarify we are talking about giving out money for free, not giving out loans. If yes, which 
situations are these; if no, why not] 
• Have you ever had to share large amounts of your own savings with other family 
members in the past? 
• [If yes] Please describe the situation [including how much was involved]. 
• [If yes] How did you feel about it when it happened? (Probe: Sad, happy, concerned, 
annoyed, tension, no tension etc.) 
• [If yes] Did you want to share with the rest of the family? [Why, why not] 
• [If yes] Did you feel it was fair to share with the rest of the family? [Why, why not] 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
Do other family members share their savings with you? [Clarify we are talking about giving 
money for free, not giving out loans.]  
• [If yes]: 
o Which family members have shared their savings with you? 
o In which situations have they shared their savings with you? 
o Do you feel they ought to share their savings with you? [Why, why not] 
o How much do they share with you? 
o Do you feel the amount you get is your right? 
• [If no]: 
o Why do you think they do not share their savings with you? 
o Are there situations where they would be required to share their savings with 
you? [If yes, what situations] 
o How do you feel about them not sharing their savings with you? [Probe: 
Indifferent, hurt, content, concerned, etc.] 
o Do you feel it is fair for them not to share their savings with you? 
  
Are you able to ask for money from your other family members if you need to?  
• [If yes] Who would you ask? 
• [If yes] What have you asked them for in the past? 
• [If yes] How much was it? 
• [If yes] Was their interest on it? 
• [If no] Why not? 
Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
 
579 | P a g e  
 
• Have your other family members ever refused to contribute money to something you 
asked for?  [If yes, what was the situation; if no, why not] 
 
Have other family members ever asked for money from you? 
• Have you ever refused to contribute money to another family member? [If yes, what 
was the situation; if no, why not] 
 
Other forms of sharing 
I would now like to ask you about other ways of sharing money in the family. 
 
Have you ever given out loans to other family members? 
• [If yes] Please describe the situation [including how much was involved]. 
• [If yes] Did you take interest on the loan given out? [If yes, how much] 
• [If yes] Did you feel it was a fair decision to lend to the rest of the family? [Why, why 
not] 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
Have you ever been required to contribute to a large purchase for another family member 
using your own savings?  
• [If yes] What was the situation [including how much did it cost]? 
• [If yes] How did you feel about contributing? (Probe: Happy, sad, indifferent, 
frustrated, generous, worried, etc.] 
• [If yes] Was it fair? [If yes, is giving less unfair then; if no, why not] 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
Have your other family members contributed to a large purchase that was for you? [If yes, 
what, when, how much did it cost; if no, why not] 
 
Sharing in the community 
I would like to ask you about sharing money and gifts in your community. 
 
Have you ever received money as gifts/upahar from other members of your community? 
• [If yes] How much did you receive? 
• [If yes] What was the occasion? Why did you receive money from them? 
• [If yes] How often do you receive money as gifts? 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
Have you ever given out money as gifts to other members of your community? 
[If yes, what, when, how much; if no, why not] 
 
Have you ever received fruit, milk or vegetables from other members of your community as 
len-den? 
[If yes, what, when, how often, how much; if no, why not] 
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Have you ever received fruit, milk or vegetables as paincho from other members of your 
community? 
• [If yes] How much did you receive? 
• [If yes] What was the occasion? Why did you receive it from them? 
• [If yes] How often do you receive paincho? 
• [If yes] What are you going to give in return? 
• [If yes] When are you going to give it in return? 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
Have you ever exchanged received fruit, milk or vegetables as satta-satt from other members 
of your community? 
• [If yes] What did you receive? 
• [If yes] What did you give? 
•  [If no] Why not? 
 
 
4) Cash transfer 
Now I would like to ask you questions regarding the cash transfer your daughter-in-law 
received from MIRA. 
In your household, who makes decisions regarding the cash transfer that your daughter-in-
law received? 
Where is the cash transfer kept? 
What does the cash transfer get spent on? 
• [If food, for each item; if more than three items, only ask about “top three”] 
o Where does she purchase the item from? 
o How much did she buy? 
o How much did it cost? 
o How often did she purchase it? 
o Did she share any of it with other family members? [If yes, how do she decide 
how much to share, when] 
• [If other item or savings, loans, investments – how much was it] 
Have you purchased any food for her from your own money?  
[If yes] How does it compare to the food bought from the cash transfer? 
[If yes] Please talk me through what you have purchased. 
• [For each item; if more than three items, only ask about “top three”] 
o Where did you purchase the item from? 
o How much did you buy? 
o How much did it cost? 
o How often did you purchase it? 
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o Did you share any of it with other family members? [If yes, how do you decide 
how much to share, when] 
Has your daughter-in-law previously been pregnant? 
• [If yes] How does the food eaten in this pregnancy compare to her previous 
pregnancies? (Probe: How has it been different?) 
o [If yes] Do you feel the differences are significant? [Why, why not] 
o [If no] Can you give an example of what has remained the same? 
o [If no] Why not? 
Do you feel the cash has made a difference to what your daughter-in-law can eat?  
• [If yes] What differences has it made? (Probe: Anything else?) 
• [If yes] Why do you think [mention differences above] have happened? 
• [If yes] Do you feel the differences are significant? [Why, why not] 
• [If no] Why not? 
Is your daughter-in-law free to spend the cash transfer on whatever she likes? 
• Can she refuse if other family members ask for money from the cash transfer? 
• Is she free to spend the cash transfer differently from what they talk about in the 
women’s groups? 
 
5) Feelings around sharing money 
 
Do you consider it a good thing or a bad thing if daughters-in-law have their own 
savings/bachat? 
• [If yes] Why? 
• [If yes] How would you feel if you kept all their savings instead of them? 
• [If yes] What if they kept a very large amount of savings? 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
Do you consider it a good thing or a bad thing if daughters-in-law have their own 
savings/koseliya? 
• [If yes] Why? 
• [If yes] How would you feel if you kept all their savings instead of them? 
• [If yes] What if they kept a very large amount of savings? 
• [If no] Why not? 
 
For each of these sources of money, please explain why you do or do not feel that your 
daughter-in-law ought to share this money with you [Probe deeply about the differences 
between these sources of money, particularly the cash transfer] 
• Her income 
• Her husband’s income 
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• Her bachat 
• Her koseliya 
• The cash transfer received from MIRA 
 
Does it show respect if your daughter-in-law shares money with you? [Why, why not] 
Do you consider it your duty to share money with your daughters-in-law as well? [Why, why 
not] 
 
6) Family circumstances 
I would now like to ask you some questions about your family circumstances. 
Now please tell me about your family’s economic situation. How would you describe your 
household? (Probe: Wealthy, poor, secure, insecure, well-off, struggling for survival; also 
probe why) 
• How do you feel about your own economic situation? (Probe: Secure, insecure, well-
off, struggling for survival, worries, fears, joys; also probe why) 
• Do you have any financial worries? [If yes, what] 
Do you depend on your family members economically or could you make a living without 
them? 
[If dependent]: 
• Please describe how you are economically dependent. 
• How do you feel about being economically dependent? 
• Do you think your ability to make decisions in your family would be different if you 
were economically independent? [If yes, how; if no, why not] 
• Has your ability to sustain yourself economically changed in your life? [If yes, how, 
what impact did it have] 
[If independent]: 
• Can you please elaborate on that [how you could make a living on your own]? 
• Do you think your ability to make decisions at home would be different if you were 
economically dependent? [If yes, how; if no, why not] 
• Has your ability to sustain yourself economically changed in your life? [If yes, how, 
what impact did it have] 
I would also like to ask you a few questions about your daughter-in-law. Please note that we 
will keep this information absolutely confidential and strictly use it for research purposes only. 
However, if you feel uncomfortable answering these questions, you can let us know and we 
can skip the questions. 
Do you currently live together with your daughter-in-law? 
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If she is separated from her daughter-in-law 
Please can you tell me the story of how you became separated from your daughter-in-law. 
(Probe, this should be conversational: What was the context? When did it happen? How did 
it start? Why did it happen? What happened when the separation took place? How did you 
split up the property when the separation happened? How did she feel during the separation? 
How does she feel now about it after it has finished?) 
How has the separation affected your relationship to the family members who no longer live 
with you? 
• How has it changed how you behave towards each other? 
o Do you still have the same responsibilities towards each other? 
o Has it changed how they treat you? 
o Has it changed the allocation of household chores in your family? 
• How has the separation changed how you feel about them? 
• How has the separation changed what decisions you can make in the family? [If no 
change, what has remained the same] 
• Do you still have a guardian? [If yes, who, what do they do that makes them a 
guardian] 
How has the separation affected how your share money in the family? 
• [If the sons are alive and earn money] Has it changed who receives the income that is 
earned by your sons? 
• Has it changed who makes purchases in the family? [If yes, how; if no, how are 
purchases made] 
• Has it changed which purchases get made? [If yes, how] 
If she lives together with her daughter-in-law 
Please can you tell me a bit about life since your daughter-in-law came into your family? 
(Probe: When did she get married? How did she get married? Who decided on the marriage? 
How did you feel when she came? What was life like after she had just come? What were the 
biggest worries or fears after she came? What were the biggest joys? How did your life change 
in the years passing afterwards? What are your current biggest worries or fears? What are 
your biggest joys?) 
Can you tell me about your relationship to your daughter-in-law? (Probe: What do you enjoy 
about living with your daughter-in-law? What do you find difficult about living with her? Are 
there any expectations from your daughter-in-law with regards to you? Do you expect 
anything from her? How do you feel about your relationship to your daughter-in-law? Has 
this relationship changed in the years since she came into the family?) 
[Only ask this question if alone with the respondent and nobody else is around] Do you expect 
to continue living with your daughter-in-law for the future? [If yes, please elaborate] 
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7) Community-wide questions 
 
Now I would like to know more about your interaction with the wider community. 
 
During times when you have many worries or fears, are you able to approach people from 
outside your family to ask for help? 
• Do you have any friends outside of your house that you visit? 
o [If yes] Please describe the friends that you visit? (Probe: Where do you know 
them from? What are they like as people? What do you like about seeing 
them?) 
o [If yes] Would they support you if you had worries and fears? [If yes, how] 
o [If yes] Would they be able to help you with family disputes? [If yes, how] 
• Do you have any friends outside of your house that visit you [apart from the ones 
mentioned already in the previous question]? 
o [If yes] Please describe those friends (Probe: Where do you know them from? 
What are they like as people? What do you like about seeing them?) 
o  [If yes] Would they support you if you had worries and fears? [If yes, how] 
o [If yes] Would they be able to help you with family disputes? [If yes, how] 
• [If no friends outside of house] 
o How do you feel about not having friends outside of your house? (Probe: 
Indifferent, content, lonely, sad, insecure, secure) 
o Would you want to have friends outside of your house? [Why, why not] 
o What are the challenges you face in making friends outside of the house? 
o Why do you not have any friends outside of the house? 
 
I would also like to know more about honor/ijjat in your community.  
Please can you explain to me what role honor plays in your life? (Probe: Why is it important 
for you personally? How does honor affect your life personally? Is your honor related to your 
other family members’ honor? Do you active try to achieve honor in your life? Do you worry 
about losing honor in your life?) 
As you know, in our community, a woman’s behavior often reflects her honor. Can you explain 
this in more detail for us? (Probe: What are some traits of women who behave with honor? 
What are some traits of dishonorable women? Are there actions that are more honorable 
than other actions? Are there actions that are more dishonorable than other actions? How 
does the community react to dishonorable women? How does it react to honorable ones?) 
Think of a woman that you know very well. This could be someone in your family or someone 
from your community. You do not need to tell us who it is (but you may if you wish). How 
would you assess whether or not she is an honorable woman? Does she do anything that is 
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particularly honorable or dishonorable? Please describe all aspects of her that reflects on her 
honor. 
In the following situations, please tell us if there is a potential for someone’s honor to be 
damaged or enhanced: 
• A woman going outside her house 
• A woman earning her own money 
• A woman making purchases outside her house 
• A woman keeping her own savings 
THANK THE WOMAN FOR HER TIME AND END THE INTERVIEW 
H.2.3 Topic guide for mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law, Phase 3 
Basic information आधार 
What is your age? आिाके उमर कते छै? 
What is your religion? आिाके धमड कोन छै? 
What is your caste? आिाके िाजत कोन छै? 
Madheshi/Bahadi? मधेसी/ पिाडी ? 
What is your educational level? आिाके शैजक्षक स्तर कते छै? 
[Make an assessment of socio-economic status] 
Are you staying in your maiti or your sasural? दक आिा अप्पन माइजतमे रिजैछ दक ससनरालमे? 
When did your daughter in law come to live with you? 
 
Please tell me who lives in your household. कृपया क के िाम्रा कहु दक आिाके घरमे के सब रि ैछै? 
[Sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law]( बेटासब, 
बेटीसब , िमायसब, पनतहुसब, साउससब , ससनरसब ) 
 
Do you have any members of your family that are currently living abroad? दक आिाके पररवारके 
कोनो सिस्य जविशे रि ैछै वतडमानमे? 
[If yes] Please tell me who lives abroad. अगर ि,ँ त, कृपया िाम्रा बताउ दक के रिछैै जविशे?  
 
First we would like to ask you about the pregnancy of your daughter in law.  
 
How did you feel when you found out your daughter in law was pregnant? 
How did her pregnancy affect what she did around the house? 
How much did she move around outside the house normally (before she was pregnant -  for 
shopping/taking children to school etc)? 
How did this change after she because pregnant? 
What do you think about married women who are pregnant, and who are not pregnant, 
moving around in the community while doing normal tasks? 
In what circumstances do you think it is ok for women to be outside the household? 
What is the community opinion about married women who are pregnant and not pregnant 
being outside the household for doing normal tasks? 
Appendix H 
Topic guides for qualitative research 
 
 
586 | P a g e  
 
How is the honour of women affected by being outside their houses to do normal tasks? (how 
does this compare with when they are outside their houses to do other tasks – ie  
 
Now we would like to ask you about the MIRA group meetings 
How did you find out about the group meetings and cash availability? 
How often did you go with your daughter in law to meetings? 
How did you feel about your daughter in law being outside of the house and going to 
meetings? 
We have heard that some families want to protect (maintain the honour) of their daughters 
in law and this makes them worried about them attending meetings. What do you think about 
this? 
(To what extent were you worried about your daughter in law and her reputation/honour?  
How were you and your family able to overcome these worries and think that it would be 
acceptable for her to go to a meeting? 
How do you think your daughter in law felt about going to the meetings? (probe about 
whether she played a role in getting permission to go the meetings, or whether she was 
reluctant do go) 
What was the main reason that your daughter in law (and you) went to meetings? 
 
What did you like about the meetings?  
What did you not like about the meetings? 
How do you think your daughter in law has been affected by going to the meetings? How has 
the meeting made her feel or behave? 
(how have you been affected by going to the meetings?) 
 
The group held a community meeting. How did you participate in this? 
Were you involved in any of the other activities (strategies) that the group have conducted? 
Which activity of the women’s group did you enjoy the most? 
How do you think the women’s group and its activities could have been improved? 
 
Now we would like to talk to you about the cash transfer. 
How did your daughter in law usually receive the cash? 
How would you have preferred her to receive the cash? Why? 
Tell us about a time when she received cash at home. (Why did she receive it at home? What 
happened? Who came to give her the cash? What did they say? Whom did they talk to?) 
When your daughter in law received cash at the women’s group meetings, what happened? 
(did she keep the cash, or give to someone else (you) – why did she give to someone else? 
(you)) 
If she kept the transfer, why did she not give it to someone else (you)? 
 
What were the advantages (good things) about receiving the cash at the women’s group 
meetings? 
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Now we would like to ask you about spending the cash transfer 
What dis the cash transfer get spent on? 
How were purchases made with the cash transfer (probe for whether things are delivered, if 
they are bought by the woman herself, or if someone else buys things for the woman, where 
they were bought from and how often)? 
In your household, how were decisions made about how the cash transfer was spent?  
Where was the cash transfer kept? 
 
To what extent did you feel the cash made a difference to what your daughter-in-law ate 
during her pregnancy? What kind of difference has it made (compared to previous 
pregnancies/other family pregnancies)? 
To what extent was your daughter-in-law free to spend the cash transfer on whatever she 
wants? 
What advice did you and your daughter in law receive about how the cash should be spent? 
How useful was that advice?  
How much were you and your daughter in law able to follow this advice? 
What made it difficult to follow the advice? 
 
We have heard that it is difficult to make the transfer last over the whole month. Can you tell 
us how your daughter in law has managed? 
Throughout her pregnancy, how did her spending of the cash change? Why? 
 
To what extent was money from the cash transfer lent or given to other family members?  
(why don’t they ask for a loan/money?) 
It must have been difficult for your daughter in law to keep the food that she buys with the 
transfer only for herself. How did she manage? To what extent did she share the food that 
she bought? 
 
Now we would like to ask you about your interactions with MIRA about the cash 
How do MIRA check that your daughter in law has spent the cash according to their advice? 
How would your daughter in law or your family be affected if you didn’t spend the cash on 
food? 
We have observed that the NM or FCHV asks how the cash is spent at every meeting. How do 
you feel about this?  
How do you think that other people (ie not MIRA staff) would react if it was known your 
daughter in law hadn’t spent the money on what was recommended? 
How would the honour/reputation of the family be affected? 
 
We want to explore your opinions about how the cash might improve the health of the 
baby. 
How is your grandchild? 
How would describe his/her health/weight/cleverness? 
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We have heard that giving cash to pregnant women improves the health of their baby because 
there was community (outside) pressure to spend the cash transfer on fruit and milk, and 
then people feel ashamed if they spend it on anything else. 
To what extent do you think this was true? 
How was this community pressure created? 
 
Some people think that giving a pregnant woman cash, helps to remind the family that 
pregnant women need good nutrition for the health of their baby. 
To what extent do you think this is true? Why? 
(Compared to other pregnancies, how aware is your family about good nutrition in 
pregnancy? Why) 
 
Some people think that giving a pregnant woman cash helps to remind her family that 
pregnancy is an important time to take care of a woman? 
To what extent do you think this is true for your family? Why? 
(compared to other pregnancies, how aware was your family about the need to take care of 
you especially?) 
probe about antenatal care and rest 
 
Some people think that the women’s group is effective in reducing the number of low birth 
weight babies, by increasing the knowledge of family members of pregnant women? 
To what extent do you think this is true? 
Why? 
What does the family know about what your daughter in law should eat, and how she should 
eat during pregnancy? 
Who has the most knowledge in your family about good nutrition in pregnancy? Why/how? 
How does your family ensure that your daughter in law had good nutrition in her pregnancy? 
How easy was it for your daughter in law to maintain good nutrition during pregnancy? What 
affected the quantity and type of food that she ate during her pregnancy? 
 
 
Many thanks for your time. 
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Job position in MIRA 
How long you have worked with MIRA 
Whether you are enrolled as a pregnant woman in LBW-SAT yourself or not 
 
Women’s groups 
First I would like to talk to you about your work with the women’s groups in general. 
 
What do you discuss with women in the women’s groups? 
How do you feel the women have responded to the women’s groups? 
How do you feel the wider community has responded to the women’s groups? 
 
Impact of the cash transfers 
Now I would like to talk to you about the cash transfers and their impact on the community. 
 
How do you feel the women and their families have responded to the cash transfers? 
How do you feel the wider community has responded to the cash transfers? 
What do you are the differences between women’s pregnancies now and before the LBW-
SAT trial? 
Do families consider the cash transfer a big or a small sum? 
• What is the difference between families that consider it a big and a small sum? 
• Have you personally witnessed women tell you that it is a big sum? [Give an example] 
• Have you personally witnessed women tell you that it is a small sum? [Give an example] 
As you may know, many women move to the cash VDCs of the trial to receive the cash 
transfer.  
• Why do you think so many women do this? 
• Why do you think some women choose to stay in their control VDCs instead of 
moving? 
Spending the cash transfers 
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Next I would like to talk to you about how women spend their cash transfers. 
 
What do you think pregnant women spend their cash transfers on? 
[For each item mentioned talk through how they buy this item] 
• Where do you think they buy it from? 
• Who supplies this item? 
• What does it cost? 
• How often do you think they buy it? 
• Where do they keep it? 
• How long does one purchase last? 
 
Teaching about the cash transfers 
Next I would like to talk to you about what you teach women regarding the use of the cash 
transfers. 
 
What do you discuss with the women in the women’s groups regarding the cash transfers? 
Please give an example. 
(For NM and FCHV only) Do you discuss the cash transfers during home visits to the women 
as well? [If yes, what do you discuss, please give an example] 
• What do you teach women regarding the purpose of the cash transfer? 
• What do you recommend women using the cash transfer on? 
• What do you teach women regarding the benefits associated with the cash transfer? 
• Do you teach women about any risks associated with the cash transfer? [If yes, please 
give an example, if no, why not] 
 
Terms and conditions regarding the cash transfer 
• What do you tell them regarding the requirements for receiving the cash transfer? 
• [Referring to the above answer] How do you tell them about this? Please demonstrate. 
• What do you tell them can lead to termination of the cash transfer? 
• [Referring to the above answer] How do you tell them about this? Please demonstrate. 
• What do you tell them happens if they do not use the cash transfer on food? 
• [Referring to the above answer] How do you tell them about this? Please demonstrate. 
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Relationship between staff and families in the community 
Now I would like to talk to you more in depth about your own role in the community. 
• Do you feel your relationship to the community people has changed? [If yes, what has 
changed, if no, why not] 
• How do people in your community see you now? What words do they use to describe 
you? 
 
Suppose you discover a pregnant woman who does not spend her cash transfer on food for 
herself. 
• Has this happened in the past? [If yes, what actually happened then?] 
• What are you supposed to do in this situation? Please describe in full detail. 
• What do most pregnant women think is the purpose of the cash transfer? Is this 
different from what you think? 
• What do pregnant women think will happen if they spend the cash transfer on 
something different from food? Why do they think that? 
 
End of the interview 
This is the end of the interview. I have asked you many questions, so is there anything you 
would like to ask of me? 
PLEASE THANK THE RESPONDENT FOR HER PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY 
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Appendix I 
Example intermediate products of 
qualitative analysis 
I.1 Example field notes 
I wrote down two types of field notes: 1) Debriefing notes were taken after 
interviews in the field, where I discussed the recently concluded interviews with 
the interviewers. It was not possible to obtain in-depth debriefings of every 
interview that was conducted, but I tried to debrief as frequently as the 
availability and willingness of interviewers allowed 2) Discussion notes were 
taken after discussions of key concepts with MIRA staff. I did not write any 
observation notes down, as I often followed up observations immediately with 
discussions with MIRA staff (which turned into discussion notes) and I took 
photos of dwellings and villages (with consent) to stimulate reflection about the 
physical environment. 
 
Example debriefing note 





SES: Lower middle class 
Education: 5th Standard 
Sasural 
4 months' pregnant 
Married 3 years ago 
3 transfers 
Living together with mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law (married a few months ago, 
left house) 
  
Father-in-law living abroad for 7 years, right now back for his daughter's marriage 
Father-in-law sends 150,000 NPR home per month 
Husband works as a fisherman earning 10,000-12,000 NPR per month 
No family business 
  
Mother-in-law receives income, mother-in-law makes decisions 
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She receives allowances from her husband and her mother-in-law to make expenditures for the 
household and for herself (not a large sum, irregular) - mostly used to eat fruits to buy from the 
village (felt like it was secretly eaten and bought when nobody is home) 
Not allowed to earn an income by her mother-in-law, because she was recently married 
Savings - five bank accounts, one in a group and one in Janakpur, mother-in-law saves 500 NPR a 
month in the name of the daughter-in-law 
Personal koseliya (didn't tell how much), saved so that she can eat well and buy fruits from people 
coming to her house (group of women buy from travelling seller), put it in her peti 
Mother-in-law saves money in a ataichi (suitcase) 
Feels entitled to receiving an allowance, because she has no other way of getting money 
Yes, we have taken loans (father-in-law took loans for the marriage of the sister-in-law, 500,000-
600,000 NPR in loan; 150,000 NPR given in dowry) 
They have not borrowed any money, but they lend money to others, in the community if 2-3 people 
ask for money then the family gives them (for illness or other purposes) 
Not involved in any group activity herself, mother-in-law goes to a group, but she does not know 
what her mother-in-law is being taught in the group 
Mother-in-law makes purchases, daughter-in-law purchases at home when people come to sell 
things, eating items only and eats them nobody is home (spend from her koseliya) 
Makes decisions herself regarding what to eat and not to eat - she keeps the whole amount with 
herself (at first), but later admitted that she actually handed over the money to her mother-in-law 
twice in order to make purchases (slip of the tongue, they are strictly told in the women's groups 
to keep the cash with themselves) 
She told her mother-in-law to purchase fruits, once when mother-in-law did not have money with 
her, then they were in Janakpur for her daughter-in-law's video X-ray, gave 750 rupees to her 
mother-in-law + extra money from her mother-in-law to pay for the X-ray (nearly 2000 NPR in total, 
gave cash transfer) 
It is frequently that fruits are purchased, every 3 market days 
FCHV told her about the women's groups meeting 
Wanted to go to the meeting herself, convinced her mother-in-law to go there and give her 
permission to go 
Went together with mother-in-law every time 
I cannot go alone, how can I go alone to the meeting place, our face is completely covered and our 
heads are always covered, I can't even see the road in front of me, if someone gives me directions 
I can't even follow them - I'm new to this village and I don't know directions 
She shares fears and worries with her husband and her mother-in-law (when “X-ray” was done and 
it reported that the position of the baby was inverted, she got support from her husband who said 
don't worry everything will go well trust Bhagwan) 
Husband helps in case of disputes with her mother-in-law 
I have never disagreed to any of the decisions at home, I think everything is going very well, I 
suggested once to my mother-in-law to take out a loan for my sister's marriage 
I told her to ask for money from somebody else and she did that 
Mother-in-law has the most authority and least is she herself 
In the beginning when I was married here, even when I had to cook food, I had to cook the mother-
in-law how much rice to cook, how much dal, what kind of vegetables, which vegetables in the 
evening, now I can cook myself and decide myself 
 
Example discussion note 1 
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When asked about why the majority of respondents indicate that the mother-in-law manages the 
money at home, Shyam told me that men are considered to be thrifty spenders whereas women 
will keep the money very secretively and only hand out money when you give them a good reason 
for getting the money. They only give money at the needed time for proper purposes, particularly 
because "this is Nepal" and a lot of men spend money on alcohol. Another reason is that sometimes 
people spend money on "bad work" (prostitution) in food lodgings here and there and for this other 
reason women prefer the money with themselves.  
  
When asked about why the men give permission to their wives to keep the money, Shyam said that 
good men give money to their wife who can keep it like a bank. Shyam said that if the wife refuses 
to give money to the husband or says that there is not any money left when the husband asks for 
money for alcohol or other things, the wife may say that all the money has been spent on other 
household expenditures (salt, spices, rice, etc.) and so I cannot give you any money. If the request 
given by the husband is logical then the wife may provide money, but if it is suspicious then she 
may come up with an excuse not to provide him with money. If the wife is very "tight" with money, 
the husband may save some of the money for himself and put it in his pocket and give the rest to 
his wife and say this is all he has earned. The other reason is that people spend a lot of money on 
betel-leaf, paan, cigarettes, guthka, paan-paraakh and sometimes the wife will share with her 
husband that you spent all this money on such things, if you spent your money on buying milk for 
yourself instead of these things it would be good for your health.  
  
When the woman has secret money it is called koseliya, but there is not an equivalent for men. The 
closest for men is "pocket karch" which is the pocket money/spending that he keeps in his pocket. 
Women don't generally have "pocket karch", because they manage the household money so there 
is no need for them to keep extra money around. When daughters-in-law keep pocket money, it 
will be called koseliya and not "pocket karch". The reason for this difference is that after marriage, 
the daughter-in-law comes into the husband's home and if they don't have their own money, 
sometimes she needs soap, lipstick, perfume and make-up (because she is newly married and needs 
to be beautiful and attractive to her husband) - for this purpose in-laws will never agree to give her 
money, hence in order to buy this she needs to accumulate koseliya.  
  
Before the marriage, the husband and wife don't have so many requirements, because they don't 
have so many relations but afterwards, in order to maintain relationships with relatives they need 
to have spending to buy gifts. If the sasu gets this information, then she will be angry with her 
daughter-in-law. 
  
According to Shyam, Sudip is confused about koseliya and when men keep money in a pouch around 
the stomach, it should be referred to as "pocket kharch". 
 
Money saved in a bank is not secret, at least not to the bank holder and so it cannot be called 
koseliya. Because money in a bank account is used for all family members and is public knowledge. 
Even if the woman keeps the money in a secret bank account, it is just like koseliya, but it is not 
really koseliya, because at least the bank holder knows about her account - if the bank staff is the 
neighbour or related to the woman there is a chance of disclosure. 
  
Koseliya money is collected either before marriage or sometimes her husband gives her money for 
expenditures and she saves some amount by purchasing and gathers it together. The amount of 
money in the koseliya is not known by family members and they don't know if they spend it 
(spending and collecting both are secret). 
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Kharcha is given for some purposes such as buying sari, blouse, cosmetic materials by the sasu to 
her buhari then it is called kharcha - this is given for personal expenditure with the knowledge of 
the whole family and the money is provided by the sasu. The key distinction between kharcha and 
koseliya is whether or not other family have information about the money at hand. 
  
Bachat means saving - it generally refers to money in a savings account/peti. If the money is taken 
from the account and it is spent then it is kharcha. Sometimes bachat can be given out for loans 
with interest. 
 
Example discussion note 2 
Neha: Important for me, because if I have honor, I will be proud of myself and people around me 
will think that I behave with honor. Because then everybody respects me and it brings happiness 
inside me. I am honored means that I am praised by them and that makes me feel happy. People 
around me will listen to my advice, if I am honored then they will keep me in mind whatever I tell 
them. Honor is closely related to notion of respect. If someone has no honor then nobody will 
respect them. Honor integral to self-concept. Status and honor related. Honor is always positive.  
  
Rishi: Honor is linked community service, gifts, appreciation, what type of work you do. No different 
between the ijjat of men and women - it is about status and decision-making, head of household, 
income earning (remittances give honor). Men have to perform good activities in the community 
(leadership, elected leaders, political parties). Women get honor from running the household, FC 
and VDCIs leading groups in the community, being teachers. Honorable people perform 
development communities, meetings in the development sector, good leaders, respect and get 
support. So a person who only works for his own family and does not help the community does not 
have honor. Even without women's groups there are forest users groups. Does not necessarily 
involve big, organized development activities, could just be helping out the neighbour with their 
construction work, providing advice with planning and execution of construction work.  
  
Neha: If there is a very rich person in the community, they get samaan/ijjat. Even if the family does 
not help out other people with their money, they still have honor. It is not common to spend your 
own money on development work. It is not common to perform philanthropy, people keep the 
money they earn with themselves only. At times, when villagers are in a crisis, they might ask for 
money (even considered help if giving out loans with interest). Ijjat is also related to sexual activity, 
but when we ask women about ijjat in general, it could be related to personal lives. Two words: Ijjat 
(more personal honor, private morality), samaan/pratishta (more general, leadership, status). We 
can use ijjat for public activities, but samaan is more powerful than ijjat. Ijjat is a more Urdu/Hindi 
word and more associated with India. Samaan is more associated with Nepal. 
  
Neha: Situation with a successful doctor - after 14/15 years of her marriage, she left her husband 
and then got married to someone else. She is living with another husband and left her two children 
and until then she is not allowed by her community people to attend any parties or any ceremonies 
in her former home, even though now she is a successful doctor. She is respected for being a doctor, 
but when it comes to her personal ijjat and more private events she is excluded. When any other 
relative is going to meet her, they are considered amoral, because they are visiting a person of low 
status. Honor is relational and affects everybody else, you can be "infected" by dishonor from 
somebody else and definitely affects other family members. When the doctor wanted to visit her 
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relatives, then the other community members asked why that family even allowed her to come to 
her home. 
  
Neha: In school settings, it is also contagious. A teacher was using a stick to beat a child very harshly, 
all the other teachers was saying that they would not teach again if that teacher would join them 
again at the school. Because of that, they have to go to jail and it is something really dishonorable. 
If it had been a private event, then the other teachers were not worried about it as much, but 
because it became publicly known it became dishonorable for the whole school and all the staff 
working there. Clarification: It is contagious through personal/private relationship or strong 
affiliation, not just public promixity. 
  
Neha: Talking to her grandmother about honor, it sounded very similar. People who were very rich 
or had great landholdings they were highly esteemed/honored. When my grandmother used to tell 
me, when they used to get married, people who had their sons or daughters getting married to a 
family where they have more and more land or they have four-five pairs of oxen and they have so 
much livestock, it was a matter of great pride. She got married into such a home and she was then 
highly respected in her maternal home when she used to be back in her home after 3-4 days of 
marriage. In the present time, people are looking for somebody to marry their daughters, they are 
not looking at how much property, land or livestock they have, now they are looking for a perfect 
guy who can earn a handsome salary and he has good behaviour. That has made a big difference. 
And those families where their sons don't have land or property, their sons had studied up a high 
level and were engineers or doctors or professors and they are like highly honored in the community 
rather than those with a lot of property. 
  
Rishi: Asked about private and public honor. Example of getting pregnant before marriage - these 
are private cultural practices, getting a good marriage and made the family members appreciate 
her. Family related activities and public activities are different. Rishi thinks that a woman who has 
gotten pregnant before marriage, but starts working and does  good public work afterwards is able 
to be accepted again by the community. For example, in the case of inter-caste marriage both the 
families did not accept the couple and afterwards both members of the couple got educated and a 
good job and the government also promoted a policy of helping scheduled castes and then 
afterwards the family and the community accepted them again.  
  
Rishi: The influence of media, education and changes in law (discrimination) have changed this 
concept. Before the community would not accept inter-caste marriages, but now education has 
changed this. Widowed women and single women have organised and demanded from the 
government and others that they should support those women. The Women and Children's Office 
now supports those women. And also women suffering from violence. Chari Maya Thing organized 
an anti-girl trafficking organization and was trafficked herself. In the beginning nobody helped her, 
because nobody trusted her and then when the matter reached the media and the public knew 
about it, then she became highly respected and became trusted. 
  
Rishi: A rich woman who goes out of her house and goes and works in the fields. She is not accepted 
by the community, she needs to convince the family members and the community members that I 
am also a normal woman who works in the field and helps her family and earns income through it. 
Decision to discuss the concept of honor in a group with the FCs. 
  
Neha: Case of woman who was a doctor - even though the family ostracized her in private affairs, 
people still needed to go to her for medical problems, people trusted her and she was a 
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gynaecologist and she was slowly accepted by her family members and other people through her 
work for her in her medical check-ups. It is true that if you are in a strong public position that can 
offset private affairs. 
  
Another example. A girl from a wealthy family who got married to a very low caste boy, they ran 
away for a love marriage out of their home. Then she is neither a doctor nor an engineer. She does 
not have anything to compensate for that. And she is not respected or honored at all in the 
community. She does not have anything else to show that yes she should be honored despite going 
against her culture. 
  
Neha: Difference between her and her sister. For Neha, honor is about getting a gold medal from 
her university. For her sister, even get a modest job or if she even passes her examination then she 
feels honored because of that. But the concept of honor does not seem to be different between 
traditional and modern women. Also people discuss the idea of being modern, it is not a strong 
concept - although there is a difference between the idea of honor between traditional and modern 
women - traditional women may feel that if she performs her household chores properly or has a 
good relationship with her mother-in-law and father-in-law in her home, she will be honored and 
respected in her family. But for a modern woman who thinks that she will work or she would like 
to go and take up acting, for her she would be honored to get such an opportunity instead. Honor 
is not just about self-respect, honor is about other people respecting you, you cannot honor yourself 
(e.g. I'm wearing this dress and I am feeling honored). 
  
Neha: When asked about whether honor is the Absolute. Everybody would like to be honored. For 
Neha, she may work very hard and complete her work very smoothly in order to be honored by her 
seniors. That is something very valuable for her. For another person who works in this office, she 
may think it's okay I do my job I am paid for that and that's all. Salary is the need. "I work for salary 
that is the need, it is not that I work in order to be honored. When I know that yes I will be paid for 
my then salary is not the only thing I would like to have from my job, but the second stage is about 
being honored like giving a better presentation or being honored by her sir or Naomi didi if she 
gives a very good presentation." But then everybody would want to be honored, everybody would 
want to be honored and feel great at work and somehow would honor us and respect us highly. 
Some other people might not think that yes they should be honored, they might just want to get 
their salary. For Neha, honor in itself is something that helps her feel good about herself, although 
a highly honored person with a bad salary might wonder why their salary is not good (one staff 
member felt like this). If somebody leaves her out of information, she may feel it is because she is 
not honored enough. 
  
Neha: Honor can conflict with personal aspirations, e.g. a woman who is achieving a lot 
professionally, but gets married and is expected to stay at home and stop achieving personally in 
order to receive the honor from being a housewife and having a successful husband. However, Neha 




Example intermediate products of qualitative analysis 
 
 
599 | P a g e  
 
I.2 Example code tree from open coding 
The relationships between the daughter-in-law and other household members 
were broken down into relationships between the daughter-in-law and 1) other 
daughters-in-law 2) brothers-in-law 3) father-in-law 4) mother-in-law and 5) 
husband. Since it would take up too much space to show the full code tree for 
all the relationships, only the sub-code tree relating to the relationship between 
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I.3 Example “integrative memo” 
Below is an example of an “integrative memo” that presents all the major 
categories of an analysis of financial agency for daughters-in-law and integrates 
them into a “storyline”. Multiple such integrative memos were written over the 
course of my analysis, the below memo comes from an intermediary stage of 
analysis. 
 
Daughters-in-law lived within an economic context characterized by pervasive 
poverty, insufficient income and high levels of risky male labour migration. 
Household access to financial services was usually only available through local 
savings, credit and micro-business groups and families widely reported storing 
cash in locked containers at home. Due to the organization of commodity 
markets, fresh food supplies were usually only available on market days at the 
nearest market or through travelling salespeople selling fruit, vegetables and 
milk door-to-door. 
 
Within the household itself, the social order of the household ranked family 
members according to a hierarchy of guardianship where higher-ranking 
family members were “guardians” of lower-ranking family members. 
Guardianship was largely determined by age and gender, but could be altered 
by factors influencing entitlements such as the death or absence of family 
members, relative education levels of family members and economic 
bargaining power. One of the more important functions of guardianship was 
to protect the honour or “reputation for goodness of character” of the 
daughter-in-law. This often involved restrictive mobility norms for daughters-
in-law, which often prevented daughters-in-law further from gaining 
friendships in the community. 
 
The organization of the intra-household economy was divided by age and 
gender. Younger, married male members were expected to earn for the 
family, while other male family members provided leadership, or 
guardianship, for the younger, male family members. Women’s roles followed 
an inside/outside distinction where housework inside the household including 
child care duties was typically allocated the daughter-in-law, while housework 
outside the household was provided the mother-in-law who also occupied a 
guardian role vis-à-vis the daughter-in-law. 
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Finances were organized in accordance with two competing social norms, a 
personal property norm and a central planning norm. According to the 
personal property norm, family members who earned or were given income 
by others had a right to that income and other family members needed to seek 
consent before taking “their” money. According to the central planning norm, 
a key person named the financial guardian, received all income and decided 
how to allocate it among household expenditures. This financial guardian was 
usually the mother-in-law who would usually be involved in organizing loans 
for the family, storing savings in savings and credit groups and directing day-
to-day purchases. In practice, compromise positions were reached where 
individual family members received small allowances of liquid cash while the 
financial guardian controlled the majority of household income. 
 
However, this organization of the intra-household economy did not always 
guarantee the economic and social security of the daughter-in-law. Daughters-
in-law often found themselves in positions of powerlessness or lack of voice 
over household finances. This posed particularly stresses on daughters-in-law 
who suffered from basic financial insecurity in meeting the needs of their own 
pregnancy or their own children. Daughters-in-law also suffered from risks of 
neglect and exploitation at the hands of their extended family including 
withdrawal of financial support for health emergencies, overwork and verbal 
abuse as well as physical domestic violence. 
 
The combined forces of economic and social insecurity often created in 
daughters-in-law a desire for financial freedom from their situation. Although 
this included dreams of economic progress and the ability to live “the good 
life”, a substantial component of the desire for financial freedom also included 
a demand for fairness in the family and treatment in accordance with norms 
of basic needs satisfaction, rights to personal property and equitable 
distribution of resources. It also instilled a desire in daughters-in-law to live 
“one’s life in one’s own way”, which included participating in family affairs, 
deciding on one’s own expenditures and purchases and being able to control 
the process of purchasing. Finally, underneath the desire for financial freedom 
seemed to be a longing for care, love and support as daughters-in-law wished 
to escape abusive situations and enter loving relationships with others. 
 
However, multiple intervening conditions prevented daughters-in-law from 
directly or overtly seeking financial freedom in the family. Reputational and 
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social risks of disobedience were severe and could cost daughters-in-law the 
financial support of the extended family. Family members and daughters-in-
law themselves also often ruled out larger sums of credit, because daughters-
in-law neither had the experience nor the collateral nor the social contacts 
necessary to obtain such loans. Further, lack of decent employment 
opportunities prevented daughters-in-law from taking up wage employment 
as a path to financial freedom.  
 
The combined effect was to limit the available options for financial freedom 
for daughters-in-law to attempts to obtain savings from their husbands, which 
were usually endorsed by their husbands as an indirect way of securing greater 
funds for themselves and their own children. However, the wider family often 
disapproved as they saw the accumulation of private savings by daughters-in-
law as a strategic move to prepare the daughter-in-law for household 
separation with her husband, when they had accumulated sufficient savings 
to live on their own. As a result, daughters-in-law often had to be wise about 
their choices of strategies to obtain financial freedom. 
 
One of the main strategies employed by daughters-in-law was almost a non-
strategy: Silencing the self and accepting “fate”. This involved avoiding 
criticism or confrontation with others, refraining from seeking help and 
silencing one’s inner thoughts and aspirations. However, daughters-in-law 
also showed a marked capacity for agency when they capitalized on supportive 
mothers-in-law and gained financial freedoms before they were financial 
guardians themselves, used the husband as a go-between to “lobby” other 
family members for their own position, or kept financial secrets with their 
husband, particularly the secret of husbands’ sending them separate income 
without the knowledge of other family members. Daughters-in-law were also 
found to “manage” their husbands by refusing money for alcohol or meat and 
fish when the husbands demanded it or secretly storing their own income 
without letting others know. Finally, daughters-in-law might use the maternal 
home as a fail-safe in situations where neither husband nor in-laws nor friends 
could support them. 
 
The strategies undertaken by daughters-in-law in reaction to their desire for 
financial freedom had both financial and psychosocial consequences, both in 
the short-term and the long-term. Financially, the daughters-in-law who relied 
on their mothers-in-law had little disposable cash in the short term. On the 
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other hand, supportive mothers-in-law often looked out for the long-term 
financial prospects of their daughters-in-law by maintaining savings accounts 
on their behalf or encouraging their further education. Daughters-in-law who 
received direct financial support from their husbands independently of 
mothers-in-law reported 5-15 times larger amounts. Finally, daughters-in-law 
who were supported by their parents received only large amounts in periods 
of financial crisis. From a psychosocial perspective, daughters-in-law reported 
feeling happier and less stressed when they were provided an allowance by 
their husbands, but faced a choice in the longer term between encouraging a 
household separation and staying with their in-laws. Daughters-in-law who 
eventually became mothers-in-law themselves might find that their 
experience as mothers-in-law was less free and unrestrained than they had 
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Appendix J 
Additional context for the financial 
power of daughters-in-law 
 
J.1 Introduction 
The aim of this appendix is to provide further contextual information on the 
household dynamics in which daughters-in-law were embedded. We focus 
mainly on the relationship between the daughter-in-law and her mother-in-law 
and her husband, as these are two of the most important figures in the Maithili 
family concerning her financial power41. Section J.2 presents the methods for 
this Appendix. Section J.3 will explore advantages and disadvantages to relying 
on the mother-in-law for attaining greater financial power in the family. J.4 will 




The methods for the analyses in this Appendix have been presented in Chapter 
6. Briefly, we followed Corbin and Strauss’ [341] version of grounded theory  and 
conducted a total of 22 interviews with daughters-in-law, 15 interviews with 
their mothers-in-law and 3 interviews with their elder sisters-in-law from a total 
of 22 families. All interviews were individual, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews. Elder sisters-in-law were only interviewed when the mother-in-law 
had passed away had taken over her responsibilities instead. 
                                                          
41 Elder brothers-in-law and fathers-in-law are difficult to draw support from due to communication taboos 
preventing speech between daughters-in-law and elder male in-laws in many families (Section J.4.2). Younger 
brothers-in-law usually have lower status in the family than husbands due to their younger age. Unmarried 
sisters-in-law are often considered temporary residents of the family, waiting to leave for their husband’s home 
when they get married. Even though other daughters-in-law living in the same household could be potential 
allies, relationships between daughters-in-law are often highly competitive – in our sample, co-resident 
daughters-in-law accused each other of stealing money or lying about their educational qualifications to gain 
higher status in the family. 
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All interviews with daughters-in-law and their mothers-in-law were conducted 
simultaneously, i.e. two interviewers would concurrently interview both 
daughters-in-law and their mothers-in-law in separate locations out of earshot 
of each other. The same procedure was used with daughters-in-law and their 
elder sisters-in-law. 
 
The interviews were directly translated from the audiotape into English from 
Maithili. The resultant data was coded using analytical methods from grounded 
theory including memoing, open coding and selective coding. All quotes from 
respondents in this Chapter are indexed by the serial numbers and district 
identifiers provided in Table 18 in Chapter 6. 
 
J.3 Relying on the mother-in-law 
J.3.1 Uncertainty about long-term pay-off 
The traditional approach to gaining power in the Maithili household was to act 
a subservient and dutiful daughter-in-law to the mother-in-law until one had 
daughters-in-law of one’s own. When such a time came, these could take over 
the menial tasks in the household and one assumed the powerful role of 
mother-in-law oneself [22]. However, significant challenges made this strategy 
an uncertain bet in contemporary Nepal. 
 
First, the timescales involved were often very long-term. Daughters-in-law could 
gradually gain the confidence of their mothers-in-law, but this was often a slow 
process. Daughters-in-law who had been married for more than seven, eight or 
even fifteen years still reported having no influence over family decisions and 
needing to seek permission for seemingly minor household tasks. For example, 
one daughter-in-law was not even allowed by her mother-in-law to help 
reinforce the mud of the house that she lived in even though she had been 
married for 8 years. 
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“I told my mother in-law that I wanted to help reinforce the mud of our house, 
but she did not give me permission to do this” (daughter-in-law 4, Kote) 
 
Another daughter-in-law had been married for 10-15 years and had already 
brought a daughter-in-law of her own into the household. However, in her 
interview, she still reported being almost completely barred from participating 
in financial decisions in the family. 
 
"As they do not share things with me and they do not tell me anything then how 
can I be satisfied with them [the in-laws]?" (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
 
Second, even if one eventually became the most senior woman of the 
household, sons and daughters-in-law could threaten to demand a household 
separation at any time. In addition to suffering a humiliating loss of honour in 
the community, such a move would potentially revert the mother-in-law back to 
her “initial position” as she had to carry out the housework that her daughters-
in-law previously carried out. 
 
“I had done everything for my household … I was cooking for my family members, 
and many more things …, but later my daughter(s) and daughters-in-law were 
doing [it]. Then I was freed from household work, but again after separation I 
am in the initial position” (mother-in-law 5, Kote) 
 
Daughters-in-law were frequently perceived as uncompliant and difficult as well 
as naturally suspicious of any claims by the mother-in-law that she could not 
afford goods and services for them. This was a difficult position for mothers-in-
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law to be in, since they might genuinely have no financial resources to provide 
their daughters-in-law. 
 
“[My daughter-in-law] fights with me … Because I forbid her to do things which 
she wants to do. As we are poor people then we should live like [poor people]. If 
anyone asks me to provide food which I could not afford then how could I 
manage that? And if anyone quarrels with me about not giving food of his or her 
choice then what can I do? Therefore she fights with me. I manage everything 
including oil, soap, clothes and so son, but I cannot manage those things for her 
which I cannot afford” (mother-in-law 4, Kote).  
 
Third, even the support of one’s sons was not assured as a mother-in-law. One 
mother-in-law reported being ostracised by her sons and their daughters-in-law 
after losing her guardianship status to her oldest son. In a restatement of a 
common fear that wives lure their husband’s affections away from his parents 
and brothers (Section J.4.3), the mother-in-law indirectly blamed her daughters-
in-law for her own misfortune, as she explained that once men start listening to 
their wives, they stop taking care of their parents. 
 
“I expect nothing from my sons. They are my sons, but in name only … Ram had 
seven sons, yet no-one looked after him … Nowadays, a man does not side with 
his mother, but instead sides with his wife. They only listen to their wives. 
Previously, people said that you had only one parent, you could always have 
more wives, therefore they used to obey their parents and look after them. But 
now people do not think like this, they only care about their wives, but not about 
their parents. Now everything is changed. People have changed their principles, 
[now] it is said that a wife is everything for a man, but parents do not count” 
(mother-in-law 7, Kote) 
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Perhaps for a similarly reason, one daughter-in-law was advised to plan for the 
possibility that she would not be supported by her sons after her own sons got 
married. 
 
“People say that it is good for me to remarry [after the death of my husband] 
because my children would grow up soon and get married and stop looking after 
their parent and at that age, a single woman would be [all] alone” (daughter-in-
law 8, Kote) 
 
J.3.2 Poor communication and oppressive experiences 
As we saw in the previous section, mothers-in-law often operated with a 
dichotomy between male support for their parents and male support for their 
wives. Thus, in order to secure their position in the family, mothers-in-law often 
acted in ways that reinforced their own status in the family and maintained the 
low status of their daughters-in-law. Many daughters-in-law experienced such 
behaviour as oppressive as they widely reported feeling micro-managed by their 
mothers-in-law with virtually no room for making their own decisions. In 
addition, even small perceived missteps lead to excoriations by the mother-in-
law. 
 
 "Even though I do everything [my mother-in-law] [still] says that I don’t do [my 
housework]. Now I have child and even if I do everything properly, sometimes my 
child would misplace things and then [my mother-in-law] would say that I was 
not doing my housework" (daughter-in-law 1, Jamal) 
"I used to ask my mother-in-law before doing anything. For example, whether to 
cook rice or roti or which vegetables should be cooked all these things I used to 
ask my mother-in-law about … I was afraid because I was newly married … Once 
upon a time, I had left my housework undone and started talking to my sister-in-
law, then my mother-in-law started berating me" (daughter-in-law 6, Sahku).  
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Daughters-in-law also frequently found mothers-in-law inaccessible and difficult 
to communicate with, while mothers-in-law on their part often felt that there 
was little need for taking advice from their daughters-in-law. This created a 
barrier against communication between the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law 
that enhanced the potential for mistrust and cynicism on both sides. 
 
"[My mother-in-law] was saying all the time that since I did not earn money for 
the family, I did not have the right to do anything or to say anything … How can 
I say anything to her, if she does not listen to me? … No, I would not ask her 
anything on any matter, because she would not agree with me in any case" 
(daughter-in-law 4, Kote) 
“I make every decision myself. I usually to tell [my daughter-in-law] not to 
interfere in any matter, because she does not understand things” (mother-in-law 
4, Kote) 
“[My mother-in-law] does not love me" (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
 
Thus, daughters-in-law frequently fought with their mothers-in-law over a range 
of issues related to both the allocation of housework and the control of income 
in the household. A common theme of daughters-in-law’s descriptions of these 
fights was an underlying fear of exploitation and neglect at the hands of the 
mother-in-law. 
 
“If I work with [fetching] water all the time, then my child may suffer from cold 
and cough. They want me to work all the time ...  Nobody looks after my child 
and I have to do housework and look after my child too. So how can I manage all 
this?" (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
"[The in-laws] have grief about [my income] … They say, “Why do you keep it?” 
But I say I keep it for my own things like clothes, oil and soap. “Why do you keep 
it?” They say, “Whatever we give you, keep that"” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
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J.3.3 Positive experiences with mothers-in-law 
Only three daughters-in-law in our sample reported warm, sincere relationships 
with their mothers-in-law characterized by co-operation and mutual trust. From 
the perspective of the daughters-in-law themselves, this was to a large extent a 
matter of the good fortune of having married into a family with a mother-in-law 
who was “loving and caring”, “like a mother” or “free-minded and not 
conservative” 
 
“She always behaves like a mother of mine but not like a mother-in-law. My 
mother-in-law is not like other mothers-in-law” (daughter-in-law 8, Kote) 
“My mother-in-law and father-in-law are not conservative people. They are free-
minded people and they have lived outside of the village for many years. They 
are modern people, not conservative people” (daughter-in-law 8, Sahku) 
"My mother-in-law and father-in-law take care about me and love me very much 
therefore I am happy. They manage everything in our household … I am a newly 
married woman and I do not know anything, but my mother in-law is an old lady 
and she knows everything" (daughter-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Undoubtedly, individual values and personality traits did play a role. For 
example, the mothers-in-law of these daughters-in-law often seemed unusually 
attached to them. In turn, the daughters-in-law reported being attached to their 
mothers-in-law as well. 
 
“My daughter-in-law will live with me during my whole life so I like living with 
her. Daughters leave home, but daughters-in-law come to our house to live with 
us and become our friends forever ... we are partners for life” (mother-in-law 6, 
Sahku) 
“It is not a certainty that she would stay here, she may leave us too … [but] I 
would be hurt, if it happened” (mother-in-law 8, Kote) 
“When she [my daughter-in-law] had gone to her maternal house for two-three 
months … [then] we had missed her a lot. Our house was totally empty without 
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our child and daughter-in-law. At present we are happy to have them back” 
(mother-in-law 8, Sahku) 
 
Alternative explanations are also possible. The incentives of mothers-in-law and 
daughters-in-law were often better aligned. In two households, the mothers-in-
law and daughters-in-law had reduced incentives to fight over the financial 
support of the husband, because either the husband passed away, leaving the 
household without a main income-earner except the mother-in-law, or because 
he refused to financially cooperate with either his wife or his mother. 
 
“After the death of my husband, I was told by my brother and father not keep 
the child, but to abort it, but I didn’t do that. And I was also told to marry again 
... She [my mother-in-law] told me to take a decision carefully. She told me to 
think about my two children and then take a decision” (daughter-in-law 8, Kote) 
“I have full rights over my husband’s income, but over my son’s income I do not 
have any rights … Once I told him [my son] to earn for the family then … He told 
me that if he became a bad man like a hoodlum/gunda, a delinquent/badmash 
or a vagabond/awara then couldn’t I keep his wife at home and look after her? 
Now what answer, should I give him?” (mother-in-law 6, Sahku) 
 
Additionally, in all three households, the daughters-in-law were “only 
daughters-in-law” in the sense that no other daughters-in-law lived in the same 
household as them. This reduced the number of players who needed to trust 
one another in the family, in turn reducing both the need for communication 
and coordination between family members and individuals’ exposure to the risk 
of betrayal. In concrete terms, it eliminated the type of competition for limited 
resources between brothers and their wives seen in bigger households that 
often amplified conflicts and disputes in the family. 
 
Furthermore, two of the households had undergone powerful, possibly 
traumatic episodes in recent memory, which could have triggered a sense of 
shared adversity and interdependence among family members. In one family, 
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the main income-earner of the family had recently passed away (daughter-in-
law 8, Kote). In another family, the husband of the daughter-in-law was 
kidnapped before he married her, during the Maoist civil war. 
 
“I had kept all our money in the bank and when the earthquake came, it blew all 
our money away. My younger son [the husband of the daughter-in-law] was 
kidnapped and all of our [retirement] money was [also] spent on that … At that 
time, we were so afraid that we were ready to give even our clothes to get our 
son back, like Tara [from Ramayana] begging the demon … I had bought my son 
from them … One of my sons-in-law works for the courts [as a lawyer] so he 
contacted the police and other party members to find about those people … All 
kinds of people come to him with their cases so he knows many people … My son-
in-law helped me and the police find out about the Maoists” (mother-in-law 8, 
Sahku) 
 
J.4 Establishing an alliance with the husband 
J.4.1 Authority of the husband and mutual trust 
The husband was often the main or one of the main authorities in the family 
"No-one is superior to the husband" (daughter-in-law 10, Sahku). Husbands were 
also usually imbued with considerable authority over their wives “it is to be 
thought by my husband, whether I am a good or a bad woman” (daughter-in-
law 2, Sahku) "You have to feel fear in front of your husband" (daughter-in-law 
3, Sahku). Yet within our sample, husbands were also one of the few family with 
whom daughters-in-law repeatedly reported developing caring, informal and 
trusting relationships. Daughters-in-law often admitted to crying and being 
comforted in times of trouble, or making jokes with their husbands in times of 
joy. Husbands were also often the first and only point of call in times of trouble, 
including husbands living abroad. 
 
"Interviewer: How does your husband help you [when you feel worried]? 
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Daughter-in-law: He says, “Don’t worry, I am here, I am alive”” (daughter-in-law 
3, Sahku) 
 
Indeed, wives frequently requested money for food, cosmetics, jewellery and 
clothes from their husbands and endorsed contributing financially to their 
husband’s wellbeing from their own savings as well.  
 
“When I asked him for money to spend on my children, then he used to give me” 
(daughter-in-law 7, Sahku) 
"For me jewellery was not important, but my husband was important, so I gave 
him my jewellery. Then he had sold my jewellery for NPR 100,000 [to finance 
going to India seek employment]" (daughter-in-law 4, Jamal) 
 
Husbands had an incentive to help their wives since they were raising a family 
together and possibly wished for family separation later on. Wives had strong 
incentives to be, or at least appear to be, devoted to their husbands, due to 
notions of female honour that emphasized spousal devotion to husbands. That 
is not to say that all husbands developed caring and loving relationships with 
their wives. The exceptions to the rule and possible conditions for such 
exceptions are analysed in Appendix J.4.4. 
 
J.4.2 Dealing with the extended family 
Strong cultural taboos proscribed social interaction between daughters-in-law 
and elder male in-laws in certain families in our sample. For example, one 
daughter-in-law explained that she always covered her face in front of her elder 
brother-in-law, whereas members of the older generation would sprinkle holy 
water on themselves if they even accidentally touched their elder brothers-in-
law. 
 
“In our culture, nobody talks to their elder brother-in-law … We keep our face 
covered. When elder brother-in-law is outside, we do not go outside or keep our 
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face covered if we go out. The older generation, old mothers-in-law, they did not 
show even their legs to their elder brother-in-law ... If they touched each other 
by mistake, they would take a bath or sprinkle holy water from the Ganges on 
themselves” (daughter-in-law 3, Sahku) 
 
A clear sexual taboo was likely behind this proscription. When daughters-in-law 
and mothers-in-law were asked in interviews if they ever talked to their elder 
brothers-in-law or fathers-in-law, they often reacted with shock, distaste or 
vulgarity. 
 
“Interviewer: In your community, people don’t normally talk to their elder 
brother-in-law, do they? 
Mother-in-law; No, in my village, women talk to their brother in-laws. Not only 
talk, but they sleep together too. Yes sister, it is true, I am not joking here” 
(mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 
The same mother-in-law reluctantly admitted to communicating with her elder 
brother-in-law when she found herself in a somewhat difficult situation after her 
own husband died and all her sons migrated abroad for work. 
 
“I talk to him a little bit … I have lost my husband and all of my sons live abroad. 
I am living here with my four daughters-in-laws so I need to talk to him, I talk to 
him a little bit” (mother-in-law 2, Sahku) 
 
Since major decisions concerning the whole family were usually reported by 
both male and female respondents to be made in consultations involving either 
an elder brother-in-law or the father-in-law, this taboo cut off young daughters-
in-law from influencing large family decisions. For example, one daughter-in-law 
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explained that she always excluded herself from senior family discussions in 
order to minimize the potential for speaking in front of her father-in-law. 
 
“[When] the elders used to talk about any matter then I did not stay around. I 
only stayed, if I had something to say to them. Or if they called me to ask me 
something then only I used to keep myself in plain sight, otherwise I did not talk 
standing in front of my father-in-law" (daughter-in-law 8, Sahku) 
 
Thus, husbands were often one of the few avenues through which daughters-in-
law could put forward their case in large family decisions without breaking social 
taboos. However, daughters-in-law had to be careful about being too obvious in 
using their husbands to influence family matters. 
 
Strong cultural norms proscribed wifely devotion to their husbands (see Chapter 
7, Section 7.3.1), while simultaneously reducing the acceptability of husbands 
reciprocating such devotion. One of the main tropes in Maithili culture has been 
reported to be the idea that household separation arose from scheming wives 
sowing discord in the family by playing their husbands against each other [22]. 
As shown in Section J.3.1, one mother-in-law and one daughter-in-law also 
expressed the idea that husbands left their parents behind when they became 
too devoted to their wives.  Another elder sister-in-law explained how scheming 
wives played off brothers against each other, an idea that was reinforced by the 
interviewer’s response that men who listened to their wives would inevitably 
end up fighting with each other. 
 
“Elder sister-in-law: You all know that brothers do not quarrel with each other … 
but ladies belong to different families so they may say different things ... You 
know that. 
Interviewer: If a man listens to his wife then it creates rifts between household 
members, doesn’t it?” (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku) 
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A third mother-in-law seemed to realize during her interview that she did not 
want her sons to listen to their wives unless they had already separated. Since 
she did not really want her sons to separate from her, this implied by her own 
logic that they should really never listen to their wives. 
 
“Mother-in-law: We are there to give suggestions so [my son] does not need to 
consult with his wife. It is not the right time to take her advice.  
Interviewer: Then what is the right time? … 
Mother-in-law: After having their own baby and house … But it is good to live 
together in a joint family” (mother-in-law 4, Sahku) 
The traditional nature of such suspicion concerning husbands’ affection towards 
their wives was reinforced by the remarks of one daughter-in-law who 
commented that her husband made visible efforts to take care of her health 
needs during her pregnancy due to the “edge of modern society” (daughter-in-
law 3, Jamal). This use of a Maithili term that signified the boundary between 
tradition and modernity thus implied a strong expectation that husbands did not 
usually act in overtly supportive ways towards their wives. 
 
J.4.3 Negative experiences with husbands 
While a failure to prevent physical violence was by no means the only complaint 
that daughters-in-law raised against their husbands in our sample, the only 
three daughters-in-law who in our sample widely condemned their husband’s 
lack of social, emotional and financial support also suffered from repeated 
physical violence at the hands of their family members (9, Sahku; 2, Kote; 7, 
Kote). 
 
Thus, one daughter-in-law reported that her husband blamed her for 
“provoking” others to act violently against her, while another husband refused 
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to separate from his family, even as his wife was pleading with him due to 
repeated violence from her brother-in-law. 
 
 “No one was there at that time [when my sister-in-law and mother-in-law hit 
me]… so I left it up to God … My husband was also not here. … When the fight 
calmed down and I told my husband … He said, “It’s your mistake. Why are you 
shouting? Shut up”” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote) 
“I asked him [my husband] whether he liked to see me beaten every day or 
whether it was better to live separately … But he did not agree” (daughter-in-law 
9, Sahku) 
 
A wife reported experiencing repeated physical violence at the hands of her 
father-in-law. After reporting the violence to her natal parents, her in-laws 
became so enraged that they separated her from them. However, her husband 
continued to eat at his parents’ place without sharing the food with his wife, 
even as she was unable to afford food for herself and her children. 
 
“[My in-laws] did not give me anything at the time of separation and told me to 
earn money myself to fill my stomach ... I stayed with an empty stomach for two 
full days ... [while] my husband was eating at his parents’ place” (daughter-in-
law 2, Kote)  
 
Husbands had an incentive to side with their parents when they depended 
economically on them in the joint family. While one might have thought that 
unemployment or retirement made mothers and fathers economically 
dependent on their sons rather than vice versa, parental ownership of family 
property evened the bargaining positions, since often only parents owned 
enough collateral to take out large loans. One daughter-in-law whose husband 
was currently studying a bachelor’s degree sponsored by his parents remarked 
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that her husband never said anything in her defense as he was economically 
dependent on his parents – at the time of interview, her husband was studying 
for a Bachelor in Education that was sponsored by his parents. 
 
“Daughter-in-law: I wanted to work in Janakpur Manpower Company, [but my 
in-laws] used to give different types of reasons like “No, you need to study. 
There’s lots of time left to earn. It’s time for you to study first.” …  
Interviewer: What does your husband think?  
Daughter-in-law: [My husband] depends on [my in-laws], so he supports them 
and says nothing in my defense” (daughter-in-law 1, Kote) 
 
Similarly, one daughter-in-law whose husband wanted to abandon her and stay 
with his natal parents explained that her husband depended on his parents to 
provide him money for his own upkeep. This, in turn, provided an incentive for 
him to side with his parents. 
 
“But my husband still wanted to live with his parents, because he was not 
earning anything and depend on his parents for his expenses … [Instead,] he said 
that he would leave me and throw me out of his house, but he would never leave 
his parents” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
 
Of course, economic incentives were not the only incentives operating on 
husbands. Normative ideas of masculine honour and responsibility for the joint 
family created status incentives for husbands to fulfil their “breadwinner” roles. 
In one case, a husband felt that a household separation would be dishonourable, 
even if it protected his wife from domestic violence, as he would be perceived 
to have failed to provide for his family. 
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“[My husband] said “What would other people say, if we left our home in such a 
state?” As he has two younger brothers and the whole family depends on him, 
he is not ready to separate from his family” (daughter-in-law 9, Sahku) 
 
In another case, the unemployed husband seemed almost jealous of the natal 
parents’ ability to support his wife. Presumably such financial dependency 
reinforced his image as a failed provider for his wife. 
 
“When my husband had gone abroad and was not working, but just behaving 
like crazy, and my son was sick here, then at that time my parents spent NPR 
7,000 [USD 68] on the treatment of my son … Whenever he heard me talk to him 
about things like this then my husband used to get angry and tell me to go and 
live with them, if they were such good people” (daughter-in-law 2, Kote) 
Conversely, daughters-in-law often expressed the opinion that their husband’s 
employment would alleviate the potential for conflicts in the family42. 
 
“When [my husband] will start to earn money, then [the domestic violence] will 
settle down … When he will earn, then he will focus on that. He doesn’t think 
about the consequences of beating his wife, like what if his wife died. There are 
small children at home. Who will look after them?” (daughter-in-law 7, Kote)  
  
                                                          
42 The role of unemployment in creating tensions in the family that erupt into physical violence has previously 
been observed in epidemiological studies as well [465]. 
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Appendix K 




The following Appendix provides contextual information for the interpretation 
of the chapter on control over the LBW-SAT cash transfers. Section K.2 presents 
the methods for this Appendix. Section K.3 presents a view of the evolution of 
the LBW-SAT programme from the perspective of the facilitation coordinators 
in MIRA. Appendix K.4 presents an analysis of participation and engagement of 
community members in the women’s groups based on our qualitative data. 
 
K.2 Methods 
The full details of the methods for this Appendix have been presented in Chapter 
6. Briefly, we followed Corbin and Strauss’ [341] version of grounded theory  and 
conducted a total of 22 interviews with daughters-in-law, 15 interviews with 
their mothers-in-law and 3 interviews with their elder sisters-in-law from a total 
of 22 families. All interviews were individual, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews. Elder sisters-in-law were only interviewed when the mother-in-law 
had passed away. 
 
All interviews with daughters-in-law and their mothers-in-law were conducted 
simultaneously, i.e. two interviewers would concurrently interview both 
daughters-in-law and their mothers-in-law in separate locations out of earshot 
of each other. The same procedure was used with daughters-in-law and their 
elder sisters-in-law. 
 
We also conducted a focus group discussion with seven out of sixteen facilitation 
coordinators. These worked as mid-level supervisors for MIRA whose role was 
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to coordinate women’s group activities across intervention areas and supervise 
the distribution of cash transfers at the end of group meetings. All women’s 
group facilitators were supervised by one facilitation coordinator.  
 
The interviews and the focus group discussion were directly translated from the 
audiotape into English from Maithili. The resultant data was coded using 
analytical methods from grounded theory including memoing, open coding and 
selective coding. Section K.3 will only present evidence from the focus group 
discussion, while Section K.4 will present evidence from both. 
 
All quotes from respondents in this Chapter are indexed by the serial numbers 
and district identifiers provided in Table 18 in Chapter 6. 
 
K.3 Evolution of the LBW-SAT programme according to 
facilitation coordinators in MIRA 
K.3.1 Mobilizing and achieving sustainability of community awareness 
At the very beginning of the LBW-SAT trial, FCs emphasized the efforts required 
to raise awareness of the LBW-SAT in the communities. After a ward gathering 
meeting where communities were informed about the initiation of the LBW-SAT 
programme, almost all MIRA staff members were involved in spreading the word 
about the intervention  
 
“All of us, social workers, nutrition mobilizers, members of the women’s groups, 
also the office-based staff in Janakpur, whoever went into the villages [spread 
the word about LBW-SAT] … it was a ghar-dailo/home and courtyard thing. 
Wherever we met people, we told them. Even the Ward Enumerators [locally 
based staff whose task is to register pregnant women] spread the message that 
women should sign up for the card [that registered women’s enrolment into 
LBW-SAT]. When the message reached the community … it started becoming 
easier for us" (FGD). 
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FCs were particularly keen to emphasize the crucial awareness-raising role 
played by locally based MIRA staff and women’s group members themselves. 
 
"The active involvement of the female community health volunteer and the 
nutrition mobiliser determined the number of pregnant women [who would 
attend women’s group meetings]" (FGD) 
“[The ward enumerators] supported us a lot. They went from house to house and 
told women to go to the women’s groups and listen" (FGD) 
"We told [women in the communities] repeatedly that they should come, they 
should spread the word to everyone, and everyone in the ward should know that 
we were giving out cards and money, we were giving money for additional food 
and we providing messages to prevent low birth weight in children” (FGD) 
 
Even so, FCs were initially worried about the prospect of having to terminate 
their women’s groups due to low participation numbers. 
 
“In many places, we were worried that, because there were few participants, the 
groups would be terminated, but it did not happen” (FGD) 
 
As communities became aware of the LBW-SAT intervention and women started 
participated in the women’s groups, the incentive structure of the intervention 
itself started promoting further awareness, possibly leading a self-sustaining 
cycle. FCs agreed that the cash incentives played a large part in encouraging 
participation and also noted that women started coming when they realized that 
LBW-SAT was a temporary programme and they might not be able to receive 
cash transfers for future pregnancies. 
 
 "When the cards started getting made and the money distribution started then 
the pregnant women’s numbers started increasing. The women who were 
pregnant and those who were not pregnant started to come when they 
understood the rule that only those who had a card could get money … [When] 
the women realized that this programme would not be going on forever and that 
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they had made a big mistake by not coming to the group, and then they started 
coming again” (FGD) 
 
Since pregnant women were likely to be newly married women, these often 
lived under strong mobility restraints (Chapter 7, Section 7.3). FCs emphasized 
the key role played by the cash transfer in enabling daughters-in-law to get 
permission to leave their house. 
 
“It is because, in our society, especially in the Terai, [the daughters-in-law] are 
not allowed to leave the house. To get those 750 rupees, the family members 
have to send them outside to take the money, and the daughters-in-law use it as 
an excuse to go outside” (FGD) 
 
However, once women came, they started bringing other women along who 
spontaneously shared messages from the women’s groups with other members 
of their community. 
 
"The good thing was that when 15 to 25, 30, 32 participants heard our messages 
in the women’s group meeting, they discussed these things with a group of 5 or 
7 people each … when all the women gathered together to fetch water from the 
tap or when they went to work in the fields. Because of this, the subject matter 
was discussed all over the village" (FGD). 
 
K.3.2 Negotiating participation in the women’s groups 
In the early phases of the LBW-SAT programme, mothers-in-law were often 
reluctant to send their daughters-in-law out to the women’s groups for fear of 
damaging their reputation. Wealthier families felt entitled to demand of MIRA 
that the cash transfers should be delivered to their doorstep. 
 
“The mothers-in-law previously really did not want their daughters-in-law to go, 
they only wanted them to register [for cash transfers] without going [to 
meetings] … [The family members] said that they did not want to send their 
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daughters-in-law to the women’s group. Instead, they should be given money at 
home” (FGD) 
 
As the cash transfer was meant to be provided completely unconditionally at 
that time, this claim was consistent with existing policy guidelines. However, this 
caused considerable dissatisfaction among the poorer participants in the 
women’s groups who felt powerless to make the same claims of MIRA and were 
forced to forego household labour and pay for travel costs to participate in the 
women’s groups “They also said that the pregnant women had work, but they 
were forced to come because [otherwise] they would not get the money” (FGD). 
 
Since it was not logistically feasible to provide every community member with 
cash transfers at their doorstep, it was decided in the end that the policy should 
be revised so that only women who were physically incapable of attending 
women’s groups would be allowed to receive cash transfers at home. In turn, 
this caused considerable dissatisfaction to wealthier families who sometimes 
rejected the cash transfer out of spite, presumably for losing face in their 
community. 
 
“[A member of one of the wealthier families] came here [and also visited] the 
office in Janakpur in order to ask for the cash transfer. At the office, they were 
also told that according to the new rules they had to let the daughter-in-law go 
to the women’s group … The same message was delivered by the nutrition 
mobilizer and from me. When they received this message, they stopped coming 
... When we asked why … they said “What could NPR 750 do [USD 7.3] [for people 
like us] … If we went and gave her [a non-participating daughter-in-law] money 
at home, she would take it happily. She just showed her ego by saying that she 
would not go to the group. That was the only one case, otherwise they only told 
us that the money was nothing to them once or twice out if anger” (FGD) 
 
K.3.3 Attempting to exploit the “rules of the system” 
Even after community members had accepted that participation in the women’s 
groups meetings was a criterion for receiving the cash transfers, conflict over 
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eligibility for the cash transfers did not stop. Some households realized that it 
was possibly to register for transfers from both the food and the cash transfer 
arm of LBW-SAT by cleverly commuting between clusters. In order to preserve 
the integrity of the evaluation design of LBW-SAT, pregnant women who were 
caught as “double registrants” had one of their cards electronically cancelled. 
However, some members of the local communities believed that they could use 
their power and status to make MIRA pay anyway. One mother-in-law was so 
vociferous about her dissatisfaction with the cancellation of her daughter-in-
law’s registration card that FCs decided to conduct a local village meeting in 
order to clarify their position on the issue. The mother-in-law called the 
representatives of the local government to support her in the meeting who were 
furious that she was being “unfairly” treated. However, after bringing the 
representatives to the Janakpur office, they were shown proof that the 
daughter-in-law was a double registrant and accepted MIRA’s decision to cancel 
her cash transfers. 
 
"Her mother-in-law spread [her complaint] all over the village and made a big 
debate out of it. She made it a big issue. A ward meeting was held after that and 
we clarified the situation. She had even called the local party representatives, 
but she had not told anyone that her daughter-in-law was getting food from 
another place, she had told everyone that she only got cash. And the party 
representatives were angry because they thought we had made one rule, but 
followed another … The same day when the ward gathering happened and the 
party representatives came, I clearly explained everything to them. After that 
they asked me if I was telling them the truth and I told them that I would show 
them the proof in the [Janakpur] office. I came to the office and I showed them 
the list and when I did that, then they understood that I was right and that she 
should not get the money" (FGD) 
 
K.3.4 Reaching the high point of participation in the women’s groups 
According to the FCs, as local community members realized that MIRA by and 
large enforced its rules uniformly without regard for wealth or caste status, they 
were both surprised and pleased 
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“During the initial phase when the cards had just started getting made, then the 
villagers, the community, the women’s groups members, none of them believed 
that it would come to this stage … [where] pregnant women from every village 
would be provided with cash. After we started systematically making cards for 
people, they began to get money according to our rules and regulations … When 
they learned … that there was no distinction between the rich and the poor, the 
big and the small, the [high and the low] castes, and that whoever was pregnant 
and met the relevant criteria were eligible for cash transfers, the community was 
very happy" (FGD). 
 
While conflicts over the cash transfers sporadically erupted and were handled 
in the community, participation rates in the women’s groups increased 
phenomenally. FCs emphasized that they did not expect to see such high 
participation rates. 
 
 “At present, everyone is on track. All the pregnant women have started coming 
to the women’s groups … The level of participation is beyond what we had 
imagined” (FGD) 
 
Indeed, FCs remarked that they themselves had become well-known members 
of their communities and were given multiple nicknames associated with their 
roles as organisers of women’s groups meetings, cash distributors, health 
advisors and representatives of MIRA. 
 
"Some people call us “doctors”” … In the food VDCs, [people call us] “food 
distributors”; in the cash VDCs, “cash distributors”; in most places, “the ones with 
a motorcycle” (everyone laughs). “Sisters, who conduct meetings”. They have 
given many names to us. Whenever we go, they ask us where the next meeting 
is going to be held and in which ward (Everyone laughs and speaks together). 
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FCs highlighted that both local women and men recognised the role of FCs in 
running meetings and some women were so used to meeting in the women’s 
groups that they would spontaneously assemble when they saw an FC in their 
village.  
 
“At first, only a few of them came to the meetings and were mostly shy when 
they came … now they say “I will also come Sister, I will come soon” [when they 
see us] … if they see us on the road while they are heading somewhere else then 
they immediately reverse direction and come to our meetings … they have a very 
big network … many times we wonder to ourselves, “She was on the road how 
did she get here so fast?” (laughs), but they manage anyway … The men say that 
there is some kind of meeting in so-and-so’s house. That means they know that 
we have gathered for a women’s groups meeting only” (FGD) 
 
K.3.5 Announcing the closure of the LBW-SAT intervention 
At the time of the focus group discussion, the LBW-SAT had just begun to close 
down. In certain areas, women’s groups were still running in full swing, while in 
others, community members had already been notified that the intervention 
was closing down. In these communities, FCs reported that participation rates 
dropped precipitously, most likely because of a loss of incentives. 
 
"After [we announced that no more cash transfers would be provided], the 
participation in the women’s group decreased abruptly" (FGD) 
 
A brief boost to participation was provided when mobile surveillance teams, the 
so-called “nutrition clinics” rallied local women in order to measure weights and 
heights in children between 0 and 22 months of age for the purpose of 
evaluating the primary outcome of LBW-SAT trial. While the team provided two 
soaps and a towel as a token of gratitude to participants for letting their children 
be weighed and measured, participants themselves, as well as the FCs, 
perceived the nutrition clinics to be part of the LBW-SAT intervention and the 
gifts were seen as a promise from MIRA for more incentives in the future  
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“But when we reached our [penultimate] women’s groups meeting, we began 
the Weighing Programme and the nutrition clinic made an impression on all of 
them. They knew that they would be provided again and again, if they went 
there. The gifts that we gave them gave them the idea that in the days to come, 
something would be done for them" (FGD). 
 
FCs reported that informing communities of the closure of LBW-SAT was one of 
the harder tasks they had faced in their job. Communities failed to understand 
why the project was closing and even asked if they themselves were to blame 
for the end of the project. 
 
"After the last batch of cards were made … and [the intervention] closed down, 
they were very anxious to know why the [card registration system] had stopped 
and what they had done that had caused us to stop handing out new cards … 
“Why did you stop when it was our turn?” … That was a common response … You 
could say it was tough and we worked long and hard [to deliver this message to 
the communities]. We had to set aside time to [explain] that it was not like that, 
that each organization had its own reasons for ending, that they could only 
provide for a certain period of time. After that period of time had elapsed, it had 
to stop" (FGD) 
 
K.3.6 Negotiating the end of the LBW-SAT intervention 
Community members generally reacted to the news of closure with assertions 
that the LBW-SAT continued to be needed. Indeed, the measurements of the 
nutrition clinics themselves proved to them that children continued to be born 
of low birth weight in their communities.  
 
"[After] two children had been weighed by the nutrition clinic and referred for 
rehabilitation [due to undernutrition], when I next met the group members, they 
told me that despite all our activities, low birth weight children continued to be 
born in their [villages] ... they said that we should continue running the groups 
as it had not been enough" (FGD) 
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There was also more than a slight undertone of abandonment in the requests 
from the community for the continuation of the LBW-SAT trial, as FCs reported 
being asked not to simply “leave and go”. 
 
"They asked us not to [simply] leave and go. They [said] that the women’s groups 
were running so actively right now and all the things that they were learning in 
the community and the improvements that were taking place, all that would not 
happen again and [the improvements] would start vanishing” (FGD).  
 
Some community members even tried to bargain over the closure of the 
intervention and suggested that they could negotiate a continuation of the LBW-
SAT intervention with the Janakpur office or perhaps the FCs could try to 
continue the groups without providing cash transfers if that was more 
sustainable. 
 
"They even said in many communities that if they had to go and talk to the 
[MIRA] then they would … [Another] response they gave [to our announcement] 
was that even if they would not be given the money, they should be provided 
with lessons and the women’s groups should be held … “If you can give us cash 
then please do, if not at least give us knowledge”" (FGD) 
 
Yet other women’s group members were reported to have converted their 
group into a small mutual fund. 
 
“Initiatives to deposit seed money have also arisen … Like a security fund [for 
pregnant women]” (FGD) 
 
K.4 Participation in the women’s groups 
K.4.1 Incentivizing participation in the women’s groups 
Although mothers-in-law, daughters-in-law and FCs all stated that the cash 
transfer was relatively small, this was usually because they compared it to their 
own wealth, their total expenditures, the health needs of the daughter-in-law, 
or the amount of wealth needed to shift their bargaining power. Relative to the 
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effort and time required to acquire it, it was good value, and the response of the 
community to LBW-SAT indicated that demand for the cash transfers was clearly 
high. Both daughters-in-law, mothers-in-law and FCs reported that the cash 
transfer was a major incentive for participating in the women’s groups "No one 
leaves the money alone (laughs)" (FGD) and a quick look at our quantitative 
results (Chapter 5) would also confirm that participation rates in the transfer 
arms (90-96%) were much higher than in the women’s groups only arm (34%). 
 
One daughter-in-law explained that the cash transfer was good value for the 
amount of effort put into receiving it and bluntly stated that there was no reason 
for coming to the women’s groups if she had not been provided with the 
transfer. 
 
“I did not have to do anything to get money [besides sitting in the meetings] … I 
had gone [to the meetings] only to receive cash … that was the motive to go, else 
why would I need to go there … if nothing was happening? It is not good to loiter 
about aimlessly” (daughter-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
The same daughter-in-law in our sample reported that she never participated in 
the women’s groups meetings. Instead she arrived to pick up the cash transfer 
at the end of meetings and left when she had received it. 
 
“I have not visited the women’s groups at all, but I only went there to take the 
cash transfers … Actually, all three times, I went there at the end of the meeting. 
Since I had to do a lot of household work in the family I did not arrive on time, 
even though I knew when the meetings were held” (daughter-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
However, it should be noted that this daughter-in-law was probably the 
exception rather than the rule because no other daughter-in-law expressed the 
same behaviour in our sample. Most daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law 
expressed a strong appreciation for their experiences with participating in the 
women’s groups (Section 9.2.2, Chapter 9). FCs also reported that daughters-in-
law would not normally be allowed out of their homes by the rest of the family, 
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but the cash transfers provided them with an “excuse” for doing so. Two 
mothers-in-law emphasized the link between their daughters-in-law’s ability to 
obtain permission to participate in women’s groups and the receipt of cash 
incentives. 
 
"It was said that they would not give cash if she did not go to women’s groups 
meetings. They would not allow her to sign the [registration] document if she did 
not go" (mother-in-law 4, Sahku) 
“Mother-in-law: Yes, previously she was getting cash transfers that’s why she 
was going.  
Interviewer: And now?  
Mother-in-law: And now nothing, cash transfers are not provided so she is not 
going (laughing)” (mother-in-law 1, Sahku) 
 
This led some daughters-in-law to lament not being allowed to attend any 
further groups after their giving birth. 
 
“I wish I could go outside so that I could learn more and I could participate in 
trainings and gain knowledge … and I could speak up too" (daughter-in-law 7, 
Sahku) 
 
However, not all families were convinced by the provision of cash incentives. FCs 
reported that some of the wealthiest families in the study area did not want to 
send their daughter-in-law to the group as the cash transfer was small relative 
to the loss of reputation they would suffer from letting their daughter-in-law 
leave the house. 
 
“[The family members] said, “What can NPR 750 do?” … One thing is, they are 
so reluctant to let go off the culture that we have here in Terai that [stipulates 
that] their daughters-in-law should not go outside” (FGD) 
 
Appendix K 
Further details on the cash transfer programme 
 
 
635 | P a g e  
 
Both daughters-in-law and the FCs also reported that guardians to the 
daughters-in-law sometimes felt that the NPR 750 was too negligible a transfer 
compared to the cost of lost housework from their own and their daughter-in-
law’s participation in the women’s groups. 
 
"The guardians who come with the pregnant women say it is late, the meetings 
have been going on for too long and they have to go home soon. They cannot do 
that, because they have to take the pregnant woman with them, and she has to 
work too, but they are forced to stay here … to get the money. That is how most 
of the guardians, whether they are rich or poor … sometimes get angry and say 
that NPR 750 can be spent in one day and it is already late" (FGD) 
 
K.4.2 Lack of voice for daughters-in-law in women’s groups 
Many daughters-in-law expressed having limited voice while attending the 
women’s groups. “Honourable” daughters-in-law did not speak up unless they 
were directly asked a question by their elders and generally did not 
communicate with their elder male in-laws in certain families (see Chapter 7, 
Section 7.3.1). As the elders of daughters-in-law were often present in the 
women’s groups, this made it difficult for daughters-in-law to express 
themselves in socially acceptable ways. Even the seating arrangements had a 
strong element of surveillance, as daughters-in-law felt pressured to provide 
pre-learned answers to the facilitator’s questions, while being watched by their 
mothers-in-law from behind. 
 
“All the pregnant women used to sit in the front, while mothers-in-law sat in the 
back. We all sat together and listened to the things told by [the women’s group 
facilitators] … They used to teach us different things about pregnancy in the 
group meetings and we all were learning together. When they asked us 
questions then some of us were answering as well. We were only answering 
those questions to which we had learnt the answer” (daughter-in-law 1, Jamal) 
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Multiple daughters-in-law also stated that they had ever spoken or only spoken 
under circumstances of exceptional privacy (e.g. in a closed school building) for 
fears of being shamed in public. 
 
“I did not show my face there … I was not talking to [the facilitators] because I 
have never gone outside like that ever and I have never spoken to others either. 
Sisters [the facilitators] told me many times to speak up, but I did not speak at 
all …I wanted to speak to them, but I didn’t. There were many people and some 
of them were male too … If I had have spoken then they [the bystanders] might 
say the name of my husband and father-in-law in front of the others, that the 
wife and daughter-in-law of so-and-so was speaking like this” (daughter-in-law 
3, Kote) 
 
FCs also noted that daughters-in-law often remained silent during women’s 
groups meetings, while mothers-in-law communicated with FCs on their behalf. 
 
“Mostly, the pregnant women do not want to speak, while those who already 
have two or three children mostly speak. The other women just sit and listen and 
their mothers-in-law say that [the cash transfer] has benefited them a lot and 
they have been eating and are doing well” (FGD), while  
 
K.4.3 Inconsistent attendance of mothers-in-law 
A frequent sight in our context was a mother-in-law walking towards a women's 
groups with a dutiful daughter-in-law walking head bowed behind her. Given 
the mobility norms in Maithili society (see Chapter 7, Section 7.3), daughters-in-
law were commonly perceived to need a chaperone to protect their reputation 
when they went outside after obtaining permission from their guardians. 
However, the degree of permissiveness towards daughters-in-law varied 
extensively by where daughters-in-law went and why. Women’s groups 
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meetings seemed to fall under the category of ‘exceptions’ that many mothers-
in-law and elder sisters-in-law were willing to make to their general prohibition 
on the mobility of their daughters-in-law. This seemed largely to be due to the 
outreach of the women’s groups facilitators and the provision of cash incentives, 
as FCs reported major struggles over participation at the start of the trial 
(Section K.3.2). 
 
However, at the time of our interviews, many daughters-in-law from both 
poorer and wealthier joint families in our sample reported casually going to 
women’s groups on their own, particularly if the mother-in-law was not at home 
“I used to go there with my mother in-law … [but] if my mother in-law was not 
at home at the time of the meeting then I went there on my own” (daughter-in-
law 7, Sahku). This was equally reflected in the reports of elder sisters-in-law 
and mothers-in-law. One elder sister-in-law first stated that the daughter-in-law 
was newly married and shy and so brought her small children along to provide 
an alibi to her in public. However, when asked by the interviewer to clarify, she 
was then pressed to admit that it was mostly just a practical convenience to 
ensure that the children were looked after.  
 
“Elder sister-in-law: She was embarrassed about going on her own. She is a 
newly married daughter-in-law, she married only about two and half years ago, 
so she is not allowed to go outside … If I was not at home then she went … with 
any of my children … If my daughters were not at home, then she would take my 
younger son in her arm and go herself. 
Interviewer: But what would he do for her, was she bringing him along as a 
companion? 
Elder sister-in-law: Yes, for her protection (laughing). 
Interviewer: How can he protect her as he is a small kid? He could not even save 
himself from a dog!  
Elder sister-in-law: He would protect her, because he would make sure that she 
did not wander about leaving him on his own. [After a pause] She was taking my 
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son along with her, because no-one was at home, not even me, and then she 
could not leave the child alone” (elder sister-in-law 3, Kote) 
 
Indeed, in our qualitative sample, only half of the mothers-in-law or elder 
sisters-in-law stated that they had visited the women’s groups even once. Of 
these, half reported that they only occasionally visited, but let other family 
members or other daughters-in-law in the village escort their daughter-in-law 
to women’s group meetings. 
 
“Two [daughters-in-law] are from that house and one is from that house, they 
usually go together to the meetings and my daughter-in-law go with them as 
well. Another neighbour also goes with them. They all go together” (mother-in-
law 6, Sahku) 
 
Mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law reported being too busy with 
housework and agricultural work to participate, while elder sisters-in-law 
reported lack of incentives as a barrier to consistent participation “We have not 
gone all the time, only 5 or 6 times. We did not get any kind of money so why 
should we go there?” (elder sister-in-law 3, Sahku). 
 
Although it is likely that mothers-in-law communicated regularly with their 
daughters-in-law and other community members about the contents of the 
women’s groups meetings, it was not clear that all mothers-in-law did so. One 
mother-in-law reported learning little about the meetings from her daughter-in-
law. 
 
“I did not visit a single group meeting and I haven’t heard anything about the 
[what the groups did] either, so how could I tell you [the interviewer] anything 
about them? [My daughter-in-law] herself went there for four times, but I never 
went with her … Since we are living in a family and we all do our tasks at home, 
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we are usually busy with our tasks. Previously, when she went to the group 
meetings she did not tell me anything and she has never told me anything since 
either” (mother-in-law 2, Jamal) 
 
Mothers-in-law and elder sisters-in-law who did report participating regularly 
also reported trying to engage in the discussions at the women’s groups and 
reported greatly valuing the lessons taught. From the point of view of the FCs, 
guardians who participated in the women’s groups meetings were often far 
more active and vocal than the daughters-in-law. The same elder sister-in-law 
who previously complained about the lack of cash transfers for herself also 
admitted to learning extensively from the womens’ groups 
 
 “I learnt things there, which I did not know about before. There in the meeting, 
we were taught different things and they explained things to us clearly with 
pictures. It was good for us … [but I thought it was not enough if I only got 
knowledge there. If my daughter-in-law also got knowledge there, then she could 
understand things better, so I let my daughter-in-law to participate … [so] she 
would hear it with her own ears … and she would gain better knowledge” (elder 
sister-in-law 3, Jamal) 
 
K.4.4 Lack of interest from male family members 
Problems involving male family members in the LBW-SAT programme were not 
entirely absent. FCs reported being approached by women’s group members 
due to problems with alcoholism, domestic violence and male family members 
who prevented women’s group members from going to meetings or who wasted 
their cash transfers. 
 
“If male family members do not approve, like if the son or husband does not 
approve them coming to the meeting, they ask us how they can talk them over. 
We also discuss that [in the women’s groups meetings] … And also those who 
drink and roam around and come home and beat their wives, they ask us to talk 
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to such people even more. They say that they do not listen to them so we should 
try to talk to them. It is because some of the men do not spend [the cash transfer 
on food] and do not really care much” (FGD) 
 
In one instance, the community members and an FC agreed to hold a meeting 
for men to discuss the issue with them, but after much discussion, the meeting 
did not materialize, as the women’s group facilitators and the women’s groups 
members could agree on who would conduct the meeting with men. The 
facilitators did not have the appropriate social connections, while the local 
women felt they did not have the authority to make men listen to “women’s 
talk” or even speak to them. After failing to find a local male leader who was 
willing to convene a meeting on their behalf, they ended up dropping the 
subject. 
 
“[In one VDC, the women’s groups members] said that the men did not listen to 
them and asked us [the women’s groups facilitators] to conduct a meeting for 
the men and talk to them … And while discussing how we should try to talk to 
them, we said they [the women’s groups participants] should conduct the 
meeting for men. Again they said [back to us] that the men would not come, that 
was the problem [in the first place], and that’s why they could not talk to them 
… But [that VDC] was recently assigned to me, whereas in [another VDC], I used 
to go many times and I know the men there quite well and could easily talk to 
them. But in [this VDC] I did not know the key persons. If I did, I could easily have 
set up a meeting … Instead I told the women’s groups participants that they 
should go speak to the men, and even if the daughters-in-law could not speak to 
the men, mostly newly married daughters-in-law are not allowed to speak [in 
our culture], all the mothers-in-law should come together and speak to them. I 
told them to try and bring them to our next women’s groups meeting … [But] 
there are [generally] lots of men who say, “Why should we listen to women’s 
talk?” That is why I [also] told them conduct a different meeting with all the men 
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using one male leader to convince them. They said they would try, but it was not 
quite possible to do it there and then” (FGD) 
 
The timidity with which the FC and the women’s groups participants seemed to 
pass responsibility back and forth between each other spoke volumes of the 
power of male members of the Maithili community and the difficulty of 
exclusively female groups to influence communities of men. It also contrasted 
with a second reported incident where women’s groups members convinced a 
husband to let go of the cash transfers provided by MIRA by threatening him 
with termination of further transfers (see Chapter 9, Section 9.2.3.2). However, 
the men in our current example considered the cash transfer insignificant, 
possibly because they enjoyed comparatively larger incomes themselves, so 
women’s group members could not simply threaten to cancel the cash transfers.  
 
The report by FCs concerning the sometimes obstructive role played by male 
family members was also reflected in multiple reports from daughters-in-law 
that their husbands initially told them not to attend the women’s groups, but 
were only won over, when the mother-in-law, sisters-in-law or staff members 
from MIRA got involved. 
 
“But the first time when I told [my husband] about [the women’s groups] then 
he did not agree to let me go … My mother-in-law and the [Ward Enumerator] 
had told my husband to allow me to go take the cash transfers … He told me to 
not take money from the government, but other people convinced him then he 
ended up agreeing … Then I had again asked my husband to let me go to the 
[women’s groups meetings] and he agreed” (daughter-in-law 5, Sahku). 
 
Finally, in line with observations conducted by MIRA staff members and personal 
observation, the FC also reported that men mostly did not attend the women’s 
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groups meetings as they were considered to be only relevant to “women’s 
issues”. Although it was probably necessary to create “safe spaces” for women, 
if only to allow them the confidence to speak in public, this probably also limited 
the impact of LBW-SAT on male household members.  
 
We should not overstate the potential for men to cause problems to the LBW-
SAT programme and beneficiary spending of the cash transfers in particular. Our 
private interviews with daughters-in-law revealed more frequent disagreements 
with the mothers-in-law than the husbands. Only one daughter-in-law in our 
sample mentioned giving her husband a small loan from her cash transfer, which 
never got returned, while none of the remaining daughters-in-law mentioned 
similar problems. It may be that daughters-in-law felt too timid to speak up 
about problems with their mothers-in-law in women’s groups meetings, 
particularly with their mothers-in-law watching them from behind. 
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Appendix L 
Data collection for study of husband’s 
attitudes to wives’ empowerment 
 
L.1 Study rationale 
In the second phase of data collection for the qualitative study on women’s 
financial power in the household (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5), open coding of 
two daughter-in-law interviews from Sahku and two daughter-in-law interviews 
from Kote revealed the important role that husbands played in household 
decision-making in activities outside the household (see Table 17). They often 
overruled mothers-in-law on matters concerning their wives such as visits to the 
natal family, participation in groups, taking up paid employment, giving cash 
allowances or making purchases at the market. Previous researchers have also 
identified husbands as key arbitrators in disputes between daughters-in-law and 
mothers-in-law [22,336]. 
 
L.2 Interviewer characteristics 
I hired a 30-year-old male native university graduate from Dhanusha, SaC, to 
conduct interviews with husbands, because I felt a male researcher would 
reduce the chance of social desirability bias. SaC had no previous experience in 
qualitative research, but I, my PhD supervisor in qualitative research and our 
female qualitative interviewer trained SaC in qualitative research skills for two 
weeks before data collection. SaC spoke native-level Maithili and Nepali and 
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Table 30. Characteristics of districts in which interviews with husbands were held.  
All districts belonged to the cash transfer arm of the LBW-SAT trial. % estimated from surveillance data in LBW-
SAT. Wealth levels derived using the Wealth Index created in Chapter 5. Travel times to the Indian border 
indicate links to foreign trade. Travel times to district headquarters indicate links to domestic trade. 
Table 31. Description of male respondents. 
Serial 




passed Interview taken? 
1 Dahak Middle Madhesi II Separated 40 0 Yes 
2 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Joint 30 9 No, consent refusal 
3 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Separated 26 4 Yes 
4 Dahak Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 8 Yes 
5 Dahak Dalit I Separated 30 0 No, consent refusal 
6 Dahak Dalit I Joint ? 0 Yes 
7 Dahak Middle Madhesi IV Joint 22 11 Yes 
8 Dahak Middle Madhesi I Joint 23 4 Yes 
9 Dahak Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 13 No, consent refusal 
10 Dahak Muslim I Joint 26 0 No, moved abroad 
11 Dahak Dalit I ? ? 0 No, consent refusal 
1 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 23 6 Yes 
2 Lalit Middle Madhesi V Joint 38 8 Yes 
3 Lalit Middle Madhesi I Joint 32 6 Yes 
4 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 31 0 Yes 
5 Lalit Middle Madhesi II Separated 29 0 Yes 
6 Lalit Middle Madhesi IV Separated 41 8 Yes 
7 Lalit Middle Madhesi III Joint 24 11 Yes 
8 Lalit Dalit II Joint 24 5 No, consent refusal 
9 Lalit Middle Madhesi V Joint 26 10 No, moved abroad 
1 Jamal Middle Madhesi V Joint 28 6 Yes 
2 Jamal Middle Madhesi III Separated 32 5 Yes 
3 Jamal Dalit I Joint 25 0 Yes 
4 Jamal Muslim III Joint 35 0 Yes 
5 Jamal Middle Madhesi III Joint 28 0 Yes 
6 Jamal Muslim III Separated 44 0 Yes 
7 Jamal Middle Madhesi V Joint 25 7 Yes 
8 Jamal Muslim I Joint 40 0 No, consent refusal 
SES reflects socioeconomic quintiles calculated using the Wealth Index from Chapter 5, I = lowest 
socioeconomic status, V = highest. Pseudonyms were created for VDCs to preserve confidentiality. 

















Lalit 10.9% 0.3% 60.4% 61.2% 2-4 hours >1 hour 
Dahak 22.5% 10.2% 63.6% 60.5% 30 mins 45 mins 
Jamal 13.1% 49.9% 78.9% 46.9% 1-2 hours >1 hour 
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L.3 Selection of respondents 
For our study on husband’s attitudes to their wives’ economic empowerment, 
we had a limited time frame to perform data collection and analysis. SaC was 
recruited and hired in August 2015, where the LBW-SAT study as a whole was 
closing down and the study area as a whole was becoming more dangerous due 
to civil unrest (see Section L.4).  
 
Consequently, husbands were purposively sampled to reflect maximum 
variation in geographical location, education, caste, wealth and household 
separation (see Table 31). Where the characteristics of female respondents had 
been identified through local MIRA contacts, we sampled the male respondents 
directly using data from the LBW-SAT surveillance system. This may have 
increased our rate of refusals, as we did not use local MIRA staff to identify 
willing respondents for us. We conducted data collection in two new VDCs, BA 
and BR in addition to an existing VDC Jamal. We interviewed men from different 
households to the interviews with women to avoid overburdening households. 
 
L.4 Data collection 
We designed a separate topic guide to interview husbands about their attitudes 
to their wives’ economic autonomy in the household. We explored household 
decision-making about food and money, wife’s employment, saving, purchasing 
and credit opportunities and control of the cash transfer. We also included the 
effect of male migration on female decision-making in our topic guide for men, 
as the subject became increasingly apparent in observations of interviews, 
conversations with MIRA staff and analyses of transcripts of interviews with 
women. We considered including questions on household separation or conflict 
in order to study conflict between male household members, but due to 
limitations on interview length and the compressed time frame in which data 
had to be collected and analysed, we decided against it. 
 
From September 2015 until November 2015, SaC completed twenty semi-
structured interviews with husbands (see Table 31). Interviews with men were 
conducted in a private place, either a private room in the respondent’s home, 
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or underneath a tree in a clearing away from onlookers. I did not get to observe 
any interviews with men except three early pilot interviews before the main 
interviews in September as my visa had run out and I was not allowed to stay 
for longer that year in Nepal. 
 
Significant political upheaval took place from September to November in our 
area resulting in curfews and economic and transport strikes. Local travel was 
often too dangerous to undertake as protesters blocked all fuel imports into 
Nepal from India. As a result, scheduling interviews in advance was not always 
possible and a local MIRA employee would meet SaC on arrival in a village to 
introduce him to the family that he was interviewing.  International staff was 
also evacuated from Dhanusha and my visa had run out, so I was not able to be 
physically present to supervise and support SaC, although I called two times a 
week which allowed for debriefing and some supervision. 
 
L.5 Reflections on interviews with husbands 
In contrast to female respondents, husbands were noticeably less interested in 
the interview process as they did not get direct cash benefits from MIRA and 
had significantly less exposure to MIRA as they rarely participated in women’s 
groups meetings. They also felt under greater time pressure as they had to leave 
the house in the early morning for agricultural work only returning home in the 
late evening. As a result, refusal rates for men were significantly higher than for 
women (compare Table 18 and Table 31). 
 
Five men out of 26 refused to participate in the study. One husband refused to 
be interviewed, because he thought as a health organization, questions 
regarding the household economy were irrelevant. Two husbands refused to 
participate because they did not have time for interviews. One husband refused 
to participate, because he was a former MIRA employee who had been recently 
dismissed. Finally, one husband expressed offence at being asked questions 
regarding community norms around decisions on cooking and women’s mobility 
that “should be asked of women only” 
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“Interviewer: What are the feelings of the community concerning women that 
work and earn money outside the home? 
Husband: Can I tell you one thing?  
Interviewer: Yes.  
Husband: Do not ask me such questions … I am really not interested in answering 
questions regarding women’s talk. And I don’t want to discuss women. If you 
have questions for me then ask me questions related to men. I have no answers 
to such questions” (husband 2, Dahak VDC).  
 
L.6 Translation and analysis  
The same translator that translated the majority of our interviews with women 
(SwC in Appendix F) translated all interviews with husbands. Translation of the 
husband interviews only finished in August 2016. Due to the limited time frame 
and word count for this thesis, I did not proceed to open-code the husband 
interviews and integrate their codes into my other analyses, but instead read 
the transcripts attentively for salient points that were relevant for my qualitative 
analyses. An in-depth analysis of the husband interviews is planned for after 
completion of my thesis. 
 
